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Oherlad (India)
May 28,
2003
Summary: Editorial argues
that India should change their election system from plurality
(first-past-the-post) to full representation (proportional
representation). The author believes that full representation will
lead to more issues-based campaigns, less nepotism, less distortion
of seats per votes, and greater minority representation.
Oherlad (India)
Defections And Proportional Representation
By Armando S. Pereira
May 28, 2003 Electoral laws need a second look and require drastic
changes to ensure that unfair methods are not adopted by candidates
or party setting them up for an election. The first reform necessary
in our system of elections to the Central and State legislatures is
to replace the first-past-the-post system which we have today by
proportional representation (PR). The existing system of elections,
i.e. single-member constituency, one elector one vote, and the
election by simple majority gives greater importance to the
individual candidate than the political party. On the other side,
elections are not an exercise in choice among various political
party programmes. The so-called merits of the candidates assume a
decisive role in elections. Elections become personality-oriented
instead of being issue-oriented. Another salient flaw in our
present electoral system is that political parties, instead of
selling their programmes and policies try to measure the
constituency in terms of religions, caste or linguistic arithmetics
and search for candidates who fit in that arithmetic. Consequently,
the parties tend to be a collection of individuals, who can walk in
or walk out of the party at their sweet convenience. Under the
present electoral system, autonomy of politics in a developing
society is not easy to achieve. If parties start with subordination
to the social structure from the very beginning in the hope that
they will be able to manipulate the system in such a way that
primacy of political parties will emerge,this would seem to be an
illusion. The existing electoral system helps in the maintenance of
the superiority of the social structure over the functioning of the
parties. The present electoral system besides diluting party
programme or ideology leads to all sorts of nepotism in the body
politics. The candidate who wins on the basis of his ˆ¢’ǨÀúlocal
qualificationsˆ¢’Ǩ’Ñ¢ keeps busy in bringing public resources for his
con stituency. The voters and supporters think that the success of
their candidate in elections should mean advantages for them and
their constituency. In this sectional competitiveness, the party
becomes secondary. This kind of individualism, not only corrupts the
body politic, but also leads to the development of very loose
loyalties in the party. Another great flaw of the present electoral
system is that there is little relationship between the electoral
performance of a party and its strength< BR>in the Parliament
or the Assembly. An example of this is that the Congress party in
several general elections of Parliament obtained more seats than the
percentage of votes secured by it. This defect can be remedied by
changing the electoral system. Minorities should get due
representation in Parliament, State assemblies and other
representative and local bodies. Absence of representation of
minorities would alienate them from the system. India is a
multi-religious, multi-linguistic an d multi-ethnic society, and is
a home for all sorts of minorities which are scattered throughout
its length and breadth. These minorities should get their due
representation which is not possible under the existing electoral
system. The Indian elite adopted the present electoral system
because of their contact with the British system, and also because
of its simplicity for an illiterate voter. Any complex electoral
system was considered unsuitable for the Indian situation. It was
not reali sed that this system is not meant for complex Indian
social situation. Any formidable minority,ˆ¢’Ǩ’Äù religious or
linguistic ˆ¢’Ǩ’Äù can be a threat to a system if it is not allowed a
share in the governance of the country. There is no equal suffrage
where every single individual does not count for as much as any
other single individual in the community. But it is not only the
minority who suffer. Democracy, thus constituted, does not even
attain its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of g
overnment in all cases to the numerical majority. It does something
different: it gives them to a majority of the majority; who may be,
and often are, but a minority of the whole. All principles are most
effectually tested by extremes cases. Suppose that in a country
governed by equal and universal suffrage, there is a contested
election in every constituency, and every election is carried by a
small majority. The Parliament thus brought together represents
little more than a bare majority of the people. The Parliament
proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a bare
majority of itself. What guarantee is there that these measures
accord with the wishes of the majority of the people? Nearly half
the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, had have no
influence at all in the decision; and the whole of this may be, a
majority of them probably are, hostile to measures, having voted
against those by whom they have been carried. Of the remaining
electors, ne arly half have chosen representatives who, by
supposition voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore,
and not at all improbable, that the opinion which has prevailed was
agreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority of
that portion of it whom the institutions of the country have elected
into a ruling class. If democracy means the certain ascendency of
the majority, there are no means to insuring that by allowing every
individual figure to tell equally in the summ ing up, any minority
left out, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives
the power not to the majority, but to a minority in some other part
of the scale. Proportional representation (PR) with all its
variations, is an attempt to secure a representative assembly
reflecting, with more or less mathematical exactness, the various
divisions in the electorate. The immediate gain for the Indian party
system, if PR is adopted, will be the end of so-called
ˆ¢’ǨÀúdefectionsˆ¢’Ǩ’Ñ¢ which has posed a serious threat to the stability
of political parties. Further, the phenomenon of `independentˆ¢’Ǩ’Ñ¢
candidates, with wavering loyalties, will come to an end. The
strength of the Indian political system will depend on the strength
of party system; and it is essential to opt for an electoral system
which helps in the strengthening of the party system. Proportional
representation with list system seems to be better than the
prevailing simple-majority system. Opponents of PR argue that it
leads to multiplication of parties, accentuates splits and
encourages oligarchical tendencies in parties which use the lists
system as a handle to enforce the principles of superior-subordinate
relationship in a party. In reply to such a reasoning, it may be
stated that PR or any electoral system cannot accentuate social
conflicts or results in the multiplicity of parties. Polarisation or
depolarisation of party politics is not contingent upon the
electoral system alone. Regarding oligarc hical trends in a party,
PR is not wholly responsible for them. Even countries with
simple-majority systems have well-organised and disciplined party
systems. After examining the impact of PR system, it is necessary
to dilate on its impact on the governance of the country. PR is
helpful in ensuring the representation of all social interests in
the Parliament or assemblies. The charge that PR results into
unstable governments is not tenable. Coalition governments in India
have not come into existence because of PR, but with the opposite
electoral system. Any electoral system can result into coalition
governments. The difference which PR makes is that the coalitions
are of parties and not of individual defectors, who have brought bad
name to the coalition experience in India. It is easy for parties to
coalesce than amorphous individuals or unattached members of
legislatures. Some coalition governments remained unstable in the
Indian States, not because of inter-party factiona lism and
unprincipled support of Independent legislators. PR helps in
securing better governance for the country because governments under
it are party governments, and sizeable number of voters in the
country know that their votes have brought these parties together.
British politicians have held that PR must necessarily lead to
coalition and, therefore, to weak governments. Most British parties
maintain this view because it has so far suited their objectives and
aims. But, in almost all other democratic systems of government of
European countries the members of Parliament are elected through PR
system and these governments function pretty well, avoiding the
violent and harmful swings of policy that have characterised Britain
in recent times. Now, to sum up it can be pointed out that after
five decades of functioning with universal adult franchise, the need
for strengthening party organisation for the governance of the
country should be clearly recognised. It should be also realized
that minorities have to be brought in the system, otherwise they
lose faith and pose a threat to the system. Diversity is the essence
of India, and it should get representation in the corridors of
power. A simple majority system cannot take care of minority
representation. PR can achieve the twin objectives of involving
minorities, hitherto largely unrepresented in the governance of the
country and making parties play their fair, just and due role in the
body politic of the country. |
