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Eurasianet.org
February 3,
2003
Summary:
This article discusses the
political effects of a referendum passed in 2002, which eliminates
full representation from Azerbaijan national government, and
thus decreases the ability of dissenting parties to participate in
government. It also provides extensive background on the history of
political parties in Azerbaijan since independence.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav020303.shtml
Little to lose:
opposition in Azerbaijan
by Daan van der Schriek
February 3, 2003. Azerbaijani domestic politics
are characterized by increasingly limited pluralism, as President
Heidar Aliyev’Äôs administration exerts a dominating influence over
both mass media and grassroots activity. In addition, opposition
parties are hampered by their own limitations. The referendum of
August 24, 2002 ’Äì labeled by opposition partisans and international
observers alike as flawed ’Äì has served to curtail the ability of
Aliyev’Äôs domestic critics to participate in politics. It has altered
the system for parliamentary elections from one of partial
proportional representation (which gives some voice to the typically
smaller opposition parties) to an exclusively majoritarian (’Äúfirst
past the post’Äù) system. This new structure provides an additional
advantage to the well-financed and larger pro-government parties.
The referendum has also made it possible for the elderly Aliyev to
appoint a temporary successor should he be unable to continue
fulfilling his duties as president. This chosen substitute would be
well positioned to win an election for the vacated post. Political
analysts say this may offer Aliyev an opportunity to engineer his
own political succession, installing his son, Ilham, as president
after he leaves the political stage. Ultimately, the new system may
end up encouraging a greater level of protest outside the extant
political framework. Some political observers believe 2003 could be
a turbulent year for Azerbaijan, with presidential elections
scheduled for October and social unrest on the rise. Although a
host of opposition parties are allowed to operate in Azerbaijan, few
of them have any influence over policy-making. Many political
observers say that opposition parties have yet to formulate a
message that can attract the support of a substantial portion of the
general population. Indeed, opposition parties have had problems
differentiating their policy stances on many issues from those held
by the Aliyev administration. On those issues where substantial
differences exist, the opposition response to government policy has
tended to be to organize protest actions, rather than attempting to
offer proactive alternatives. In addition, opposition parties have
often become entangled in intra-mural squabbles and rivalries. Due
to the government’Äôs attempts to stifle institutional opposition and
the opposition’Äôs own failure to unite and strike a chord with the
Azerbaijani populace, the number of spontaneous protests is likely
to grow in the coming months and years. The diversion of
anti-government sentiment into non-official forms of protest can
already be seen in such events as the violent clashes in the village
of Nardaran in June 2002 (and continuing unrest in the area), the
protests of cadets at Azerbaijan’Äôs main military academy in
September, and other public demonstrations. Fundamental Islamist
sentiment, which offers an outlet for dissent outside of official
structures, may likewise be on the rise. Background Azerbaijan’Äôs
political development since its independence in 1991 is inextricably
linked to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The status of this
Armenian-inhabited enclave inside Azerbaijani territory has long
been a source of discord and tension in the region, and the violence
that flared up during the late Soviet era quickly turned into
full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenians were
victorious, and now control an estimated 15 to 20 percent of
Azerbaijan’Äôs Soviet-era territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The
conflict further created an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 internally
displaced persons in Azerbaijan (with many Azerbaijanis claiming the
figure to be as high as one million). No peace deal has been
concluded since the 1994 cease-fire, and the short-term prospects
for one seem dim. In addition to its massive social and economic
effect, the war had a major impact on Azerbaijani internal politics.
Popular discontent over the handling of the conflict by the
government of former Communist Ayaz Mutalibov led to his ousting in
the spring of 1992, when the main opposition movement, the Popular
Front, took over. Further losses in the war, however, as well as
serious internal problems, led to the subsequent dismissal of the
Popular Front government. This paved the way for the return of
Aliyev, the veteran Communist Party leader of Azerbaijan. Aliyev
succeeded in stabilizing the country, negotiating a truce in the
war, and securing Azerbaijan’Äôs status as an independent state.
Internally, he consolidated his hold over the country in a series of
disputed elections, and his New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) now enjoys a
comfortable majority in parliament. The Azerbaijani President was
not always in such a dominant position. The Popular Front, which can
be regarded as the ancestor of many of today’Äôs opposition parties,
played an important role in the early years of independence. It was
formed in 1989 to promote perestroika in Azerbaijan, but soon became
an umbrella group for a broad spectrum of groups opposed to the
Communist regime. In early 1992, it led the protests against
Mutalibov that forced his resignation. The movement’Äôs chairman,
Abulfaz Elchibey, captured the presidency in June of that year with
60 percent of the vote. However, a series of battlefield setbacks,
beginning with the controversial killing of hundreds of Azerbaijani
soldiers and civilians at Khojaly in February 1992 continued to
erode public confidence in Elchibey’Äôs leadership. One year after
taking power, in June 1993, Elchibey was forced to step down
following a military uprising and nationwide antigovernment
protests. As speaker of parliament, Aliyev became acting president.
Elections later that year made that status permanent, despite the
widespread reporting of irregularities. The Opposition Major
Parties Azerbaijani political parties, according to the more
critical observers, are not necessarily representative of an
association of individuals who share common political values and
objectives. Instead, there is a tendency for them to be patronage
structures centered on powerful, charismatic politicians. In this
respect, opposition parties in Azerbaijan do not differ from the
ruling party. The personality- rather than platform-based style of
politics means that many of those in the opposition have extremely
limited organizational depth and a very narrow support base.
Although approximately 40 parties exist in all, only three of the
opposition groups have local branches throughout the country and a
constituency numerous enough to have any influence. All three owe
their existence largely to the disintegration of the Popular Front.
Popular Front: This movement, which began to take shape prior to
the Soviet collapse, evolved into a large and loosely organized
protest group for any organization opposed to the Communists. It was
the leading political force in the period just before and after
independence, but the forced resignation and internal exile of
Elchibey shattered this dominance in 1993. Afterwards, the Popular
Front lost many leading figures to other parties. Elchibey’Äôs return
from banishment in his home province, the exclave of Nakhichivan, in
October 1997 led to a split in the Popular Front. A younger group
supporting liberal ideas, led by Ali Kerimli, came to dominate,
while a smaller, more traditional group of nationalists remained
clustered around Elchibey. (Upon Elchibey’Äôs death in August 2000,
Mirmahmud Miralioglu took over the leadership of the nationalist
wing.) Attempts to reunite the party have failed; in fact, in 2002 a
second split appeared when a group led by Gudrat Hasanguliyev left
Kerimli’Äôs wing. As its three branches and history of infighting
attest, the Popular Front remains an extremely loose organization.
It finds most of its support in Baku and the isolated Nakhichivan
region, and presently controls six seats of a total 125 in
parliament. New Equality Party (Musavat): Musavat is the
self-proclaimed successor to the pro-Turkish party of the same name
that figured prominently in the first independent Azerbaijani
republic (1918-1920). In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, many of
the present Musavat leaders were members of the Popular Front. They
split with the Popular Front in 1992, originally distinguishing
themselves with an ideological mixture of nationalism, pan-Turkism
and pan-Islamism, but later becoming increasingly moderate and
secular in orientation. Recently Musavat, often described as the
party of Azerbaijan’Äôs intelligentsia, has taken over the Popular
Front's role as the most prominent opposition party. Similar to the
Popular Front, there exist within the party disagreements over
whether to emphasize nationalism or a more Western, liberal stance,
but in this case a split has been avoided. Isa Gambar currently
heads Musavat, which enjoys support in Baku and the country’Äôs
central regions and currently holds two seats in parliament.
Azerbaijan National Independence Party (ANIP): The ANIP's core
constituency is made up of Azerbaijanis who used to live in Armenia.
Its leader, Etibar Mamedov, like Musavat’Äôs Gambar, is a former
Popular Front member. Founded in September 1992 on a platform of
liberal market reforms, the party blames Aliyev for the country’Äôs
widespread poverty. Mamedov, who has at times cooperated with
Aliyev’Äôs regime in return for influence, was nevertheless its
strongest opponent in the 1998 presidential elections. The ANIP has
two deputies in parliament. Democratic Party of Azerbaijan: Exiled
former Chairman of Parliament Rasul Guliyev leads the Democratic
Party. An ally of Aliyev's in the mid-1990's, the two later fell out
and Guliyev joined the opposition. By the late 1990's his party had
attracted a large enough following to be considered one of the key
opposition groupings, although its level of exposure and regional
representation were not on par with the three described above. In
1998, Guliyev was charged with embezzlement and similar crimes and
fled abroad. The party's electoral influence has declined since his
departure, although it is still quite active on the opposition
scene. Cooperation and Disagreement All of the above-mentioned
party leaders at one time or another were members of the Popular
Front and share many of the same political beliefs. Their greatest
disagreement is over which of them is the best-equipped to lead a
united opposition. At times all three parties and other like-minded
factions have proven their ability to work together ’Äì as a rule just
before elections ’Äì but normally such cooperation fades as soon as
the event that brought them together has passed. This lack of
coordination has undoubtedly hurt their electoral chances. More
importantly, perhaps, the infighting has allowed Aliyev to isolate
each party politically and maintain his dominance through a ’Äúdivide
and conquer’Äù approach. An organization called the Democratic
Congress (DC) represents the most durable form of opposition
alliance. Established in 1994, it unites a fluctuating number of
parties ’Äì usually around 10 ’Äì of which the most influential are the
Popular Front and Musavat. Even given such a longstanding multiparty
organization, though, until recently true cooperation remained
elusive. The DC does not present a united party list during
elections, and its small Baku office seems devoted primarily to
exchanging ideas and maintaining informal ties. However, recent
joint statements and rallies by key parties in response to the
August referendum have some observers predicting that opposition
cooperation will continue to rise in the face of increasing pressure
from Aliyev’Äôs administration. The informal coalition set up to
contest the referendum, which is both broader and looser than the
DC, remains intact, issuing a statement on October 9 calling for the
removal of Aliyev from power. Four opposition rallies followed over
the course of October, with high attendance. The core group opposing
the referendum, which has created an Opposition Coordinating Center,
is active on other issues as well, such as the drafting of the new
electoral code. Alone or in cooperation, funding is a perennial
problem for opposition parties. The NAP, as the party of power,
controls a much larger war chest than these groups. There are four
main sources from which the opposition attracts financial support,
explained Leila Yunus of the Azerbaijani NGO Institute of Peace and
Democracy: membership dues, contributions of Azerbaijani businessmen
inside the country, donations from businessmen that reside abroad
and the finances of party leaders themselves. Of all these sources,
Azerbaijani businessmen living abroad are the most significant
contributors. These businessmen often feel excluded from
opportunities in many lucrative domestic sectors, which tend to be
controlled by Aliyev’Äôs relatives and political allies. These
businessmen hope that a change in leadership could provide them with
new commercial openings. Relations with Government Despite such
tension, the main opposition parties agree with the current
government in a number of areas. They all promote a pro-Western
course and champion the extraction of Azerbaijan’Äôs natural resources
as a means of developing the country as a whole. Even here, however,
the DC ’Äúworries about the large compromises that the government made
to foreign [oil] companies.’Äù The DC shares the government’Äôs wariness
of Iran, however. Both fear that Iran might try to foment an
Iranian-style Islamic revolution in the country; Azerbaijan is,
after all, one of the few other Islamic countries in the world with
a Shia majority. Instead of defining themselves as such, however,
both opposition and government see secular Turkey and the United
States as the country’Äôs most important strategic allies.
Similarities aside, opposition parties tend to be considerably more
nationalistic than the government, most notably on the issue of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The DC claims that ’Äúthe humiliating ’Äòpeace’Äô
proposals of the international missions’Äù to solve the problem are
’Äúan unsuccessful result’Äù of the administration’Äôs policies. Taking a
more hard-line stance than the government, the DC proposes offering
the region autonomy ’Äúaccording to European standards,’Äù a concept
that it has yet to define further. Considering the paramount
importance of the Karabakh issue in Azerbaijani politics, existing
policy differences make dialogue between the two sides unlikely,
despite their similarities in other areas. The apparent ballot
manipulation during successive elections by Aliyev’Äôs administration
is another major irritant in opposition-government relations. For
example, Human Rights Watch [for additional information see the
EurasiaNet archives], observing the 2000 parliamentary elections,
reported that local government authorities were engaged in
’Äúwidespread and systematic interference in electoral procedures,
principally by blocking access to the ballot for opposition and
independent candidates in the country’Äôs . . . single-mandate
constituencies.’Äù Furthermore, ’Äúcandidates, their campaign personnel,
and those voters who gave signatures in support of their candidacies
all faced harassment from local government authorities.’Äù Amnesty
International, meanwhile, noted a ’Äúcompletely flawed counting
process.’Äù In addition, some observers say law enforcement and other
government agencies have been utilized by the administration to
intimidate opposition parties. For example, on October 2, 2002,
police stormed the headquarters of the Democratic Party, reportedly
smashing furniture and discarding documents. Only a day earlier, six
Musavat party members had been rounded up for arrest on unclear
charges. The media also comes under significant government
pressure. While there is officially freedom of the press in
Azerbaijan, in practice the government indirectly controls much of
what is broadcast and written in the country, political experts say.
As the National Democratic Institute writes, ’Äúdespite the formal
abolition of censorship in 1998, reporters and the print media
continue to come under pressure. Journalists have been subject to
violence in recent years, and actions by government officials . . .
have fostered an atmosphere of self-censorship.’Äù This was
particularly true in late 2002 and early 2003, as court action
against independent print media increased and broadcast media faced
the prospect of continued state oversight, despite a Council of
Europe-sponsored initiative to encourage less government control.
The government further hinders the opposition by attempting to
attract independent parties or individuals into its camp through
offers of power-sharing or economic incentives. As a local political
analyst explains, the ANIP acted in accordance with the government
for a long period of the 1990’Äôs, and was for a time better funded
than the rest of the cash-strapped opposition. The uneasy alliance
ended during the presidential elections of 1998, as Mamedov,
suspecting that Ilham Aliyev was being groomed to succeed his father
and therefore doubting his own chances, parted ways with the ruling
party and began to campaign in earnest. Future Prospects An
Underrepresented Populace The opposition currently has little to no
impact on Azerbaijan's mainstream politics. Like the government they
oppose, opposition politicians understand the problems of society,
such as a lack of employment and uneven development, but do no
better than the government at proposing constructive means to combat
them. Instead, many opposition leaders give the appearance of
pursuing individual agendas. This struggle leaves a majority of the
population politically alienated, a situation which engenders great
apathy, ’Äúand also a vacuum, which is very dangerous,’Äù as put by
Andreas Gross, one of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe’Äôs (PACE) rapporteurs for the country. This apathy could lead
to a situation in which dissatisfied citizens, alienated from both
government and opposition, decide to circumvent the political
process and take to the street. The riots in the village of Nardaran
beginning in June 2002, prompted by appalling living conditions,
might foreshadow such a development. [For background see the Eurasia
Insight archives]. While some argue that Nardaran is a case apart,
as the village is very close-knit, whose residents have a reputation
for being devoutly Islamic ’Äì giving the government an opportunity to
blame the unrest on Iranian influence ’Äì the fact remains that the
village is the site of ongoing protests that have occurred separate
from the political framework. Another, less explosive demonstration
occurred on October 2, as members of the Union of Baku and Baku
Villages picketed the Interior Ministry and prosecutor's office,
demanding the release of their imprisoned leader. For its part, both
opposition and government failed to anticipate or even adequately
react to these events. External Factors Meanwhile, the United
States seems more concerned with maintaining Azerbaijani stability
than promoting democratic processes. As the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
begins to take form and oil flows at an ever-increasing rate,
Azerbaijan's strategic importance will similarly increase. Some
political analysts believe that, as in many of the countries of
Central Asia, Azerbaijan will become a state in which the commitment
of the United States and other major powers to human and civil
rights becomes secondary to perceived economic and security
interests. Russia and Iran are two other countries that can
possibly have considerable influence over domestic developments.
Relations between Baku and Moscow have improved over the past year,
[for additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives],
although areas of tension remain, including the illegal migration of
Azeris to Russia in search of work. Balancing the often-different
strategic and economic objectives of Russia and the United States in
the Caucasus will remain an ongoing challenge for Azerbaijani
leaders. Forging better ties with Iran is also an important task,
not only in the religious sphere, but also in the economic realm.
Baku and Tehran continue to struggle to find a mutually acceptable
formula for the division of the Caspian Sea [for background see the
Eurasia Insight archives]. A Caspian pact is seen as a key to
ensuring the stable development of regional energy resources.
However, given their strategic interests and history of relations
with the region, both Russia and Iran cannot be expected to push for
significant democratic reform. In contrast, the country’Äôs accession
’Äì together with Armenia ’Äì to the Council of Europe in early 2001
could potentially lead to some encouraging developments. While
Azerbaijan has a long way to go to reach European standards in the
areas of human rights, civil liberties and press freedom, to name a
few, some observers express hope that constructive engagement by
European structures will push Azerbaijan along the road to a truly
representative democracy. So far, however, the Council of Europe's
involvement has been limited to a few key issues, such as advocating
the release of Azerbaijan's political prisoners. Opposition Chances
Given the triple hindrance of administrative obstruction, low
popular support, and a lack of international interest, the chances
for the opposition in future elections seem bleak. This is true even
without considering the constitutional amendments adopted in the
August 2002 referendum. Aliyev has announced that he will run for
the presidency again in 2003, and there is little doubt that he will
win. Once the elderly president has secured another term, the
recently approved amendments to the Constitution allow him to
virtually appoint his successor. The changes stipulate that the
prime minister will take over from the head of state in the case of
the latter’Äôs incapacity or death ’Äì rather than the parliamentary
speaker, as in the past. Most opposition leaders believe Aliyev
will appoint his son Ilham as prime minister. In the event of
Aliyev’Äôs retirement or death, his son would then have a much
smoother road to the presidency if, as acting president, he had
continued control of the governmental bureaucracy, budget and media
outlets. While the opposition may have once hoped to take advantage
of the window of opportunity if Aliyev were to die or become
incapacitated, the August referendum appears to have considerably
limited the chances of ending the family’Äôs dominance over
Azerbaijani politics. With Aliyev making every effort to assure his
continued control of the political playing field, it seems unlikely
that the opposition will be willing to compromise with the
government. Rather, the already significant mistrust between these
groups and the administration will stiffen, as shown by both the
recent crackdowns by the authorities as well as the increased
coordination displayed by the opposition. The ongoing clashes over
a draft elections code underline both these points. The Opposition
Coordinating Center has united in an effort to boycott discussions
of the draft code, on the grounds that the government will not allow
opposition parties to participate on an equal footing. The parties
claim that the proposed law does nothing to address Azerbaijan's
continual problems with electoral corruption and vote-rigging. PACE
has expressed its own concern over the draft code, with rapporteur
Guillermo Martinez Casan stating that if the elections of October
2003 are held under such provisions, the Council of Europe will not
recognize the results. Alternative Protest Alternative forms of
protest and expression are likely to gain ground as more citizens
reject all groups in the traditional political arena, whether
pro-government or opposition. Islam is one such outlet. The
Azerbaijan Islamic Party, which advocated the country's development
through Islamic laws and principles, was banned in 1996. Its leaders
were arrested and accused of espionage for Iran. Despite rumors that
the Iranians helped to fund the organization, it seems likely that
the government was less afraid of Iranian intrigue than of the
appeal of alternative political views to an increasing restive
populace. While according to a 1997 survey only up to 6 percent of
Azerbaijanis consider themselves devout, Islam’Äôs popularity seems to
be rising. During a demonstration in Baku in early 2002, shouts of
’ÄúAllahu Akbar’Äù were heard for the first time since 1989. It is
possible, therefore, that Islamist ideology may become a rallying
point for impoverished Azerbaijanis. However, regardless of the form
political protest takes, the ailing but still powerful Aliyev holds
the key to the riddle of Azerbaijani politics. His abrupt departure
from the scene could potentially lead to widespread destabilization
or the continuation of rule by his son. Indeed, even in the way he
exits from political life, Aliyev seems set to retain the
controlling influence over Azerbaijan’Äôs domestic political life.
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