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Crickey.com.au
January 20, 2004
http://www.crikey.com.au/politics/2004/01/15-0002.html How
Tough is the QLD Question?
By Senator John Cherry, with response from ABC
election analyst Antony Green
January 20, 2004 There is no question that Peter
Beattie���s Labor Government enters the 2004 State Election with a
thumping majority, holding 66 out of 89 seats in the Parliament.
But, the electoral statistics to some extent overplay the
���safeness��� of Labor���s margin due to Queensland���s optional
preferential voting system.
The electoral pendulum published by most media outlets (including
yesterday���s ���Courier Mail���) base the pendulum on the two-party
preferred vote calculated by the Electoral Commission. On this
basis, Labor would lose office with a uniform swing of 9.5%, with
Glasshouse being the 22nd seat to fall.
But the Commission���s data has a flaw in it. It calculates the two
party preferred vote based on the votes left in the count, excluding
those votes that exhausted due to voters not allocating preferences.
As a result of the ���optional preferential��� voting system,
Labor���s winning vote was less than 50% of the formal vote in 14 of
the 22 most marginal seats, as as low as 41.7% in Burdekin where
24.4% of the formal vote exhausted.
Taking Burdekin as an example, Labor���s winning majority of
1648 votes was 55.13% of the remaining two-party preferred vote.
But, to overcome this lead, the Nationals need a swing of just 3.9%
of the total primary vote to win, not the 5.1% shown in the
pendulum. Further, if One Nation and its largely defunct offshoot
the City County Alliance had run a single candidate in Burdekin
instead of two candidates, they would have won the seat with a 6.2%
buffer in 2001. Hervey Bay would also become a line ball seat on
this basis, instead of the misleading 7.6% margin estimated by the
Commission.
If the One Nation votes fell by 5% at this election in favour of the
Nationals, the lower exhausting rate would see the National win
Burdekin with a 0.1% majority, without winning a single extra vote
off Labor. In fact, if the Nationals win a 5% vote switch from One
Nation (which averaged 18% across Queensland in 2001 compared with
3% in the most recent Newspoll and 6% in Morgan poll), the
Labor seats of Noosa, Burleigh, Toowoomba North, Kawana and Burdekin
all shift to the Coalition, with Charters Towers knife edge. That is
without any direct swing from Labor to the Coalition but purely
because of a lower level of conservative exhausted votes.
The elimination of three-cornered contests between the Liberals and
the Nationals also serve to reduce Labor���s margin in Springwood
(from 10.3% to 6.8%) and Glasshouse (9.5% to 5.9%) and to a more
limited extent in Thuringowa.
Finally, the Greens ran in only 8 of the 25 most marginal seats in
2001. The average exhaust rate for the Greens was 43%, with
most of their vote coming direct off Labor. This suggests that if
the Greens run in any of the other 17 marginal seats, assuming a 5%
vote shown in Newspoll/Morgan, they could pare up to 2% off
Labor���s final vote by increasing the number of exhausted vote .
This could affect the outcome in seats like Noosa, Burleigh,
Broadwater, Thuringowa and possibly Kawana where the Greens did not
run last time (if they run this time).
Correcting the pendulum results in the trigger figure falling as
follows for Labor to lose 22 seats:
- ECQ two party preferred figure: 9.5%
- Margins calculated as % of formal vote: 8.2%
- Elimination of Lib/Nat contests: 8.2%
- 5% shift from One Nation to Nats: 7.6%
REVISED ELECTORAL PENDULUM:
|
Two party preferred
|
% Swing of formal vote
|
No three cornered contests
|
5% shift from ONP to Nats
|
|
1. Noosa 0.9%
|
0.9%
|
|
-1.8%
|
|
2. Burleigh 1.7%
|
1.6%
|
|
-0.6%
|
|
3. Burnett 1.7%
|
1.7%
|
|
|
|
4. Toowoomba Nth 1.8%
|
1.7%
|
|
-2.2%
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5. Clayfield 2.0%
|
1.9%
|
|
|
|
6. Charters Towers 2.2%
|
2.0%
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0.1%
|
|
7. Broadwater 2.4%
|
2.4%
|
|
|
|
8. Kawana 2.6%
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2.4%
|
|
-0.3%
|
|
9. Indooroopilly 2.9%
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2.6%
|
|
|
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10. Thuringowa 3.5% (I)
|
3.0%
|
2.4%
|
|
|
11. Aspley
|
4.7%
|
|
|
|
12. Burdekin 5.1%
|
3.9%
|
-5.7% (ON)
|
-0.1%
|
|
13. Mudgeeraba 6.7%
|
5.6%
|
|
|
|
14. Redlands 6.8%
|
6.2%
|
|
4.1%
|
|
15. Ipswich West 7.2% (ON)
|
6.3%
|
4.9% (ON)
|
|
|
16. Barron River 7.2% (I)
|
6.2%
|
|
|
|
17. Gaven 7.5%
|
6.6%
|
|
|
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18. Hervey Bay 7.6% (ON)
|
6.2%
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0.5% (ON)
|
|
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19. Mansfield 8.6%
|
8.2%
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|
|
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20. Mt Ommanney 8.7% (I)
|
8.2%
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|
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21. Townsville 9.3%
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8.8%
|
|
|
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22. Glasshouse 9.5%
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7.6%
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5.9%
|
3.3%
|
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23. Whitsunday 9.5%
|
8.0%
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|
6.3%
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24. Springwood 10.3%
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8.7%
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6.8%
|
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25. Southport 10.8%
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9.7%
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7.6%
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26. Mundingburra 11.4%
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9.8%
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7.5%
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- First figure: Two party preferred vote as calculated by the
ECQ
- Second figure: Vote changes needed calculated as percentage of
formal vote
- Effect of single ONP/CCA or Lib/Nat candidate also indicated, as
well as impact of 5% swing from ONP to Nats. (Negative figure
assumes Non-government majority. Second candidate assumed to be
Coalition unless specified).
- Labor would need to lose 22 seats to lose its majority.
ANTONY GREEN ON JOHN CHERRY AND OPTIONAL PREFERENCE VOTING
ABC election analyst Antony Green responds to John Cherry and
provides his own revised electoral pendulum:
I was interested to read John Cherry's comments yesterday on the
swing need for Peter Beattie to be defeated at the February 7
election. After the slagging off I received from Crikey the other
day, I though a suitable peace offering might be the little
contribution below on optional preferential voting and my own
alternative electoral pendulum for Queensland.
It is without doubt that Labor received a substantial advantage in
2001 from the operation of Optional Preferential Voting (OPV). As
John pointed out, the result in Burdekin was truly remarkable. Labor
polled 36.7% of the primary vote, the three conservative candidates
63.3% between them, but after the distribution of preferences, Labor
won thanks to the high number of exhausted preferences.
Equally remarkable was Hinchinbrook. After the full distribution of
preferences, 7,192 votes elected the National Party's Marcus Rowell,
6,436 chose the One Nation candidate, and 6,713 votes had exhausted
all preferences. 33% of all votes ended up expressing no preference
for either of the two remaining candidates. I think we can call this
the 'none of the above' vote.
For the technically minded, you calculate a percentage by dividing
the numerator by the denominator and multiplying by 100. The
numerator is either the primary or 2-candidate votes, while the
denominator is the formal votes under compulsory preferential voting
(CPV) or the votes remaining in the count under OPV.
Under CPV, your percentage goes up only when preferences are
received, the denominator being fixed at all times. Under OPV, your
percentage also goes up when preferences exhaust, as the denominator
is cut by each exhausted vote. But the key point is, the percentage
vote of all candidates does not go up equally. The percentage of the
candidate with the highest primary vote always goes up fastest with
each exhausted vote. This is why Labor won seats like Burdekin. 58%
of preferences exhausted, and as Labor had the highest primary vote,
its vote was weighted upward.
So can we come up with a measure that removes the exhausted vote
effect. This is effectively to come up with a measure as to what
would have occurred under CPV rather than OPV. The assumption I make
is to take all the votes that did not have preferences, and
distribute them to the two final candidate in the same proportion as
the votes that did have preferences. I think this is a reasonable
approach to take, and is certainly the most defensible assumption
when there is in fact no empirical data to indicate why people
exhaust their votes.
Applying this assumption and calculating the percentages, the
differences between OPV percentage and the CPV estimated percentage
can be seen as the advantage gained by exhausted preferences.
As an example, a hypothetical election of 1,000 votes as follows.
A - 450 (45.0%) / B - 400 (40.0%) / C- 150 (15.0%)
Say of candidate C's votes, 10 had preferences for A, 40 for B and
100 votes exhausted. Before we go and distribute the preferences,
first exclude the 100 exhausted votes and re-calculate the
percentages.
A - 450 (50%) / B - 400 (44.4%) / C - 50 (5.6%)
So you see, A's vote went up 5% (and achieved a majority without
receiving any preferences), while B's rose 4.4%. The percentage of
the candidate with the highest primary count is always boosted in
this way. The leading candidate on primary votes is always advantage
by OPV. (That is unless the majority of exhausted preferences would
otherwise have come to them). The final distribution of preferences
then gives
A - 460 (51.1%) / B - 440 (48.9%)
Now, what if all C's votes had expressed preferences in the same
proportion to those votes that did. Of the 50 votes with
preferences, 10 (20%) had preferences for A. So 20% of all 150 votes
is 30, and by the same reasoning, 120 for B. My CPV estimate for
this election would now be
A - 480 (48.0%) / B - 520 (52.0%)
A very different result. Under OPV, candidate A ended up with 51.1%,
under my CPV estimate, only 48.0%. If I subtract the estimate from
the actual percentage, you get a measure of advantage received from
the operation of OPV, in this case +3.9%.
Now I have done this for all Queensland electorates. Below is the
same table of marginal seats as used by John Cherry. The number on
the left is the ordering on the conventional pendulum. I have
re-ordered the seats according to my CPV estimate, and included an
advantage column.
ANTONY GREEN'S
REVISED ELECTORAL PENDULUM:
|
Two party preferred
|
OPV % Margin
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CPV % Margin
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Advantage to Labor
|
|
12. Burdekin
|
5.1
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-0.8
|
+5.9
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|
10. Thuringowa (v Ind)
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3.5
|
-0.7
|
+4.3
|
|
6. Charters Towers
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2.2
|
-0.2
|
+2.4
|
|
2. Burleigh
|
1.7
|
0.0
|
+1.7
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|
18. Hervey Bay (v ONP)
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7.6
|
0.2
|
+7.4
|
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1. Noosa
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0.9
|
0.8
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+0.1
|
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4. Toowoomba North
|
1.8
|
1.1
|
+0.8
|
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3. Burnett
|
1.7
|
1.7
|
..
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5. Clayfield
|
2.0
|
1.9
|
+0.1
|
|
7. Broadwater
|
2.4
|
2.4
|
..
|
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16. Barron River (v Ind)
|
7.2
|
2.4
|
+4.9
|
|
8. Kawana
|
2.6
|
2.7
|
-0.1
|
|
15. Ipswich West (v ONP)
|
7.2
|
2.9
|
+4.4
|
|
9. Indooroopilly
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2.9
|
3.7
|
-0.8
|
|
14. Redlands
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6.8
|
3.9
|
+3.0
|
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22. Glasshouse
|
9.5
|
3.9
|
+5.7
|
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23. Whitsunday
|
9.5
|
4.0
|
+5.6
|
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11. Aspley
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4.7
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4.7
|
..
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24. Springwood
|
10.3
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4.9
|
+5.5
|
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13. Mudgeeraba
|
6.7
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6.0
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+0.8
|
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20. Mt Ommanney (v Ind)
|
8.7
|
6.3
|
+2.4
|
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17. Gaven
|
7.5
|
6.8
|
+0.8
|
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19. Mansfield
|
8.6
|
7.2
|
+1.4
|
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26. Mundingburra
|
11.4
|
9.2
|
+2.2
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25. Southport
|
10.8
|
8.2
|
+2.6
|
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21. Townsville
|
9.3
|
9.3
|
..
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As you can see, the seats of Burdekin, Thuringowa, Charters Towers
and possibly Burleigh, are in Labor hands in large part because of
optional preferential voting. On this pendulum, the swing for Labor
to lose 22 seats and its majority comes down to 6.8%, and quite a
few seats that are currently on margins above 4% suddenly look much
more marginal.
One thing to be careful of though is to assume too much of the
victory in 2001 was just optional preferential voting. Sure,
Burdekin was a freak result. The same almost occurred in Gympie much
to Labor's amazement. But the seat of Burnett is not that dissimilar
to Burdekin, another mid-north coast sugar seat. Burnett only had
two candidates, so no problem with competing conservative candidate.
Labor romped home to win for the first time since 1909 with an 11%
swing.
There were 16 seats in 2001 where my advantage/disadvantage measure
was greater than 4%. All were seats with competing conservative
candidates. Given a choice with optional preferential voting, voters
expressed a primary vote intention, but then did not give
preferences. If there had been only two candidates, those same
voters would have had no other option except abstention, voting
informal or choosing between Labor and a single conservative
candidate. The evidence from Burnett is that voters may have been
prepared to vote Labor so strong was their anger. At this election,
without competing conservative candidates, it is hard to see some of
the 2001 results being repeated.
Another warning to take from the above table is in the entry for
Indooroopilly. Labor was disadvantaged there. While Labor led on the
primary votes, it's majority was then built on Green and Democrat
preferences. Overall Labor won 62.4% of preferences from votes with
preferences, but just over a third of all distributed votes
exhausted. If the Greens do well at this election, and their is a
high exhausted rate, then Labor could be the party that suffers from
OPV instead of the the Coalition.
After all, that was one of the problems for Wayne Goss in 1995.
Labor would probably not have had its problems in Mundingburra at
that election, or lost Mulgrave, if the government had not so
alienated Green voters.
Senator Cherry responds to Green���s argument:
���Antony Green's 'revised' electoral pendulum highlights the real
advantage that the optional preferential voting system had for Labor
in 2001 with One Nation cannabalising the Coalition vote.
But, it also highlights the risks for Labor in 2004 with One
Nation's vote in decline and the Greens now contesting upwards of 70
seats, twice the number in 2004.
Simply put, and despite all the rhetoric about Greens preference
deals in today's papers, Green voters are incredibly ill-disciplined
when it comes to preference allocations.
In 2001, the Greens directed preferences to Labor in every marginal
seat in Queensland bar two (Greenslopes and Indooroopilly). Yet, in
the six most marginal seats won by Labor which the Greens contested
(Clayfield, Barron River, Glasshouse, Indooroopilly, Gaven,
Mudgerraba and Mt
Ommanney), 65% of Green voters ignored the Greens how to vote card
and only 35% gave their preferences to Labor - 47% allocated no
preferences and 18% gave preferences to the Coalition or others.
Ironically, in Indooroopilly where the Greens didn't allocate
preferences, the flow to Labor was stronger (52%) and the exhaust
rate was lower (28%) than the seats where they did.
Thus the decision by the Greens to double the number of candidates
they contest is likely to cost Labor around 2-3% of the two party
preferred vote in every seat the Greens contest even if the Greens
decide (as they usually do) to direct preferences to Labor. On the
other hand, their poll results (4% in the latest Morgan and Newpoll)
suggest that the Green vote is not that much moved from the 2001
result.
Labor is still deciding whether to run its 'just vote one' campaign
again at this election. But it is likely that regardless of the
campaign, many Queensland voters will again decide to exhaust their
preferences, which could hurt Labor more than the Coalition in this
election.���
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