Impact
of U.S. Runoff Elections on Racial Minorities and Women:
An
Analysis and Comparison with Instant Runoff Voting
August 2000
by Rob Richie and Caleb
Kleppner
Center for Voting and Democracy
Contents
Overview
Nearly all
southern states use two-round runoff elections for their federal and state
elections and for many of their local elections. Two-round runoffs are
relatively common in other nations (most presidential elections around the
world use runoffs) and for local elections in other parts of the country,
but no states outside the South (and some bordering states like Oklahoma
and Texas) use runoffs for federal and statewide primaries. Given the
looming factor of race in voting patterns in the South and the fact that
runoff elections by definition help those in the majority, there have been
understandable concerns about the impact of runoffs in the South. Several
challenges have been brought under the Voting Rights Act, while some
states have debated and made changes in recent years.
This memo
summarizes findings from a 1991 book, Runoffs Elections in the United
States, by Charles Bullock and Loch Johnson. This book is the most
comprehensive assessment that we have found of runoffs in the United
States, although at the same time, Bullock was a witness for the state of
Georgia when it defended its runoff system in a voting rights challenge.
We report Bullock and Johnson's findings on who wins runoff elections, how
runoffs affect voter turnout and how runoffs affect the election of racial
minorities and women. We also summarize Bullock and Johnson's discussion
of three legal challenges to runoffs on voting rights grounds.
Given that there
does seem to have been an adverse impact on black candidacies and women in
some runoff elections, we then explore the possible differences between
the use of two-round runoffs and a one-round "instant runoff."
Both approaches can increase the threshold of support necessary to win, as
opposed to plurality elections that set no threshold (but where a
candidate stills needs a majority to be sure of winning), but instant
runoff may be better for racial minorities due to factors involving
campaign costs, voter turnout and racial polarization. We also contrast
instant runoff voting with plurality voting, looking in particular to
vote-splitting that can occur with plurality voting if "too
many" candidates run and, correspondingly, the issue of suppression
of potential good candidacies in plurality systems to avoid such splitting
of the vote by "spoilers."
Finally, we
present the results from primary runoffs in several black-majority
congressional districts in 1992 -- ones that all worked to the advantage
of black candidates -- and summarize recent interest in instant runoff
voting around the country.
Description
of Data Used in Analysis
The bulk of the
data in the Bullock/Johnson book consists of the results of 1,222 primary
runoffs for state legislative, federal and statewide offices from
1970-1986 in the ten southern states that use primary runoffs and for
which election data was available. The states were: Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina and Texas. The authors also analyzed data from a 1953 study on
runoff primaries from 1920-1948 and studies on black and female candidate
success in local runoff elections. Note that all of this data is
relatively old; more recent analyses would be helpful, given partisan
shifts in the South -- particularly in congressional elections -- in the
last decade.
Factors
Affecting Frequency of Runoffs in Southern Primaries
Summary:
Runoff elections generally are infrequent, but the frequency rises
dramatically in open seat elections, in elections with more than two
candidates and in statewide elections.
Frequency of
runoffs and number of candidates: Between 1970 and 1986, 10% of the
partisan primaries that were studied resulted in a runoff, with little
variation by state or little change over time. Fully a quarter of all
contested primaries resulted in runoffs (176 out of 717 primaries). Note
that because many of these contested primaries only had two candidates (in
which a runoff election only could be a triggered by a write-in
candidacy), the percentage of primaries resulting in runoffs likely was
substantially higher than 25% in those primaries contested by three or
more candidates.
Frequency of
runoffs and open seats: Open seats were much more likely to require
runoffs than seats in which incumbents sought reelection. Nearly 41% of
open seats resulted in runoffs (107 of 262 races), while only 4% of races
with incumbents led to runoffs (69 of 1,632 races).
Frequency of
runoffs and prestige of office: Bullock and Johnson found that the
competitiveness of nominations was related to the prestige of the office:
higher-level offices had runoffs more frequently. Runoffs were required in
34% of governor's nominations (34 of 100 races), 24% of U.S. Senate
nominations (24 of 102), and only 7% of U.S. House nominations (118 of
1,1672).
Factors
Affecting Who Wins Runoffs: First-Round Results and Incumbency
Summary:
The first-round leader had a significant edge in runoffs, but this edge
was smaller in elections for more prestigious offices. Even though
incumbents still won most runoffs, there was modest anti-incumbent bias in
runoffs. This bias may have been more pronounced in local elections,
although data was limited.
First-round
results and runoff success in primaries: The first-round leader won
the nomination 70% of the time in partisan primaries. This tendency varied
little among states, but it did vary according to office. The more
prestigious the office, the less impact that the first-round results had
on the runoff: 54% of first-round leaders won in U.S. Senate primaries,
56% in primaries for governor, 61% for primaries for lieutenant governor
and over 70% for primaries for other statewide offices, state legislature
and U.S. representative. Note that in primaries for U.S. Senate and
governor, the first-round result almost had no bearing on who won -- the
second-place finisher won four of every nine primary runoffs in these
elections.
Incumbency and
runoff success: There was a modest anti-incumbent bias in runoff
elections. Incumbents who led after the first-round went on to win the
nomination two-thirds of the time (65%), while non-incumbent first-round
leaders won in three-quarters of the runoffs (74%). This difference was
affected only slightly by the fact that incumbents are more likely to be
forced into runoffs in the more prestigious offices. (The authors found
253 primaries in which incumbents were forced into primary runoffs; 19
were for statewide and U.S. House races.)
Local elections:
The data set used by Bullock and Johnson was very small for local
elections, but their limited information indicated that the anti-incumbent
bias may have been higher in local elections. In Dallas, Fort Worth and
San Antonio, incumbents won only two of six runoffs (33%).
Civic leaders in
Los Angeles have reported a similar pattern to our Center. Their
impression is that incumbents who lose typically lose in a runoff after
leading the first round. In San Francisco, on the other hand, the
first-round leader has won every single runoff for the past 25 years (from
1974 to 1999) -- in 14 runoffs for mayor, district attorney and the Board
of Supervisors. These San Francisco victors have included both winning and
losing incumbents.
Effect
of Runoffs and Plurality Elections on Voting Behavior and Candidacies
Compared to
plurality elections, runoff elections seem to give more candidates an
incentive to run, even if these candidates may not expect to win.
Candidates can win plurality elections with a smaller threshold (although
they can't be sure of winning unless they can achieving a majority of the
vote), but on the other hand, groupings of voters can fear splitting their
vote among too many candidates or "wasting" their vote on a
candidate they believe cannot win. Given that the runoff mechanism lessens
concerns about "spoilers" (unless spoiling is defined as forcing
a runoff), an increase in candidacies is not surprising. Runoffs also give
more voters an incentive to vote for their favorite candidate in the first
round rather than casting a strategic vote for a frontrunner. As a result,
Bullock and Johnson conclude that more serious candidates run in
jurisdictions that use runoffs than in places that use plurality
elections. They write:
"In crowded
fields under majority-vote rule, some voters will support their
most-preferred candidate in the initial balloting, even if they foresee
little likelihood of this individual winning. The vote does this in the
expectation of a second primary, in which it will be possible to support
the successful candidate. Without the possibility of a second primary, a
larger share of the electoral is likely to line up behind on of the top
two candidates rather than waste a vote on a contender who has little
prospect of prevailing in the primary. In support of this proposition,
Bradley Canon has shown that plurality states tend to have fewer serious
candidates - defined in terms of the share of the vote received than do
states in which a runoff is possible." (p. 105, Runoffs Elections in
the United States)
Voter
Turnout in Runoffs
Voter turnout
generally declines between the first-round of a primary runoff and the
second round. Voter turnout declined in 67% of all state and federal
runoffs, with the decline being particularly steep for runoffs for
low-profile offices. The party, race and gender of candidates seems to
have an impact on turnout. The authors conclude that the impact of
candidate race and gender is too small to indicate that voters flock to
the polls to help elect or defeat black or female candidates, but we will
seek to study this question more thoroughly.
Decline in
runoff turnout and level of election: The declines in voter turnout
between the first-round and the second-round runoff was particularly steep
in runoffs for some lower-profile offices, but there also were some
surprises among prestigious offices such as congressional races. In races
for governor, lieutenant governor, state senate and state house, turnout
increased over the first-round primary in about a third (ranging from 31%
to 38%) of the runoffs. For elections for other statewide executive
offices, for the U.S. Senate and for the U.S. House, turnout increased in
fewer races: about 20% in those categories. The authors theorize that
turnout goes up less frequently in congressional races due to personal
contact, but that does not seem entirely persuasive. (Note: the number of
races under consideration is low for the Senate races: there was data from
only 24 U.S. senate primary runoffs, compared to data from more than 1,000
state legislative runoffs.)
Turnout and
party of candidates: Democratic primaries had higher turnout in
runoffs than Republican primaries, with runoffs in Democratic primaries
averaging 96% of first-round turnout compared to 75% for Republican
primaries. This difference perhaps could be tied to Democratic primaries
likely being seen as more decisive for determining who would win the
office in the general election; Democrats in this period dominated most
southern elections.
Turnout and
race of candidates: The race of candidates also appear to affect
runoff turnout. Bullock and Johnson write, "Contests involving black
candidates tended to stimulate greater participation than did all-white
runoffs." (p. 148). When a black candidate is in the runoff, for
example, turnout increased in the runoff more frequently than when the
runoff is all-white (55% of races with a black candidate, compared to 33%
for all-white runoffs).
Turnout tended to
rise more often when whites beat blacks in runoffs than when blacks beat
whites. When whites defeated blacks in runoffs (as happened in 27
instances), turnout rose in 64% of the races and averaged 103% of the
first-round turnout. When blacks defeated whites (as happened in 11
instances), turnout rose in 44% of the races and averaged 90% of the
first-round turnout. Cause and effect are unclear and merit further
examination. Turnout and gender of candidates: The turnout in male-female
runoffs is similar to that in male-male runoffs. When women candidates
won, turnout increased in 37% of the races, and turnout averaged 90% of
the first-round turnout. When men won, turnout increased in fewer races
(30%) but on average was higher (97% of first-round turnout).
Runoffs
and Race of Candidates
Summary:
The authors present mixed evidence on the impact of runoffs on black
electoral success. On one hand, they conclude that the presence of a
runoff requirement in local elections has no effect on the percentage of
city councilors who are black. On the other, whites were much more likely
to win runoffs between black and white candidates in primaries for both
state and local offices. The success of black candidates in U.S. House
primary runoffs in black-majority districts suggests that this may be
linked more to the question of whether blacks or whites are a majority in
the primary electorate rather than the demands of winning a runoff
election. As Julian Bond, NAACP chair and former Georgia legislator, once
wrote: "The runoff actually discriminates against the numerical
minority, black or white, in elections in which there is racial
polarization."
Black
candidates in state and federal primary runoffs: In primary elections
for state and federal office, white candidates won runoffs between black
and white candidates far more frequently than black candidates won in
these white-black runoffs. 90% (18 of 20) of white candidates who led in
the first round went onto win the nomination, while only 50% (9 of 18) of
black candidates who led the first round won the runoff. In these 38
instances of white-black runoffs, black candidates would have won 18 times
under plurality rules, but won only 11 times with runoffs. (Note. Of the
black primary leaders, two were running for statewide office.)
In contrast, in
runoffs between candidates of the same race, first-round leaders in
all-white and all-black primary runoffs won at very similar rates: 70% and
71%, respectively.
Although the
number of black-white runoff cases is small, these findings support the
contention that runoffs are racially discriminatory. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the discriminatory effect diminished from the 1970s to the
1980s, and Bullock and Johnson conclude that there is insufficient data to
know why the elections rates of white and black first-round leaders
differ. The trends over time need to be analyzed more vigorously, and
updated as best as possible with data from the 1990s, when there were far
more black-majority state and congressional legislative districts (see the
appendix for initial findings that indicate black candidates were assisted
by runoff elections in black-majority districts).
Black
candidates in local election runoffs: According to Bullock and
Johnson, "blacks were as likely to serve on city councils in
majority-vote cities as in plurality cities." (p. 117) They also
point out that the percentage of black city councilors is greater in the
West and Midwest in cities with runoffs than in cities using plurality.
(They do not mention the relative voting-age population of different
racial groups in these cities, however -- important information to have,
given the bias that runoffs give to whichever side is in the majority.)
Evidence from
Georgia counties paints a similar picture about black-white runoffs as
with state and federal primary elections, however. Black candidates who
led in the first round won only 50% of the time against white candidates,
but white candidates who led in the first round won 84% of the runoffs
against black candidates.
Runoffs
and Gender of Candidates
Summary:
Nationally, the presence of a runoff requirement generally does not affect
the percentage of women in local elections, but the evidence is more mixed
for state elections and, based on a relatively few instances, runoffs have
had a clear adverse impact against women candidates in runoffs for the
most prestigious offices.
Women
candidates in primary runoffs: In runoffs in all primary elections,
women who lead men after the first round generally win (72% of time). They
win less frequently than men who lead women (who win 82% of the time), but
more frequently than men who lead men (who win 67% of the time). If a
woman has a strong lead after the first round (defined as having won at
least 40% of the first-round vote and leading by 5% or more), they win
about the same rate as men -- 86%. It is the "weak" first-round
leaders among women who do not do as well as "weak" male
first-round leaders -- winning 61% of runoffs against men compared to the
"weak" male first-round leaders winning 80% of their runoffs
against women.
But women have won
nominations far less frequently than men in elections to the most
prestigious offices and when women trail after the first round. Only 29%
of women who led primaries for statewide office went on to win the
nomination (two of seven races) and in only three cases out of twenty-one
did women overcome second place finishes for statewide, U.S. House and
state senate races. In races for the state house, women overcame second
place finishes more frequently, 12 of 66 races (18%).
In spite of these
apparently clear differences, Bullock and Johnson conclude, "Contrary
to conventional wisdom, no evidence exists beyond the episodic and
anecdotal that runoffs discriminate against women who win a plurality in
the first-round of a primary. Women who finish second in the first-round,
however, face stiff odds in the runoff election." p. 69 In the wake
of a recent general growth in the number of women in office around the
country, analysis of runoff elections and gender of candidates in the
1990s would be very helpful.
Women in cities
with runoffs: Women make up approximately 20% of city councilors
across the country. Bullock and Johnson report that in the Northeast,
South and West, there either is no difference or more women serve in
cities with runoffs, but in the Midwest, more women serve on city councils
when elected by plurality than runoffs (23% vs. 17%).
Legal
Challenges to Runoffs
Summary:
Bullock and Johnson describe in detail three legal challenges to runoff
elections pursued under the Voting Right Act. The case against runoffs has
been persuasive to several judges, but no challenge ultimately has
succeeded. Their discussion of the concerns raised by candidates of color
in New York City provide some of the best insights into the possible value
of instant runoff voting as an alternative runoff mechanism.
Butts v. the
City of New York: New York City's runoff primary for mayor: In
1969 a relatively fringe, weak candidate named Mario Proccacino won the
Democratic nomination for mayor with 33% of the vote. Proccacino went on
to lose to incumbent John Lindsay in the general election. The state
legislature and governor then approved a 40% runoff threshold for New York
City's citywide primary nominations. The new law resulted in several
citywide primaries in subsequent elections.
In 1984, in Butts
v. the City of New York, the runoff was challenged in U.S. District Court
on voting rights grounds. One leading plaintiff was Herman Badillo, a
Latino candidate who lost a runoff election in the Democratic primary for
New York City's mayoralty in 1973 (after trailing 34% to 29% in the first
round, Badillo lost 61% to 39% in the runoff against a white candidate).
In the trial, Badillo testified "There are two types of campaigns.
One is a media campaign based on money. The other one is a street campaign
based upon your physical presence in the neighborhoods... The media
campaign can be a short campaign, and that's what the runoff is geared
for... If you are dependent on dinners and cocktail parties [rather than
big individual contributors], by definition a short campaign less than
three weeks would make it very difficult to raise significant amounts of
money."
Bullock and
Johnson commented on Badillo's complaints with runoffs: "The brevity
of the runoff period also encourages last-minute negative campaigning,
claimed critics of the runoff provision. Certainly, anti-Badillo
literature with racist overtones was distributed to voters during the
second primary in 1973, giving him precious little time to refute charges
that he favored quotas in hiring and education and was anti-Jewish. As
Badillo recalled, 'You have the kind of panic that you can set off on a
one-to-one campaign where there is a limited period of time because you
don't have enough time to overcome this, you don't have enough time to
conduct an investigation.'"
In 1985 U.S.
District Court Judge Charles L. Brieant, Jr. ruled against the runoff. He
concluded that, in the presence of racially polarized voting, the runoff
law enhances the effectiveness of negative racial campaign tactics during
a three-week runoff campaign. Since minority candidates tend to have less
access to campaign contributions, they are less able to pay for sufficient
media to respond to racial attacks. This gap in ability to raise funds
thus dilutes their vote. Judge Brieant wrote: "Historical evidence of
past inequality when combined with evidence of lower socioeconomic status
and lower rates of voter registration, supports a finding that a plaintiff
class member has less opportunity to nominate and elect a candidate of
choice under a statute which requires a superplurality in the first-round
(40%), or the burdens associated with running two primary campaigns."
(p. 88)
The city and state
argued on appeal that there had been no racial intent in the adoption of
the runoff; it was simply designed to avoid the nomination of fringe
candidates such as Proccacino. The purpose of the runoff was to encourage
coalition-building and avoidance of the dangers of single-issue voting.
The goal was to elect a candidate who was ideologically and politically
accountable to a broad spectrum of the members of the party. They also
showed that no minority candidate had ever been denied the nomination
after finishing first in the first-round of a primary, and that no black
and Latino state legislators had voted against the bill instituting the
runoff.
In a 2-1 decision,
the U.S. Circuit Court reversed the Butts ruling and reinstated the
runoff. In Judge Oakes' dissent to this decision, he highlighted that no
minority candidate had ever been elected to any office affected by New
York's runoff provision. He argued that the 40% threshold gave minorities
less opportunity to nominate and elect candidates of choice because of the
brevity of the campaign, the estimated half-million dollar expense of the
campaign and the difficulty of responding to racial appeals in such a
short time.
In 1989, black
candidate David Dinkins won the New York City's mayor race without a
change to the runoff law. His success seemingly has quieted challenges to
the runoff law in New York City, but in 2001, there likely will be a
decisive runoff once again in the Democratic primary in the mayor's race.
Note that all of
the factors raised by Judge Oakes, along with several complaints with
runoffs raised by Badillo, would be addressed by instant runoff voting
because it would avoid having to hold a second election.
Whitfield v.
Democratic Party of the State of Arkansas -- Runoffs in
Arkansas primaries: In a 1988 decision, Whitfield v. Democratic
Party of the State of Arkansas, Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele upheld the
use of runoffs in primaries in Arkansas. Unlike in New York City, where no
minority had won the plurality but lost the runoff, there were four
instances in which a black led the first-round of a primary but lost in
the second-round runoff. In addition, no black had been elected to a
countywide office in Phillips County since the turn of the century. To
demonstrate discriminatory intent, plaintiffs pointed to the 1983
enactment of a West Memphis runoff law after a black won the mayor's race
with a plurality.
Judge Eisele
conceded that some legislators may have supported the new law to block the
election of black candidates, but the overall legislative intent was
simply to promote majority rule. He rejected as too speculative the notion
that a black might lead a first-round of primary if the white vote were
split among several candidates but then lose the head-to-head runoff
against a white. Judge Eisele reasoned that reverting to a plurality
nomination might result in fewer candidates running for office.
In a 2-1 panel
decision, the Eighth Circuit Court reversed Whitfield by finding that
runoffs diluted the black vote in primaries in Phillips county, but it
left intact the runoff primaries in the other 74 counties. Supporting the
use of runoff primaries, the dissenting judge argued that the runoff could
provide an incentive for reducing racially polarized voting because
candidates would have to campaign in the runoff to expand their support
and to develop biracial appeals.
The full panel of
the Eighth Circuit deadlocked 5-5 without comment on Whitfield, which had
the effect of vacating the 2-1 decision and restoring the runoff primary
in the one place (Phillips County) in which it had been invalidated.
Jeffers v.
Clinton: Runoff in general elections in Arkansas: In 1990, in
Jeffers v. Clinton, plaintiffs challenged runoffs in general elections in
Arkansas, highlighting four cases involving three cities in which the
legislature approved statutes requiring majority victories after black
candidates won pluralities with less than a majority. The U.S. District
Court of Arkansas upheld the runoff requirement for partisan primaries. It
also ruled on the use of runoffs in general municipal elections, finding
that the intent to discriminate was so convincing that future efforts to
require a majority vote in general elections must be precleared. It did
not, however, throw out any existing runoff requirements.
Instant
Runoff Voting: How it Works and Evidence of Rising Interest
Summary:
Instant runoff voting (IRV) is a one-person, one-vote system that achieves
the goal of runoff elections -- clear support by substantial numbers of
voters - in a single election. Used for national elections in Australia
and Ireland and mayoral elections in London, IRV has recently gained
support in several American states and localities.
How IRV works:
Instant runoff voting (IRV) is a one-person, one-vote system that achieves
the goal of runoff elections -- clear support by substantial numbers of
voters - in a single election. Because it increases voters' choices
without increasing the number of elections, IRV has particular currency in
the United States today -- when simple "either-or" choices are
being replaced with a more complex array of choices in most aspects of
American's lives. As opposed to traditional American elections where
voters cast a vote for just one candidate, IRV allows voters to express a
range of preferences by ranking candidates in order of choice:
"1" for a first choice, "2" for a second
"runoff" choice, "3" for a third choice and so on.
Ballot-counting in
instant runoff voting simulates a series of runoff elections, although
with just one candidate eliminated in each round. If no candidate receives
a majority of first choices, the instant runoff takes place. The last
place candidate (or several candidates, if a minimum level of support is
set) is eliminated. All votes are then recounted, with ballots that listed
the eliminated candidate as a top choice now being counted for whichever
candidate is the next choice on those ballots. This process of eliminating
the last?place candidate and retabulating the votes continues until one
candidate reaches a majority.
Rising interest:
Used for national elections in Australia and Ireland and mayoral elections
in London, IRV has recently gained support in several American states and
localities. Among them:
- Vancouver (WA)
and Santa Clara County (CA): after charter commissions recommended
amending local charters to allow IRV, voters approved the change in
stand-alone ballot measures in 1998 and 1999;
- Vermont: an
impressive coalition supports IRV for statewide elections, including
the Vermont Grange and state branches of Common Cause, PIRG and League
of Women Voters, and IRV legislation has bi-partisan support,
including from Governor Howard Dean;
- Austin (TX): a
charter commission has recommended a stand-alone amendment to enact
IRV for city elections;
- New Mexico: in
1999, the state senate voted to place a constitutional amendment to
enact IRV for all state and federal offices on the ballot, and a more
modest measure to allow IRV for these offices and local elections has
good prospects for passage in 2001;
- Alaska:
legislation to enact IRV for most state and federal offices was
introduced in 1999, and a citizen's initiative with similar provisions
will be on the ballot in 2002 after the legislature has a chance to
act on the measure in 2001.
Contrasting
Instant Runoff Voting and Two-Round Runoffs
Summary:
Two-round runoffs and instant runoff voting (IRV) both establish
thresholds of support necessary to win, but (IRV) ensures that this
threshold will be reached in a single election. Avoidance of a second
round of voting saves candidates and jurisdictions money and is more
likely to produce strong winners. Producing a winner in one election would
seem to have particular benefits for advocates of minority voting rights.
General
comparisons: Two-round runoffs and instant runoff voting (IRV) both
establish thresholds of support necessary to win, but IRV ensures that
this threshold will be reached in a single election. Avoidance of a second
round of voting has several benefits. Among them:
1) Campaign
finance reform: IRV makes candidates less reliant on wealthy
contributors. Candidates in runoffs -- particularly in large
jurisdictions -- typically must raise substantial money for a second
campaign. They often have little time between rounds of election, giving
an advantage to candidates who can raise large amounts of money quickly.
2) Lower
election administration costs: IRV saves jurisdictions money on
election administration because they do not have to conduct two rounds
of election. Holding a statewide runoff election in North Carolina costs
taxpayers nearly $4 million. Citywide runoff elections cost taxpayers
close to $10 million. Many jurisdictions may need to incur a one-time
cost in adapting voting machines to what is required for conducting IRV
elections, but after that change, will have no additional costs.
3) Election
of stronger winners: IRV is more effective in producing the goal of
strong winners. First, IRV ensures the decisive election occurs when
turnout is highest. In two-round runoffs, turnout in the second round
often is much lower than in the first round. (In one dramatic example,
turnout dropped in half in Georgia's U.S. Senate race from the general
election in November 1992 to the runoff election in December 1992. In
addition, candidates must more clearly appeal to the supporters of
eliminated candidates, as these supporters might not return to vote in a
runoff -- in party primaries, having this broader appeal is all the more
important for general election success.
Voting rights
and IRV: There are three areas where IRV would seem to be preferable
to two-round runoffs for advocates of minority voting rights, even if the
threshold of support to win is the same.
1) Campaign
finance: Racial minorities and candidates with strong support among
racial minorities generally are less likely to have access to funds for
campaigns, particularly under time pressure associated with runoffs. As
Herman Badillo testified in the New York City Butts case (see above),
"If you are dependent on dinners and cocktail parties [rather than
big individual contributors], by definition a short campaign less than
three weeks would make it very difficult to raise significant amounts of
money."
Bullock and
Johnson provide two additional relevant quotes (page 103). Victor McTeer,
a Mississippi attorney, testified before a House Judiciary subcommittee
in 1985 that: "When poor black candidates are required to finance
two campaigns rather than one, get out the vote twice rather than once,
aid and provide illiterate black voters with voting assistance on two
occasions rather than one, the resulting drain of finances and other
resources makes the dual primary a real threat to equal participation in
both party and general electoral politics."
Michael Thurmond,
a black member of the Georgia Assembly, in the same hearing testified
against runoffs on similar grounds: "Elections under the runoff
provision are like a gun fight at the OK-Corral. By the time you shoot
your way through the first election, you're all out of ammunition --
with another election to go just for the nomination!"
2) Voter
turnout: The disparity in turnout between the first and second round
of a runoff could also have an adverse impact on the chances of
candidates with the backing of racial minorities, at least under certain
circumstances. The clearest case would be when a higher-profile,
up-ballot race drew minority voters who may not return to the polls for
a second round. The U.S. Senate runoff in Georgia provides a good
example. In November 1992, Democrat Bill Clinton had a narrow win in
Georgia, but Democratic incumbent senator Wyche Fowler fell just short
of winning 50%. In the December turnout, Republican Paul Coverdell won,
even though his vote total was barely half that it had been in November.
In 1996, Harvey Gantt won a contested U.S. Democratic primary in the
first round in North Carolina, thanked in large part to a high turnout
among black voters. Any minority-backed candidates in down-ballot races
who were forced into runoffs were affected by the lower turnout of black
voters in the second round -- among candidates who lost in the second
round after stronger first-round performances were a black woman running
for secretary of state and a Native American running for a U.S. House
nomination.
The impact of
turnout differential should be studied more exhaustively before reaching
definitive conclusions about its impact on minority candidates. For
example, lower turnout in the second round could work to the advantage
of minority-backed candidates in jurisdictions where racial minorities
have a strong grassroots organization.
3) Polarizing
campaigns: IRV creates more obvious incentives to build electoral
coalitions that can cross racial lines. These incentives have been
recognized internationally. For example, Bosnia will use IRV for the
first time in its next presidential election, with the goal of
encouraging coalition-building in an ethnically divided nation. There is
anecdotal evidence that campaigns in southern runoffs between white and
black candidates can become more racially polarized than might occur if
the elections took place in one round.
Imagine, for
example, an election for sheriff with one black candidate and two white
candidates in which it wasn't clear that a candidate would reach the
required threshold based on first-choice votes alone. If the black
candidate were to finish third, the second choices of that candidate's
supporters would determine which white candidate won. White candidates
would necessarily need to curb racial appeals.
In fact, there
was just such a combination of candidates in New York City's Democratic
mayoral primary in 1997, but under the dynamics of a traditional runoff
election, eventual winner Rush Messinger did little to reach out to
supporters of black candidate Al Sharpton. This failure contributed to a
very low black turnout in her general election defeat against Republican
Rudolph Giuliani. (The black share of the general election electorate in
New York City fell from 27% in 1993 to 22% in 1997.)
Bullock and
Johnson's comments in relation to the New York City Butts case (see
above) are pertinent. They write that: "Certainly, anti-Badillo
literature with racist overtones was distributed to voters during the
second primary in 1973, giving him precious little time to refute
charges that he favored quotas in hiring and education and was
anti-Jewish. As Badillo recalled, 'you have the kind of panic that you
can set off on a one-to-one campaign where there is a limited period of
time.'"
References
Bullock, Charles
S., III and Loch K. Johnson. Runoffs Elections in the United States
(1991, University of North Carolina Press)
Works cited by
Bullock/Johnson
Ewing, Cortez
A.M. 1980. Primary Elections in the South: a Study in Uniparty Politics.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953. Reprint. Westport, CT:
Greenwood.
Bullock, Charles
S., III and Susan A. MacManus. 1991. "Municipal Electoral Structure
and the Election of Councilwomen." Journal of Politics 53:76-89.
Bullock, Charles
S., III and A. Brock Smith. 1990. "Black Success in Local Runoff
Elections." Journal of Politics 52:1205-22.
Blacks
and Electoral Success in Congressional Runoffs and Elections in the 1990s
Every
black-majority congressional district now has a black representative,
including all those with runoff primaries, except for Pennsylvania's first
Congressional District (CD-1), where white candidate Robert Brady won with
74% in his initial election. In 1992 there were several noteworthy cases
where black candidates won runoffs in congressional primaries in newly
created black-majority districts, sometimes after trailing white
candidates in the first round. Black candidates won every black-white
runoff in Democratic primaries in black-majority districts, including
three nominations in which white candidates won a plurality in the first
round.
1992 runoff
primaries between black and white candidates: Following is a report on
all black-white runoffs in Democratic primaries in black-majority
congressional districts in 1992. Black candidates were successful in each
of these runoff, and every black candidate improved their performance over
the first round.
- In Florida
CD-23, Alcee Hastings trailed white opponent Lois Frankel 35% - 28%
after the first round, but won 58% - 42% in the runoff.
- In North
Carolina CD-1, Eva Clayton trailed white opponent Walter Jones 38% -
31% in the first round, but won 55% - 45% in the runoff.
- In Georgia
CD-2, Sanford Bishop trailed white incumbent Charles Hatcher 40% - 21%
in the first round, but won 53% - 47% in the runoff.
- In Georgia,
CD-11, Cynthia McKinney led her white opponent George DeLoach 31%-25%
in the first round and increased her margin in the runoff, winning
56%-44%.
- In Florida
CD-3, Corrine Brown comfortably won her runoff against white opponent
Andrew Johnson 64%-36% after leading 43%-31% in the first round.
Runoffs between
black candidates in 1992:
There were two runoffs in black-majority districts between two black
candidates.
- In Alabama
CD-7, Earl Hilliard defeated Hank Sanders 50%-50% (a 700-vote margin)
after leading 31%-24% in the first round. Turnout dropped
significantly; Hilliard had fewer votes in the second round than he
won in the first round.
- In Louisiana
CD-4, Cleo Fields won 74%-26% in a general election runoff against
Charles Jones (apparently black, although unclear in our source) after
leading in the first round 48%-14%.
1993 special
election: In 1993, there was a special election for Mike Espy's seat
in Mississippi CD-2. A blanket primary was held instead of partisan
primaries. In a general election runoff with white Republican Hayes Dent,
Bennie Thompson won 55%-45% in the runoff after trailing 34% to 29% after
the first round.
Reviewing black
electoral success in congressional elections: It is likely that if
primary runoffs had been used in all federal and gubernatorial primaries,
black representation would not be lower than today. Even though nearly all
of these offices outside the south are elected with plurality rules in
primaries, no U.S. Senator or governor is black or Latino, and only three
U.S. House Members are African-Americans who first were elected in
white-majority districts. Those three black Members of Congress are Julia
Carson (IN), Barbara Lee (CA) and J.C. Watts (OK). Lee won a comfortable
majority in her initial primary win in 1998. Carson won her initial
primary in 1996 over a white opponent by a plurality -- winning 49% to 31%
-- but with enough support to indicate that she likely would have won in a
runoff. Republican Watts narrowly won a runoff in his initial primary in
1994 after leading 49% - 35% in the first round.
Race
and Gender in Runoffs: Tables
From: Bullock and
Johnson, Runoff elections in the United States (1991)
Table 2.16
Success Rate for Women in Runoffs: Controlling for First-Round Finish
in Primaries and Level of Office, 1970-1986 (Number of Cases in
Parenthesis)
Office |
First in 1st Round |
Second in 1st Round |
Statewide |
29%
(2 of 7)
|
0%
(0 of 7)
|
U.S. House |
63%
(5 of 8)
|
50%
(2 of 4)
|
State Senate |
90%
(9 of 10)
|
10%
(1 of 10)
|
State House |
76%
(41 of 54)
|
18%
(12 of 66)
|
Total |
72%
(57 of 79)
|
17%
(15 of 87)
|
Table 4.1
Success Rate of Blacks in Runoffs: Success of First-Round Leaders in
Primary Runoffs (controlling for race), 1970-1986
Race of Candidates |
Won |
Lost |
Number |
All white |
70% |
30% |
1,162 |
Black and white |
71% |
29% |
38 |
Black led
|
50% |
50% |
18 |
White led
|
90% |
10% |
20 |
All black |
71% |
29% |
21 |
Notes:
- Because of the
small number of blacks in runoffs for higher office, the authors did
not report on the relationship of the office to the black success in
runoffs.
- The pattern is
similar in local Georgia runoffs: in black-white runoffs, blacks who
led the primary won 50% of the 36 races and white primary leaders won
84% of 37 races.
Quotes
about Runoffs and Minority Candidacies and Representation (from
Bullock/Johnson)
Julian Bond, NAACP
chair and former Georgia legislator, wrote: "The runoff actually
discriminates against the numerical minority, black or white, in elections
in which there is racial polarization." p. 73
Harold Stanley
wrote that black candidates might "split the black vote and allow a
white candidate to gain a plurality nomination." p. 73
Referring to
majority black districts, the (unnamed) chair of the black caucus in South
Carolina state house said, "Things have changed [since
reapportionment and black districts] so that runoffs now can work in our
favor." p. 73
Herman Badillo, a
Latino candidate who lost a runoff election in New York City's mayoral
race in 1973 61%-39% after trailing 34%-29% in the first round, in
testimony in the 1984 case against runoffs (detailed below): "There
are two types of campaigns. One is a media campaign based on money. The
other one is a street campaign based upon your physical presence in the
neighborhoods... The media campaign can be a short campaign, and that's
what the runoff is geared for... If you are dependent on dinners and
cocktail parties [rather than big individual contributors], by definition
a short campaign less than three weeks would make it very difficult to
raise significant amounts of money." pp. 85-86
Bullock
and Johnson, commenting on Badillo's complaints with runoffs: "The
brevity of the runoff period also encourages last-minute negative
campaigning, claimed critics of the runoff provision. Certainly, anti-Badillo
literature with racist overtones was distributed to voters during the
second primary in 1973, giving him precious little time to refute charges
that he favored quotas in hiring and education and was anti-Jewish. As
Badillo recalled, 'you have the kind of panic that you can set off on a
one-to-one campaign where there is a limited period of time because you
don't have enough time to overcome this, you don't have enough time to
conduct an investigation.'" p. 86
Victor McTeer, a
Mississippi attorney in testimony before a House Judiciary subcommittee in
1985: "When poor black candidates are required to finance two
campaigns rather than one, get out the vote twice rather than once, aid
and provide illiterate black voters with voting assistance on two
occasions rather than one, the resulting drain of finances and other
resources makes the dual primary a real threat to equal participation in
both party and general electoral politics." p. 103
Michael Thurmond,
a black member of the Georgia Assembly, testifying against runoffs on
similar grounds: "Elections under the runoff provision are like a gun
fight at the OK-Corral. By the time you shoot your way through the first
election, you're all out of ammunition -- with another election to go just
for the nomination!" p. 103
Bullock and
Johnson: "It is true that a greater number of blacks members of
Congress have been elected from states without a runoff; however, in both
runoff and non-runoff states, election to the U.S. House of
Representatives seems to hinge primarily on the existence of a majority
black district." p. 104
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