CVD Comments on
Federal Elections Commission's Proposed New Voting System Standards
July 23,
2001
It has been 10 years since
the Federal Elections Commission has issued voting systems
standards. Independent testing laboratories use these standards to
test voting system hardware and software under a national program
established by the National Association of State Election Directors
(NASED). In June, it issued proposed new voting system standards and
is soliciting public comment. The letter below was submitted by Rob
Richie, Executive Director of The Center for Voting and
Democracy.
July 23, 2001
Ms. Penelope Bonsall, director Office of
Election Administration Federal Election Commission 999 E
Street, NW Washington, DC 20463 [email protected] (email) (202)
694-1095 (phone) (202) 219-8500 (fax)
Dear Ms. Penelope Bonsall,
The Center for Voting and Democracy is a
non-partisan, non-profit educational organization that studies
voting systems and their impacts on political participation,
representation and governance.
Our President is John B. Anderson, former Member of Congress
from Illinois and presidential candidate. We have reviewed the
revised Voting System Standards (VSS) and wish to make the following
public comments that we hope will be incorporated in the final
VSS.
We
believe it is critical, yet eminently practical, to require all new
voting equipment, including paper-based systems, to have the capacity to
record and store an anonymous, electronic image of each voter�s
ballot. This belief
is driven by two concerns.
The first is to preserve voting integrity by
ensuring the security of paper-based ballots between the casting of
the ballots by voters, any necessary recounting of these ballots and
the final certification of results. With paper-based ballots,
the primary means of preserving the security of ballots is physical
protection: ballots are
transported in sealed ballot boxes and are stored under lock and
key. If this physical
security is breached and someone alters a ballot after it has been
cast, it is virtually impossible to detect the alteration unless it
is directly witnessed.
Ballots can also be altered inadvertently. For example, when poll
workers pick up ballots during recounts, unpunched chads sometimes
fall out. Unless this
occurrence is witnessed, it is extremely difficult to detect the
alteration.
The report released on July 16, 2001 by the
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project underscores the importance of
adding an electronic audit trail for paper ballots. One general
recommendation (on page 42) is to �design equipment that logs all
events (votes, maintenance, etc) that occur on the machine.� Other
relevant comments in the report include: �Many systems have
redundant recordings of the vote. Some jurisdictions require that
the system have an �audit trail,� a separate recording of each vote
that can be used to audit the performance of the machine� (p. 43)
and �Most equipment does, and all equipment should, provide
redundant trusted recordings. Having several recordings of voters'
intentions allows a full audit of any election.... For reasons of
security, we should require redundant recordings of all new
equipment.� (p. 44)
Capturing a ballot image that can be recorded and
stored in a digital format is essential for this redundancy. Making
this feature a standard in all new voting equipment would allow the
rapid detection of alterations of ballot by comparing the electronic
ballot image created on Election Day with the actual paper ballots.
We have assurances from the major voting
equipment vendors that they can establish this capacity in their
equipment, but at this time they do not always automatically include
it as a feature. Note that in most cases, such a requirement would
not add to the cost of voting equipment; in other cases, it would
only slightly increase the cost of equipment, perhaps $100-200 per
punch card reader or optical scanner. Given that modern electronic
Direct Recording Equipment (DRE) already stores electronic ballot
images, the requirement would not increase their cost. In sum, these
costs are an inconsequential price to pay to better ensure the
integrity of our elections.
Our second reason for
seeking this capacity in new voting equipment is that it would
provide jurisdictions with the capacity to handle all four ballot
types currently used in public elections in the United States. These
ballot types are discussed in an attached fact sheet. Note that the
final report of the Constitution Project
includes a recommendation that all voting equipment be able to
handle a variety of ballot types, and a growing number of
organizations, elected officials and administrators support this
particular measure of ballot equipment flexibility.
We are attaching two additional items about
voting equipment flexibility that we wish to enter into the public
record. The first item is a letter signed by a variety of prominent
organizations: the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the Asian American
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Brennan Center for Justice,
Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, the National
Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, the Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund, and U.S. Public Interest Research
Group. The letter
supports voting equipment standards in several important areas,
including ballot type flexibility. The second item is the fact sheet
that discusses ballot types and other aspects of equipment
flexibility.
The rest of our comments refer to specific
language in the VSS.
First, we note that the standards 2.2.2.1.2,
2.4.3.3 (k) and 3.2.4.2.3 require that electronic systems create
multiple, redundant copies of ballot images. Section 3.2.4.2.3
specifies �Electronic systems shall incorporate multiple memories
� These systems shall also maintain an electronic or physical
image of each ballot, in an independent data path,� and
�Electronic systems shall maintain a record of each ballot cast �
The system shall be capable of reproducing these ballot images in
human-readable form.�
These are critical
requirements and should be applied equally to paper-based
systems.
Second, section 3.2.5.2 appears to
contemplate the creation of electronic ballot images from
paper-based ballots.
It reads, �This paper-based system requirement is limited
to the conversion of the physical ballot into an analogous
electronic image.� We suggest adding to 3.2.5.2
the following language to emphasize the importance of multiple,
redundant records of ballot images:
�All mechanical
or electronic devices that read paper-based ballots shall create
multiple electronic records of the image of each ballot cast. The system shall be capable
of reproducing these ballot images in human-readable form.�
Third, section 2.3.2 (d) requires the �ability to
select from a range of voting options to enable conformance with the
laws in the jurisdiction in which the system will be used.� New voting equipment should
give all jurisdictions the flexibility to choose any ballot type
currently used in public elections in the United States, so we
suggest modifying 2.3.2 (d) to read (addition is underlined):
�Ability to select from a range
of voting options, including all four ballot types currently used
in public elections, to enable conformance with the laws in the
jurisdiction in which the system will be used.�
Fourth, section 2.4.1.1 lays out paper based system standards.
This section should
include a requirement that the ballot counting equipment produce
multiple, redundant electronic copies of ballot images.
�All paper based systems shall
include:
a.
a means of
verifying that ballot punching or marking devices are properly
prepared and ready for use;
b.
a voting booth or
similar facility, in which the voter may punch or mark the ballot in
privacy; and
c.
secure receptacles for
holding voted ballots.
d.
a means for
creating multiple, redundant electronic records of ballot
images.
Fifth, section 6.3 describes the two areas of concern for
equipment and data security: disruption of the voting process and
corruption of voting data.
Electronic ballot images are the strongest method of both
detecting and correcting any violation of the physical security of
paper ballots during the period between the casting of the ballots
and final certification of results.
We thank you for your consideration.
If you wish to discuss these suggestions, please
contact me at 301-270-4616. We would welcome any opportunity to
testify at any hearings you may hold on these standards. Please notify us of any
scheduled public hearings.
Sincerely,
Robert Richie, Executive Director The Center for
Voting and Democracy |