REPORT ON CUMULATIVE VOTING

for

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA* v. *VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER

by

Richard L. Engstrom

Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Social Sciences
Duke University

(February 7, 2008)

I declare the following:

1. My name is Richard L. Engstrom and I am a resident of Durham, North Carolina. I am a former Research Professor of Political Science and Endowed Professor of Africana Studies at the University of New Orleans. I was employed as a consultant at the Center for Civil Rights at the School of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, from July 2006 through December 2007. I am presently a Visiting Research Professor of Political Science and a Visiting Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Social Sciences at Duke University. I have served two terms as the Chairperson of the Representation and Electoral Systems Section of the American Political Science Association (1993-1995, 1995-1997) and served as a member of the Executive Council for that section from 1993 to 2007.

2. I have done extensive research into the relationship between election systems and the ability of minority voters to participate fully in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The results of my research on this topic have been

published in the *American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Western Political Quarterly, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Social Science Quarterly, Journal of Law and Politics, Electoral Studies, Representation*, and other journals and books. Three articles authored or co-authored by me were cited with approval in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, at 46 n.11, 49 n.15, 53 n.20, 55, and 71 (1986), the Supreme Court decision interpreting amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I am the co-author, with Mark A. Rush, of *Fair and Effective Representation? Debating Electoral Reform and Minority Rights* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001). A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as an Appendix to this declaration.

3. I have also testified as an expert witness in numerous cases in federal and state courts across the United States. Since 2001 I have testified at trial and/or been deposed in the following cases: Johnson v. Hamrick (N.D. Ga. 2001), Del Rio v. Perry (200th Dist. Ct. Tx. 2001), Balderas v. State of Texas (E.D. Tx 2001), Johnson v. Bush (S.D. Flda 2001), Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron (1st Judicial District Court, County of Santa Fe, NM 2001, 2002), Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (Superior Court, County of Maricopa, AZ, 2002), Curry v. Glendening, Court of Appeals of Maryland (2002), Levy v. Miami-Dade Co (S.D. Flda. 2002), Dillard v. Baldwin Co. (M.D. Ala. 2002), Prejean v. Foster (M.D. La. 2002), Georgia v. Ashcroft (D.C. DC, 2002), Louisiana House of Representatives v. Ashcroft (D.C. DC 2002), United States v. Alamosa County (D. Co. 2003), Black Political Task Force v. Galvin and Camacho v. Galvin (D.C. Mass. 2003), G.I. Forum v. Perry (E.D. Tx. 2003), Stewart v. Blackwell (N.D. Oh. 2004), Cottier v. City of Martin, S.D., (D.C. SD 2004), Pender County v. Bartlett (General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division,

County of Wake, NC 2005), and Arise for Social Justice v. City of Springfield and Springfield Election Commission (D.C. Mass. 2006, 2007).

4. The Court in this case has held that the at-large election system in place in the Village of Port Chester dilutes the voting strength of Hispanics in that village and is therefore in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act [United States of America and Cesar Ruiz v. Village of Port Chester, DC. NY 06 Civ. 15173 (SCR), January 17, 2008]. The attorney for the village has asked me to examine whether a cumulative voting system would provide that group with an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice to the village's six-member Board of Trustees.

5. I am being compensated at a rate of $250 an hour for my work in this case.

CUMULATIVE VOTING AS A REMEDY FOR MINORITY VOTE DILUTION

6. Cumulative voting is an election system that has been adopted by over 50 local governments within the United States over the past 20 years.[1] These adoptions have almost always, if not always, been in response to complaints that the previous election systems diluted the votes of minority voters protected under the Voting Rights Act.

7. In an at-large cumulative voting system, each voter may be provided with as many votes as there are seats to be filled in a particular election. However, the usual restriction, in this country at least, that only a single vote may be cast for any particular candidate is removed. Voters may still, if they wish, provide one vote to as many candidates as there are seats to be filled. But they also have the option to cumulate their

[1] For a list of jurisdictions adopting cumulative voting as of 2000 see Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and David Brockington, Electoral Reform and Minority Representation: Local Experiments with Alternative Elections (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2003), 120-122. These

votes behind fewer candidates than there are seats to be filled. Generally, the only restriction in distributing votes among the candidates is that the votes be cast in whole units.

8. In a cumulative voting election voters have more flexibility in exercising their franchise. They may distribute their votes across their preferred candidates as they wish. In a six-seat, six-vote context, for example, voters retain the option of providing a single vote to six different candidates. But if a voter prefers two candidates more intensely than the others, for example, he or she may cast three votes for each of them, while a voter who strongly prefers the election of one particular candidate may cast all six of their votes for that candidate (a practice known as "plumping"). The winning candidates in a cumulative voting election are determined by a simple plurality rule, i.e., the top six candidates receiving the most votes are elected to the six seats.[2]

9. Despite the at-large context, minority voters can have opportunities to elect representatives of their choice when cumulative voting rules are employed. The removal of the limit of one vote for any particular candidate permits minority voters, and all other voters, to cast in effect a more efficacious type of "single-shot" vote than they may in more traditional multi-seat elections. The single-shot voting strategy entails group members voting for only one particular candidate (or perhaps a few, depending on the

---

jurisdictions are in Alabama, Illinois, South Dakota, and Texas, with the latter containing around 80 percent of them.

[2] It is not necessary that voters cast votes in whole units. In Peoria, Illinois, for example, a five-seat, five-vote cumulative system has been adopted whereby voters simply identify up to five candidates for which they vote and then their five votes are allocated evenly among those candidates. If a voter votes for only one candidate, five votes are allocated to that candidate. If a voter votes for two candidates, then two and one-half votes are allocated to each. If a voter votes for three, four, or five candidates, then one and two-thirds votes, one and one-fourth votes, or one vote, respectively, are allocated to each of the chosen candidates. For analyses of cumulative voting elections in Peoria, see Larry T. Aspin and William K. Hall, "Cumulative Voting and Minority Candidates: An Analysis of the 1991 Peoria City Council Elections,"

relative size of the group). Under the traditional voting rules, when a group employs the single-shot strategy members of the group do not use all the votes available to them. The group's voters cast a vote for the candidate that they want elected, and *withhold* the rest of their votes from all of the other candidates so as not to add to the vote totals of those other candidates. The idea behind single-shot voting is that by voting for one particular candidate and not contributing votes to the others, the candidate preferred by the group might finish among the top N vote recipients (N is the number of seats being filled) and win one of the seats.[3] Single-shot voting is allowed in Port Chester under its current election system, but the staggering of terms reduces each contest to a two-seat, two vote election. In this context, single-shot voting is not a very promising strategy for Hispanic voters as there is only one vote available to be withheld and their candidate of choice must finish no lower than second in the total vote. Indeed, the staggered term feature of Port Chester's elections has been identified by this Court as an enhancing the dilutive nature of its at-large election system.[4]

10. When cumulative voting rules are used, a group will not need to withhold its remaining votes, as the group's voters may cast those votes as well for the candidate or candidates of its choice. Cumulative voting allows voters to concentrate their votes much more effectively, and thereby increases the opportunity that minority group voters have to elect representatives preferred by them. A group does not have to constitute a plurality of

---

American Review of Politics 17 (Fall 1996) 225-244, and Larry T. Aspin, "Cumulative Voting and Straight Voting: An Empirical Comparison," American Review of Politics 22 (Spring-Summer 2001) 55-91.

[3] The successful application of the single-shot strategy depends not only on a group's voters complying with it, but also on the other voters dispersing their votes across more candidates than there are seats to be filled. See Richard L. Engstrom and Michael D. McDonald, "'Enhancing' Factors in At Large Plurality and Majority Systems: A Reconsideration," Electoral Studies 12 (December 1993) 386-387.

[4] Sl. op., at 51-52.

the voters in the entire jurisdiction in order for a candidate or candidates preferred by it to receive enough votes to finish among the top N candidates.

11. An at-large cumulative voting system satisfies the basic "one person, one vote" rule, or individual voter equality requirement, because every voter has the same number of votes and the same options through which to cast them. Every voter, in short, is treated equally.[5] This alteration in the voting rules within an at-large system, however, can cleanse the multi-seat format of its tendency to dilute the vote of a minority. These alterations in the voting rules counter the submergence effect that so often accompanies the traditional rules, and thereby can provide minority voters with opportunities to elect representatives of their choice, even when voting occurs along group lines.

12. The opportunities that cumulative voting systems provide minority voters to elect candidates of their choice can be demonstrated theoretically through a coefficient known as the threshold of exclusion.[6] This coefficient identifies the percentage of the electorate that a group must exceed in order to elect a candidate of its choice regardless of how the rest of the voters vote. This coefficient is based on a set of worst case

---

[5] When adopting a cumulative voting remedy for a dilutive elective system for the city council in Martin, SD, last year, the federal District Court stated that "Plan C [the cumulative voting system] achieves precise population equality because the entire City of Martin is contained in one district and all voters in that district receive three votes" [Cottier v. City of Martin, 475 F. Supp. 2d 932, 939 (DC SD 2007)]. See also McCoy v. Chicago Heights, 6 F.Supp. 2d 973, 984 (N.D. Ill. 1998) rev'd sub nom. on other grounds by Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F. 3d. 593 (7th Cir 2000)] ("By allowing each voter the same number of votes, cumulative voting subscribes to the one-person, one-vote requirement with numeric exactness").

[6] Douglas W. Rae, Victor Hanby, and John Loosemore, "Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of Exclusion: An Analytic Note on Electoral Systems," Comparative Political Studies 47 (January 1971): 479.

assumptions, from the minority group's perspective, about the behavior of the other voters. These assumptions are:

(1) the other voters cast all of the votes available to them, but

(2) none of their votes are cast for the candidate preferred by the minority voters, but rather are

(3) concentrated entirely on a number of other candidates equal to the number of seats to be filled, and are

(4) divided evenly among those other candidates.

The other voters, in short, are assumed to cast their votes as efficiently as possible in a multi-seat election.

13. The formula for calculating the threshold of exclusion values for cumulative voting systems, expressed as a percentage, is:

$$\frac{1}{1 + (\text{Number of Seats})} \times 100$$

In a six-seat, six-vote cumulative context, therefore, the threshold value is 14.3%. In other words, out of 1,000 voters, if a group constituting 14.3% + 1, or 144, chooses to "plump" all of their votes for a particular candidate, giving him or her 864 votes, then that candidate must win one of the seats. The other 856 voters could distribute their 5,136 votes evenly across six other candidates, resulting in each receiving 856 votes. In this situation, the candidate preferred by the minority will be a winner. If the other voters deviated from the worst case assumptions, for example by giving more votes to five of

their choices, then their sixth choice would have even fewer votes than 856 and the minority preferred candidate would still win a seat.

14. The threshold of exclusion, it must be remembered, identifies the percentage of the voters in a particular election that a group sharing the same candidate preference must exceed in order to elect that candidate with no assistance whatsoever from the other voters. If the behavior of other voters deviates in any way from the worst case assumptions, then a minority group may be smaller and/or less cohesive in its preferences and still have a realistic opportunity to elect a representative or representatives of its choice.[7] As the federal District Court in Dillard v. Chilton County recognized, the threshold of exclusion for cumulative voting systems is "not an automatic cut-off point" for minority electoral success [699 F. Supp. 870, 875 (1988)], but it does serve as a useful guideline.

15. The ability of minority voters to elect candidates favored by them, but not by other voters, when cumulative voting rules are used has been documented in numerous elections. African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans have all elected the candidates of their choice under cumulative voting arrangements.[8]

---

[7] In the 1995 cumulative voting election for the Olton city council in Texas, for example, a Latino candidate preferred by Latino voters was elected to one of the two seats at issue despite the Latino percentage of the turnout being 11 percentage points less than the Threshold of Exclusion, 22 percent versus 33 percent. This result was facilitated by Anglo voters concentrating their votes on a particular Anglo candidate rather than more evenly dividing their vote across two Anglo candidates [Robert R. Brischetto and Richard L. Engstrom, "Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation: Exit Surveys in 15 Texas Communities," Social Science Quarterly 78 (December 1997): 984-985].

[8] Exit polls have provided documentation that, in the elections studied, the minority candidates that were elected were also the choice of the minority voters [see Robert R. Brischetto and Richard L. Engstrom, "Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation," Social Science Quarterly 78 (December 1997): 973; Richard L. Engstrom, Delbert Taebel, and Richard L. Cole, "Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico," Journal of Law and Politics 5 (Spring 1989): 469; Richard L. Cole, Richard L. Engstrom, and Delbert A. Taebel, "Cumulative Voting in a Municipal Election: A Note on Voter Reactions and Electoral Consequences," Western Political Quarterly 43 (March 1990): 196-197; Richard L. Cole and Delbert A. Taebel, "Cumulative Voting in Local Elections:

16. It is sometimes suggested that cumulative voting rules are too complicated for voters to understand and use. Allowing voters to cast more than one vote for a candidate or candidates of their choice, it is alleged, will be a difficult task for voters, especially for less educated voters. This, it is further alleged, will negate the minority electoral opportunities associated with the system because minority voters are more likely to be among the less educated than are white or Anglo voters.[9] These allegations have never been backed up with empirical evidence however, and studies of cumulative voting elections demonstrate that they are not valid. The studies cited in note 7 and 8 show that minority voters, including Hispanic voters, have understood, used, and supported the cumulative system in the elections examined.[10] And not only were the minority candidates elected in them the choice of minority voters, but their elections were almost always attributable to minority voters actually cumulating their votes on their behalf. This is true for the Hispanic candidates as well as the African American and Native American candidates.[11]

CUMULATIVE VOTING AND THE MINORITY OPPORTUNITY IN PORT CHESTER

Lessons from the Alamogordo Experience, Social Science Quarterly 73 (March 1992): 194-201; Richard L. Engstrom and Charles J. Barrilleaux, "Native Americans and Cumulative Voting: The Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux," Social Science Quarterly 72 (June 1991): 388, and Richard L. Engstrom, Jason Kirksy, and Edward Still, "One Person, Seven Votes: The Cumulative Voting Experience in Chilton County, Alabama," in Anthony Peacock, (ed.), Affirmative Action and Representation: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of Voting Rights (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1997), at 304-306].

[9] See Richard L. Engstrom and Robert R. Brischetto, "Is Cumulative Voting Too Complex? Evidence from Exit Polls," Stetson Law Review 27 (Summer 1998), 817-819).

[10] For a review of these findings, see Richard L. Engstrom, "The Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting Rights," in Mark E. Rush and Richard L. Engstrom, Fair and Effective Representation? Debating Electoral Reform and Minority Rights (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2001) at 47-49.

[11] See Brischetto and Engstrom, "Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation," 979, and Engstrom, Cole, and Taebel, "Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution," 489-495.

17. Cumulative voting systems guarantee no particular election outcomes, but they can provide minority voters with opportunities to elect representatives of their choice. A six-seat, six-vote cumulative system would offer Hispanics in Port Chester such an opportunity.

18. The staggered feature of the at-large elections in Port Chester has been identified by the Court as enhancing the dilutive effect of those elections. It found that "... it is substantially less likely that white bloc voting could defeat all Hispanic-preferred candidates if all six trustees were chosen at one time."[12] The same will be true if staggered elections were to be held with cumulative voting. Reducing the number of seats at issue each election will increase the value of the Threshold of Exclusion for the cumulative voting system. The threshold for two-seat elections is 33.3, much higher than that for six-seat elections, for which the threshold, as noted above, 14.3.[13]

19. A system with a threshold value of 14.3 will provide Hispanics in Port Chester with a reasonable opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. According to Andrew A. Beveridge, an expert witness for the United States in this case, the Hispanic percentage of the citizen voting age population (hereinafter CVAP) in Port Chester in 2000 was 21.9.[14] As reported in Table 1 below, this is over one and a half times, 153.1 percent, of the value of the cumulative voting threshold for a six-vote, six-seat election.

---

[12] Sl. op., at 51.

[13] A negative effect of staggered terms on the election of Hispanic candidates to local governing boards in cumulative voting elections in Texas has been reported by Brischetto and Engstrom, "Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation," at 988-989 (see also Bowler, Donovan, and Brockington, Electoral Reform and Minority Representation, at 105).

[14] This figure is reported in paragraph 12 in Declaration of Andrew A. Beveridge, Ph.D., dated December 4, 2006.

He also reports an estimate of the CVAP in 2006 as 27.5 percent.[15] This is almost twice the value of the threshold, 192.3 percent. Peter A. Morrison, an expert witness for the Village of Port Chester, also reports that voters with Spanish surnames constituted 15.3 percent of those turning out in the latest municipal election, that for Mayor in March of this year.[16] This is 107.0 percent of the threshold.

20. These figures compare very favorably to how close the percentage of CVAP is to the Threshold of Exclusion in the three versions of District 4, the majority-Hispanic single member district (hereinafter SMD) contained in Prof. Beveridge's illustrative six-district plans. It takes a majority of the voters in a SMD to guarantee the election of a candidate, and therefore the Threshold of Exclusion value for a SMD is 50.0 percent. In Beveridge's original plan the CVAP for the Hispanic district is 50.5 percent in 2000, and estimated to be 61.3 percent in 2006.[17] As reported in Table 1 this 2000 figure is only 0.5 percentage points above the threshold for a SMD, or 101.0 percent of the threshold value. The estimate for 2006 is 122.6 percent of the SMD threshold. The respective percentages of the threshold for a six-seat, six-vote cumulative system are, in contrast, much higher, 153.1 and 192.3, as reported above. Based on this indicator, Hispanics in Port Chester will have a better opportunity to elect a representative of their choice through a six-vote, six-six seat at-large cumulative voting election than in a six SMD arrangement.

21. If the modification that Prof. Beveridge made to his original plan is used instead, then the CVAP percentages for the majority-Hispanic district are 50.4 based on

---

[15] Ibid, paragraph 14 and Exhibit D, Table 2, and relied upon by the United States in Post-Trial Memorandum of Law of the United States of America, at 2.

[16] Report of Peter Morrison, Ph.D., for the case of *United States v. Village of Port Chester*, dated May 13, 2007, at 21-22.

[17] Beveridge Declaration, note 10 supra, at paragraph 17.

2000 and 61.0 based on the 2006 estimate.[18] These figures, also reported in Table 1, are of course slightly closer to the SMD threshold, with the 2000 figure constituting 100.8 percent of the threshold and the 2006 estimate 122.0. In Prof. Beveridge's third plan, labeled Map 2, the Hispanic CVAP percentages for the majority-Hispanic district are 56.3 based on 2000 and 70.4 based on his 2006 estimate. As reported in Table 1, this brings the 2000 figure to 112.6 percent of the threshold and the 2006 estimate to 140.8. These also remain considerably below the 153.1 and 198.0 figures respectively for the six-vote, six-seat cumulative system.

22. Dr. Morrison reported that the percentage of those turning out to vote in the 2007 mayoral election, in that area, that had Spanish surnames, was 44.5 percent, also below the threshold for a SMD.[19] This figure constitutes 89.0 percent of that threshold, respectively. In contrast, Spanish surname voters constituted 15.3 percent of the village wide turnout in the 2007 mayoral election, which was 107.0 percent of the cumulative voting threshold.

Table 1: Threshold of Exclusion Values, Six-Vote Cumulative System and Proposed Majority-Hispanic Single Member Districts

	Threshold of Exclusion	CVAP 2000	CVAP 2006 est.	CVAP as % of threshold 2000	CVAP as % of threshold 2006
Cumulative Voting	14.3	21.9	27.5	153.1	192.3
Majority-Hispanic District					

[18] These figures are reported in paragraph 6 of Declaration of Andrew A. Beveridge, Ph.D., dated February 1, 2007.

[19] These figures are reported in the Morrison Report, supra note 12, at 23.

Original Plan	50.0	50.5	61.3	101.0	122.6
Modified Original	50.0	50.4	61.0	100.8	122.0
Map 2	50.0	56.3	70.4	112.6	140.8

23. By every indicator examined, whether it be CVAP in 2000, estimated CVAP for 2006, or voter turnout in the 2007 mayoral election, cumulative voting will provide Hispanics in Port Chester with a better opportunity to elect a representative of their choice to the village Board of Trustees.

24. This is a function of the number of Hispanics left outside the illustrative majority-Hispanic SMDs created by Beveridge. In his original plan, 82.5 percent of the estimated Hispanic CVAP in Port Chester in 2006 remain outside District 4, with 58.9 percent in the three districts adjacent to it, Districts 3, 5, and 6. In his slight modification of that plan the respective percentages are 82.6 and 59.1. In his Plan 2, they are 82.5 and 59.0. Cumulative voting enhances the electoral opportunity provided Hispanics over that provided by the illustrative SMD alternatives by allowing all of the Hispanic citizens of voting age who are registered to vote to support the same candidate for a seat on the board, if they so wish, regardless of where they live. Indeed, based on the Threshold of Exclusion and the estimated CVAP as of 2006, Hispanics could have a reasonable opportunity to elect two members to the board, given that the CVAP constitutes 192.3 percent of the threshold. If the Hispanic growth in Port Chester has continued, the Hispanic opportunity to elect two members will come sooner than under a revised districting plan following the 2010 Census of Population, if it even comes then.

25. The increase in the Hispanic opportunity to elect a representative of their choice, including a Hispanic representative or two,[20] under a cumulative voting arrangement is also likely to stimulate Hispanics to organize and mobilize more in a cumulative voting election. Expert witnesses in this case have opined that if a majority-Hispanic SMD were adopted, turnout among Hispanic voters can be expected to increase within that district. Prof. Beveridge stated that "... it is well known that once a specific [minority] community has a newly-drawn district that gives them an opportunity to elect their candidate of choice, then registration and turnout increase, often dramatically."[21] R. Keith Gaddie, an expert witness for the village, elaborated on this point by stating that if a district that offers a minority group a "high likelihood of victory" is created, then minority candidates are more likely to run. He continues, concerning these minority candidates:

> It's the candidates that bring the voters in, and why? Because the candidates create the campaign environment and they go to

---

[20] Hispanic voters in Port Chester clearly preferred the unsuccessful Hispanic candidate, Cesar Ruiz, in the 2001 village board election. Ruiz is described by Prof. Beveridge as "the first highly identifiable Hispanic candidate" to run in a village election (Transcript of trial testimony, February 16, 2007, at 726). No Hispanic has sought a seat since Mr. Ruiz's defeat. The expert witness for the plaintiff's on the issue of racially polarized voting, Lisa Handley, reported that this election was "the most probative Trustee contest" (Rebuttal Report: Voting Patterns and Participation Rates in Recent Elections in the Village of Port Chester, New York, January 31,2007), and testified that "Very few Hispanics did not vote for Ruiz" (Transcript of trial testimony, May 21, 2007, at 59; see also 60-61). Likewise the expert witness for the defendants testifying on the racially polarized voting issue, Ronald E. Weber, reported that Hispanics were "strongly cohesive" in their support for Ruiz (Transcript of trial, at 975). This was based on his finding that Ruiz received a vote from an estimated 94.2 of the Hispanic voting in this election (ibid., at 930). Voting in Port Chester has been found to be racially polarized by the Court in this case (sl. Op. at 50-51.

[21] Declaration of Andrew A. Beveridge, Ph.D., dated February 1, 2007, at 3. See also Beveridge, Transcript of trial, February 16, 2007, at 606-607, 633, and Lisa Handley, Transcript of trial, February 15, 2007, at 466.

those voters and they mobilize them.[22]

This Court has concluded that "it seems highly likely" that an election system that provided Hispanics with an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice would result in an increase in Hispanic voter turnout in Port Chester.[23]

26. A reasonable opportunity to elect a representative of their choice provided Hispanics by cumulative voting can be expected to have the same effect. It is the opportunity to elect, not the medium through which it is offered, that provides the stimulus to organize and mobilize. Cumulative voting can provide Hispanics with such an opportunity in Port Chester, and that opportunity can also be expected to produce an increase their registration and turnout.[24]

OTHER REASONS TO ADOPT CUMULATIVE VOTING

27. There are a number of reasons to choose cumulative voting as a new election system for Port Chester, in addition to it cleansing the current system of its tendency to dilute the minority vote. The structural features of the current election system that interact with the candidate preferences of Port Chester voters to bring about the dilution of the Hispanic vote are the traditional at-large voting rules, and the use of staggered terms that enhance the dilutive effect of those rules. Changing to cumulative rules without staggered terms will cleanse the system of its dilutive effects without any additional changes in the system. Elections to the board can be held at-large, as they are

---

[22] Ronald Keith Gaddie, Transcript of trial, February 22, 2007, at 1327. See also ibid., at 1343, and Report of Ronald Keith Gaddie, Ph.D., January 20, 2007, at 17-18, 20.

[23] Sl. op., at 20.

[24] Evidence that efforts to register and mobilize voters among minority candidates and their supporters occur more frequently than among white candidates and their supporters in cumulative voting

now, and the voters can cast a number of votes, six, equal to the number of seats on the board, as they now do, albeit currently with two votes over three staggered elections. The decision rule for determining who is elected can be the plurality rule, as it is now. The ballots employed in the elections can identify the party affiliations of the candidates, as they now do, and the procedures that political parties use to nominate their candidates for these seats can also remain as they are now. And given the CVAP estimates for Port Chester for 2006, the opportunity to elect will be present in village elections held in March, as they are now.[25] There will be no need to elect board members in November simultaneously with county and statewide elections, or even with the election of presidential and vice-presidential electors pledged to particular presidential candidates, in order to remedy the dilutive effects of the system.[26]

28. Port Chester is a small political jurisdiction. The village is only 2.4 square miles in area. As of the 2000 Census, only 27,867 people resided in it.[27] Creating six SMDs in the village will result in small geographical districts with small populations. Based on the 2000 census, the average district, in total population, will have less than

---

elections is reported in Bowler, Donovan, and Brockington, Electoral Reform and Minority Representation, at 47, 63, and 137 n.8.

[25] It would be preferable, other things being equal, to hold the Board of Trustees elections in March so that the cumulative voting election for the Board of Trustees either stands alone, or will be held simultaneously with that for only one other office, that of Mayor. Efforts to educate the voters of their cumulative options and how to implement them, by the village and/or the board candidates themselves, would not have to compete with county and statewide campaigns, and even presidential campaigns, for the attention of the voters. Voter understanding of the new voting rules could be facilitated by the greater focus on the board election.

[26] The plaintiff notes that Hispanics tend to turnout less, relative to whites, in the March elections than the November elections, and argue that this exacerbates the discriminatory effect of the current system (Post-Trial Memorandum of Law of the United States of America, at 51). As noted above however, Dr. Morrison's analysis of the surnames of the voters turning out in the March 2007 mayoral election, in which there was no Hispanic candidate, showed that the percentage of voters with Spanish surnames exceeded the Threshold of Exclusion for a six-vote, six-seat cumulative voting election.

[27] Beveridge Declaration, supra note 10, at paragraph. 5.

5,000 people in it, 4,644.5. The average CVAP in a district, a measure of the potential electorate, will be only 2,330 based on the 2000 Census, and 2,376.5 based on Prof. Beveridge's estimate for 2006.[28] It is not necessary to cut up the village into such small election districts to remedy the dilution found in its current system. At-large elections could continue to be held within the 2.4 square mile area that constitutes the village without diluting the Hispanic vote if cumulative voting rules are adopted. Such an arrangement would also avoid the often contentious process of redistricting after each census, if not more frequently, and expensive litigation over district lines that so frequently follows the adoption of a plan.[29]

29. As noted above, the average CVAP based on the 2000 census for six districts in Port Chester is 2,330. But given that citizens of voting age are not likely to be distributed across the village in the same manner as the total population, due to differences in the age and citizenship status of residents in different areas, it is likely that the distribution of the CVAP, an indicator of the number of potential voters within those districts, would not be close to equal. This is the case, not surprisingly, with all three of Prof. Beveridge's illustrative plans.

30. I agree with Dr. Morrison that the districts in Beveridge's plans are, on this dimension, "severely imbalanced."[30] The districts in Beveridge's initial plan would have CVAPs, based on the 2000 Census, ranging from of 3,144 to 1,362, and based on his estimates for 2006, from 3,199 to 1,122. These figures for his modified version of that plan are 3,144 to 1,350 and 3,199 to 1,117 respectively, while for Plan 2 they are 3,065 to

---

[28] Calculated from figures provided in Table 1 in Beveridge Declaration, supra note 10.

[29] See generally Richard L. Engstrom, "The Post-2000 Round of Redistricting: An Entangled Thicket within the Federal System," Publius, 32 (Fall 2002), 51-70.

1,239 and 3,122 to 975. When expressed as the combined percentage deviation from equality,[31] Morrison reports that these figures for Beveridge's initial plan, his modification of that plan, and his Plan 2, are 76.5, 77.0, and 78.4, respectively, based on the 2000 census, and 87.4, 87.6, and 90.3 based on Beveridge's estimate of the CVAP as of 2006.[32]

31. Inequalities of some type in the VAP or CVAP across districts are expected in virtually all districting plans, but not to this extreme. These figures do suggest that the relative weight of an individual's vote in Port Chester will vary depending heavily on the CVAP of the districts they are in.

32. An at-large election under cumulative voting rules for six seats on the board would not be a dilutive elective system and would not entail differentiating among potential voters in this manner. Avoiding disparities of this size in the CVAP among the districts would certainly be a rational reason for adopting cumulative voting rather than a SMD plan as a remedy for minority vote dilution in Port Chester.

33. The large differences in CVAP across districts that would undoubtedly result from a SMD plan in Port Chester containing a majority-Hispanic district will also have an impact on the field of candidates. Candidates for the board must be citizens of at least voting age and presumably, if running for a district seat, will have to reside within the district. This will have its greatest impact on a majority-Hispanic district, where citizenship and voting age requirements would preclude more people from running. In Prof. Beveridge's illustrative plans, for example, the CVAP for his three versions of

---

[30] Ibid., at 34.

[31] The combined deviation is calculated by adding the absolute values of the percentage deviation from the average CVAP of the district with the largest CVAP and the district with the smallest CVAP.

District 4, based on his latest numbers, the estimates for 2006, are 1,122 in his initial plan, 1,117 in his modification of that plan, and 975 in his Plan 2 (while in District 1 it would be 3,199 in both his original plan and modified plan and 3,122 in Plan 2).

34. As noted above in paragraph 23, in Beveridge's original plan, 82.5 percent of the estimated Hispanic CVAP in Port Chester in 2006 resides outside District 4. In his slight modification of that plan the respective percentage is 82.6, and in his Plan 2 it is 82.5. A cumulative voting remedy would provide Hispanic voters with an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice, including a Hispanic candidate, from anywhere within the village, rather than limit that opportunity to the election of a candidate residing in a restricted geographical area smaller than the village itself. Given that the effect of the current at-large election format has been to dilute the voting strength of Hispanics across the entire village, not just those residing within an illustrative majority-Hispanic district, it would certainly be a rational policy to have a remedy that allows all of the Hispanic voters in the village to participate in the opportunity to elect the representative of choice for that group.

35. Cumulative voting does not preclude the election of candidates from different areas of the village if that is important to the voters. Cumulative voting rules allow voters to form "voluntary constituencies" with other like minded voters. If geography is an important criterion to the voters they are free to vote along those lines. Cumulative voting does not entail a geographical constraint, as districts do. It leaves it up to the voters to decide whether having a representative who lives close to them in an already small village is important to them. Cumulative voting, in short, allows

---

[32] Report of Peter Morrison, supra note 12, at 35.

"communities defined by actual shared interests"[33] to be determined by the voters, rather than those who draw, or adopt, district lines.[34]

CONCLUSION

36. A six-vote, six-seat cumulative voting system will provide Hispanic voters in Port Chester with a reasonable opportunity to elect a representative of their choice, and perhaps two, to the Board of Trustees. A comparison of the Thresholds of Exclusion values for these systems and the relative presence of Hispanics within the village, along with an earlier opportunity to elect a second representative of their choice, reveals that the opportunity to elect provided through cumulative voting rules will be equal to, if not better than, that provided by a single majority-Hispanic SMD. There are, in addition, rational reasons to adopt cumulative voting for board elections, noted above, that are not related to the dilution issue itself. This is especially the case given the small size of the village, both in geography and in population.

37. It is recommended that an educational program to help voters understand their options under cumulative voting rules and how to implement them accompany the first election under these rules. This is not because cumulative voting is especially difficult to grasp, because it is not, but simply because it is different, in that it allows voters more options through which to express their candidate preferences than under the rules employed in the past. Educational efforts need only focus on the options voters have, and how to express them through the type of voting equipment and ballots used. Cumulative voting has been employed with paper, machine, and computer ballots. Given

---

[33] Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916, (1995).

[34] On communities of interest as a districting criterion, see Engstrom, "The Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting Rights," 25-30.

that the village is only 2.4 square miles in size, it should not be difficult to make the educational program accessible to everyone.

38. It is proposed that a pamphlet be prepared explaining the cumulative voting system adopted for Port Chester. This pamphlet will be mailed to every registered voter in the village, as well as copies made available at public buildings in the village. The pamphlet will also identify, as will notices placed in local newspapers, the times and places of at least three public forums at which the system will be described and voters allowed to practice vote, using the same kind of voting equipment as will be used in the election, and using an illustrative cumulative voting ballot that will be a replica of the ballot to be used in the cumulative voting election, albeit with "candidates" identified by A, B, C, and so forth. These meetings should be held, at a minimum, during the daytime during a week day, the evening during a week day, and a Saturday during the day. In addition, more than one person should be trained to explain how votes are cast and counted under this system, and at least one such person be available at the village office, during regular business hours, to explain how votes are cast and counted under this system whenever a registered voter so requests.

Executed on the 7th of February, 2008.

Richard L. Engstrom, Ph.D.

APPENDIX
VITA
RICHARD L. ENGSTROM

January 2008

OFFICE
Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity,
and Gender in the Social Sciences
Social Science Research Institute
Duke University
Erwin Mill
Duke Box 90420
Durham, NC 27708
Phone:(504-756-1478) Fax:(919)-681-4183
E-Mail Address = richard.engstrom@uno.edu
rle9@duke.edu

HOME
6205 Farrington Rd.
Apt. G-1
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Phone = (504)-756-1478

PERSONAL AND EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION

Born May 23, 1946. Married to former Carol L. Verheek. Four children: Richard Neal, born 3/10/70; Mark Andrew, born 1/14/73; Brad Alan, born 3/31/77; and Amy Min, born 8/18/84.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of New Orleans, 1971-74; Associate Professor, 1974-1979; Professor, 1979-present; Research Professor, 1987-2006, Endowed Professor of Africana Studies, 2003-2005.

Chairperson, Department of Political Science, University of New Orleans, 1976-1979. Coordinator of Graduate Studies, 1990-1992, 1993-2006.

Consultant, Center for Civil Rights, School of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2006-2007.

Visiting Research Professor of Political Science and Visiting Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Social Sciences, Duke University.

Fulbright-Hays Professor, National Taiwan University and National Chengchi University, and Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of American Culture, Academic Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C., 1981-82.

Fulbright-Hays Professor, University College, Galway, Ireland, 1985-86.

Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Irish Studies, the Queen's University of Belfast, 1990.

David Bruce Fellow, Bruce Centre for American Studies, University of Keele, England, 1993.

Visiting Fellow, School of Politics, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia, 1998.

Program Visitor, Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, June-July, 2005.

Recipient, UNO Alumni Association's Career Distinction Award for Excellence in Research, December 1985.

Recipient, George W. Lucas Community Service Award, New Orleans NAACP, 1993.

FORMAL EDUCATION

Ph.D., University of Kentucky, 1971

M.A., University of Kentucky, 1969

A.B., Hope College (Holland, Michigan), 1968.
(recipient of Class of '65 Political Science Award, 1968.

PRIMARY TEACHING FIELDS

Election Systems, Urban and Minority Politics, Legislative Process, American Politics.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Member, Election Review Committee, American Political Science Association, 2003-2004.

Chair, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association, 1993-95, 95-97. Section Board, 1993-present.

Book review editor, American Review of Politics, 1995-present.

Lecture tour, under sponsorship of United States Information Agency, of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Liberia, January, 1994. Topics include, among others, comparative election systems, legislatures within democratic regimes, and race and gender in contemporary politics.

Associate Member, Centre for the Study of Irish Elections, University College Galway.

Member, Board of Editors, Public Administration Quarterly 1977- present.

Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Politics, 1988-1993.

Member, Board of Editors, State and Local Government Review, 1988- 1990.

Member, Committee on the Status of Blacks, Southern Political Science Association, 1991-1996.

Treasurer, Southwestern Political Science Association, 1981 (position resigned during term due to Fulbright Lectureship).

Chair, Harold D. Lasswell Award Committee, American Political Science Association, 1995-1996 (best dissertation in public policy).

Chair, Ted Robinson Award Committee, Southwestern Political Science Association, 1995-1996 (best research project in minority politics by a graduate student).

Member, Nominating Committees, Southern Political Science Association, 1980; Louisiana Political Science Association, 1981, Study Group on Comparative Representation and Electoral Systems, International Political Science Association, 1988, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association, 1999.

Member, Chastain Award Committee, Southern Political Science Association, 1978. V.O. Key Award Committee, Southern Political Science Association, 1990. Ted Robinson Memorial Award Committee, Southwestern Political Science Association, 1995, 1996 (chair). Hallett Award Committee, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association, 1999, 2000.

Member, Program Committee (Urban Politics Section), 1976 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Program Committee (Urban Politics Section), 1992 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Program Committee (Representation and Electoral Systems Section), 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Program Committee (Representation and Electoral Systems Section), 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Member, Membership Committee, Southwestern Social Science Association, 1973-74.

Presented papers at meetings of the American Political Science Association, International Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Southern Political Science Association, Southwestern Political Science Association, Louisiana Political Science Association, Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics, International Society of Political Psychology, Harvard University Computer Graphics Week, Australian-New Zealand Academy for the Advancement of Science. Formal papers also presented at programs at Tulane University, Sagamon State University, University of Keele (England), and Rice University.

Chaired panels at meetings of the American Political Science Association, Southern Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Southwestern Political Science Association, and International Political Science Association.

Served as discussant for panels at meetings of the American Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Southern Political Science Association; Southwestern Social Science Association; Louisiana Political Science Association; Institute of American Culture, Academic Sinica (Taiwan), and International Political Science Association.

Reviewed manuscripts for the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Polity, Social Science Quarterly, Legislative Studies Quarterly, American Politics Quarterly, Urban Affairs Review, Electoral Studies, Election Law Journal, National Political Science Review, Women and Politics, Southeastern Political Review, State and Local Government Review, Public Administration Quarterly, American Review of Politics, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Journal of Policy History, Women and Politics, Election Law Journal, Howard University Press, and Stanford University Press.

Recipient of grant from Pacific Cultural Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan to support project entitled "The Legislative Yuan: A Study of Legislative Adaptation" (1982).

Recipient of grant from private sources, New Orleans, to support a study of mayoral tenure in large American cities (1983).

Recipient of grant from Southern Regional Council, Atlanta, Georgia, to conduct exit poll of cumulative voting election in Chilton County, Alabama (1992).

Recipient of grants from Louisiana Education Quality Support Fund, Fellowship Funding for Superior Graduate Students, 1992 (1993-1997) $48,000; 1996 (1997-2001) $64,000; 1997 (1998-2002) $48,000; 1998 (1999-2003) $56,000.

Reviewed grant proposals for National Science Foundation programs in Political Science and Law and Social Sciences, and National Science Foundation graduate fellowship applications for the National Research Council.

Served as mentor in Southern Regional Council's Voting Rights Fellowship Program to Jason F. Kirksey, 1992-1993, and Dr. Olethia Davis, 1993-1994.

United Nations Consultant on Election Systems and Constituency Delimitation, National Election Commission of Liberia, UN Mission in Liberia, 2004.

COMMUNITY AND UNIVERSITY SERVICE

Consultant, Charter Task Force Committee, New Orleans, 2000. Preparation of Term Limits: A Report to the Charter Task Force Committee, February, 2000.

Interviewed on term limits issue on "Crescent City Close Up," public affairs program on three radio stations, WNOE, KKND, and KUMX, March 19, 2000.

Participant, Roundtable on At-Large Elections for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), sponsored by Common Cause, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the Markle Foundation, at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 9, 2000.

Member, Board of Directors, Concern International Charities, 1998-2003.

Chairperson, Taskforce on Civil Service, Mayor-Elect Ernest Morial's Transition Office (New Orleans), 1977-78.

Member, Chachere Subcommittee of UNO Diversity Cabinet, 2003-2004.

Member, Graduate Council, UNO, 1975-76, 1994-95, 2006.

Member, Research Council, UNO, 1995-97, 2005.

Member, International Student Recruitment Committee, UNO, 1993-96.

Chairperson, Search Committee for Vice Chancellor for Research and Graduate Studies and Dean of the Graduate School, UNO, 1987-88.

Chairperson, Search Committee for Graduate Dean, UNO, 1978-79.

Member, University Budget Committee, UNO, 1983-84.

Member, Liberal Arts Advisory Committee, UNO, 1975-76, 1982-84.

Member, Academic Planning Committee, UNO, 1982-1988.

Member, Faculty Council Committee on Faculty Honors, UNO, 1985-1990.

Member, Committee on Research, UNO Self-Study, 1972-73; 1982-83.

Member, Dean's Advisory Committee on Academic Planning, College of Liberal Arts, UNO, 1983-84.
Member, University Senate, UNO, 1975-77; 1980-81; 83-85; 87-91.

Member, Steering Committee, Legal Division, New Orleans Chapter, American Foundation for Negro Affairs, 1977-79.

Service as expert witness in numerous vote dilution cases in federal courts. Employed by the United States Department of Justice, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Center for Constitutional Rights, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund; Native American Rights Fund, and other organizations. Served as court-appointed expert for the remedial portion of Williams v. City of Dallas, United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, 1991. Service as Special Master for the remedial portion of Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 2002-2004.

INVITED LECTURES / PRESENTATIONS (Since 1986)

1986: McGee College, University of Ulster - "The Reagan Elections: Realignment or Dealignment?" and "The Contemporary Voting Rights Issue in American Politics"

The Queen's University of Belfast - "The Reagan Elections: Realignment or Dealignment?" and "The Contemporary Voting Rights Issue in American Politics"

University of Keele - "The Contemporary Voting Rights Issue in American Politics"

University College Dublin - "The Contemporary Voting Rights Issue in American Politics" (4/30/86).

University College Galway - "The Reagan Elections: Realignment or Dealignment?"

1987: Southern University -"The Equal Protection Clause and Electoral Reapportionment" (4/8/87).

APSA Summer Institute for Black Students, Louisiana State
University - "The Political Scientist as Expert Witness" (7/26/87).

NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Conference on Voting Rights, San Antonio, Texas - "Cumulative and Limited Voting as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution."

1988: College of William and Mary - "The Contemporary Voting Rights Issue" and "The Role of Social Scientists in Voting Rights Litigation"

University of Queensland - "One Vote, One Value: The U.S. Experience After 25 Years" (5/24/88).

Griffith University (Brisbane) - "One Vote, One Value: The U.S. Experience After 25 Years" (5/25/88).

1989: Tulane University - "Frontiers of Voting Rights: Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections" (3/9/89).
Lamar University - "Voting Rights: A Retrospective" (10/30/89).

Oklahoma State University - "Frontiers of Voting Rights" (November/10/89).

Prairie View A and M University - "Reapportionment and Black Political Power" (11/16/89).

1990: The Queen's University of Belfast-Institute of Irish Studies, "The Irish Election System: Manipulation and Reform" (3/13/90); Department of Politics, "The Reagan Presidency: An Assessment" (3/8/90).

Brookings Institution - "Social Scientists and the Voting Rights Act" (10/19/90).

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (Austin, Texas) - "The Evolution of the Voting Rights Act of 1965" (10/29/90).

1991: University of Texas at Dallas - "Redistricting the Dallas City Council" (3/8/91).
United States Department of Justice, Voting Section - "Alternative Election Systems" (3/15/91).
Stetson University School of Law - "Alternative Election Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution" (4/27/91).

Norfolk State University - "Election Analyses in Voting Rights Litigation" (6/15/91).

1992: University of Colorado, Summer Workshop in Urban Politics - "Race and Voting in Judicial Elections: New Orleans as a Case Study Setting" (7/9/91).

Harold Washington College, Chicago - "Political Science Research and Testimony in the Miami-Dade County Core" (9/5/92 - not presented to illness).

Southern Regional Council, Atlanta, Georgia - "Exit Polls and Voting Rights Litigation" (10/2/92).
1994: Lecture tour of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Liberia for United States Information Agency, January, 1994.

National Conference of State Legislators, Annual Meeting, New Orleans - "Redistricting and the Courts" (7/26/94)

1995: Department of International Politics, Peking University, "Constitutional Law, Comparative Electoral Systems, and the Politics of Race and Gender" (10/17/95).

1997: John D. Lees Memorial Lecture, Keynote Address, 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Politics Group, (United Kingdom) Political Science Association, Keele, England, "Affirmative Action: The Election and the Election System" (1/3/97).

Alumni College, College of Liberal Arts, University of New Orleans, "Racial Gerrymandering in the 1990s: The Issues and the Alternatives" (2/1/97).

Commission on Governmental Reorganization, City of New Orleans, "Principles for Governmental Organization" (9/23/97).

Civil Rights Training Institute (Airlie Conference), NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, "Alternative Election Systems in the Post-Shaw Era" (11/8/97).

1998

School of Politics, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, "Racial Gerrymandering in the United States" (4/1/98) and "Election Systems and Minority Representation in the United States: Racial Gerrymandering and Its Aftermath" (5/29/98).

School of Political Science, University of New South Wales, Sydney, "Election Systems and Minority Representation in the United States: Racial Gerrymandering and Its Aftermath" (4/8/98).

Illinois Secretary of State's Commission on Redistricting, Chicago, IL, "Computer Generated Districting Plans: Necessary Conditions and Tie Breaking Criteria" (12/16/98).

2001

Carinthian Institute of Minority Affairs, Villach, Austria, "Spiders, Earmuffs, and the Mark of Zorro: Creating Electoral Opportunities for Minorities in America's Single Member District System" (5/5/01).

Bureau of Governmental Research, New Orleans, LA, "The Mayor: How Many Terms?" (10/10/01).

2002

Pomona College, Claremont, CA, "Spiders, Earmuffs, and the Mark of Zorro: There Must be a Better Way" (3/13/02).

Utah State University, "The Redistricting Thicket: Are There Alternatives?" Bennion Teachers' Workshop (8/9/02).

Utah State University, "Missing the Target: Priorities among Districting Constraints," Redistricting in the New Millennium: A Lecture Series, (11/26/02).

2003

Florida State University, "Missing the Target: Priorities among Districting Constraints," (1/21/03).

2004

Cleveland City Club/Cleveland State University, "Metro Reform and Minority Voting Rights," (2/25/04).

Liberian National Election Commission Consultative Assembly, Monrovia, Liberia, "Constituency Boundary Redemarcation: Concepts and Timeframes," (6/7/04).

2005

Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, written and oral testimony, hearing on Extension of the Preclearance Provision of the Voting Rights Act, (10/25/05).

William C. Velasquez Institute, San Antonio, TX, "Influence Districts," (11/19/05)

2006

University of West Georgia, "The Gerrymandering Problem: Lessons from Australia?" (4/3/06).

Duke University, "Racially Polarized Voting: Pervasive and Persistent in the American South," Conference on "W(h)ithering the Voting Rights Act?" (4/7/06).

International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan. Roundtable on Electronic Voting. "E Voting in the U.S.," (7/13/06).

Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, "The Gerrymandering Problem: Lessons from Australia?," (8/7/06).

Short Course on The National Popular Vote Plan to Revamp the Electoral College, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, "Potential Impact of the National Popular Vote Plan on Presidential Elections and Other Electoral Reforms," (8/30/06).

Numerous other presentations before groups such as the Louisiana Municipal Association; New Orleans League of Women Voters; Public Policy Forums at Southern University in Baton Rouge; Louisiana Municipal Clerks Institute; (La.) Black Legislative Caucus Institute; Robert A. Taft Institute of Government Seminars, Southern University; Special Committee on Elective Law and Voter Participation, American Bar Association; Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Law, United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary; Institute of American Culture, Academic Sinica (Taiwan),

Foundation for Scholarly Exchange (Taiwan), and Tulane University, Department of Political Science and College of Law College of Law.

REFERENCES

Dr. Charles Barrilleaux, Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306 904-644-7643

Dr. Jason F. Kirksey, Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74074 405-744-5575

Dr. Charles D. Hadley, Chair, Department of Political Science, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148 504-280-6456

Dr. Susan Howell, former Chair, Department of Political Science, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148 504-280-6467

Dr. Michael D. McDonald, Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13901 607-777-4563

CURRENT RESEARCH

"Districting by Independent Commissions: Lessons from Australia."

"Southern Primaries," revision of a paper presented at a conference on Plurality and Multi-Round Elections, Montreal, June 17, 2006 (co-authored with Richard N. Engstrom).

Analysis of Instance Runoff Voting elections in North Carolina, 2007 (with Michael Cobb).

LATEST CONFERENCE PAPERS

"Influence District: A Concept in Need of Clarity," presented at the Conference on "Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the Future: Honoring the Fortieth Anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965," Center for the Study of American Politics, Yale University, April 21-23, 2005, expanded version selected for inclusion in volume edited by Daniel McCool.

"Racially Polarized Voting: Pervasive and Persistent in the American South," Conference on "W(h)ithering the Voting Rights Act?" John Hope Franklin Center, Duke University, April 7, 2006, to be included in a volume edited by Paula McClain and Kerry Haynie.

"Majority Vote Rule and Runoff Elections," presented at a conference on "Plurality and Multi-Round Elections," University of Montreal, June, 2006 (co-authored with Richard N. Engstrom), Montreal, June 17-18, 2006. Expanded version selected for inclusion in mini-symposium edited by Bernard Grofman.

PUBLICATIONS

BOOKS

Fair and Effective Representation? Debating Electoral Reform and Minority Rights (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001) (with Mark A. Rush).

MONOGRAPHS

Home Rule for Louisiana Parishes (Baton Rouge: Police Jury Association of Louisiana and Governmental Services Institute, Louisiana State University, 1974).

Municipal Home Rule in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Municipal Association and Governmental Services Institute, Louisiana State University, 1974).

Municipal Government Within the 1974 Louisiana Constitution: A Reference Guide for Municipal Officials (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Municipal Association and Governmental Services Institute, Louisiana State University, 1975).

Louisiana Mayor's Handbook (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Municipal Association and Governmental Services Institute, Louisiana State University, 1977), (with Edward Clynch and Konrad Kressley).

Mayoral Tenure in Large American Cities (New Orleans: School of Urban and Regional Studies, University of New Orleans, 1983).

ARTICLES, RESEARCH NOTES, AND BOOK CHAPTERS

"Statutory Restraints on Administrative Lobbying -- 'Legal Fiction'", Journal of Public Law, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1970), 90-103 (with Thomas G. Walker). Reprinted in Dennis Ippolito and Thomas Walker (eds.), Reform and Responsiveness: Readings in American Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 428-438.

"Race and Compliance: Differential Political Socialization," Polity, 3 (Fall 1970), 100-111. Reprinted in Charles S. Bullock, III, and Harrell Rogers, Jr. (eds.), Black Political Attitudes: Implications for Political Support (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 33-44.

"Political Ambitions and the Prosecutorial Office," Journal of Politics, 33 (February 1971), 190-194.

"Life-Style and Fringe Attitudes Toward the Political Integration of Urban Governments," Midwest Journal of Political Science 15 (August 1971), 475-494 (with W.E. Lyons).

"Expectations and Images: A Note on Diffuse Support for Legal Institutions," Law and Society Review, 6 (May 1972), 631-636 (with Michael W. Giles).

"Black Control or Consolidation: The Fringe Response," Social Science Quarterly, 53 (June 1972), 161-167 (with W.E. Lyons).

"Life-Style and Fringe Attitudes Toward the Political Integration of Urban Governments: A Comparison of Survey Findings," American Journal of Political Science, 17 (February 1973), 182-188 (with W. W. E. Lyons).

"Racial Gerrymandering and Southern State Legislative Redistricting: Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act," Journal of Public Law, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1973), 37-66 (with Stanley A. Halpin, Jr.).

"Socio-Political Cross Pressures and Attitudes Toward Political Integration of Urban Governments," Journal of Politics, 35 (August 1973), 682-711 (with W.E. Lyons).

"Candidate Attraction to the Politicized Councilmanic Office: A Note on New Orleans," Social Science Quarterly, 55 (March 1975), 975-982 (with James N. Pezant).

"Home Rule in Louisiana -- Could This Be The Promised Land?," Louisiana History, 17 (Fall 1976), 431-455.

"Judicial Activism and the Problem of Gerrymandering," in Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin (eds.), National Government and Public Policy in the United States (Itasca, IL: Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1977), pp. 239-244.

"The Supreme Court and Equi-Populous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Representation," Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 1976, No. 2 (1977), 277-319. Cited extensively in Karcher v. Daggett, _____ U.S. _____ (1983) (by J. Stevens, concurring, and J. White, dissenting).

"State Centralization Versus Home Rule: A Note on Ambition Theory's Powers Proposition," Western Political Quarterly 30 (June 1977), 288-294 (with Patrick F. O'Connor).

"Pruning Thorns from the Thicket: An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2 (November 1977) 465-479 (with John K. Wildgen). Cited extensively in Thornburg v. Gingles, _____ U.S. _____ (1986) (by J. Brennan).

"Racial Vote Dilution: Supreme Court Interpretations of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act," Southern University Law Review, 4 (Spring 1978), 139-164.

"The Political Behavior of Lawyers in the Louisiana House of Representatives," Louisiana Law Review 39 (Fall 1978), 43-79 (with Patrick F. O'Connor, Justin J. Green, and Chong Lim Kim).

"Restructuring the Regime: Support for Change Within the Louisiana Constitutional Convention," Polity 11 (Spring 1979), 440-451 with Patrick F. O'Connor).

"The Hale Boggs Gerrymander: Congressional Redistricting, 1969," Louisiana History, 21 (Winter 1980), 59-66.

"Lawyer-Legislators and Support for State Legislative Reform," Journal of Politics, 42 (February 1980), 267-276 (with Patrick F. O'Connor).

"Racial Discrimination in the Electoral Process: The Voting Rights Act and the Vote Dilution Issue," in Robert P. Steed, Lawrence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker, (eds.), Party Politics in the South (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1980), pp. 197-213.

"Spatial Distribution of Partisan Support and the Seats/Votes Relationship," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 5 (August 1980), 423- 435 (with John K. Wildgen).

"Computer Graphics and Political Cartography: ASPEX of Gerrymandering," in Computer Mapping Applications in Urban, State, and Federal Government, Plus Computer Graphics in Education, Vol. 16, Harvard Library of Computer Graphics, 1981 Mapping Collection (Cambridge, Mass.: Laboratory for Computer Graphics and Spatial Analysis, Harvard University, 1981), pp. 51-57 (with John K. Wildgen).

"The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship," American Political Science Review, 75 (June 1981), 344-354 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"Post-Census Representational Districting: The Supreme Court, 'One Person, One Vote,' and the Gerrymandering Issue," Southern University Law Review, 7 (Spring 1981), 173-226.

"Municipal Government," in James Bolner (ed.), Louisiana Politics: Festival in a Labyrinth (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), pp. 181-219.

"The 1980 Election and the Realignment Thesis: A Note of Caution," American Studies (Mei-kuo-Yen-chiu), 12 (June 1982), 107-132.

"Racial Vote Dilution and the 'New' Equal Protection Clause: City of Mobile v. Bolden," American Studies (Mei-kuo-Yen-chiu) 12 (September 1982), 25-72.

"The Underrepresentation of Blacks on City Councils: Comparing the Structural and Socioeconomic Explanations for South/Non-South Differences," Journal of Politics, 44 (November 1982), 1088-1099 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"The Impact of the 1980 Supplementary Election on Nationalist China's Legislative Yuan," Asian Survey, 24 (April 1984), 447-458 (with Chu Chi-hung).

"The Marginality Hypothesis and the State Legislative Salary Issue," Southeastern Political Review, 13 (Spring 1985), 169-182 (with Patrick F. O'Connor).

"Racial Vote Dilution: The Concept and the Court," in Lorn Foster (ed.), The Voting Rights Act: Consequences and Implications (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), pp. 13-43.

"Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation: Political Participation and Polarized Voting," The Urban Lawyer, 17 (Summer 1985), 369-377 (with Michael D. McDonald). Cited in Thornburg v. Gingles, _____ U.S. _____ (1986) (by J. Brennan).

"The Reincarnation of the Intent Standard: Federal Judges and At- Large Election Cases," Howard Law Journal 28 (No 2, 1985), 495-513. Cited in Thornburg v. Gingles, _____ U.S. _____ (1986) (by J. Brennan). Abbreviated version appeared in Focus (June, 1985). (Focus is a monthly publication of the Joint Center for Political Studies in Washington, D.C.).

"The Effect of At-Large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, Inc., 1986), pp. 203-225 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"Repairing the Crack in New Orleans' Black Vote: VRA's Results Test Nullifies 'Gerryduck'," Publius 16 (Fall 1986), 109-121. Reprinted in Charles Vincent (ed.), The African American Experience in Louisiana: From Jim Crow to Civil Rights (Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies).

"Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation, Part II: Minority Coalitions and Multivariate Analysis," Urban Lawyer 19 (Winter 1987), 65-75 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"District Magnitudes and the Election of Women to the Irish Dail," Electoral Studies, 6 (August 1987), 123-132.

"The Election of Blacks to Southern City Councils: The Dominant Impact of Electoral Arrangements," in Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker (eds.) Blacks in Southern Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), pp. 245-258 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"Race, Referendums, and Rolloff," Journal of Politics 49 (November 1987), 1081-1092 (with Jim M. Vanderleeuw).

"Definitions, Measurements, and Statistics: Weeding Wildgen's Thicket," Urban Lawyer 20 (Winter 1988), 175-191 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"The Desirability Hypotheses and the Election of Women to City Councils: A Research Note," State and Local Government Review 20 (Winter 1988), 38-40 (with Michael D. McDonald and Bih-Er Chou).

"Black Politics and the Voting Rights Act(s): 1965-1982," in James Lea (ed.), Contemporary Southern Politics: Continuity and Change (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), pp. 83-106.

"Race and Representational Districting: Protections Against Delineational and Institutional Gerrymandering," Comparative State Politics Newsletter 9 (October 1988), 15-24.

"Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico," Journal of Law and Politics 5 (Spring 1989), 469-497 (with Delbert A. Taebel and Richard L. Cole). Reprinted in Roger L. Kemp, (ed.), Local Government Election Practices: A Handbook for Public Officials and Citizens (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1999), 372-391.

"When Blacks Run for Judge: Racial Divisions in the Candidate Preferences of Louisiana Voters," Judicature 73 (August-September 1989), 87-89.

"Detecting Gerrymandering," in Bernard Grofman (ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts (New York: Agathon Press, Inc., 1990), pp. 178-202 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"Cumulative Voting in a Municipal Election: A Note on Voter Reactions and Electoral Consequences," Western Political Quarterly, 43 (March 1990), 191-199 (with Richard L. Cole and Delbert A. Taebel).

"Alternative Electoral Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution," Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 11 (Spring 1990), 19-29 (with Delbert A. Taebel and Richard L. Cole). Cited in Holder v. Hall, _____ U.S. _____ (1994), (by J. Thomas, concurring).

"Cincinnati's 1988 Proportional Representation Initiative," Electoral Studies 9 (September 1990), 217-225.

"Getting the Numbers Right: A Response to Wildgen," Urban Lawyer 22 (Summer 1990), 495-502.

"Native Americans and Cumulative Voting: The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux," Social Science Quarterly 72 (June 1991), 388-393 (with Charles J. Barrilleaux).

"Proportional Representation Considered in Cincinnati," Representation 30 (Spring 1991), 3-5.

"Voting for Judges: Race and Roll-Off in Judicial Elections," in William Crotty (ed.), Political Participation and Democratic Politics (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 171-191 (with Victoria M. Caridas).

"Minority Representation and Councilmanic Election Systems: A Black and Hispanic Comparison," in Anthony Messina, Laurie Rhodebeck, Frederick Wright, and Luis R. Fraga, (eds.), Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 127-142 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"Alternative Judicial Election Systems: Solving the Minority Vote Dilution Problem," in Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman (eds.), United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 129-139.

"Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution," Stetson Law Review 21 (Summer 1992), 743-770.

"Councilmanic Redistricting Conflicts: The Dallas Experience," Urban News 6 (Fall 1992), 1, 4-8.

"The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution," University of San Francisco Law Review 27 (Summer, 1993), 781-813. Excerpt reprinted in Voting and Democracy Report, 1993 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Voting and Democracy, 1993).

"'Enhancing' Factors in At-Large Plurality and Majority Systems: A Reconsideration," Electoral Studies 12 (December 1993), 385-401 (with Michael D. McDonald).

"Louisiana," in Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman (eds.), The Quiet Revolution: Minority Voting Rights and Representation in the South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 103-135, 413-417 (with Stanley A. Halpin, Jean A. Hill, and Victoria M. Caridas-Butterworth).

"The Voting Rights Act: Disfranchisement, Dilution, and Alternative Election Systems," PS: Political Science and Politics 27 (December 1994), 685-688.
"The 1994 New Orleans Mayoral Election: Racial Divisions Continue," Urban News 9 (Spring 1995), 6-9 (with Willie D. Kirkland).

"Shaw v. Reno and New Election Systems: The Cumulative Voting Alternative," Voting Rights Review (Spring 1995), 10, 12 (with Jason F. Kirksey and Edward Still) [excerpt reprinted in Voting and Democracy Report, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Voting and Democracy, 1995), 67-68].

"Voting Rights Districts: Debunking the Myths," Campaigns and Elections (April 1995), 24, 46.

"Shaw, Miller, and the Districting Thicket," National Civic Review, 84 (Fall-Winter 1995), 323-336. Reprinted as "The Supreme Court on Redistricting" in Roger L. Kemp, (ed.), Local Government Election Practices: A Handbook for Public Officials and Citizens (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., Inc., 1999), 80-92.

"Local Redistricting Under the Voting Rights Act," Communities and the Voting Rights Act: A Guide to Compliance in These Changing Times (Denver: National Civic League, Inc., 1996), 69-82.

"One Person, Seven Votes: The Cumulative Voting Experience in Chilton County, Alabama," in Anthony Peacock, (ed.), Affirmative Action and Representation: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of Voting Rights (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1997), pp. 285-313 (with Jason Kirksey and Edward Still).

"Limited and Cumulative Voting in Alabama: An Assessment After Two Rounds of Elections," National Political Science Review, Vol. 6 Race and Representation (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 180-191 (with Jason F. Kirksey and Ed Still).

"Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation: Exit Surveys in Fifteen Texas Communities," Social Science Quarterly 78 (December 1997), 973-991 (with Robert R. Brischetto).

"Is Cumulative Voting Too Complex? Evidence from Exit Polls," Stetson Law Review 27 (Winter 1998), 813-833 (with Robert R. Brischetto).

"Affirmative Action and the Politics of Race," in Gillian Peele, Christopher J. Bailey, Bruce Cain, and B. Guy Peters, (eds.), Developments in American Politics 3 (London: MacMillan Press Ltd. and New York: Chatham House Publishers, 1998), pp. 292-306.

"Race and Representational Districting in Louisiana," in Bernard Grofman, (ed.), Race and Redistricting in the 1990s (New York: Agathon Press, 1998), pp. 229-268 (with Jason F. Kirksey).

"Minority Electoral Opportunities and Alternative Election Systems in the United States," in Mark Rush, (ed.), Voting Rights and Redistricting in the United States (New York: Greenwood Publishing, 1998), pp. 227-243.

"Electoral Arrangements and Minority Political Incorporation," in Richard Kaiser and Katherine Underwood, (eds.), Minority Politics at the Millennium (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000), pp. 19-50.

"Louisiana," in Dale Krane, Platon R. Rigos, and Melvin Hill, (eds.), Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001), 173-182 (with Robert K. Whelan).

"The Post-2000 Round of Redistricting: An Entangled Thicket within the Federal System," Publius, 32 (Fall 2002): 51-70.

"The United States: the Future – Reconsidering Single-Member Districts and the Electoral College," in Josep M. Colomer, (ed)., Handbook of Electoral System Choice (London: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2004), 164-176.

"Expert Witness Testimony," Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, Vol. 1 (London: Elsevier Inc., 2005), 919-925.

"Revising Constituency Boundaries in the United States and Australia: It Couldn't be More Different," Democratic Audit of Australia (August 2005), 1-10 (http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au)

"Missing the Target: The Supreme Court, 'One Person, One Vote,' and Partisan Gerrymandering," in Peter Galderisi, (ed.), Redistricting in the New Millennium, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 313-340.

"Reapportionment," in Joseph R. Marbach, Ellis Katz, and Troy E. Smith (eds.), Federalism in America: An Encyclopedia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), Vol. 2, 528-532.

"Race and Southern Politics: The Special Case of Congressional Districting," in Robert P. Steed and Laurence W. Moreland, (eds.), Writing Southern Politics: Contemporary Interpretations and Future Directions, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 91-118.

"Electoral College," in William A. Darity, Jr. (ed.), International Encyclopedia od the Social Sciences (Vol. 2, 2d ed; Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008), 559-560.

BOOK REVIEWS

Review of John Wilson Lewis (ed.), THE CITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA, in Journal of Politics, 34 (February 1972), 310-311.

Review of Arthur I. Blaustein and Geoffrey Faux, THE STAR-SPANGLED HUSTLE: WHITE POWER AND BLACK CAPITALISM in Wall Street Review of Books, 1 (June 1973), 215-229.

Review of Carroll Smith Rosenberg, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CITY: THE NEW YORK CITY MISSION MOVEMENT, 1812-1870, in Christian Scholar's Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1974), 73-75.

Review of Robert Higgs, COMPETITION AND COERCION, BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1865-1914, in Wall Street Review of Books, 6 (Spring 1978), 117-119.

Review of Herbert E. Alexander, MONEY IN POLITICS, and Herbert E. Alexander, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM, in Wall Street Review of Books, 6 (Summer 1978), 209-211.

Review of James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES, in Wall Street Review of Books, 6 (Fall 1978), 319-320.

Review of American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING AND SUNSET LEGISLATION, in Wall Street Review of Books, 7 (Winter 1979), 53-55.

Review of David Rogers, CAN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT SAVE THE CITIES? THE CASE OF NEW YORK, in Wall Street Review of Books, 7 (Spring 1979), 75-77.

Review of Kevin R. Cox and R. J. Johnston (eds.), CONFLICT, POLITICS AND THE URBAN SCENE, in American Political Science Review, 78 (June 1984), 531-532.

Review of Manuel Carballo and Mary Jo Bane (eds.), THE STATE AND THE POOR IN THE 1980s, in American Political Science Review, 79 (June 1985), 523-524.

Review of Terry Sanford, A DANGER TO DEMOCRACY: THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS, in Presidential Studies Quarterly, 16 (Winter 1986), 153-155.

Review of Charles W. Whalen, Jr., THE HOUSE AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE IRONY OF CONGRESSIONAL REFORM, in Presidential Studies Quarterly, 16 (Spring 1986), 369-371.

Review of Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, in Irish Political Studies, 1 (1986), 125-127.

Review of David McKay, AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, in Presidential Studies Quarterly, 17 (Fall 1987), 784-785.

Review of Sheila D. Collins, THE RAINBOW CHALLENGE: THE JACKSON CAMPAIGN AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, in Presidential Studies Quarterly, 19 (Fall 1988), 874-875.

Review of Abigail M. Thernstrom, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS, in Policy Studies Review 8 (Autumn 1988), 191-194.

Review of Herbert H. Haines, BLACK RADICALS AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MAINSTREAM, 1954-1970, in Journal of Southern History, 56 (February 1990): 155-157.

Review of Harlan Hahn and Sheldon Kamienieki, PREFERENDUM VOTING: SOCIAL STATUS AND POLICY PREFERENCES, in Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (Fall 1990): 828-830.

Review of Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds.), CANDIDATE SELECTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE SECRET GARDEN OF POLITICS, in Presidential Studies Quarterly 21 (Winter 1991): 167- 168.

Review of Thomas Cronin, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL, in Presidential Studies Quarterly, 22 (Fall 1992): 786-788.

Review of F. Leslie Seidle, (ed.), COMPARATIVE ISSUES IN PARTY AND ELECTION FINANCE, in British Journal of Canadian Studies, (1993).

Review of John Dittmer, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 540 (July 1995): 170-171.

Review of Michael J. Glennon, WHEN NO MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, in National Political Science Review, 6 (1997): 323-325.

Review of Frederick M. Wirt, "WE AIN'T WHAT WE WAS": CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NEW SOUTH, in American Political Science Review, 92 (June 1998): 474-475.

Review of David T. Canon, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS, in The Law and Politics Book Review, 9 (October 1999): 467-471.

Review of Christopher M. Burke, THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING, REDISTRICTING, AND THE SUPREME COURT, in The Law and Politics Book Review, 9 (November 1999): 506-508.

Review of J. Morgan Kousser, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, in Journal of Politics, 62 (August 2000): 934-937.

Review of Kathleen L. Barber, A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION: PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEMS FOR THE TWENTIETH-FIRST CENTURY, in Representation, 38 (Summer/Autumn 2001), 171-173.

Review of Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman, (eds.), ELECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, IRELAND, AND MALTA UNDER THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE: REFLECTIONS ON AN EMBEDDED INSTITUTION, in American Political Science Review, 95 (December 2001), 1012 - 1013.

Review of Dianne T. Thompson, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN NORTH CAROLINA: RECONSIDERING TRADITIONAL CRITERIA, in The Law and Politics Book Review, 13 (December 2003).

Review of Douglas J. Amy, REAL CHOICES / NEW VOICES: HOW PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS COULD REVITALIZE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, in 40 (No. 2, 2004) Representation, 158-160.

Review of David M. Ferrell and Ian McAllister, THE AUSTRALIAN ELECTION SYSTEM: ORIGINS, VARIATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES, in Representation (forthcoming).

Review of Thomas E. Mann and Bruse E. Cain, eds, PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING, in Party Politics (forthcoming).