Chicago Heights Amicus Curiae
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 95-3925, 98-2785, 98-2798, 98-2811,
98-2899, 98-3004, 98-3051, & 98-3075
RON HARPER, WILLIAM ELLIOT, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants
and
ROBERT McCOY and KEVIN PERKINS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO HEIGHTS, et al.
Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Brief of
The Center for
Voting and Democracy
as Amicus Curiae
In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees Kevin
Perkins and Robert McCoy Urging Affirmance
Jamin B. Raskin, Professor, American U.,
Washington College of Law
Attorney for Amicus
Curiae
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF
THE ISSUES
INTEREST OF
THE AMICUS CURIAE
SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
The Center for Voting and Democracy will
address the following issues:
1. Whether cumulative voting is a legitimate
remedy for a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.
2. Whether the district court abused its
discretion in selecting a seven-member cumulative voting plan
as a remedy in this case.
The Center for Voting and Democracy is a
non-partisan and non-profit corporation incorporated in the
District of Columbia for educational purposes. The Center
researches and distributes information on electoral systems
that promote full voter participation and fair representation,
particularly alternatives that will enable more voters to
elect candidates of their choice than in plurality or in
traditional at-large elections. The Center's mission is
founded on the belief that implementing such voting systems
would: restore vitality to our democracy; ensure fairer
representation of our society's diversity in elected bodies;
and assist local, state, and national governments in solving
the complex problems facing our nation. The Center has been
active in encouraging government officials, judges and the
public to explore systematic alternatives to the use of
territorial districting, especially where race is used as a
divisive and controlling factor.
Cumulative voting is a legally valid remedy
for minority vote dilution claims under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. It has been upheld against constitutional
challenge, referred to favorably by federal courts as a vote
dilution remedy, and approved as a remedy by federal courts as
part of settlements under Section 2. The empirical experience
shows that it is effective in remedying minority vote
dilution. Its use is not contrary to the "proviso" of Section
2. That proviso merely states that the election of minority
candidates at a proportion less than that minority group�s
share of the relevant population does not by itself indicate
liability; it does not state that the potential for such a
result invalidates a Section 2 remedy. Both the plain language
of the statute and Supreme Court precedent make clear that the
potential to achieve "proportionality" is not problematic.
Similarly, the cases cited by appellants rejecting cumulative
voting remedies dealt with factually distinct situations in
which the district remedy offered by the defendant
jurisdiction was itself adequate, the district court showed
insufficient deference to the defendant jurisdiction�s policy
preferences, or the lower court underestimated the peculiar
needs attendant to judicial elections.
The particular cumulative voting plan adopted
by the district court in this case is an appropriate remedy
within the court�s discretion. Illinois, including Chicago
Heights, has a history of using cumulative voting for some
elections. The "equal and even" form of cumulative voting
adopted by the court is particularly easy for voters to
understand and for election officials to administer.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by choosing a seven-member cumulative voting plan
in an at-large framework. The decision to use an at-large
framework was justified by the need to achieve finality to
this twelve-year denial of plaintiffs� fundamental voting
rights by avoiding the potential for Shaw litigation,
and by the deference paid the district court to the policy
preferences reflected in the defendant jurisdictions�
electoral system prior to the filing of the suit. The use of
seven members was justified by the need for an odd number of
members (to reduce the likelihood of tie-breaking votes by an
official elected at-large) and the need to keep the government
body size as close as possible to that chosen by the defendant
jurisdictions.
I.
Cumulative Voting is a Proper Remedy Under the Voting Rights
Act
There is no federal constitutional or
statutory provision banning the use of cumulative voting,
limited voting, or single transferable vote systems ("modified
at-large systems"), or barring the adoption of such systems by
federal courts. The constitutionality of these schemes has
been upheld by a number of courts. Federal courts may approve
such alternatives to single-member districts as remedies in
cases brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Indeed, federal courts may be required to adopt such
alternative systems to reconcile dilution remedies with the
jurisdiction�s policy choices.
A number of courts have commented favorably
on the use of cumulative voting and other "modified at-large"
systems as voting rights remedies. See, e.g.,
SCLC v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1313 (11th Cir.
1995) (Hatchett, dissenting); see also Marshall
v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 936 n.9 (5th Cir.
1978) (noting prevalence of "proportional representation"
systems abroad, acknowledging use of "Hare system" in the
United States, and quoting approvingly from John Stuart Mill�s
endorsement of proportional representation systems); Latino
Political Action Committee, Inc. v. City of Boston,
609 F. Supp. 739, 744 (D. Mass. 1985) (describing limited
voting�s beneficial effect on minority voters, and relying on
use of limited voting in present system to reject vote
dilution claim). Judge Hatchett of the Eleventh Circuit has
praised cumulative voting as a potential remedy in judicial
election cases. SCLC v. Sessions, 56 F.3d at
1313-1315. Many courts have approved settlements of Section 2
cases using cumulative voting. See, e.g.,
Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist No. 54-5,
No. 84-1025 (D.S.D. 1988); Banks v. Peoria, No.
87-2371 (C.D. Ill. 1987); and the Dillard cases
cited above.
Contrary to the arguments raised by
appellants, there is no factual or legal impediment to the use
of cumulative voting as a Section 2 remedy, either as a
general matter or under the circumstances of this case.
A. Cumulative Voting Is An Appropriate And
Effective Remedy For Minority Vote Dilution
Cumulative voting affords voters protected by
Section 2 an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice,
which is the purpose behind Section 2. See 42 U.S.C. �
1973b. By allowing voters to "plump" multiple votes in favor
of one heavily preferred candidate and thus register the
intensity of voter preference, cumulative voting gives
voters in a minority group a better chance to elect a
candidate of choice. This principles applies to voters in
politically cohesive racial minority groups as well as all
other self-defined political minorities.
The track record of the first cumulative
voting elections held (pursuant to Voting Rights Act
settlements) in the late 1980s and early 1990s makes this
clear from the standpoint of racial and ethnic minority
empowerment. Whenever racial or ethnic minority candidates
participated in a cumulative voting election, their
participation resulted in the election of racial or ethnic
minority candidates for the first time in decades (or ever).
This result obtained in all regions of the country and for all
minority groups, including elections held in Peoria, Illinois
(black candidate), Alamogordo, New Mexico (Hispanic
candidate), Sisseton, South Dakota (Native American
candidates), and several local jurisdictions in Alabama (black
candidates). Richard L. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat
Election Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution,
21 Stetson L. Rev. 743, 750 (1992), at 758-60. Moreover,
cumulative voting elections also enhance opportunities for
non-racial or ethnic minority voting blocs � for example, they
have in some instances resulted in the election of a
Republican candidate in a predominately Democratic
jurisdiction for the first time in that jurisdiction�s modern
history. Engstrom et al., One Person, Seven Votes: The
Cumulative Voting Experience in Chilton County, Alabama,
in Affirmative Action and Representation: Shaw v. Reno
and the Future of Voting Rights 285 (Anthony A. Peacock ed.,
1997); Pildes and Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United
States.
B. Cumulative Voting Is Not Contrary to
the "Section 2 Proviso"
Appellant Park District (Brief at 33-34)
cites the opinion in Cousin v. Sundquist,
145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998) for the proposition that
cumulative voting is inconsistent with Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act because of the "Dole proviso," which reads:
Nothing in this Section shall be read to
guarantee the election of minority group
representatives in proportion to the minority group�s
share of population.
42 U.S.C. � 1973 (emphasis added). This
language has been interpreted (correctly) to mean that
statutorily protected minority groups are not entitled to
"proportional representation." See, e.g..,
McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 117-118
(4th Cir. 1988). However, this language has no
bearing on the use of cumulative voting as a valid Section 2
remedy. The Park District�s argument and the decision in
Cousin reflect nothing more than terminological
confusion between a political science rubric for electoral
systems used in many democratic nations on the one hand and a
very distinct judicial concept in Section 2 law on the other.
Cumulative voting and other "modified
at-large" voting systems have been placed by political
scientists within a broad umbrella of electoral systems called
"proportional representation." These systems contrast with
plurality or "winner-take-all" systems in that they are
designed to allot legislative seats according to votes cast.
These systems have nothing to do with racial quotas or
entitlements.
The proviso, on the other hand, was added to
the text of Section 2 only to make it clear that Section 2 did
not establish a quota system in elections � that is, that no
election would be held invalid simply because there were not a
certain percentage of blacks elected. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that "proportionality" as used in the proviso
"links the success rate of minority candidates to the minority
group�s share of the jurisdiction�s population."
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 n.11
(1994). For example, if blacks make up 20% of the population
of a county governed by a five-member commission, a consistent
failure by black candidates to win one out of the five
commission seats would not, in and of itself, entitle black
voters to Section 2 relief. Nor would a failure to draw one
out of five majority-black districts entitle black
voters to any relief. Instead, plaintiffs would still have to
prove (as they have proven in this case) racial bloc voting,
historical discrimination, socio-economic disadvantage, and
all the other applicable Gingles factors. However, if
they made this showing, the fact that their relief might
enable them to approach or even exceed "proportionality" would
in no way be fatal to their claim.
This result is entirely consistent with the
Section 2 proviso and the Voting Rights Act as a whole. This
is clear from both the plain language of the proviso and the
Supreme Court�s interpretation of it. The proviso itself
merely states that "proportionality" is not a legal guarantee;
it does not in any way imply that proportionality is a
forbidden result. The Park District invites this Court to take
a provision which says merely that racial "proportionality is
not guaranteed in legislative bodies and convert it to
the unintended and far more restrictive statement that racial
"proportionality" is not allowed in legislative bodies.
The Supreme Court has explained this point
beyond any doubt. In DeGrandy, the Supreme Court held
that a percentage of representation equal to or greater than a
minority group�s population percentage was not a "safe harbor"
for defendant jurisdictions, and that such a result was
consistent with the Section 2 proviso. Id. at 1013
n.11, 1017-1018. Indeed, Justice O�Connor noted that a
representation percentage lower than the corresponding
population percentage was "always relevant" and "probative
evidence of vote dilution." Id. at 1025 (O�Connor, J.,
concurring). This result is consistent with lower court
decisions faced with this very issue. See, e.g.,
Williams v. City of Texarkana, 862 F. Supp. 756,
764 (W.D. Ark. 1992), aff�d, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir.
1994). Thus, the argument asserted by the Park District (and
by the court in Cousin) � that cumulative voting is
barred by the Section 2 proviso because it enables minority
groups to reliably attain a share of elected seats
proportionate to their population share � is flatly
inconsistent with the plain language of Section 2 and the
Supreme Court�s interpretation of this language.
The argument is also flawed factually. It
proceeds from the premise that cumulative voting would
guarantee proportionate electoral results. But
cumulative voting provides only an opportunity to elect
candidates of choice, not a guarantee. Voters who are part of
any such political or racial minority must participate in the
election and must be cohesive in their voting patterns. And it
is by no means a foregone conclusion which candidates will
win. Black voters may field too many competing candidates,
split the (otherwise politically cohesive) black vote, and
elect no candidates of choice. Or black voters may choose not
to vote strategically by "plumping" their votes and forego the
mathematical advantages afforded under cumulative voting by
strategic voting. Alternatively, black voters may form a
coalition with another group and help elect a non-black
candidate, or a candidate who is not the first choice of the
black community. Indeed, modified at-large voting systems move
away from the kind of race-based politics now characteristic
of territorial districting by allowing voters to, in effect,
district themselves.
C. The Cases Cited By Appellants Do Not
Hold That Cumulative Voting Is Unavailable As A Section 2
Remedy
Appellants cite several cases dealing with
cumulative voting (or limited voting, another "modified
at-large" system) for the proposition that such alternative
electoral schemes are unavailable either generally or in this
case. The cases cited are easily distinguished.
Neither McGhee v. Granville
County, 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988) nor Cane v.
Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1097 (1995) lend
any support to appellants� arguments. In McGhee, the
Fourth Circuit rejected a limited voting remedy because the
district remedy offered by the defendant jurisdiction
adequately remedied the underlying violation. 860 F.2d at 115.
For the reasons explained in the briefs submitted by the
Perkins-McCoy plaintiffs and the United States, the
defendants� offered remedy in this case did not adequately
remedy the underlying Section 2 violation found by the
district court. The court in McGhee expressly
disclaimed any intent to rule generally that limited voting
schemes were unavailable as remedies, concluding that "the
specific issue here is not the validity vel non of the
[limited voting plan], but the prior adequacy of the County�s
plan." Id. at 120. The Fourth Circuit�s holding in
Cane was similarly limited to "the specific facts and
circumstances presented," 35 F.3d at 929, which are ably
explained and distinguished in the United States� amicus
brief.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit�s opinion in
Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir.
1998) contains a number of criticisms of the cumulative voting
remedy employed in that case. However, with the exception of
the "Section 2 proviso" argument discussed above, the court
emphasizes that all of its criticisms are directed at the use
of cumulative voting in the unique context of judicial
elections, where the need to maximize judicial
"collegiality" and to avoid the "specter of ...organized
interest groups seizing control" of the judiciary made
cumulative voting inappropriate. 145 F.3d at 834. While we
disagree with the criticisms made by the court in
Cousin, they clearly do not apply in any event to the
instant case.
II.
Cumulative Voting Is A Proper Remedy In This Case
A. The Cumulative Voting System Used In
This Case Is Established, Simple,
And Has A History Of
Use In Illinois, Including Chicago Heights
Cumulative at-large voting is not a novel
system. Illinois used cumulative voting to elect its state
assembly from 1870 to 1980. Everson, The Effect of the
"Cutback" on the Representation of Women and Minorities in the
Illinois General Assembly, in United States Electoral
Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities. Many large
corporations us cumulative voting (see the ABA Model Business
Corporation Act). Cumulative voting has received a sharp
increase in attention in recent years, with a corresponding
rapid growth in its adoption in localities around the United
States; the number of localities with cumulative voting now
totals more than fifty. States with localities adopting
cumulative voting since 1986 include Alabama, Illinois, New
Mexico South Dakota and Texas. Texas has the greatest number
of jurisdictions with cumulative voting, and the success of
the system is supported by the fact that in 1995, the State of
Texas adopted a law allowing school districts to adopt
cumulative voting for their elections.
Nevertheless, because most localities still
do not use cumulative voting, there are concerns that it will
be confusing to voters simply because it is unfamiliar. While
important to raise, the suggestion that cumulative voting is
confusing to voters is baseless. Every empirical study of the
use of cumulative voting in recent elections has shown that
voter confusion is not a significant problem. See
Richard Engstrom & Robert Brischetto, Is Cumulative
Voting Too Complex?: Evidence From Exit Polls, 27 Stetson
L. Rev. 813, 821-827 (1998) (exit poll data showed no
significant voter confusion; when asked to compare it to other
election methods they had experienced, more voters found
cumulative voting relatively easier than relatively more
difficult); Engstrom, One Person, Seven Votes, supra,
at 294-295 (exit poll data of first-time cumulative voting
election indicated 90% of voters understood system and did not
find it any more difficult to use than other voting systems);
Robert Brischetto & Richard Engstrom, Cumulative Voting
and Latino Representation: Exit Surveys in Fifteen Texas
Communities, 78 Social Sci. Q. 4 (1997) (exit poll data of
first-time cumulative voting election indicated 90% of voters
understood system); Richard Engstrom and Charles J.
Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative Voting: The
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 Soc. Sci. Quarterly 388, 391
(1991) (both Native American and Anglo voters understood
cumulative voting system).
The district court has made clear that the
form of cumulative voting used in this case is the "equal and
even" method of cumulative voting. As the record in this case
makes clear (see Richie Affidavit, Document 518, Group
Exhibit), this form of cumulative voting is particularly easy
for voters and consistent with Illinois� statutory scheme. The
ballot can look exactly like the ballot for a traditional
at-large election, and voters can vote exactly as they would
in such an election. The only difference for voters is that
they must be aware that the fewer candidates for whom they
cast votes, the greater the share of their seven votes each
favored candidate will receive. Use of equal and even
cumulative voting (EE cumulative voting) also fully addresses
concerns about election administration. In fact, Cook County
used its current punch-card voting during the time when EE
cumulative voting was used to elect the Illinois House of
Representatives from 1870 to 1980 (Richie Affidavit, p. 4).
EE cumulative voting proceeds as described in
the Illinois state statute. "Each elector may cast as many
votes as there are aldermen to be elected in the elector's
district, or may distribute his or her votes, or equal parts
of the votes, among the candidates as the elector sees fit"
(65 ILCS 5/3.1-15.35). To distribute "equal parts of votes," a
voter simply "X" votes for the candidates he or she supports,
and the voters' votes are evenly distributed among these
candidates. In elections to the Illinois House of
Representatives from 1870 to 1980, voters --including, of
course, residents of Chicago Heights -- had the option to "X"
vote for one, two or three candidates. If the voter supported
one candidate, i.e., placed only one "X" on the ballot, that
candidate received three votes. If the voter supported two
candidates, each candidate received one and one-half votes
each. If the voter supported three candidates, each candidate
received one vote. The voter did not have to understand
fractions; rather, the voter needed to understand that the
fewer the number of candidates supported, the more votes each
of those candidates received.
The City of Peoria currently uses EE
cumulative voting. The system was adopted in a consent decree
and has been used to elect five at-large city council members
in elections held in 1991 and 1995. In both elections,
Peoria's board of elections pursued community outreach about
the cumulative voting system (Richie affidavit, pp. 4-5). The
actual method of voting was similar to the previous method of
election when three members were elected at-large, with voters
having an option to support fewer than three candidates. The
rate of invalid ballots has been comparable to other Peoria
elections using non-cumulative voting methods.
EE cumulative voting can make voting easier
for voters who are interested in electing more than one
candidate. Rather than having to make uncertain calculations
about which favored candidate might need slightly more votes
than other candidates, a voter can simply vote for the
preferred "team" of candidates.
As further indication of cumulative voting's
viability as a workable electoral system, many senior
political leaders and analysts in Illinois have indicated
their indicated their support for restoring cumulative voting.
The Chicago Tribune editorialized in 1995 that:
The magic of cumulative voting was that it
often produced the most thoughtful, independent members of the
legislature. There were liberal Republicans and conservative
Democrats.... The intermeshing of political and regional
interests has all but disappeared in the 15 years since
cumulative voting was abolished. In its place, partisan
politics has become increasingly shrill and
confrontational.... For years, many partisans and political
independents have looked wistfully at the era of cumulative
voting. They acknowledge that it produced some of the best and
brightest in Illinois politics. It's time for a debate about a
possible revival.
"Better Politics From An Old
Idea,"
Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1995,
editorial.
B. The District Court�s Decision To Use
Cumulative Voting In The Context Of A Seven-Member Body Was A
Valid Exercise Of Its Remedial Discretion
Appellants object that the district court�s
remedial plan modifies state law slightly by providing for
seven-member cumulative voting at-large rather than either
dividing the City into between three and six wards with three
members per ward (for a "minority representation" system) or
dividing the City into seven wards with two seats per ward
(for an "aldermanic system"). Of course, it was the appellants
themselves who first modified state law by moving to a
six-member body with a "strong mayor" form of government, a
result not permitted under Illinois law. Where appellants
deviated from state law, it was with the effect of aggravating
minority vote dilution. Where the district court did so, it
was with the effect of reconciling the overriding need to
fully remedy minority vote dilution with the competing
interests of 1) deference to the defendant jurisdiction�s
policy judgments and 2) the need for certainty and finality in
extremely protracted litigation. An examination of the
district court�s reasoning shows that the district court did
not abuse its remedial discretion.
In this case, the district court "exercise[d]
its discretion in fashioning a near optimal plan" by
balancing the policy preferences of the defendant
jurisdictions with state law considerations and with the need
to fully and completely remedy the underlying minority vote
dilution. See Cane, 35 F.3d at 927, 928
(emphasis added). The latter concern must of course be
paramount, so the district court legitimately decided, for the
reasons discussed in the briefs of the Perkins-McCoy
plaintiffs and the United States, that an odd number of
members was required. State law authorized the use of
cumulative voting, which the district court chose to avoid any
further litigation under Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993).
In doing so, the district court was not
making a finding that a viable Shaw challenge could be
raised to any districting scheme adopted as a remedy. Rather,
the court was making a realistic assessment that any
districting plan had the potential for such litigation which
could delay the arrival of certainty and finality to the
voters of Chicago Heights who had suffered an abridgement of
the fundamental right to vote for many years. Under the unique
circumstances of this case � after 12 years, several
elections, numerous district court hearings and two appeals �
it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to decide that
a system immune from Shaw challenge was desirable.
Further, an at-large electoral framework was
consistent with the policy judgments made by the defendant
jurisdictions prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Before
plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit, both the Park District
and the City Council were elected at-large. As the United
States points out in its amicus brief, district courts may
look to the policy judgments "underlying the
current electoral scheme or the legally
unacceptable remedy offered by the legislative body."
Cane, 35 F.3d at 927, 928 (emphasis added). Because of
its understandable desire to forestall any further litigation
over district lines and to achieve consistency with the
electoral scheme existing at the time of suit, the court
deviated from state law in crafting this cumulative voting
relief. This decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Nor was the selection of seven members an
abuse of discretion. Appellant City of Chicago Heights points
out (Brief at 34) that state law provided for either a
cumulative voting scheme with between nine and 18 members
(three each from between three and six wards), or an
"aldermanic system" of 14 members (two each from seven wards).
But every indication of the City and Park District�s policy
preferences � its original five-member plan, its proposed
six-member consent decree � pointed toward keeping the size of
the body relatively small. A governing body much larger than
this would be inappropriate in a city as small as Chicago
Heights. By choosing a seven-member body, the district court
again reconciled the overriding need to fully remedy the
minority vote dilution by using an odd number of seats with
the corresponding need to keep the governing body as close as
possible in size to that preferred by the defendant
jurisdictions. Perhaps a five-member body would have worked as
well, but the choice was well within the district court�s
equitable discretion.
Similarly, we agree with the Perkins-McCoy
plaintiffs and the United States that the change to a
seven-member body does not run afoul of Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994). In Holder, the Court
was concerned with the absence of a "benchmark" from which to
measure vote dilution for the purposes of determining
liability. The Court did not state that after liability was
found, a district court could not exercise its remedial
discretion to choose a different number of members if it
determined such a change to be necessary to fashion a full and
complete Section 2 remedy. In the instant case, liability was
established through the use of a traditional benchmark. At the
remedial phase, all parties, including defendants, were
choosing among various municipal government schemes provided
for as options in the Illinois statutes. To the extent any
"benchmark" was needed at this distinct phase not considered
in Holder, the Illinois statutes provided them.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court
should affirm the district court�s remedial order.
Banks v. Peoria, No.
87-2371 (C.D. Ill. 1987) 4
Blaikie v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d 134, 243 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 439 (1964) 3
Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist No.
54-5, No. 84-1025 (D.S.D. 1988) 4
Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921
(4th Cir. 1994) 10, 15, 16
Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) 3
Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818
(6th Cir. 1998) 6, 8, 10, 11
Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F.
Supp. 870 (M.D. Ala. 1988) 3, 4
Dillard v. City of Guin, No. 87-T-1225-N (M.D.
Ala. 1988) (unpublished opinion) 4
Dillard v. City of Centre, No. 87-T-1174-N (M.D. Ala.
1988) (unpublished opinion) 4
Dillard v. Town of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 1244
(M.D. Ala. 1988) 4
Dillard v. Town of Louisville, 730 F. Supp.
1546 (M.D. Ala. 1990) 3
Dillard v. Town of Myrtleswood, No.
87-T-1263-N (M.D. Ala. 1988) (unpublished opinion) 4
Hechinger v. Martin, 411 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1976)
3
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) 3, 10,
17
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 7,
8
Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa.
1971) 3
Latino Political Action Committee, Inc. v.
City of Boston, 609 F. Supp. 739 (D. Mass. 1985) 4
LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743 (D.
Conn. 1972) 3
LULAC v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728 (5th
Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc) 3, 4
McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d
110 (4th Cir. 1988) 6, 10
Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927
(5th Cir. 1978) 4
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1995) 16
Orloski v. Davis, 564 F. Supp. 526 (M.D. Pa.
1983) 3
SCLC v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281
(11th Cir. 1995) 4
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 15,
16
United States v. Marengo County Comm'n,
731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984) 3
Williams v. City of Texarkana, 862 F. Supp. 756
(W.D. Ark. 1992), aff�d, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th
Cir. 1994) 8
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