Re-Running the 1994 Elections with Different Systems
Andrew Reynolds
The 1994 national
parliamentary elections held in South Africa marked the high point of a period of
tumultuous change from authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy in the region. There is
strong evidence to suggest that institutional factors have an important role to play in
the consolidation of a new democracy. Nowhere is this more apparent than in an ethnically
divided or plural society like South Africa, with a history all too often filled with
conflict over fundamental preferences and beliefs.
Constitutional design carries most weight
when politics is at its most dangerous; i.e., when it is seen as, or in practicality is, a
"zero-sum game." The recent experience in Angola, Algeria and elsewhere in
Africa illustrates that the concept of a "loyal opposition" is a difficult one
to entrench when one segment of society sees that losing an election is equivalent to
being completely shut out of governmental power.
It is for these reasons that the issues
of: whether to adopt majoritarian or consensual democracy; whether to choose
a presidential or parliamentary executive system; and whether to constitute
parliament by a plurality, majoritarian, or proportional representation
type electoral system, become critically important to the prospects for democratic
consolidation in a divided society.
Assessing Different Electoral Systems
This article will concentrate on the
third of those constitutional engineering choices -- the type of electoral system to be
used. By re-running the national parliamentary elections in South Africa we can assess how
the use of alternative electoral system formulae would have changed the composition of
government and parliament. The resulting empirical evidence can then be used to assess how
stable the system would have been likely to be considering the pre-existing divisions
within each society.
For the purposes of this exercise I have
re-run the election under: (1) single member district (SMD)
plurality; (2) a majoritarian system (the Alternative Vote, or AV) in the same single
member districts; (3) regionally based constituency list proportional representation (PR).
To these main electoral systems I have added: (4) the Alternative Vote in multi-member
districts (MMD), which was the important and widely discussed, proposal made for South
Africa by Donald Horowitz in his award-winning book A Democratic South Africa:
Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society.
Methodology and Assumptions
The data used in this paper comes from
the full district level voting figures released by the Independent Electoral Commission of
South Africa which gives voting figures, by party, for nine provinces and 343 counting
districts. The underlying assumption of the simulation exercise is that voter
preferences would have, by and large, remained the same regardless of the electoral system
used in South Africa and therefore electoral system incentives would not have
significantly affected the votes cast.
But indeed the predominant objection to
re-running elections under alternative systems is that a voter's party preference may not
be constant under varying electoral rules as some systems, chiefly plurality type ones,
provide powerful incentives for minority party supporters to vote tactically where they
believe their first choice party has no feasible chance of winning in a single member
district.
Preference voting systems, such as the
Alternative Vote, help in part to negate such tactical voting by allowing supporters of
minority parties to express their second preference on the ballot. At the other extreme,
list PR, held in districts of large magnitude, free the voter to choose their first
preference party almost regardless of that party's perceived support because the low
threshold for representation makes "wasted" votes far less likely.
However, I would argue that intuitively
this objection is far less troublesome in the case of democratic elections in South Africa
as party identification and voting preferences were very strongly held, reflecting
polities highly polarized along ethnic, linguistic, cultural, ideological and regional
lines. Polling evidence from South Africa supports this intuition that there was little
scope for voting "defection" among party supporters.
Re-Running the 1994 South African National Elections Under Alternative Electoral
Systems
Party |
Vote % |
Plurality (Seats) |
% |
SMD AV (Seats) |
% |
MMD AV (Seats) |
% |
Prov. PR (Seats) |
% |
Nat. List PR |
% |
ANC |
62.65 |
283 |
71 |
277 |
69 |
282 |
71 |
255 |
64 |
252 |
63 |
NP |
20.39 |
68 |
17 |
70 |
17 |
63 |
16 |
82 |
20 |
82 |
20 |
IFP |
10.54 |
49 |
12 |
53 |
13 |
55 |
14 |
43 |
11 |
43 |
11 |
FF |
2.17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
9 |
2 |
DP |
1.73 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
7 |
2 |
PAC |
1.25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
ACDP |
0.45 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0.5 |
Total |
100 |
400 |
100 |
400 |
100 |
400 |
100 |
400 |
100 |
400 |
100 |
I.D. |
6.7 |
5.9 |
7.2 |
0.8 |
0.3 |
Key: ANC= African National Congress, NP= National Party, IFP= Inkatha Freedom Party, FF=
Freedom Front, DP= Democratic Party, PAC= Pan-Africanist Congress, ACDP= African Christian
Democratic Party, I.D.= Index of Disproportionality
Overview of Current System
South Africa's general election of
April 1994 was held under a form of national list PR with half the National Assembly (200)
being constituted from nine provincial lists and the other half being constituted from a
single national list. In effect the country used one nation-wide constituency (of 400
members) for the conversion of votes into seats and no threshold for representation was
imposed. The Droop quota (votes/ [seats + 1]) was used to apportion seats and surplus
seats were awarded by an adaptation of the largest remainder method.
Complete results for each of the four
electoral system simulations, and the actual national list PR results, are given in table
1.
A Re-Run With Plurality: One Party Domination
The first, and probably most salient,
issue to note concerning plurality's effect on the South African National Assembly
election is that the ANC would have won, under this system, more parliamentary seats than
under any alternative system and furthermore that they would have received well over
two-thirds of the Constitutional Assembly giving them enough power to write the new
constitution without formal reference to any other party in the Assembly.
The 283 ANC seats represent a "seat
bonus" of 31 members, over and above what the party would have won under a purely
proportional electoral system. Interestingly the vast majority of ANC seats turned out to
be "safe" ones, in the sense that there was no competitive challenge in the
district from another party. Only eight (3%) of the ANC's seats were not won with an
absolute majority and the average ANC seat was taken with over 80% of the popular vote (in
seats the ANC lost, it averaged 19% of the popular vote).
These results illustrate, that under
plurality at least, the likelihood of the ANC losing their grip on parliamentary power in
the next, or subsequent, elections would be slim. If the Nationalists were to make gains
from the ANC (or if Inkatha, or the PAC, were to win converts from the ANC) those
defectors would more likely be from already safe ANC constituencies and thus the ANC could
easily hold constituencies despite a moderate drop in their national popular vote.
In Britain marginal seats are categorized
as those seats won with a majority of less than 10 percent of the recorded vote. These
then are considered the "battle-ground" seats -- those that determine which
party forms a government. In the 1992 British parliamentary elections there were 171 such
marginal seats, or 26 percent of the total.
However, under the plurality simulation
for South Africa only 13 (3 percent) seats were won with majorities of less than 10
percent, and thus would be considered "marginals." In effect the system would be
frozen in terms of seats won and requiring a political earthquake to jar the patterns of
party voting concentration.
This finding is a serious blow to the case
for plurality in South Africa, for such majoritarian prescriptions rely on the perception
that executive power can change hands from election to election. If plurality leads to a
de facto "one-party state" then there are no incentives for losing parties (in
this case the NP, IFP, FF, and PAC) to remain "loyal parliamentary opposition"
parties. A deeply divided society like South Africa is most threatened in its fledgling
democratic times if incentives for pro-system loyalty are lacking.
Plurality and Incentives for Violence
The second most serious threat to
stability posed by the plurality results is the total exclusion from parliament of the
smaller minority parties (the Freedom Front [FF], the Pan Africanist Congress [PAC], the
Democratic Party [DP] and the African Christian Democratic Party [ACDP]).
The exclusion of the liberal Democratic
Party might be a sad loss to parliamentary debate in the new South Africa and clearly
Helen Suzman's 13 years as a lone voice in the previous "whites-only" parliament
illustrated that the level of parliamentary effectiveness does not always correlate with a
party's number of seats.
Similarly the loss of the ACDP's two seats
might eliminate another small but growing and dynamic section of opinion. But the threat
really would emanate from the exclusion of representatives of the Afrikaner Freedom Front
led by General Constand Viljoen and the Pan Africanist Congress of Clarence Makwetu. Both
parties are currently undergoing an internal "battle for the soul" waged by
proponents of moderation versus those who have in the past advocated and practiced
anti-system violence.
The pressures on the Freedom Front to
withdraw from the democratic system come from Afrikaners within the Conservative Party
(CP) and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), and PAC withdrawal is argued for by similarly
vociferous racists in the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) the armed wing of the
PAC nationalist movement.
I believe that the 14 combined seats won
by these diametrically opposed parties under the list PR system invests each group with a
"pro-system" democratic mentality which helps to tip the balance in favor of the
moderate wings of each respective party. If, as under the plurality electoral system, the
FF and PAC had won not a single National Assembly seat, then their incentives for
anti-system violence might have been greatly increased.
Plurality and Regional Fragmentation
Another telling implication that
plurality would have had for the evolution of politics in South Africa is the way in which
the system would have created regional/provincial fiefdoms of homogeneous party power.
Under the actual results each province sent representatives from at least two parties --
five parties in the PWV case -- to sit in the National Assembly.
But under the plurality simulation all the
seats were won by a single party (the ANC) in four provinces (North-West, Northern
Transvaal, Eastern Cape, Eastern Transvaal) and all but one seat was won by the ANC in the
Free State. The NP would have been far more dominant in the Western Cape (winning 34/42
seats instead of 24/42) and the IFP more dominant in KwaZulu-Natal (taking 49/80 seats as
opposed to 39/80).
Such concentrations of representation
would first, increase pressures for the politics of clientelism -- the exclusion of some
regions from government resources and the inclusion of others -- and second, eliminate the
ability of minority party supporters in most regions to approach a representative from
their region who sympathized with their views.
Re-Running the Election Under the Alternative Vote
The first thing to note about the
impact of the alternative vote on South Africa's election is that, for all intents and
purposes, the results would have been the same as under a SMD plurality system. This is
due to the fact that most seats (94 percent) were won with absolute majorities (making the
AV redundant) and of those 17 seats won by a plurality only six would have been likely to
have been won by the second placed party in the plurality vote.
The ANC would still have had their
two-thirds parliamentary majority although with six seats less than their plurality
victory. The NP and IFP's handful of extra seats would not have been enough to alter the
dynamics of the new National Assembly. The complaints about both the exclusion of the FF,
DP, PAC and ACDP and also the troubling occurrence of regional fiefdoms would have
remained.
The Alternative Vote in Multi-Member Districts
Before explaining the results of the
alternative vote in multi-member (MMD AV) simulation in South Africa, it is useful to give
some background to the rationale Donald Horowitz cites for his proposal and the ensuing
pre-election debate which then took place within scholarly publications.
In his 1991 book A Democratic South
Africa? Horowitz argued that "The incentive to compromise, and not merely the
incentive to coalesce, is the key to accommodation" in an ethnically divided society.
This rested, on the empirically well-founded premise, that parliamentary coalitions
between differing ethnic parties often fall apart because there is no substantive common
interest glue to keep them together.
Horowitz therefore argued that incentives
for "pre-election" compromise that encouraged "vote-pooling" or party
appeals across ethnic boundaries, were key to crafting a stable and less ethnically
divisive constitutional order. In practical terms Horowitz argued that these incentives
would be engendered by the Alternative Vote, a majoritarian type electoral system also
called Majority Preference Voting, which forces the winning candidate of a SMD to win an
absolute majority of the district's vote (i.e., 50 percent plus one).
If no one candidate wins over 50 percent
of the first preferences then the lowest polling candidate is eliminated and his or her
second preferences are redistributed to candidates remaining in the race. This process
continues until a single candidate surmounts the 50 percent threshold. However, these
incentives only "kick in" if no one party has an absolute majority of (or
perceives it has an absolute majority of) the districts votes. As Horowitz himself noted,
"If a party can win on first preferences, second preferences are irrelevant".
Due to the correlation of ethnicity,
geographical concentration and party preference in South Africa, Horowitz recognized that
constituencies would have to be heterogeneous to allow for the possibility of no single
party winning an absolute majority. "To achieve this, the constituencies may have to
be large, and they may therefore need to be multi-member constituencies."
The two most detailed analyses of the
"Horowitz proposal" are Arend Lijphart's 1991 article in the South African
Journal of Political Science, Politikon, and chapter five in my own 1993 book Voting
for a New South Africa. Both of these pieces questioned the applicability of MMD AV
for South Africa and prophesied that the system would have disastrous implications for
stability and democratization in South Africa if used in practice.
Lijphart's critique rested on three main
points: firstly, that party coalitions within parliament carry similar incentives to
compromise as "vote-pooling" incentives on the electoral level. Secondly, that
AV, in theory and practice, resembles the "majority-runoff" method which was
found to be highly unsatisfactory when used in divided societies in 19th century Europe.
Thirdly, Lijphart refuted Horowitz's claim that AV would "mitigate the
winner-take-all aspects of plurality systems"...and that it would by
necessity..."achieve better proportionality of seats to votes than plurality systems
do".
As Douglas Rae stated in his 1967
comparison of electoral system consequences, "the Australian system (of AV) behaves
in all its particulars, including its degree of disproportionality, as if it were a single
member district plurality (FPTP) formula." Furthermore, Lijphart notes that AV
operated in multi-member constituencies makes the system even less proportional and more
majoritarian. "In PR systems proportionality increases as district magnitude
increases, but the relationship is just the other way round for majoritarian systems. AV's
disproportionality will rise sharply when it is applied in multi-member districts."
Indeed the only empirical case study we
have of MMD AV -- the elections for the Australian Federal Senate between 1919 and 1946 --
proves this to be the case. J.F.H. Wright has argued that in all ten elections with this
system the results were unsatisfactory. "On two occasions parties with less than half
the votes won majorities of seats, and on eight occasions, parties or coalitions with more
than 40 percent of the votes won three seats or less (15 percent)." The system
displayed its worst anomalies in 1925 when Labour, with 45 percent of votes, failed to win
a single seat, but then in 1943 Labour won all 19 seats up for election with 55 percent of
the popular vote.
MMD AV In Practice
The results in table 1 illustrate that MMD
AV in South Africa would not only have been far less proportional than PR but even less
proportional than results simulated for a straight SMD plurality system. This is primarily
due to the occurrence of minority parties winning plurality SMDs, but being submerged, and
defeated, in larger multi-member AV majoritarian constituencies.
The practical implications for South
Africa were; firstly that the ANC would have gained a "seat bonus" of 30 and, as
under plurality and SMD AV, would have had enough parliamentary seats to write the new
South African constitution unfettered; secondly that, similar to the other majoritarian
systems, all other minority parties (bar the NP and IFP) were excluded from
representation; and finally, that the creation of homogeneous provincial party fiefdoms
became even more pronounced.
The NP lost five seats from their
plurality total -- they picked up two seats in the Western Cape and one in the Northern
Cape, but these gains were outweighed by losing eight seats in KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP were
the main beneficiaries of that loss, picking up six seats, over and above their plurality
total, from KwaZulu-Natal.
However, the most important implication
for the Horowitz proposal is that the geographical concentration of each parties vote
meant that only three multi-member constituencies (totaling 19 seats) were not won with an
absolute majority and therefore in only 5 percent of the National Assembly seats was there
any incentive for a party to appeal outside its particular support base.
Horowitz could well argue that I simply
have not tried hard enough to draw heterogeneous constituencies but the reality is that
drawing substantial numbers of plurality-won MMDs in South Africa, under current electoral
realities, would be a task making "affirmative districting" in the U.S. for
compliance with the Voting Rights Act look like a picnic.
There is no conceivable way of drawing
such districts in the Orange Free State, North-West, Eastern Cape, Northern Transvaal or
Eastern Transvaal provinces, and in vast swathes of the PWV area and the Western Cape.
Only in the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal could such districting be countenanced and
even there it would require massive gerrymandering of boundaries losing any semblance of
geographical compactness.
This is precisely the sort of electoral
manipulation that Horowitz has railed against in black majority districts in North
Carolina and elsewhere in the United States. Increasing the magnitude of the districts
does not help and would add the disadvantage of a highly complicated ballot in a
multi-candidate, multi-member, preference voting constituency.
From the evidence it appears as though the
Horowitz proposal might only have merit when either; a) there is a massive realignment of
voting behavior, or b) when there is substantial dwelling mobility among different ethnic
groups and districts become far more integrated and diverse than they are at the present
-- neither occurrence seems likely in the foreseeable future.
Re-Running the Election Under Provincial List PR
Re-running the election on a
provincial list PR basis with no national or compensatory list seats would have largely
left the national results unaltered as is illustrated in column 4 of table 1. The ANC
would have gained three seats, one from the Freedom Front and both the parliamentary seats
of the ACDP, but this would not have altered the dynamics of the new parliament as the
ANC's absolute majority still would have fallen short of a two-thirds super-majority.
Electoral Systems Make a Difference
The
results contained within this paper clearly illustrate that institutional design, and more
specifically electoral system design, matter a great deal in the early stages of a
multi-party democracy. In South Africa the choice of electoral system would have
determined:
1) the ANC's ability to write the
new constitutional unfettered, or with reference to other parties;
2) the ability of the FF, DP, PAC,
ACDP, AMP and AMCP to gain representation;
3) the nature of territorial
representation by party.
Furthermore, as the first Cabinet of
President Nelson Mandela was apportioned along proportional lines, with each party winning
over 5 percent of the Assembly seats being awarded a number of cabinet portfolios, the
choice of system would have also effected the balance of power within the cabinet. If a
plurality system had been used instead of a PR one the ANC would have taken one extra
Ministerial portfolio and the NP one less.
The evidence from this case study is not
definitive but the results do highlight clear trends which have become apparent during the
"third wave" of democratization. i.e., that plurality or majoritarian systems
are detrimental to democratic consolidation in ethnically divided fledgling democracies
and that proportional representational type systems are necessary to provide the inclusive
ground rules to enable party compromise and ethnic accommodation to flourish.
The Impact of Plurality
In South Africa plurality would have
been detrimental in four important respects.
First, minorities would have been
excluded, thus engendering a climate in which anti-system extremist violence would have
been more likely.
Second, regional fiefdoms of
concentrated party support would have been exaggerated and exemplified at the
parliamentary level providing the recipe for government clientelism and the politics of
inclusion of allies and exclusion of foes.
Third, the party system would have
"frozen," with few seats being competitive and likely to change hands from
election to election. An adequate level of seat competitiveness is a pre-requisite for a
successful majoritarian system of governance.
Fourth, if plurality had been
combined with majoritarian, "Westminster" system of government (as is usually
the case), then the classic "zero-sum game" so detrimental to ethnic
inclusiveness in a divided society would have been heightened.
However, the simulation does illustrate
one interesting (and as yet under recognized) aspect of plurality in that the system
provides relatively proportional national results in countries which have highly
concentrated ethnically based parties. Results from the 1994 Malawi elections further
demonstrate this point.
The Use of Alternative Vote
While the use of the Alternative Vote
in single member districts would have had no great effect on plurality results in South
Africa the Alternative Vote used in multi member constituencies (or the
"Horowitz" proposal) would have had a much greater impact. The Horowitz proposal
would have given rise to the most disproportional results, exaggerated regional fiefdoms
of support, advantaged the largest and discriminated against the smallest parties.
As I noted earlier, for
"vote-pooling" incentives to work constituencies must be created that avoid
single party majorities, but the realities of South Africa illustrate that crafting such
constituencies would, at the very least, take massive degrees of gerrymandering and
probably then would still be impossible to manage.
Choosing a PR System
With a failure of
plurality/majoritarian type electoral systems we are left to consider variations of PR
systems. PR appears most attractive because it has in South Africa facilitated inclusive
parliaments representing majorities and minorities, which form the bedrock of any viable
power-sharing constitutional dispensation. PR helps to mitigate incentives to clientelism
and the exclusion of those geographical areas which did not vote in large numbers for the
government of the day.
Added to this is the intuition that access
to representation and advocacy in South Africa is better under PR systems because voters
would be more likely to have a representative of their choice from their region, if not
from their single member district. Finally, when deciding between "provincial"
and "national list" PR it seems as though national list PR includes the wider
array of opinion in parliament and so one would lean towards recommending that, even if
the PR system was constituency based, there would be a national or compensatory list
element to facilitate the inclusion of small parties whose support was widely
geographically dispersed.
This article is condensed from a chapter
in Elections in Africa (Washington DC: USIP Press, 1995), edited by Andrew Reynolds
and Timothy Sisk. Reynolds is a doctoral student at the University of Calif.-San Diego
specializing in constitutional design and democratization in Southern Africa. He edited Election
'94: South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects (St. Martin's Press,
1994) and wrote Voting for a New South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman,
1993).