A Test for Democracy in Eastern Europe
Martyn Rady
Four years after their defeat in
Hungary's first free elections, the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) obtained an
overwhelming victory in the two-round general election held in May 1994. The HSP increased
its share of parliamentary seats from 33 in 1990 to 209, thus giving it an overall
majority in the 386-seat, single-chamber legislature.
The conservative Hungarian Democratic
Forum (HDF), which had led the government coalition from 1990 to 1994, fell back from 165
seats to 37. The principal opposition party to the former HDF coalition, the liberal
Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), failed to make the expected electoral breakthrough.
Although remaining the second largest party in the parliament, its number of seats fell
from 92 to 70. Hungary thus joined several other East European countries in electing to
power a party led mainly by former communists.
The Campaign
According to the Hungarian
constitution, general elections take place in Hungary at least every four years. The
political parties thus had ample notice to prepare their campaign strategies. The issue
which dominated the campaigning was the competence of the incumbent government,
particularly with respect to economic policy.
During the four years since 1990, the
HDF-led government had achieved much in terms of building a market economy based on
private ownership. Despite the gradualist approach adopted by the government, however, the
population experienced over this period a growing sense of social and economic
dislocation. High interest and inflation rates, unemployment amounting to 12% of the
workforce, and the conspicuous consumption of the new elite of entrepreneurs engendered
wide-spread anxiety and dissatisfaction.
Nostalgia for the social security of the
communist period boosted the HSP's appeal. According to an opinion poll held in early
1994, the most important factor behind support for the HSP was the belief that
"things were better in the old days when there were jobs and a secure
existence."
The HSP exploited these discontents. In an
advertisement published at the beginning of the year, the HSP leader, Gyula Horn, promised
that his party would raise the living standards of most sections of the population. During
the course of the campaign, however, HSP economic policy became increasingly influenced by
L�szl� B�kesi, the party's economics expert and a former finance minister.
B�kesi injected a sense of realism into
the HSP's economic policy arguing that "the HSP cannot build its policy on the
widespread existing social attitude that the average Hungarian was better off under the
Kadar (i.e former communist) regime." The HSP program thus eschewed command economics
and stood by the continued expansion of the private sector.
The HSP additionally promised to complete
the process of compensating the victims of communism, to restore property confiscated from
the churches, and to maintain the tempo of the privatization program. In its overall
commitment to market economics, the HSP's official program differed little from those of
its main rivals.
The HSP used its leading members'
communist background to the party's advantage. By emphasizing the experience of socialist
politicians in government, the HSP also drew attention to the apparent amateurism of its
rivals. "Let the experts govern" was the HSP's main slogan.
During the course of the campaign, the HSP
succeeded in presenting itself as a non-ideological party consisting of pragmatists and
managers. According to Horn, the popularity of the HSP rested on the fact that it was free
from "ideological limitations" and "dealt with no one's past."
Other parties fall short
The campaigns of the other political
parties fell substantially short in terms of electoral appeal and credibility. Rather than
confront the HSP on economic policy, the HDF took its position on the high moral ground of
politics. The HDF stressed its role as a Christian party which embodied Hungarian national
values, and frequently drew attention to the communist past of the HSP leadership.
These claims sat uneasily with the HDF's
previous involvement in property speculation and its attempted imposition of controls on
the media in advance of the election. Distrust of the HDF was additionally felt on account
of the slowness with which it had distanced itself in 1992 from the extremist and
anti-semitic statements of the populist poet and politician, Istv�n Csurka. The death of
the HDF Prime Minister, J�zsef Antall, in December 1993 and the succession of the
colorless P�ter Boross may additionally have weakened the HDF campaign.
While the HSP was able to maintain a
united front on account of the traditions of party discipline and strong central direction
inherited from the communist period, its rival suffered from intra-party rivalries and
dissensions. The HDF was caught between its "government-wing," comprising mainly
pragmatic conservative politicians, and its "party-wing" of nationalists and
populists.
Recent changes in the AFD leadership added
to confusion concerning its own ideological direction which wavered in economic policy
between radical individualism and corporatist remedies. Bitter feuding within the
Independent Smallholders' Party (ISP), a former coalition ally of the HDF, was probably
responsible for its loss of sixteen seats in the election.
The most spectacular collapse of any party
in the election campaign involved the Alliance of Young Democrats (AYD). The AYD had led
in the opinion polls for much of 1993 and was widely tipped as a partner in any future
government coalition. The AYD's reputation as the party of the young, "clean"
politicians suffered a major setback with revelations of shady business practices.
Moreover, the AYD seemed unable to decide whether it would prefer to join a
government-coalition with the HDF or the AFD.
The Electoral System and Its Impact
The present Hungarian electoral system
was designed to facilitate the transition from communism by adding strong legitimacy to
the parliament. Yet the system is also intended to prevent the fragmentation of the
legislature into small parties.
The result is an electoral system of
outstanding complexity -- if straightforward for voters -- which combines several
principles. Of the 386 seats contested in the 1994 election, 176 went to individual
candidates in constituencies, 125 were decided by proportional representation in 20 county
constituencies and 85 went to the national transfer list.
The Hungarian general election is held in
two rounds, customarily on Sundays. In 1994 the first round was held on 8 May; the second
on 29 May. In the first round, candidates in single member constituencies who obtain more
than 50% of the votes cast are elected directly to the parliament.
Only two of 176 seats were won in this way
on 8 May. Constituencies where the first round has not yielded a decisive outcome, go on
to the second round when there is a straight race either between those who obtained more
than 15% of the vote in the first round or the top three candidates from the first round,
whichever number is the greater.
The 125 seats in the 20 county
constituencies are given on the basis of proportional representation to those parties
which win more than 5% of the vote. The counties differ substantially in terms of their
population-size and this affects the number of representatives they may send to the
legislature. Thus, Budapest has 24 county seats elected by proportional representation,
but the less-populated Tolna and Vas counties have only two apiece.
The national list is allocated on the
basis of "residual votes." Votes cast for candidates who were not elected and
votes cast for parties in county constituencies where they failed to win a seat are
apportioned to the relevant parties providing they have obtained more than 5% of the
national vote.
Despite the complexity of the electoral
system, ballot papers are straightforward. Voters make two marks on separate papers: the
first for their preferred candidate in the single member constituency to which they
belong; the second for their preferred party on the county list. All the rest is
determined by computers.
The electoral system tends to produce a
bandwagon effect. Candidates representing smaller parties are knocked out of the election
at the first round, and those parties which score below the 5% threshold forfeit their
right to proportional representation through the county and national lists.
The system benefits large, established
parties and hinders the emergence of new parties with only a small organization. Thus the
Hungarian Workers' Party, ideological heir of the former communist party, and the extreme
right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party, founded in 1992 by Istv�n Csurka, which
obtained respectively 3.2% and 1.6% of the vote in the first round, emerged with no seats
in the new parliament.
The preponderance of seats allocated by
single member constituency creates a further discrepancy between votes cast and seats in
the legislature. The HSP received only 33% of votes cast in the first round, but obtained
after the second round of voting a total of 54% of seats in the parliament.
Despite the scale of its election victory, which enabled it to govern alone, the HSP leadership sought to build a coalition. |
By the same token, the HDF polled
11.7% of votes in the first round, but took under 10% of seats overall. The Entrepreneurs'
Party, headed by the emigre industrialist and former Hungarian ambassador to Washington,
P�ter Zwack, obtained a single seat in the legislature on account of its leader's victory
in a single member constituency. Its representation in the legislature is thus identical
to that of the Agrarian Alliance, even though the latter polled nationally more than three
times the vote of the Entrepreneurs'.
Political Legitimacy and Governing Stability
Despite the incomprehensibility of the
electoral system to the average Hungarian voter, the 1994 elections retain strong
political legitimacy. They were conducted with scrupulous impartiality by the National
Electoral Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, the voter turnout was high
by Hungarian standards: 68.9% in the first round and 55.1% in the second.
Nor was the HSP victory built on regional
or class interests which might subsequently have left it exposed to the charge of
sectionalism. In Budapest, traditionally a bastion of the AFD, 28 of the 32 single member
constituencies and 10 of the 24 county seats were taken by the HSP. Although support for
the HSP was higher in the eastern part of the country, the HSP still obtained an
overwhelming majority of single member constituencies in the west.
Despite the scale of its election victory,
which enabled it to govern alone, the HSP leadership sought to build a coalition. Its
interest derived from several considerations. First, as Horn argued, the tough economic
measures which had to be introduced to keep down the budget deficit required "a broad
government of national unity and reconciliation that seeks social peace."
Secondly, the HSP needed allies in the
parliament in order to reduce the influence of the trade unionists and former communist
youth groups with which it had established close links during the campaign. In particular,
the HSP leadership feared that B�kesi's free market policies might have the effect of
splitting the party and provoking a parliamentary crisis. Thirdly, the Hungarian
constitution lays down that certain types of legislation require a two-thirds majority in
the parliament.
Within days of the election, the HSP
entered into talks with the AFD on the issue of a coalition. Although the two parties'
economic programs were fairly close, the AFD was suspicious that its role in any future
government would simply be that of window dressing. In addition, the ex-dissident leaders
of the AFD had natural misgivings about entering into an alliance with their former
jailers.
During June, both parties held
extraordinary congresses which approved the text of a coalition agreement. The agreement
granted the AFD substantial influence over policy including the right to approve major
government decisions, appointments and draft legislation. The next month, the new
coalition government took office. Gyula Horn became Prime Minister. The parliamentary
leader of the AFD, G�bor Kuncze, was given the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the
office of Deputy Prime Minister. Two additional ministerial portfolios were awarded to AFD
politicians.
The HSP-AFD coalition gives the government
control of 72% of seats in the parliament and threatens to marginalize the role of the
opposition within the legislative system. Nevertheless, both the scale of the HSP victory
and the subsequent coalition agreement should ensure that Hungary continues to enjoy
stable parliamentary government over the next four years. The presence of the AFD in the
ruling coalition may additionally dissuade the HSP leadership from going back on its
commitment to the complete establishment of a market economy in Hungary.
Martyn Rady is Lecturer in Central
European History at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of
London. This article originally appeared in Representation, the quarterly magazine
published by the Arthur McDougall Fund.