Combining PR and "Dual Constituencies"
Jack H. Nagel
Observers have devoted considerable
attention to New Zealand's 1993 decision to switch its parliamentary elections from the
Anglo-American method of plurality voting in single-member districts to a German-style,
mixed-member proportional system.
However, many have neglected a subsidiary
but strikingly original aspect of the New Zealand reform -- the provisions it includes to
promote fair and effective representation for the country's indigenous Maori minority.
This plan, which synthesizes mixed-member proportional with New Zealand's 128-year-old
tradition of separate Maori electorates, can be abbreviated MMP-DC, for "mixed-member
proportional with dual constituencies."
Disadvantages of Conventional Systems
Before explaining the MMP-DC system
and its attractions, it will be helpful to sketch the problems of minority representation
in conventional electoral systems. Most national legislatures are elected either from
single-member districts (using plurality or majority rule) or from multi-member districts
(using a proportional or semi-proportional decision rule).
In single-member district (SMD) systems,
if group identity affects voting patterns, then the ability of a minority to elect
legislators depends on its geographical distribution in relation to constituency
boundaries. This creates the potential for the following disadvantages:
• underrepresentation of
geographically dispersed minorities;
• overrepresentation of groups
(minorities or majorities) that are distributed geographically in an optimally
concentrated pattern;
• increased salience of
geographically-linked cleavages, which are often especially dangerous, because they are
conducive to secession and civil war;
• development by groups of a
political stake in territorial segregation;
• a strong group interest in the
mapping of constituencies, which can lead to gerrymandering and other distortions.
In the United States, court battles over
constitutionality of odd-shaped "majority-minority" districts (devised to elect
more nearly proportionate numbers of blacks and Hispanics) dramatize the conflict between
conventional single-member districts and equitable representation of minority groups.
Because of these problems with SMD
systems, it has become the conventional wisdom in comparative politics to recommend
proportional representation (PR) as the best system for plural societies. Because PR and
related "semi-proportional" systems use multi-member districts, parties --
acting from statesmanship or to gain votes -- can offer lists or slates that include
candidates from various groups.
If a group nonetheless considers itself
underrepresented, its members can organize their own party and win a share of seats
proportional to the vote they attract, once they surpass the threshold of representation.
Despite this compelling logic, conventional PR systems have four potential drawbacks as
devices for representing minority groups:
• If groups are represented primarily
by their own parties, then the process of political mobilization at the mass level will
perpetuate and perhaps aggravate group differences. Unless such divisions are countered by
accommodative norms and successful coalition-building at the elite level, the unity of the
polity may be endangered.
• A group that organizes its own
party in order to achieve fair representation risks ineffectual or even dangerous
political isolation, because other parties may give up hope of competing for its members'
votes.
• PR in itself offers no
constitutional guarantee of representation to any minority; each group must take its
chances in a political process that may be dominated by an indifferent or hostile
majority.
• Although it is usually deemed an
advantage that PR offers hope of fair representation within a legal framework that treats
all individuals equally, without reference to group identities, some groups may strongly
desire explicit constitutional recognition of their distinctive status.
How MMP-DC Will Work
MMP-DC has three crucial elements:
• As in other mixed-member systems,
each voter will cast two ballots -- one for a constituency representative elected by
plurality from a single-member electorate and one for a national party list. Following the
German compensatory principle, seats that parties win in electorates will be subtracted
from their list allocations, so each party's overall representation in Parliament will be
proportional to the vote for its list.
| Adaptations of the New Zealand system might help solve the problems of other democracies, established or emerging, that face the problem of how to combine two or more different peoples into a unified polity on a basis of fairness and consent. |
• The single-member electorates
will consist of two types of constituencies -- General and Maori. This dual-constituency
(DC) feature can be visualized as a map with two overlays -- one dividing New Zealand into
numerous General electorates, the other apportioning the same territory into a smaller
number of geographically larger Maori electorates. Mps elected from both types of
electorates will serve in the same chamber with equal rights and privileges.
• In a process known as "the
Maori option," New Zealanders of Maori descent will periodically choose whether they
wish to vote on the General or Maori electoral roll. The number of Maori seats will
fluctuate up or down depending on the number of people on the Maori roll, using the same
population quota as determines the number of General seats.
Advantages of MMP-DC
Compared with both standard systems of
representation, the New Zealand invention of dual constituencies has significant
advantages as a device for ensuring minority representation.
(1.) MMP-DC allows separate representation
to a minority that desires it -- whether negatively out of insecurity and distrust or
positively to maintain a cherished distinctive identity; but it also provides a mechanism
to end that separate system if -- through intermarriage, assimilation, or personal choice
-- members of the minority acting as individuals no longer wish to affirm their difference
by registering on the minority roll.
(2.) Although MMP-DC offers members of the
minority a distinctive status, it does not confine them to it. The General roll and seats
are defined in universalistic rather than exclusive terms, and they are open to all. Thus,
the voting system is fully inclusive and the state forces no one to accept an unwanted
ethnic identity.
(3.) MMP-DC offers guaranteed
representation to the minority even if it is geographically dispersed.
(4.) MMP-DC does not require the minority
to form a separate political party in order to attain an assured minimum of descriptive
representation; however, if enough members of the group believe that a separate party
would be advantageous, that alternative is feasible because of the party-list element of
the mixed-member system.
(5.) Because it assigns the minority seats
based on enrollment, MMP-DC provides a mechanism to ensure that the group's guaranteed
representation is fairly proportional, thus preventing the dangers of tokenistic
underrepresentation or privileged overrepresentation.
(6.) MMP-DC promotes higher levels of
voting participation among the minority group in three ways. First, if its members believe
that the polity treats them fairly, they will be less alienated from politics. Second,
because the number of minority seats depends on how many voters register on the separate
roll, MMP-DC rewards efforts to enroll minority voters. Third, as a list-PR system, MMP-DC
fosters higher turnout generally, because each party-list vote has a roughly equal chance
to influence the allocation of seats and even minor parties have a chance to share
legislative power. In contrast, in SMD systems, votes cast in safe districts and votes
cast for minor parties have less impact.
(7.) Finally, in what may be its most
important feature, MMP-DC enables the minority to have a guaranteed level of descriptive
representation without risking loss of substantive influence. The party list vote
determines the overall allocation of seats among parties, and there is no distinction
between the party-list votes of electors on the minority and general rolls. Therefore, all
parties have an incentive to appeal to the minority for list votes, despite the
segregation of their constituency votes. Thus under MMP-DC the minority can have separate
representation without becoming politically marginalized. In contrast, in SMD systems, a
minority that is concentrated in its own electorates (whether from residential segregation
or gerrymandering) loses substantive influence over legislators from the majority group.
No matter how compelling they seem, these
arguments remain theoretical until MMP-DC is tested in practice. In fact, the system is
off to a rocky start, as Maori leaders have charged that the government devoted too little
time and money to the first Maori option campaign, which resulted in fewer voters on the
Maori roll than they had expected.
Once this dispute is resolved, the
development of Maori politics over the next decade will be a question of more than
parochial interest. However, even if the new system for Maori representation proves an
unqualified success in New Zealand, other plural societies cannot transplant it unless
they meet three preconditions.
(1.) There must be no constitutional
barrier to giving some citizens a distinctive status on the basis of group identity.
(2.) As a form of proportional
representation based on party lists, MMP-DC does not apply to small councils, non-partisan
elections or single-winner contests. It is most suitable for parliamentary systems with
fairly large chambers, in which list votes can be pooled system-wide or in large-magnitude
districts.
(3.) If a polity has more than one
significant minority, there must be some generally accepted way to decide who is entitled
to separate representation. In New Zealand, that question is readily answered, because
Maori are the indigenous people and other minorities are not yet numerous. Where
two or more substantial minorities have compelling claims, the concept might be extended
to three or more sets of constituencies; but proliferation could not be carried too far
without creating unworkable political and administrative complexity.
The first two of these restrictions (and
probably the third also) suggest that MMP-DC will not be applicable in the United States,
which is perhaps regrettable, given our current dilemma over the gerrymandering of
majority-minority Congressional districts. Nevertheless, adaptations of the New Zealand
system might help solve the problems of other democracies, established or emerging, that
face the problem of how to combine two or more different peoples into a unified polity on
a basis of fairness and consent.
Jack Nagel is the Daniel J. Brodsky
Term Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. A former Fulbright
lecturer in New Zealand, he has written on electoral reform and other aspects of democracy
in that country.