The Conflict between Court Ideals and District Elections
Samuel Issacharoff
In the three decades since the Voting
Rights Act, attention has shifted dramatically from rudimentary notions of voters' access
to the ballot to extremely difficult questions of representation. In part, the very
successes of the Act in making the franchise more broadly accessible than at any other
time in the nation's history have placed the foundational questions of democracy properly
before the political community.
In addition, a confluence of events,
including the decennial reapportionment in 1991-1992, the withdrawn nomination of Lani
Guinier as Assistant Attorney General in 1993 and the visible presence of an expanded
group of minority elected officials around the nation, forced questions about what the
Court called "fair and effective" representation in Reynolds v. Sims to
the forefront of the voting rights agenda.
The Supreme Court's unsatisfying
confrontation with questions of political fairness in Shaw v. Reno opened the door
to reevaluations of the building blocks of most elections in the United States: the
single-member, geographically-based district. With Justice Thomas' forceful invocation of
proportional voting systems as part of his dissent from 25 years of vote dilution case law
in Holder v. Hall (1994), and with the first judicial order of non-districted
elections as court-imposed voting rights remedy in a Maryland voting rights case, the
issue of non-districted elections is emerging front and center on the voting rights
agenda.
The Supreme Court in fact has contributed
to the reevaluation of the foundational questions of voting rights. Although Justice
Thomas's opinion in Holder is the only time the Court has directly addressed the
question of proportional voting systems, the Court in its voting rights jurisprudence has
unleashed a set of expectations for and constraints upon the operation of voting systems
that are fundamentally destabilizing for single-member district voting systems.
Were one to begin from scratch to
determine which system would best satisfy the various constraints imposed by the Court on
a fair system of
representation and best fit the Court's descriptions
of the positive goods that should be delivered by a voting system, it is unlikely that
single-member districts would be the system of governance of choice.
Ensuring Fidelity to Voter Preferences
It should be axiomatic that the
purpose of election in a democratic order is to have "chosen the free and uncorrupted
choice of those who have the right to take part in that choice" (Ex Parte
Yarborough, 1884). The principle of "popular choice of representatives" (United
States v. Classic, 1941) is, in the Supreme Court's view, "the foundation of our
representative society" (Kramer v. Union Free School District, 1969).
Ultimately, the popular choice can be deemed frustrated when electoral outcomes represent
a "frustration of the will of a majority of voters of a fair chance to influence the
political process" (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986).
But districting necessarily imposes a
filtering device on the popular choice of the voters. In their aggregate, voters may have
a prescribed set of choices. When those votes are broken down into geographically-based
districts, however, substantially different results may obtain, even within the equal
population constraint on districts.
This proposition is so self-evident as not
to need elaboration. One only needs look at the enormous resources devoted to
redistricting battles -- and even to the gubernatorial elections immediately preceding
redistricting in large states like California -- to understand that different
configurations of voters may yield different electoral outcomes, even with the same
distribution of total votes.
A ready example are House elections in
Texas in 1992, held the year after a Democratic governor signed a plan crafted by a
Democratic-run state legislature. The Democratic candidates won 49.9% of the vote,
compared to the Republicans' 47.8%, yet won 70% of the state's 30 seats, with only one
election closer than 10% -- proving not only that district lines matter, but strongly
indicating that control of the line drawing process yields tangible rewards.
Even the Supreme Court has recognized that
districting of necessity is not coextensive with insuring fidelity to popular choices:
The very essence of districting is to produce a different -- a more politically fair -- result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the legislative seats. Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment (Gaffney v. Cummings, 1973).
Or, as put more simply in Robert Dixon's Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in
Law and Politics, "[in] a functional sense. . . districting is
gerrymandering."
Districts and "Fairness"
The burning question then becomes the
baseline for determining whether redistricting does indeed further the two, not
necessarily compatible, goals of faithfully reproducing popular choices and yielding
"a more politically fair" outcome than if elections were simply left to the
electorate at large.
The driving consideration in this area, as
in so much of voting rights law, is the concern for minority representation. It is this
concern, after all, that inspired the second generation of voting rights cases and forced
courts to substitute districted elections for at-large elections precisely for reasons of
political representational opportunities roughly proportional to preconceived notions of
group rights. Even the weaker form of group protection afforded to political, as opposed
to racial, minorities must take some measure of proportionate outcomes as the point of
departure. As the Supreme Court argued in Davis v. Bandemer:
[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole...[S]uch a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.
Repeatedly, the Court has fallen back on
proportional and semi-proportional theories of representation to justify the inevitable
political filtering that occurs with districting. In Gaffney, for example, the
Court found that a rather evident political gerrymander should elicit only minimal
judicial scrutiny so long as a "State purport fairly to allocate political power to
the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits,
succeeds in doing so."
This principle appears even more candidly
in the contest or radical exclusion from representation: "The Constitution permits [a
State] to draw district lines deliberately in such a way that the percentage of districts
with a nonwhite majority roughly approximate the percentage of nonwhites in the
country" (United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 1977).
At an immediate level, it is difficult to
reconcile this proportionate concept of fair representation with the express command of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act that the Act creates no right to proportional
representation by race.
But more significantly, the dilemma is to
create a conception of fairness that escapes the "brooding omnipresence" of
concerns for proportionality that emerge throughout voting rights law, as pointed out by
Sanford Levinson in his 1985 UCLA Law Review article "Gerrymandering and the
Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why It Won't Go Away."
This is, as Justice Scalia has
vociferously noted, the conceptual weakness at the heart of enforcement of politically
fair objectives on an unruly electoral system: how does one ultimately measure dilution of
voting influence in the absence of a comprehensible baseline definition of proper
outcomes?
Once the case law moved beyond the
complete exclusion of minorities from political opportunity, there was an inexorable push
toward the ultimate resolution of what group rights are cognizable. That definition of
group rights, in turn, had to use some conception of proportionality as its baseline.
At this point, the weakness of districting
systems in achieving proportionate outcomes becomes manifest. Geographically-based
districts are an inherently poor mechanism for reflecting the autonomous preferences of
groups defined through the act of voting.
Since districted elections necessarily
stand between voter preferences and election outcomes, it is difficult for districted
election systems to satisfy the demands for voter autonomy and outwardly determined proper
outcomes. It is inconceivable that districted elections could better meet these objectives
than many of the proportional and semi-proportional systems that assure proportionate
results by reproducing voter preferences without state-sanctioned manipulation of the
outcomes.
"Fair and Effective Representation"
There are several ways of analyzing
the varying Supreme Court doctrines governing the legal constraints upon the electoral
process. At its most simple, the Court is able to effectively police the limits of
negative liberties from most forms of state encroachment. While this is an accomplishment
of no small measure, it is by no means complete.
Perhaps because of the association of the
reapportionment revolution with breaking a rural stranglehold on local politics, or
perhaps because of the inevitable association of access to the franchise with eradicating
the political power of Jim Crow, the Court in these cases sought a transformative vision
of politics. Out of these cases establishing individual rights in the political sphere
grew the more difficult propositions defining a new objective of political fairness.
In analyzing both the initial articulation
of what the Reynolds Court termed "fair and effective representation" and
the subsequent applications of that principle, the challenge to single-member districts
emerges most clearly. The positive liberties in these cases traverse an unsteady divide
between political self-realization through concerted activity and the proper filtering
role of districting in producing equitable electoral outcomes.
At this level of analysis, however,
single-member districts poorly fit the objectives set out by the Court. Indeed,
single-member district would serve as the electoral system of choice only to satisfy
immediate access to local representatives for
constituent services and the preservation of the political oligopoly enjoyed by the
Democratic and Republican parties. These are hardly the most inspiring declarations of our
democratic order.
The broader Supreme Court declarations
have particular salience in the post-1990 period of redistricting. The first generation of
voting rights cases has broadened the electorate and made the process more open than ever
before in American history. The amended Voting Rights Act has subjected the actual choices
of political line-drawers to substantive judicial review. Technological change have in
turn opened the redistricting process to a broader set of activists.
The sum total is a districting process
under greater pressure, under greater public scrutiny and judicial oversight, and still
unable to deliver the promises of three decades of Supreme Court pronouncements.
These unrealized expectations, more
visible than ever, are ultimately destabilizing to the established order of single-member
districting. Into this void will inevitably surface renewed attention to alternatives to
districting, particularly if these alternative systems emerge as more faithful to the
substantive vision of fairness that has animated the case law to date.
Samuel Issacharoff is Charles Tilford
McCormick Professor of Law at the Texas School of Law. This article is from a longer piece
to appear in the 1995 University of Chicago Legal Forum.
The American University Forum,
continued
Samuel Issacharoff: Anytime the
state starts to redistrict, the language used in its decisions is whether this is a Polish
district, a black district, this is a Democratic district, this is a Republican district,
and the trick is to get it right in terms of the mix. This means if you want to create a
Polish district, you want about 60% Polish. 100% is packing, and that means that you have
to throw people in there that the state has said, "You get in that district because
we need you to fill out the numbers, but we don't really want you to affect the outcome.
This is not your district."
You know, if we want to create a 60% black
district, that means we need 40% white votes who aren't supposed to affect the outcome of
the election. If we want a Republican district, the Democrats are there to fill out the
numbers, but they're not supposed to alter the outcome either.
With the computer, the manipulation of
lines, the way that these people -- I call them the filler people -- are being forced to
fill out the numbers in these districts is so much more apparent. It is because this is so
much more transparent that I think that the level of distaste at the grassroots response
level is much higher....
There is a line from Tolstoy about once an
illusion is exposed, it can never be renewed. And the fact is that we have laid bare these
processes, largely through Voting Rights Act litigation and somewhat through "one
person, one vote" litigation. Everybody can see what we're doing.
And with the computer, and Rick Pildes has
shown, the lines are more extreme than they used to be. And there is a sense of just
looking at it and saying, "I don't really want to be told that I should be the person
that fills out the numbers in a district that belongs to another group as determined by
the state districting authorities.