Dubious Democracy and the 1994 Elections
Electing the U.S. House of Representatives
The Center for Voting and Democracy
The Center for Voting and Democracy in 1995 released Dubious Democracy, a
statistical analysis of the 1994 elections for the United States House of Representatives.
Much had been written about the historic nature of the elections in which the Republican
party gained a majority in the House for the first time since 1954. But the Center's study
went beyond the national partisan results to provide statistics that help explain the
increasing frustration of many American voters -- a frustration that has not diminished
with the change in control of the House.
Behind 1994's vote for change in the House of Representatives were three disturbing
facts:
- Most eligible voters did not participate.
- Most voters have limited choices.
- Most races are not remotely competitive.
"Winner-take-all," plurality elections in single-member districts put
profound limitations on American democracy. They give more power to those who draw the
district lines -- usually legislators who then run for office within the districts they
created -- than to voters. They almost always limit voters' choices to at most two
candidates, promoting "zero-sum" politics in which it is entirely logical for
candidates to attack opponents and muddy their own positions -- a politics that today
extends more and more to governance. Furthermore, districts emphasize where voters live
over what they think and what they might consider their broader interests.
The report highlights the "representation index." It measures the percentage
of eligible voters who helped elect a representative. The democracy index in U.S. House
elections in 1994 was just over 20%, meaning that close to 80% of the American voting age
population did not help elect someone to the House. Our representation index is far lower
than that of most other democracies that use forms of proportional representation.
The combination of voters turning out to the polls, having a range of choices and
having their vote count creates a meaningful political center grounded in the reality of
what voters want. Just as forty years of Democratic control of the House did not reflect
the changes in political wind that took place during those four decades, the Republicans
are not governing on a foundation that is clearly established on what the majority wanted
in 1994. Republican policies perhaps will be popular, but how Republicans got into power
and how they might stay there are not tied to a need to win majority support.
Impact of "No Choice" Elections
Some of our strongest statistics measure the disturbing lack of competition in House
elections. Races were won on the average by 33.5%, and only 157 out of 435 seats were won
by less than 20%. While 34 Democratic incumbents lost, 103 Democratic incumbents joined 87
Republican incumbents in winning "landslide victories" (victories by at least
20%) in both 1992 and 1994. Eighteen of New York's 31 districts were won by at least 40%,
while 11 of Florida's 23 districts were uncontested.
A full 10% of people who voted in statewide elections did not vote in House elections,
a margin only partly explained by the 31 uncontested seats. Lack of competition clearly
had an impact on voter turnout. The 118 races won by at least 40% had a voter turnout of
35.5%, the 247 won by at least 20% had a turnout of 36.9% and the 157 won by less than 20%
had a turnout of 40.4%. The three states that did not have statewide races all had voter
turnout in 1994 under 30%, suggesting what turnout would be if only House races were on
the ballot.
This lack of competition can be traced to the partisan composition of districts usually
drawn carefully by legislators to provide certain results. As an example of the impact of
redistricting, Democrats outspent Republicans in over half of the 56 House seats taken
over by Republicans, but only one of those seats were among the 99 districts that Bill
Clinton won with a majority in 1992.
Our study also showed that women remained stuck at only 11% of the House in 1994 and
the number of states with women representatives in the House actually decreased from 27 to
23, in contrast to international trends for women steadily increasing their share of
political power. Single-member district elections may be the primary culprit: in Germany's
1994 elections, women won 13% of seats contested in single-member districts and a full 39%
of seats filled by proportional voting.
Our analysis also revealed other findings as well. For those following partisan swings,
the Republican victory is magnified by the fact that Republican percentages of the
statewide vote in House races decreased in only six states. On the other hand, the fact
that only 17 of the 56 Republicans who won seats held by Democrats had higher vote totals
than losing Republicans had won in those districts in 1992 suggest the impact of
voter turnout.
Following are excerpts from the report, including an example of the report's state
profiles and a glossary of terms used in profiles.
Note: Election results are based on Associated Press reports after the elections and
do not include all absentee vote totals. Estimates of eligible voters are based on the
post-election report by Curtis Gans of the Committee for the Study of the American
Electorate (CSAE) and cannot be determined with pinpoint accuracy. The CSAE report
provides estimates by state only, which meant that determinations of voter turnout by
district were based on the voting age population estimates for 1992 elections in the
National Journal's Almanac of American Politics -- and thus might not reflect
changes in voting age population. Nevertheless, future data corrections are likely to
cause only minor changes.
GLOSSARY
Republican Gain: |
Overall number of seats gained by GOP in a state's delegation to the House of
Representatives |
Redistricting: |
Description of which party controlled redistricting in a state in 1991-1992;
"VRA" indicates the state was covered by the Voting Rights Act (which means that
the Justice Department could influence how lines were drawn), while asterisks mark states
where courts directly influenced redistricting |
Representation Index: |
Measure of the percentage of eligible voters who helped elect a candidate in House
elections; it is determined by multiplying voter turnout by the percentage of votes cast
for winning candidates |
Wasted Vote Index: |
Total: |
Percentage of votes cast for losing candidates |
R-D-O: |
Percentage of voters for losing Republican (R), Democrat (D) and other (O) candidates |
Landslide Index: |
Percentage of all races won by at least 20% |
Votes vs. Seats: |
Percentages of votes and seats won by Republicans, Democrats and others |
Scale of Competitiveness: |
Competitive: |
Won by 5% or less |
Opportunity: |
Won by between 6% and 19% |
Landslide: |
Won by between 20% and 39% |
Runaway: |
Won by between 40% and 99% |
Uncontested: |
Won with 100% or only one candidate running |
Untouchable: |
Incumbents who won by landslides in both 1992 and 1994 |
GOP Seat Gain with Vote Gain: |
Ratio of number of seats gained by Republicans to number of these seats in which
winning Republican had more votes than losing Republican candidates in 1992 in the same
districts |
Drop-Off: |
Percentage of voters who participated in a statewide race but did not vote in a House
election |
Race/Ethnicity: |
Measure of the number of representatives from a state who are white, black, Latino and
Asian |
Gender: |
Measure of the number of males (M) and females (F) in a state's House delegation |
UNITED STATES
|
ELIGIBLE VOTERS: |
193,198,000 |
|
REPUBLICAN GAIN: |
52 (+56, -4) |
|
REDISTRICTING: |
Federal mandate on states |
|
DEMOCRACY INDEX |
1994: |
21.2 |
1992: |
31.8 |
|
LANDSLIDE INDEX |
1994: |
64% |
1992: |
62% |
|
WASTED VOTE INDEX, 1994 |
Total: |
37.6% (24,609,162) |
R-D-O: |
33.3% - 39.8% - 92.8% |
|
VOTES VS. SEATS, 1994 (R%-D%-O%) |
Votes: |
51.3 - 46.6 - 2.1 |
Seats: |
52.9 - 46.9 - 0.2 (230-204-1) |
|
WASTED VOTE INDEX, 1992 |
Total: |
37.7% (36,326,157) |
R-D-O: |
42.5% - 29.0% - 95.6% |
|
VOTES VS. SEATS, 1992 (R%-D%-O%) |
Votes: |
45.4 - 50.8 - 3.8 |
Seats: |
40.5 - 59.3 - 0.2 (176-258-1) |
|
Competitiveness |
SCALE OF COMPETITIVENESS |
Competitive: |
50 (D-24, R-25, O-1) |
Opportunity: |
107 (D-61, R-46) |
Landslide: |
129 (D-59, R-70) |
Runaway: |
118 (D-53, R-65) |
Uncontested: |
31 (D-7, R-24) |
|
INCUMBENTS |
Total: |
383 (of 435 seats) |
Re-Election: |
349 (of 383 - 91%) |
Landslide: |
259 (of 383 - 68%) |
R. Landslide: |
142 (of 157 - 90%) |
D. Landslide: |
117 (of 225 - 52%) |
Untouchable: |
190 (R-87, D-103) |
|
AVERAGE MARGIN OF VICTORY |
1994: |
33.5% |
1992: |
29.6% |
|
GOP SEAT GAIN W/VOTE GAIN |
1994: 56: 17 |
|
Voter Turnout and Demographics |
NATIONWIDE ELECTION |
1994: |
37.8% |
1992: |
56.0% |
|
DROP-OFF |
1994: |
10.2% (7,452,535) |
1992: |
9.1% (9,641,294) |
|
HOUSE ELECTIONS |
1994: |
34.0% |
1992: |
50.9% |
|
HIGH/LOW STATES, 1994 |
High: |
58.6% (South Dakota) |
Low: |
20.3% (Florida) |
|
GENDER |
1994: |
387M, 48F |
1992: |
387M, 48F |
|
RACE/ETHNICITY |
1994: |
376W, 38B, 17L, 4A |
1992: |
376W, 38B, 17L, 4A |
|
Comments
Republicans' dramatic win in 1994 House elections -- taking a majority of seats for the
first time in forty years -- was marred by a low representation index. Barely 20% of
voters helped elect candidates, competition actually decreased, over 24 million voters won
no representation and women took only 11% of seats. These results provide support for
repealing a 1967 law mandating single-seat districts to allow states to adopt PR.
TEXAS
|
ELIGIBLE VOTERS: |
13,166,000 |
|
|
REDISTRICTING: |
Monopoly (Dem.) / VRA |
|
DEMOCRACY INDEX |
1994: |
19.8 |
1992: |
31.9 |
|
LANDSLIDE INDEX |
1994: |
53% |
1992: |
83% |
|
WASTED VOTE INDEX, 1994 |
Total: |
33.2% (1,338,689) |
R-D-O: |
45.9% - 17.4% - 100.0% |
|
VOTES VS. SEATS, 1994 (R%-D%-O%) |
Votes: |
53.0 - 44.6 - 2.4 |
Seats: |
36.7 - 63.3 - 0.0 (11-19-0) |
|
WASTED VOTE INDEX, 1992 |
Total: |
31.1% (1,749,642) |
R-D-O: |
44.5% - 15.1% - 100.0% |
|
VOTES VS. SEATS, 1992 (R%-D%-O%) |
Votes: |
47.8 - 49.9 - 2.3 |
Seats: |
30.0 - 70.0 - 0.0 (9-21-0) |
|
Competitiveness |
SCALE OF COMPETITIVENESS |
Competitive: |
1 |
Opportunity: |
13 |
Landslide: |
4 |
Runaway: |
10 |
Uncontested: |
2 |
|
INCUMBENTS |
Total: |
27 (of 30 seats) |
Re-Election: |
25 (of 27 - 93%) |
Landslide: |
15 (of 27 - 56%) |
R. Landslide: |
9 (of 9 - 100%) |
D. Landslide: |
6 (of 18 - 33%) |
Untouchable: |
15 |
|
AVERAGE MARGIN OF VICTORY |
1994: |
35% |
1992: |
40% |
|
GOP SEAT GAIN W/VOTE GAIN |
1994: 2 : 1 |
|
Voter Turnout and Demographics |
STATEWIDE ELECTION |
1994: |
33.4% |
1992: |
50.6% |
|
DROP-OFF |
1994: |
11.7% |
1992: |
8.6% |
|
HOUSE ELECTIONS |
1994: |
29.7% |
1992: |
46.3% |
|
HIGH/LOW DISTRICTS, 1994 |
High: |
49% (#6) |
Low: |
UNCONTESTED (#7 & #19) |
|
GENDER |
1994: |
28M, 2F |
1992: |
29M, 1F |
|
RACE/ETHNICITY |
1994: |
23W, 2B, 5L, 0A |
1992: |
23W, 2B, 5L, 0A |
|
Comments
After 1992's democratic debacle created by a classic partisan and incumbent protection
gerrymander -- in which 29 of 30 seats were won by at least 10% and Democrats took 70% of
seats with under 50% of the vote -- Texas was slightly more competitive in 1994. The
average victory margin "dropped" to 35% and two incumbents lost. Yet Republicans
won only 37% of seats despite winning 53% of the vote, and there were 15 repeat
landslides.
Table of Contents
Chapter Three