The Influence of Electoral Laws
In this article I will assess the
influence of electoral laws on legislative and governmental formation in emerging
democracies, using the African country of Malawi as an example. I base my analysis on
elections for a legislature that selects a prime minister (a parliamentary system) as
opposed to the current presidential system. (I believe that mechanisms that concentrate
executive power -- like a strong presidency -- could in the long run be detrimental to the
stability of multi-party democracy in Malawi.)
There are many types of electoral systems,
but the debate really falls into an analysis of the two predominant types of systems: 1)
plurality (to which we can also bracket majoritarian systems, as they have similar
properties); 2) proportional representation (PR) systems, which are predominantly of the
list or preference voting (PV) variety. There are also semi-proportional systems like
Japan's single non-transferable vote.
However, no electoral system is a panacea
for a country's ills and our task is to find the least imperfect and potentially most
accessible system for the voters of Malawi. In coming to a final decision, trade-offs have
to be made between: the representativeness of Parliament and coherency of government; the
complexity of the ballot and range of choice given to the elector; proportionality of
Parliament and geographic linkage with MPs; and the means and level of accountability of
the system.
Electoral systems are merely one cog in
the intricate wheel of constitutional design mechanisms, however. If the electoral system
is flawed, then this misshapen cog may cause the whole structure to grind to a halt. But
for success, it requires the other constitutional mechanisms to be equally as sensitive to
the divides and tensions within a particular society.
Other crucial aspects of constitutional
design in a developing country include the choice of parliamentary or presidential
government, whether there is unicameral or bicameral structure and the degree of
separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial levels of government.
Criteria for a Stable Voting System
Divided societies and those with a weak
democratic history may be particularly susceptible to instability if any of the following
criteria are ignored in the electoral system design process.
1) Representative: In order to maximize legitimacy and ensure a degree of
electoral consent to any government formation, the system must fairly reflect the opinions
of the electorate -- and not just the majority, as Parliament needs to be seen as
representative of the whole country. The people must accept the results as 'just,'even if
their own party or group is not in the majority. As former Chair of the British Electoral
Reform Society Michael Meadowcraft has observed, "the value of the individual vote
should not be distorted by factors of geography, race or class."
Failure to fulfill this criteria in
electoral system design, especially in developing countries with a propensity for
instability can lead to devastating results. Immediately after Angola's
"winner-take-all" presidential election of September 1992, the losing candidate
re-instigated civil war, plunging the country into chaos, and costing the lives of at
least 25,000 civilians in the following 15 months
2) Accessible: The legislature will only be representative to the extent that people do not feel alienated and excluded from the political process. If people feel their vote has some impact in elections, then they are more likely to work for change within the system rather than support anti-system parties and organizations which feed on societal instability. Accessibility does not merely mean the representation of minority groups; it also relates to the degree of choice a voter has among candidates of different parties, among candidates of the same party and among parties as a whole. Furthermore, accessibility is determined by the nature of the ballot and its ease of use by literate and illiterates alike. As Malawi's 59% illiteracy rate is one of the highest in the world, ballot paper design will be particularly crucial to the prospects for a free and fair election.
3) Reconciliatory: Throughout Southern Africa, and other divided societies, it
is important for the electoral system (as with other constitutional measures) to
facilitate an environment of compromise and reconciliation as opposed to exacerbating
tendencies toward conflict. This does not necessarily mean enforced consensus but, rather,
the mutual recognition of opposing views in the political system.
Systems that exaggerate adversarial,
confrontational politics will merely perpetuate the divisions which already exist in
Malawi and retard the building of a unified and stable state. The theory and practice of
"consociational" power-sharing in divided societies teaches us much about how to
facilitate such mutually beneficial compromises among opposition groupings.
There are a number of electoral systems
which facilitate the workings of such "consociational governments." Most are
methods of PR, but there are also some non-PR electoral systems -- such as Australia's
majority preference voting system -- which have been proposed as answers to the problems
of divisive electoral politics in already divided societies.
4) Accountable: The government and elected members of parliament must be accountable to their constituents to the highest degree possible. The level of accountable control a voter has over his or her representative depends on "geographical" constituency size considerations and the level of choice among candidates as opposed to parties. Under the most simplified forms of "list PR," there is no direct voter influence over which elected candidates are elected from any one party (such "closed list" systems operate in Namibia and Israel). However, there are ways of building personal candidate accountability into the system even if list PR is used.
5) National Vision: The prospects for stability will also improve if the
electoral system engenders parties based on national concerns and defined political values
rather than ethnic, linguistic or geographic divides. Plurality voting's defenders claim
their system performs particularly well on this criteria, but, if an ethnic group is
sufficiently geographically concentrated, then under a plurality system they may be more
advantaged by appealing to divisive ethnic loyalties rather than national political
values. Such
is the case with the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa, which has advocated
a plurality system for the South African constitution because they might be able to
dominate the seats contested in KwaZulu-Natal -- with a quarter of the South African
electorate -- with only a plurality of votes in that area.
Applying the Criteria to Malawi: The Case for PR
The fundamental reason why drafters of a
new Malawian constitution should prefer PR over plurality to elect their new parliament is
that PR will largely avoid the anomalies that plurality often produces (especially when
used under multi-party conditions). The lack of a clear link between national votes polled
and parliamentary seats can be devastating to stability in newly democratizing,
politically fragile states.
Distorted results could push Malawi to a
civil war of the likes seen in Angola and Mozambique. The study of election results under
plurality shows that these fears are by no means groundless, as single party governments
are often elected under plurality systems with less than a majority of the popular vote.
In new multi-party democracies where there is distrust among groupings, losing groups in
these situations may easily resort to extra-parliamentary, destabilizing tactics if they
feel cheated by the electoral system.
A system of PR will be inclusive enough to
bring minority interests into the legislative arena of government even if they are still
excluded from the decision-making structures. Whether they are Malawians from the North, a
certain type of religious group or one of the smaller linguistic groups, they will have
the opportunity under PR to organize and play a role in national party politics.
An argument leveled against PR is that it
gives rise to coalition governments which, in theory, are not as decisive as single party
governments. In Malawi, however, multi-party governments could be a blessing. After
experiencing an all-encompassing dictatorship since independence, Malawi has reasons to
guard against one group taking power and excluding others.
I am optimistic about the possibilities
for multi-party democracy in Malawi for the simple reason that there is a strong desire
for such a system among the society as a whole -- a desire which has been articulated at
substantial cost. However, I strongly believe the continuation of the plurality electoral
system in the new multi-party system would seriously retard the establishment of
democracy: first and foremost because of plurality's potential for anomalous results, and
secondly because of its adversarial and exclusionary character. Although not the only
precondition, PR is a necessary precondition for democracy to take root in Malawi.
Andrew Reynolds is author of Voting
for a New South Africa (1993: Cape Town, Maskew Miller Longman). This article is from
a much longer analysis presented at a November 1993 conference.