Western governments were understandably
alarmed by the results of parliamentary elections in Russia on December 12, 1993. The
relatively strong showings of ultra-nationalist movements and Communist Party allies and
relatively poor performance of forces supportive of President Boris Yeltsin warrant
concern about the consequences for Russia's political stability and economic reform
efforts.
For observers of voting systems, however,
Russia's latest democratic experience should not be a complete disappointment. It is
remarkable that elections could have taken place there at this time at all. It is
encouraging that the democratic process and the fractious government produced by it appear
to be viewed, at least for now, as legitimate.
Nor should these recent elections be
dismissed as an aberration unworthy of study. Russia's experience not only provides
further evidence of the difficulties in transforming a formerly totalitarian state to a
democracy, but also suggests some problems in nominally "mixed"
majoritarian/proportional systems.
Election Context
It is hard to imagine democratic elections
being successfully conducted under more challenging circumstances (for a comparatively
advanced society) than those in which voting was held in Russia on December 12th. Voting
took place among an electorate dealing with:
• the still recent collapse of the
Communist system and dissolution of the U.S.S.R.;
• a disintegrating command economy
and the insecurities of market reform, marked by severely declining living standards and
rampant poverty and crime;
• months of political stalemate
between Parliament and President Yeltsin, ended by Yeltsin's extra-constitutional call for
new Parliamentary elections, which created a constitutional crisis and culminated in
violent confrontation only ten weeks before election day.
The volatile election setting was
exacerbated by:
1) an extremely complicated voting process for candidate and party list elections and the
constitutional referendum; 2) a lack of cultural familiarity with the institutions and
processes of a civil society or experience with political participation, including the
absence of coherent political movements or cohesive party organizations; and 3) a very
brief election period.
In this environment, and given the
disunity and political ineptness of the pro-reform Russia's Choice coalition (and the
shrewdness of their opponents), the electoral result should not have been surprising.
Ballots and Voting Process
At polling sites on election day, Russians
were given four ballots with quite distinct purposes and voting procedures: a ballot for
the constitutional referendum; two ballots for deputies to the State Duma (lower house of
the new Federal Assembly), including one based on proportional representation; and a
ballot for representatives to the Federation Council (upper house). Some localities,
including Moscow, simultaneously conducted local elections, and their voters received five
ballots.
The ballot for the referendum on the new
constitution followed the traditional Russian method of voting: cross out the answer of
which you do not approve (cross out "NO" if you favor adoption, etc). This
negative approach was used in last April's referendum, and is a throwback to Communist
days when only one candidate appeared on election ballots (and prudent Russian citizens
would not bother visiting a voting booth before casting their ballot).
Half of the 450 deputies to the State Duma
were elected through a nationwide party list vote from which seats were allocated by
proportional representation -- with the results tabulated separately, unlike Germany's
proportional system. Parties and electoral coalitions qualified their candidate lists for
this election by obtaining at least 100,000 signatures on petitions, no more than 15% from
any one "subject" of the Russian Federation (republic, region, oblast, etc);
several party lists were rejected by the Central Election Commission (CEC) for failing to
gain signatures from at least seven different regions.
The ballot listed each party or coalition
and the names of three candidates from its list. The election law also provided for
regional lists -- the listed names varying by region, and distribution within party
lists of awarded seats weighted by relative success in particular regions. Voters were to
make one mark on this ballot in the box corresponding to the party they supported, and
were also provided the dissenting choice of marking for "against all
candidates."
The other 225 deputies to the State Duma
were elected in new single-member districts. Candidates qualified for this election either
by being nominated by a party or coalition that had already qualified for the nationwide
party list vote or by collecting petition signatures equal to one percent of their
electoral district (about four or five thousand).
For these single-member district
elections, voters were to make one mark on this ballot corresponding to the candidate they
supported, and again were given the choice of "against all candidates."
Significantly, candidates on this ballot were not identified by party affiliation or
independent status, and the proportional party-list vote did not have any compensating
effect or bear any other relationship to the single-member constituency vote outcome.
Voters from each subject of the Russian
Federation chose two representatives to the Federation Council (which is somewhat
analogous to the U.S. Senate, but has a less important role in legislating). The
nomination and voting procedures were similar to candidate elections to the State Duma,
except voters were to mark two choices on the Federation Council ballot. The Federation
Council election justifiably received less foreign attention, but it is noteworthy that
successful candidates tended to be regional government leaders that were more supportive
of Boris Yeltsin than State Duma winners.
Election Period and Administration
President Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament
on September 21st, calling for new elections to be held on December 12th. The law
governing the election process for the State Duma (which became the model for the other
election procedures) was enacted by Presidential Decree on October 1st, just three days
before tanks shelled the Parliament building.
The calendar set forth in these
regulations for the remaining ten-week election period indicates the daunting
responsibilities in preparation for voting faced by election administrators (particularly
the CEC), candidate and political groups, and voting public.
These responsibilities included:
• creation by the CEC of 225 new
single-member constituency districts;
• naming members of constituency
election
commissions;
• naming polling site commission
members by
local governments;
• preparation of voter registries by
local authorities;
• submitting candidate lists and
collecting
signatures by political parties and
coalitions;
• submitting petitions by candidates
for Federation
Council and State Duma single-member
district
constituency seats;
• allocation of free media time to
candidates and
parties;
• voter education;
• campaigning;
• printing and distribution of
ballots;
• preparation of polling sites;
• pre-election ("absentee")
voting and ;
• adjudication of complaints and
grievances.
Under the political circumstances, in a
country with eleven time zones, 105 million voters and 95,000 polling sites, it is
astonishing these myriad and difficult steps in the election process were achieved mostly
on schedule and that elections were held without serious administrative problems. The
accomplishment is even more impressive considering the Central Election Commission did not
really exist and had no offices or staff at the time elections were called.
Lessons for Voting System Analysis
A wholly new system of representative
government and voting was created and implemented for the December elections in Russia,
including the innovation of a "mixed" proportional vote for the State Duma. As
noted earlier, however, this mixed system was of the bifurcated type: the proportional
awarding of mandates for the State Duma was not related to, and did not have any
compensating effect for, the winning of seats (and "wasting" of votes) in
single-member constituencies for the same body. Nor did Russian voters have an opportunity
to favor individual candidates within party lists, as occurs in proportional systems using
"open lists."
While the combination did provide some of
the advantages of both proportional and majoritarian systems, the voting results suggest
the Russian electorate was unable to articulate a coherent political choice in these
elections. The results, though broadly representative, seem simply muddled. The lack of
connection between the two voting processes for the State Duma was demonstrated not only
by the quite different successes of the political parties under the two voting systems,
but by the fact independent candidates won more than half the constituency-level seats.
Ironically, under these circumstances, the proportional party-list vote may be seen as
contributing less to political stability and thoughtful voter choice than the candidate
voting.
It must be acknowledged, however, this
outcome was heavily influenced by immediate political factors and not just systemic
weaknesses. Most important was voter unhappiness with economic conditions and general
disillusionment with change. Party list balloting created an opportunity for a protest
vote. Also, the ultra-nationalists were very effective in their use of populist rhetoric
and television appeals, and led the pack in nationwide voting at about 23% (which, because
it was tabulated centrally and reported first, became the primary focus of world
attention); however, they did poorly in recruiting, qualifying and electing candidates for
the single-member constituency voting.
The Russian elections also illustrate the
voter information problems that arise when introducing complicated voting systems. In a
society unfamiliar with democratic elections or institutionalized and competitive
political parties, initiation of a party-list proportional voting system (with a regional
weighting component) would alone have required extensive voter education efforts. Combined
in an election process involving a constitutional referendum that utilized an archaic
negative cross-out style of voting, and candidate elections for two legislative chambers
involving both an affirmative one-candidate and a two-candidate voting choice, it is
understandable how Russian voters might have been somewhat confused and discouraged by
their task.
Voters complained of the procedures'
complexity, and election observers noted substantial problems with spoiled ballots:
crossing out party or candidate names, votes for more than one party, marks for individual
names on party lists, etc.
Both the phenomena of contradictory
election results and voter confusion show that imposition of new election systems, often
driven by scholarly theory and political compromise, may have unexpected and
unsatisfactory consequences, at least initially.
Prospects for Democracy in Russia
Russia's recent elections were fairly
successful as an administrative matter, but it is not yet certain they represent a step
forward in an ongoing process of democratic development. As the Russians continue to
grapple with economic adversity, social upheaval and political tensions, it is clear the
real rest for democracy in Russia still lies ahead. Yet there is reason to hope the
Russian people will continue down the road of genuinely democratic reform, learning from
their experiences and adapting or discarding Western voting methods as their cultural and
political needs require.
Robert Alan Dahl is an attorney in
Washington, D.C. specializing in U.S. campaign finance issues and election systems in
emerging democracies. Mr. Dahl has consulted extensively in Eastern Europe and the former
U.S.S.R. on election laws, voting procedures and civic education. He recently served as
on-site project manager in Moscow for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems
in providing technical assistance to Russia's Central Election Commission.