Daily
Mirror
February 14, 2004
http://www.dailymirror.lk/2004/02/14/opinion/1.asp
Sri Lanka's electoral system: Bogey or
asset? By Dr. Chandra Dolawatte
In this article, I propose, once again to examine the subject of
electoral reforms in Sri Lanka, which even recently became a hot
topic of discussion amongst political circles (though apparently not
amongst the academics and general voters), having already had a
previous fling at it, in my book under the title 'Whither Sri
Lanka's Representative Democracy? A People's Manifesto' with a
forward by Dr. Gamini Corea, and published by Godage
Brothers.
Since 1931, but particularly, after the receipt of independence
in 1948, Sri Lanka has had a democratic form of government and it is
the need to nurture and strengthen not merely the form but also the
practice of democracy in the country that truly constitutes the
raison detre for the investigations conducted by the Parliamentary
Select Committee on Electoral Reform to which I have also submitted
my above book as a memorandum.
Representative Democracy There is no single word, in
the political lexicon that is so frequently mentioned as the word
democracy. I wish however, to commence by giving some thought to
what this word implies, particularly since it is not seldom that the
term is used to justify contradictory actions. Abraham Lincoln's
characterization of democracy as 'government of the people, by the
people, for the people' is still unrivalled as a concise definition
of this word.
Direct democracy practised in ancient Greek
city states being impracticable in the present day large polities;
there is no alternative to having that form of democracy called
'representative democracy'. A successful representative democracy
has two indispensable components one being physical and the other an
imponderable.
Democratic structure
Of these two parts, the physical component is the democratic
structure. A country's legislature (whether called Parliament,
Congress or Assembly) the executive and the judiciary constitute the
major parts of the democratic structure, along with the electoral
system. In fact, a properly conceived and devised electoral system
is an indispensable foundation on which the other above-mentioned
parts (which we may collectively refer as the superstructure) of a
viable and durable democratic structure that can be erected. If the
foundation is infirm and fragile, the superstructure would be
unstable and could totter and fall.
The parliamentary select Committee, now sitting is entrusted by
Parliament with no less a task than examining the health and quality
of the existing foundation discover its deficiencies and weaknesses
if any and prescribe cures thereto, while agreeing that the present
system which has been in operation for upwards of two decades merits
review in the light of its performance and changing circumstances in
the polity.
I do, however wish to sound a note of caution, lest in our
enthusiasm for refurbishing the electoral foundation, we unwittingly
weaken it rather than strengthen it. Since we are dealing with no
less a subject than the very foundation of representative democracy
in Sri Lanka, it especially behoves on us to view it objectively and
with caution, trace erectly where any malaise lies and devise
therapeutic measures directly targeted on such weak spots. We ought
to desist from adopting inappropriate remedies in the manner of
facetious Ayurvedic simile 'paya baravayata pitikara beheth
bandinawa' (medicate the back of the neck to cure
filiarisis).
I have so far dealt with only one of the two indispensable
components of representative democracy, namely its structure and
there too, only with its foundation viz electoral system. The
foundation of a structure is not an end in itself. It is only a
means to an end namely the erection and maintenance of a durable and
viable superstructure of governing institutions. If the foundation
is such as to provide a firm basis for the superstructure, its job
is done, so to say. If anything goes wrong in the superstructure or
the manner of its functioning, that fault cannot justifiably be
attributed to the foundation. If the superstructure, however
well-founded, fails to deliver the expected service or goods,
whatever remedial measures we take will have to be targeted on the
deficiencies there and not on the foundation.
If, however, the various governmental institutions that
constitute the superstructure, too turn out to be flawless and well
attuned to the goal of generating the expected democratic outcome,
but still the latter fails to materialize, then the obvious
inference would be that the fault lies with the second of the above
noted major components of democracy, i.e. the imponderable
part.
Democratic Spirit
This imponderable is nothing other than the all too easily
forgotten democratic spirit. It is the democratic spirit of
toleration and compromise that infuses life into the democratic
structure.
It is also absolutely essential that all political operators in a
democracy realize the fundamentality of the principle of trusteeship
i.e. that those who wield power do so only as the trustees of the
people who are the fountain of all governmental power.
On this reasoning, the success of a representative democracy
depends not only on how well-attuned its structure or its
constituent parts or institutions to its ideal functioning but also
on how much its operators have imbibed the democratic spirit of
toleration of opposing views and readiness to compromise. Peaceful
debate, openness and transparency of government and freedom of
expression are the lifeblood of democracy and constitute the only
viable way of realizing the maximum long-term public
welfare.
Two corollaries follow from this consideration. The first of
these is an obligation on the part of everyone to facilitate and
accept the freely arrived verdict of the people at an election (Here
I emphasize the word free) without in anyway seeking to distort or
obstruct its manifestation. The second corollary is that no amount
of constitution or electoral reform would be of avail, in the
absence of the democratic spirit and attitudes. Reforms, whether of
the constitution or of the electoral part of it, in such a milieu, I
am afraid, run the risk at best of being fruitless and at worst
having the contrary effect of accelerating the collapse of the
democratic system by diverting public attention from the basic
malaise.
Even the most perfect democratic structure including the
electoral system is only as good as those who operate it. Moreover
even a quite beneficial principle or idea, if badly implemented,
could easily become the subject of public apathy or outright
condemnation thereby depriving the society of valuable benefits that
principle could otherwise have yielded. I am afraid to say that,
judging from what is now being heard, from almost every quarter
(apart from an occasional dissentient voice), that is more or less
the fate a useful innovation like the valuable principle; of
preference, a principle that has worked so successfully in a multi
ethnic society like the USA runs the risk of succumbing too. In the
demonization of this principle politicians of all hues, seem to have
for understandable reasons, played no small role.
Electoral Reforms of 1981 and 1983
Having thus cleared the preliminaries I shall now turn my
attention to Sri Lanka's democratic foundation, i.e. the electoral
system. Reforms introduced thereto in 1981 and 1983 changed the
hitherto existing electoral system almost beyond recognition and for
reasons dealt with at some length especially in chapters 1 through 5
in my book referred to above, did contribute to a marked
strengthening of the democratic foundation of Sri Lanka in that they
enabled a more accurate reflection of the electoral will of the
people in Parliament and subsidiary legislature bodies in the
country.
As one who has had substantially long periods of residence in the
UK and the US and has had the opportunity to gain familiarity with
the electoral systems in those countries, I must confess to a
feeling of disheartening at the readiness of some influential
political circles in Sri Lanka to lay the blame for a multiplicity
of ills, actual or imagined, ranging from violence at election
booths, forcible stuffing of ballot boxes and molestation of
election officials, candidates and voters to intra-party rivalries
and problems of securing mandatory 2/3 majorities for constitutional
amendment, at the door of the electoral system.
But deeper and dispassionate analysis of these phenomena would
reveal their intrinsic character as social ills and not as electoral
ills. In other words, they are either law and order problems or
political problems rather than electoral problems. The existence of
such ills or difficulties, as the case may be, cannot, realistically
or logically, be construed as resulting from faults in the existing
electoral system anymore than the occurrences of robberies in banks
could be attributed to faults in the financial system. Intra party
rivalry arguments against the preference system is a particular
example of fallacious reasoning. As I have pointed out in para 2 of
chapter 4 of my book those who argue for the abolition of the
preference system on the alleged ground that it causes conflicts and
mayhem among adherents of the same political party, will also have
if they are to be logical, to argue for the abolition of the entire
electoral system on the patent ground that elections of whatever
sort leads to conflicts and mayhem between adherents of different
political parties. I am only mentioning here this logical imperative
only to highlight that both arguments are based on an identical
fallacy and hence should be discarded.
While, however, rejecting instances of spurious causality, such
as the above, adduced by some critics of the existing electoral
system, I do readily admit that it is far from being perfect and
that it does have certain important deficiencies that should be
addressed by the Parliamentary Select Committee now sitting.
However, I must hasten to add that such defects do not at all
warrant its total jettisoning lock stock and barrel or even its
radical reform for that matter, based as it is on the democratically
unimpeachable principles of proportional representation and voter
preference among candidates.
What is rather required is the selective introduction of well
thought out reforms targeted on its weak spots and so calculated as
to advance the frontiers of democracy rather than in the reverse
direction towards authoritarians of a by-gone era. It is in this
spirit that I formulated my electoral reform proposals in part III
of the study.
The fundamental premises that underlie the argumentation in my
treatment there of the subject of electoral reform may be listed as
follows:
a. The ultimate sovereignty in a democracy is inherent in its
people and this fact should be explicitly recognized both in word
and deed by all political operators.
b. On the political plane, the only goal that is sacrosanct is
the of the maximization of the sum total welfare of the entire
population: every other consideration should be treated as
subsidiary and deriving its validity and acceptability only in so
far as it contributes to the attainment of that overarching
goal.
c. Those who have, for the time being, been delegated
(through the electoral process) the task of exercising governmental
power do so only as trustees of the people).
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