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Plurality Wins in the U.S. Senate
Most
Senate races are won with a majority, but fully 139 Senate races
have been won with a plurality since 1908. Generally speaking, the bulk of
these plurality races tend to cluster at the beginning and the end
of the century. While 38 plurality elections occurred from 1910 to
1918, when Teddy Roosevelt�s �Bull Moose� Progressive party had a major national impact, the
number of plurality wins dwindled considerably by the middle of
the century. The 1950�s, for example, saw only four plurality elections to
the Senate and the 1960�s only five. The number of plurality elections each decade
has steadily increased since then, however, with a notable resurgence occurring in
1992. In the five election years since 1992, there have
been 22 Senate races decided by a plurality. To put this in
context, these five election years have had 40% of all
plurality victories since 1950.
The 1998 Senate
election in Nevada is a clear example of the impact of third party
candidates and independents on election outcomes. In this election,
the incumbent Democrat Harry Reid won with 47.9%, narrowly defeating
Republican John Ensign by a margin of only 421 votes, or 0.1%. What
makes this case interesting is that the Libertarian candidate
Michael Cloud received 8,044 votes, or 1.8%. Considering the
leanings of most Libertarians, it is likely that these votes came
primarily from people who would have voted for a Republican in a
choice between the major party candidates. Little of the remainder
of the vote would have gone to Reid in a two-candidate choice, as
the 1.8% for �None of the Above� can be seen as anti-incumbent and
the Natural Law Party�s 0.63% of the vote probably came primarily at
Republican expense. Thus, it is quite conceivable, perhaps even
likely, that Democrat Reid won only because the Republican vote was
split and that Republican Ensign would have won in a two-way race
with Reid. The plurality-based voting system helped elect someone to
a six-year term despite likely not being preferred by the majority
of voters to his leading opponent.
Another U.S. Senate race in which the plurality voting system
produced questionable results occurred in Georgia in 1996. In this
race, Democrat Max Cleland won with 49% of the vote, beating
Republican Guy Millner by just 1%. Other candidates won a total of
close to 4% of the votes, mostly to a Libertarian candidate likely
to have drawn more votes from Millner. Ironically, the legislature
had recently modified Georgia�s requirement for majority winners,
which had contributed to Democrat Wyche Fowler defeat in a runoff
after leading Republican Paul Coverdell by 1% in the initial round
of the election. Once again, the system of plurality voting produced
another election here with questionable results.
Sen. Charles Robb�s re-election in a 1994 Senate race against
Republican Oliver North also raises questions about the role of
plurality voting. Robb defeated North by 46% to 43% -- a margin of
3%. Independent candidate Marshall Coleman, who had been the
Republican nominee for governor in 1989 and had the backing of
Virginia�s Republican senator John Warner, won 11%. It is not clear
which candidate would have been the second choice of most Coleman
backers, as Coleman was positioned as a relatively centrist
candidate, but it is clear that his candidacy provided an outlet for
many Republicans concerned about North�s conservative positions.
Spoiler candidates have hurt Democrats as well, although more
clearly in U.S. House races. For example, the Republican Heather
Wilson was elected to the House in a 1998 special election with only
44.6%, with a 5% margin over Democratic candidate Phillip Maloof.
The deciding factor in this election likely was the Green Party
candidate Robert Anderson, who won 14.7% of the vote, most of which
came from people who probably would have supported Maloof in a
two-candidate race between Maloof and Wilson. Again, it is realistic
to say that Maloof might have won had Cloud not split his votes.
Wilson won the 1998 general election five months later in the same
fashion, with Anderson once again splitting the Democratic vote.
The problem of plurality races can
also be seen in Senate primaries, where plurality results occur in
greater numbers. For example, the five election years from 1994 to 2002
had 29 primaries decided by plurality, in addition to 12 others that
went to runoffs in southern states with runoff provisions. Incidentally, few
of these plurality winners went on to victory in the general
election -only three of the 29 plurality winners from 1994 to 2002 were elected. Many
factors ultimately decide the general election, but the evidence
suggests that perhaps the plurality method of nominating candidates
is not the best way to ensure that a strong candidate is nominated.
Senate data is rather limited, but this notion is strengthened when
one considers the fact that candidates in House races who went
through a runoff tended to fare much better: from 1994 to 2002, 38
of the 66 such candidates went on to win the general election.
Strategically, therefore, it seems that plurality voting systems for
primaries might not be the best way for a party to nominate a strong
candidate.
Given that plurality victories in Senate races are both
increasing in number and problematic for American democracy, the
time has come for serious consideration of a better method of
voting. An ideal choice can be found in instant runoff voting (IRV). IRV simulates a series
of runoff elections, but in a single round of voting that corrects
the flaws of runoffs and plurality voting. At the polls, people vote
for their favorite candidate, but they also may indicate their
second, "runoff" choice and subsequent choices. If a candidate
receives a majority of first choices, she wins. If not, the
candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and a runoff round of
counting occurs. In this round your ballot counts for your
top-ranked candidate still in the race. The eliminated candidate is
no longer a "spoiler" because the votes of that candidate's
supporters go to their runoff choice. Rounds of counting continue
until there is a majority winner.
IRV would be a better method of voting for several reasons.
First, it would ensure that the winner of the election would
actually command the support of a majority of those who voted. This
would be helpful in preventing a third party candidate from spoiling
an election by splitting the vote of the candidate preferred by the
majority of voters. If IRV had been used in Nevada and New Mexico in
1998, for example, the candidates truly preferred by most voters
would have been elected. Another advantage of IRV is that voters
would no longer have to fear that voting for their top choice might
split the vote of their second favorite candidate. Instead of
choosing the lesser of two evils, voters could give their first
preference vote to the candidate they actually want to win. As long
as the United States uses single member districts for congressional
elections, ensuring that representatives and senators actually
represent the majority of voters is an essential element of
democracy. Given the increasing number of plurality victories in
Senate races, adopting IRV would be an important step towards
building a healthier democracy.
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