

---

ILLINOIS ASSEMBLY ON  
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION  
 AND ALTERNATIVE  
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS

---

---

ILLINOIS ASSEMBLY ON  
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION  
 AND ALTERNATIVE  
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS

SPRING 2001

 IGPA *University of Illinois*

---



# CONTENTS

<b>Foreword</b> .....	5
<i>Jack H. Knott</i>	
<b>I. Introduction and Summary of the Assembly Report</b> .....	7
<b>II. National and International Context</b> .....	15
An Overview of the Core Issues .....	15
<i>James H. Kuklinski</i>	
Electoral Reform in the UK: Alive in '95 .....	17
<i>Mary Georghiou</i>	
Electoral Reform in Japan .....	19
<i>Thomas Lundberg</i>	
1994 Elections in Italy .....	21
<i>Richard Katz</i>	
New Zealand's Method for Representing Minorities .....	26
<i>Jack H. Nagel</i>	
Voting in the Major Democracies .....	30
<i>Center for Voting and Democracy</i>	
The Preference Vote and Election of Women .....	31
<i>Wilma Rule and Matthew Shugart</i>	
The Minority Majority in 2001 .....	34
<i>Brad Edmondson</i>	
The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation.....	37
<i>Charles S. Bullock, III and Richard E. Dunn</i>	
<b>III. The State of Illinois Then, Now, and Tomorrow</b> .....	49
Voting for the Illinois House: Experience and Lessons from the Illinois Laboratory ..	49
<i>James H. Kuklinski, James D. Nowlan, and Philip D. Habel</i>	
The Case for Cumulative Voting.....	64
<i>Judge Abner J. Mikva</i>	
The Cutback Amendment and Future Reforms .....	67
<i>Patrick Quinn</i>	
A Comparison of Selected Electoral Systems .....	71
<i>James H. Kuklinski</i>	
<b>IV. Participants, Illinois Assembly on Political Representation &amp; Alternative Electoral Systems</b> .....	79



---

# FOREWORD

**I**n Spring 2000, the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois created the Illinois Task Force on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems. Governor Jim Edgar and Judge Abner Mikva served as co-chairs. The task force examined the effects of the change from cumulative to plurality voting in Illinois House elections, gathered information about alternative electoral systems that are used throughout the world, and considered how and how well those systems work in other regions of the country and world.

With that information in hand, they brought together leaders from politics, the media, academe, business, and nonprofit organizations for the Illinois Assembly on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems. The assembly met to explore the pros and cons of various electoral systems as they might be used in Illinois House elections.

I am happy to present you with the final report of the Illinois Assembly. This report is very timely. Work on reapportionment and redistricting of local, state, and federal legislative districts has already begun. Moreover, some recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions have negated congressional districts that were gerrymandered in 1991 to achieve minority representation. Proportional representation and cumulative voting increasingly are seen as alternatives to gerrymandering. This report is being distributed nationally with the intent that it will play a positive role in what has become a worldwide discussion of how best to elect our political leaders.

The Institute of Government and Public Affairs wishes to express its gratitude to the Joyce Foundation for its generous support of the task force, the assembly, and the production of this report.

— Jack H. Knott  
*Director, Institute of Government and Public Affairs*



# INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ASSEMBLY REPORT

Citizens tend to take the electoral system they use to choose their public officials for granted. This should surprise no one. Most voters, after all, experience only one electoral system in their lives. In the United States, that system is, with a few local government exceptions, winner-take-all: he or she who receives the most votes wins. To the great bulk of Americans, winner-take-all and democracy are one and the same.

To be sure, studies that systematically compare electoral systems exist. Most appear in academic journals, not in high-circulation magazines, however, and they tend to be written in arcane and highly technical language. Consequently, debates and discussions rarely extend beyond scholars and a handful of election reform advocates.

This state of affairs is unfortunate. Elections are the centerpiece of any democratic system, and how citizens elect their public officials has important implications for how democracy works. Consider, for example, the following:

- As the nation watched intently, determining who would win the 2000 popular vote in Florida, and thus the United States presidency, turned into a question of how to count votes: Should Florida accept hand-counted ballots or not? If Florida's electoral system had provided a clear-cut answer, as some other states' systems do, the United States Supreme Court would not have been the final arbiter.
- Half of all races for the Illinois House of Representatives were uncontested in 2000. In one of every two races voters had no choice in either the primary or general election. They could vote for the incumbent or not vote at all. Among the remaining races, a large majority lacked meaningful competition; two candidates ran in opposition, but who would win was never in doubt. Many factors contribute to this disturbing lack of competition, but none is more significant than the use of the winner-take-all system to elect Illinois state legislators.
- The demographic composition of the United States and Illinois is changing dramatically. In less than one lifespan, by the year 2050, Americans who belong to racial and ethnic minority groups—Asians, African-Americans, Native Americans, and Hispanics—will outnumber non-Hispanic whites and attain majority status. This population shift will bring—in fact, is already bringing—new demands for political representation. In the view of many experts, our existing electoral system cannot accommodate the growing diversity of interests.
- Many countries around the world use an electoral system that allocates legislative seats on the basis of the percentage of the vote that a party receives. The idea is that if a party receives, say, 20 percent of the vote, it should receive about 20 percent of the total legislative seats. Typically, this type of electoral system produces three or more legislative parties. Known as proportional voting, it produces relatively more women and minority legislators than the kind of system we use to elect state and national legislators in the United States.

How we choose our public officials **does** matter, and thus citizens of this state, this nation, and the world should take discussions of electoral change seriously. Many already are. A variety of nations, from Japan to Great Britain to Australia, have undertaken critical

---

reevaluations of their existing electoral systems. In the United States, criticism of the winner-take-all system has risen sharply in recent years. Critics point to declining turnout, the increasing lack of competition in state and congressional elections, and the inability of women and racial and ethnic groups to gain adequate representation in legislative bodies.

## THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

It is no exaggeration to say that a worldwide conversation about electoral systems is well under way. In an effort to encourage citizens from across Illinois to join this conversation, former Governor Jim Edgar and former federal Judge Abner Mikva convened, in Spring of 2000, the Illinois Task Force on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems. With funding from the Joyce Foundation and research assistance from the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, the task force was created to undertake an objective and comprehensive evaluation of the system used to elect Illinois state legislators.

### *Why a Task Force?*

The existence of the task force raises two questions: why create a task force at all and why create one specifically at the beginning of the year 2000? With regard to the first question, a task force is the most effective and appropriate vehicle by which to undertake an objective and comprehensive evaluation of Illinois' electoral system. Unlike some of the organizations currently active in the state, the task force did not come into being for the purpose of advocating change or defending the status quo. Although it ultimately offered recommendations, they were based on the best analysis and information available. Moreover, members of the task force brought to their assignment a wide range of expertise and a variety of initial impressions about the workings of the current electoral system. Some members work in the private sector; some are associated with prominent civic organizations; some are past or current elected officials; some work closely, and day-to-day, with the state's electoral machinery; some represent racial and ethnic interests; some are Democrats, others Republicans. What bound them throughout their deliberations was a commitment to an effective electoral democracy that fosters good public policy.

### *Why a Task Force Now?*

Why create the task force at the beginning of the year 2000? Twenty years ago, Illinois voters passed an historic constitutional amendment that dramatically changed the way representatives to the Illinois House of Representatives are elected. The amendment replaced cumulative voting with plurality voting and eliminated the only statewide cumulative voting scheme in the United States.

Considerable controversy surrounded the historic vote. Many supporters of cumulative voting argued that the final vote was not a reflection of the electorate's attitude toward cumulative voting but, rather, their desire to reduce the size of the Illinois House. It is indeed true that much of the rhetoric in support of the so-called Cutback Amendment centered not on the merits of plurality voting but on the reduction of the House from 177 to 118 members. A highly unpopular pay raise that legislators had passed prior to the vote on the amendment fueled public support of the cutback.

In the past few years, especially, many legislators and political activists have advocated a return to cumulative voting. They point to the lack of minority party representation in many areas of the state, or to the lack of racial, ethnic, and gender representation. They also attribute the growing centralization of power in the four legislative leaders as an outcome of the electoral change. Others contend that the current plurality voting system is preferable. In their view, it is less confusing to the voters and has facilitated legislative policymaking. They observe that the legislature is considerably more efficient today than it was prior to the change in electoral systems. Advocates of the current system also believe that critics have unfairly and wrongly used it as a scapegoat by placing the blame for existing problems on it.

### *Two Compelling Reasons*

In short, circumstances unique to Illinois offer two compelling reasons to examine the state's electoral system now. First is plurality voting's 20th anniversary: two decades of experience with plurality voting provide a sufficient time frame within which to examine the effects of Illinois' historic change in electoral systems. Second, discussion about the efficacy of the state's current electoral system appears to be peaking, with some individuals longing for times past and others supporting the status quo. Voices on both sides are louder than ever before.

Moreover, the growing national and international interest in electoral change provides two opportunities that did not exist earlier. On the one hand, information about the workings and likely effects of various electoral systems is more widely available than ever before. Thus the task force could evaluate the pros and cons of a variety of systems that conceivably might be used to elect Illinois' state legislators. On the other hand, the task force's deliberations can contribute to the ongoing national and international discussion. The substantive focus is Illinois, but the potential audience is worldwide.

## **THE ILLINOIS ASSEMBLY ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS**

The most crucial step in the task force's deliberations was the holding of an assembly at the Union League Club of Chicago on October 3-4, 2000. The assembly brought together approximately 70 participants, including academics, concerned citizens, civic and business leaders, and past and present elected officials (see the list of Illinois Task Force members and Assembly participants on page 79). They were asked to review the work of the task force, to offer an assessment of Illinois' current electoral system, and, if they deemed it appropriate, to recommend changes in that system.

The assembly began with a debate between Patrick Quinn, former Illinois State Treasurer and founder of the Coalition for Political Honesty, and Dan Johnson-Weinberger, Executive Director of the Midwest Democracy Center. Quinn made the case for retaining the current electoral system and Johnson-Weinberger argued for a return to cumulative voting. Then, during the next one and one-half days, participants worked in small groups to identify the principal problems, if any, with Illinois' current electoral system and to consider possible changes in it as a means to address those problems.

## MISSION STATEMENT

The Illinois Task Force on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems set forth the following tasks as its mission:

1. Establish the context for discussing electoral systems in Illinois by reviewing the growing national and international interest in voting systems and the reasons for that growing interest.
2. Review the consequences of the change from cumulative to plurality voting in the election of members to the Illinois House of Representatives. The consequences to be analyzed include changes in:
  - competition for seats
  - drop-off in voting
  - the representation of regional and demographic groups
  - party cohesion in the state House
  - the internal deliberations and functioning of the General Assembly
  - cost of running the legislature
3. Review relevant features of electoral systems in other states.
4. Identify desired outcomes and appropriate criteria to use in evaluating the performance of any electoral system.
5. Identify a limited number of alternative electoral systems that appear to be appropriate for possible application in Illinois.
6. Evaluate each alternative electoral system in terms of the criteria and outcomes identified by the task force.
7. Hold an assembly for the purpose of making recommendations and encouraging public discussion of them.

### *Problems*

Participants in the Illinois Assembly on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems expressed concern about the following problems:

#### **Limited Choice and Lack of Electoral Competition**

- Many voters are offered no choice when voting in state legislative elections. In the just-completed 2000 election, 50 percent of all Illinois House races lacked any competition at all. In most of the remaining races, the challenger stood no realistic chance to win.
- The number of uncontested state legislative races has increased steadily over the last two decades. Uncontested races are far more common in both primary and general elections today than they were two decades ago.

#### **Low Voting Turnout**

- Voting in Illinois state legislative elections is abysmally low. In the just-completed 2000 election, only 44 percent of the eligible electorate voted in Illinois House elections.

- Voting in Illinois state legislative elections has declined over the last two decades.
- Voting in state legislative elections is related to the availability of competition; voting is discernibly lower in districts that lack competition.

### **Exorbitant Campaign Costs**

- The cost of campaigning for state legislative office is exorbitant. For example, in several 2000 Illinois House races, the two candidates spent more than one million dollars in total during the general election. Although expenditures in other competitive races did not quite reach this level, they were, with few exceptions, substantial. That this high cost discourages challengers from running is indisputable.
- The cost of campaigning has skyrocketed in recent years. There is currently no indication that this trend will change.

### **Limited Representation of Non-Majority Interests**

- The representation of racial, ethnic, and gender groups has marginally improved in recent decades, yet their ability to win legislative seats under the existing electoral system remains limited.
- Because winner-take-all electoral systems produce a single representative from each district, members of the minority party are often left without representation. This reality has not gone unnoticed among Illinois citizens. In a recently completed survey, a majority indicated a preference for bipartisan—Democratic and Republican—representation within their districts.
- The lack of within-district bipartisan representation applies to regions as well as districts. Highly Republican regions of the state overwhelmingly elect Republicans and highly Democratic regions overwhelmingly elect Democrats. In Chicago, for example, almost all state legislators are Democrats, while in the five collar counties almost all are Republicans. Although there are some notable exceptions to this generalization, many Chicago Republicans and collar-county Democrats find themselves without partisan representation. To put it another way, Republican votes in Chicago and Democratic votes in the collar counties are wasted.

### **Concentrated Power and Lack of Deliberation in the Illinois Legislature**

- In the Illinois General Assembly, a few legislative leaders wield excessive power, including the power to allocate campaign funds. As a result, many, if not most, legislators feel that their participation in the legislative process and their capacities to be responsive to their constituents have been dangerously diminished.
- The concentration of power in the hands of legislative leaders is precluding full deliberation of the major issues facing Illinois. Party leaders often decide the fate of important bills without allowing full floor debate or committee consideration.

---

## Goals

The assembly also identified five goals that an electoral system should meet. These goals are as follows.

**First**, an electoral system should maximize voter choice in the electoral process by encouraging candidate competition.

**Second**, it should provide opportunities for candidates from diverse backgrounds to run competitive campaigns without having to rely on large financial contributions.

**Third**, it should invigorate the voices of individual legislators in policymaking.

**Fourth**, it should encourage broad legislative deliberation on important issues and generate policies that reflect a broad public vision.

**Fifth**, it should foster decisiveness in the legislative process.

## RECOMMENDATION: A RETURN TO CUMULATIVE VOTING

With these concerns and goals as context, the assembly evaluated several electoral systems (See *A Comparison of Selected Electoral Systems*, page 71, for specific details) with the objective of determining if one would be superior, overall, to the others in addressing the preceding concerns and goals. The assembly focused principally, although not exclusively, on four electoral systems: winner-take-all, cumulative voting, instant-runoff voting, and party-list voting. As noted above, Illinois used cumulative voting to elect members to the Illinois House until 1982, when a voter-passed constitutional amendment replaced it with winner-take-all voting (see *Voting for the Illinois House*, page 49, for a brief history). The other two systems—instant-runoff and party-list voting—are common in Europe and other parts of the world. Participants also discussed the benefits and feasibility of a unicameral legislature, although they ultimately rejected that option.

At the close of their discussions, the participants in the Illinois Assembly on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems reviewed the following statement. The statement represents general agreement; however, no one was asked to sign it. Further, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to every part of the statement. (The League of Women Voters of Illinois noted that they are currently undertaking their own study and thus opted to abstain from expressing either support or opposition.)

## ASSEMBLY PROCLAMATION

The Illinois Assembly recognizes that changing an electoral system is itself not capable of fully addressing all of the assembly's goals and concerns. Other factors that contribute to the identified problems include (but are not limited to) the state's currently lax campaign finance laws, the reduction in partisan attachment among voters, and the effects of partisan- and incumbent-motivated redistricting. Nonetheless, a majority of the assembly finds that cumulative voting in multi-member districts would be preferable at this time to single-member districts for electing members to the Illinois House.

Compared to plurality voting, cumulative voting tends to:

- offer greater choice for voters in primary and general elections;
- provide prospective candidates easier access to the electoral system;
- provide greater representation for the minority political party in districts dominated by the other party;
- provide individual legislators greater independence from legislative leaders;
- generate richer deliberations and statewide consensus among all legislators since both parties would be represented in all parts of the state;
- be more readily adaptable to the existing electoral machinery than instant-run-off and party-list voting.

As with any electoral system, cumulative voting has deficiencies. Cumulative voting is somewhat more complex than single-member-district voting. Legislators from large, multi-member districts might be less accountable to their constituents as a whole than those elected by single-member districts. In the past, moreover, the two parties sometimes colluded in putting together a single slate of candidates. Finally, circumstances have changed. Candidates use TV campaign ads far more than they did 20 or 30 years ago. Candidates who ran 20 or 30 years ago spent a sliver of what candidates spend today. In short, even if one concedes that cumulative voting 'worked' decades ago, there is no guarantee that it will 'work' today. Overall, however, the assembly finds that cumulative voting would better serve a diverse state that has geopolitical regions in which one party dominates.

A change in electoral systems alone will not resolve the issues surrounding Illinois' political system. Campaign finance reform, for example, is a must. Nonetheless, a change in the current electoral system could be a significant first step in a process of reform that will help to overcome the problems the assembly identified and to achieve the goals it set forth.



---

# NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

---

## AN OVERVIEW OF THE CORE ISSUES

*By James H. Kuklinski*

The confluence of three forces has driven national and international interest in electoral systems to a new height. One is the democratization of countries throughout the world, which received its biggest impetus from the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Faced with the new challenge of democratic governance, these countries have faced critical choices of institutional structures. A second is the growing diversity of the world's population. In the United States, for example, demographers predict that non-whites will be a majority of the United States population within three decades. With this diversity have come cries for increased racial, ethnic, and gender representation. The third is the recognition that electoral systems matter. Different systems aggregate votes differently and thus produce different outcomes. Electoral laws and systems are not benign.

The articles included in this section deal with a range of topics that capture the broader context within which the Task Force on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems operated. The first four discuss electoral system changes or contemplation of changes in four democratic countries: Japan, Italy, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. A fifth summarizes the kinds of electoral systems that are used in democracies throughout the world. A sixth briefly examines the effect of proportional representation systems on the election of women to legislative bodies.

In the United States, changing demographics have motivated much of the discussion of the need to change existing electoral laws. The next article summarizes predictions about population change over the next several decades. What is most self evident is that "White America," as it has existed historically, will no longer be by the year 2020.

Much of the debate in the United States has centered on the representation of African-Americans. This debate is rooted in the 1965 Voting Rights Act but it is the Supreme Court decision *Shaw v Reno* that brought the controversy to the fore. In *Shaw*, the Court ruled that using race as a principal criterion for creating congressional districts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. This decision has led many to conclude that increased racial and ethnic representation, if that is to be the goal, must occur through changes in electoral systems, not through redistricting. The last article in this section summarizes the legal and other issues surrounding the representation of African-Americans in American legislative bodies.

Although debates about electoral systems differ in the specifics, all are driven by a core set of issues. They include the following.

### GROUP VS. PARTISAN REPRESENTATION

Traditionally, representation in the United States has been synonymous with partisan representation. This form of representation is effective as long as the two major parties can

---

bring all or nearly all interests into the fold. Critics of partisan representation question the viability of such representation in light of an increasingly diverse population. In their view, each of the many and varied interests needs its own legislative advocates. While supporters of partisan representation find plurality voting systems congenial, therefore, critics do not, and instead advocate the use of proportional representation systems.

### FEW VS. MANY PARTIES

The type of electoral system that a country or other political unit employs will affect the number of parties that exist in the legislature. Electoral systems that place a premium on the representation of diverse interests will typically spawn a relatively large number of parties, one for each of the primary interests. Although such electoral systems do well at ensuring the representation of many specific interests, they also require coalition building within the legislature, since no one party is likely to hold a majority of the seats. Thus the representation of diverse interests via many parties brings the associated need to form a majority legislative coalition, which can dilute the representation of each individual interest included in the coalition.

### LIMITED CHOICE VS. WIDE RANGE OF CHOICE

On its face, a wide range of choice would appear preferable to limited choice. In fact, this is debatable. Intelligently choosing one or two among a large number of candidates requires that voters be informed about all or most of the candidates. Without that information—collecting it is a formidable task—voting can become highly confusing. On the other hand, a limited choice is just that: limited. So the question is, what is a “reasonable” range of choice? People can easily disagree on the definition of reasonable.

### WHERE SHOULD THE COMPETITION BE LOCATED?

One can speak of the competition in the electoral race and the competition in the legislature. The first, of course, refers to the closeness of the race, while the second refers to the split of seats between (or among) the parties. What is not at all self-evident is whether one kind of competition leads to better representation, however that is defined, than the other. Consider, for example, a hypothetical state with 10 districts. Which would be preferable: 51-49 splits in all the races, with one party winning 8 seats and the other 2 seats or 70-30 splits in all races with each party winning 5 seats? To be sure, neither condition is likely to exist in the real world. Nonetheless, most of the time in most systems the competition lies predominantly in one arena, not in both.

---

*James H. Kuklinski is a professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.*

# ELECTORAL REFORM IN THE UK: ALIVE IN '95

*By Mary Georghiou*

Electoral reformers in the United Kingdom, inside and outside the Labour Party, had to adjust to the death in May 1994 of John Smith, Labour Party leader and hailed as the next Prime Minister.

Smith had what he called “a missionary zeal about reforming the constitution.” He spoke of giving “our people the rights, the freedom and the power to be equal citizens in a modern participating democracy.... I look forward to the enactment of a Bill of Rights; to abolishing the bizarre hereditary basis of the House of Lords; and to giving the people themselves the choice on how they elect their representatives in the House of Commons.”

This “new constitution for a new century” included the commitment to a regional list PR system for the European Parliament. It looked forward to a democratically-elected second chamber using PR regional lists and to a Scottish Parliament elected by a German-style, mixed-member system.

John Smith’s legacy remains. After his death, all three leadership candidates supported the idea of a referendum “to let the people decide.” New Labour leader Tony Blair wrote: “I fully support the Party’s commitment to a referendum on the issue of the electoral system for the Commons...and existing Party policy for both the European Parliament and an elected chamber. With regards to an electoral system of a future Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Constitutional Convention has agreed that first-past-the-post [plurality] is not appropriate for a future Scottish Parliament. I fully concur with this view.”

The Labour Party in Wales is conducting a consultation about its plans for a Welsh Assembly including the voting system to be used. The Borrie Commission produced “a new Beveridge report” on the Welfare State entitled *Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal*. In it there is some discussion about the merits of proportional systems for local government. Labour is preparing separate consultative papers on local and regional government which exclude how they will be elected.

Before John Smith’s death, the Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform (LCER) played a big role in winning over Smith’s Scottish Labour Party to the principle of PR for the House of Commons, despite media forecasts that Labour would go back on its support for the Additional Member System for the Scottish Parliament. Three out of six Labour by-election victories were won by supporters of LCER bringing the tally of MP supporters to 70.

After the June European election, LCER welcomed to its list of sponsors six new British Labour Members of the European Parliament, including Glenys Kinnock. Neil Kinnock — former Labour leader and LCER sponsor — is leaving the House of Commons to become a European Commissioner.

The most prominent Labour electoral reformer, Robin Cook MP, became Shadow Foreign Secretary this fall after topping the polls for Labour’s National Executive, while Raymond Plant, LCER’s president, is Labour Home Affairs spokesperson in the House of Lords. The work of his Commission on electoral systems has been passed on to Labour’s Policy Commission on Democracy and Citizenship.

---

LCER's major success in 1994 was warding off the attacks on Labour's referendum promise. The Annual Conference voted overwhelmingly to reconfirm Labour's position to hold a referendum to allow the people to choose how they elect MPs.

LCER was constantly reminded by visitors and events around the world that it is part of a worldwide movement for changing the relationship between governments and citizens. We welcomed Ed Still and Doug Amy, active with the Center for Voting and Democracy in the U.S., and leading New Zealand PR supporters. We talked with newly elected ANC MPs from South Africa and Japanese academics and trade unionists.

1995 is the year when the trade unions need to think through their positions, particularly the two largest unions, the Transport Workers and UNISON, the only unions not to vote for Labour's referendum at Labour's Annual Conference. The referendum is still being attacked by supporters of the status quo.

Meanwhile, for the first time since 1979, the plurality system has failed to give the Conservative Government the unrepresentative majority it needs to introduce legislation without winning common consent. Politics is more like it would be under PR.

---

*Mary Georghiou is a leader of the pro-PR Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform in Britain.*

Copyright (c) 2000 The Center for Voting and Democracy, 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 901, Takoma Park, MD 20912. Used with permission.

# ELECTORAL REFORM IN JAPAN

*By Thomas Lundberg*

In 1994 Japan replaced its old electoral system, the single nontransferable vote (SNTV), with a new, mixed member system for the lower house of the Japanese Diet that combines plurality voting in single-member districts (for 300 seats) with regional, closed-list proportional representation (PR) for the remaining 200 seats.

The previous SNTV system allowed voters one vote in elections for three to five representatives per constituency (except for a handful of smaller and larger ones), with the top vote-winning candidates taking those seats. While this form of limited voting is not considered a true PR system, SNTV in practice exhibited a degree of proportionality (comparing a party's allocation of seats won to its percentage of national popular vote) equivalent to some party list proportional systems with small districts.

Because the smaller parties were consistently able to win some seats under SNTV, they resisted attempts by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to reform the system in a more majoritarian fashion, the direction always proposed by governments that were headed by the LDP from 1955 to 1993.

LDP candidates campaigned against each other in most constituencies. Since they could not compete on a policy basis, they were forced to campaign on a more personal level, which critics contend led to corruption, parochial politics and incentives for high campaign spending.

The other major complaint was the malapportionment of constituencies. Rural areas had more representation in the Diet than their population would justify — sometimes at a 4:1 margin when compared to urban areas. This was seen as unfairly helping the LDP. Court decisions only brought about minor changes in the worst cases.

After several scandals involving important LDP officials, public confidence was shaken, and a number of LDP members left the party. The LDP lost for the first time in the 1993 general election to a reformist coalition, composed mainly of former LDP members.

## STRONG ELEMENTS OF MAJORITARIANISM

One of the coalition's main priorities was to change the electoral system. After making proposals for a mixed system combining first-past-the-post and proportional voting, the LDP and the coalition agreed (after an initial defeat in the Diet's upper house and an increase in single-member seats at the LDP's request) on the 300/200 split.

This new system, approved in December 1994, should not be confused with the German and New Zealand electoral systems, which also combine plurality and party list voting, but are fully-fledged PR. In these countries, the total allocation of parliamentary seats for parties is determined exclusively by the party list vote, meaning that single-member district candidates are included in that allotment. In the Japanese plan — like the mixed system used in Russia — the plurality and PR list seats are completely separate and there is no party list compensation for the results of the 300 single-member district races. This means that the new electoral system has a strong element of majoritarianism; the largest, best organized parties are likely to gain the most seats at the expense of the smaller parties.

---

For this reason, several small parties merged into a new conservative party called *Shinshinto* (New Frontier) in December, 1994. This party is largely the creation of ex-LDP member Ichiro Ozawa, a strong advocate of plurality voting and the majoritarian politics he believes it will bring to Japan (see his 1994 *Blueprint for a New Japan*).

However, it is possible that many of his fellow citizens do not share his views. The Japanese press has a negative opinion of him, based upon his actions and the views of party members who know him. This coalition of parties may have a difficult time agreeing upon single candidates to stand under the Shinshinto banner in the single-member constituencies. While the LDP is unpopular, its support remained higher than that for Shinshinto (22% to 8%), according to an April 1995 survey by one of Japan's leading newspapers.

Furthermore, the same survey revealed a startling 57% of Japanese voters sampled do not support any party, thus undermining one of the goals of the reform, which was to make politics more party-oriented. In fact, it is likely that the heavy dose of first-past-the-post voting will exacerbate personalized politics, as the LDP and Shinshinto are both conservative parties with few policy differences.

The local elections in April 1995 indicated a surge in support for independent candidates, with the governorships for both Tokyo and Osaka won by candidates who had no party affiliation and did not even campaign.

If party-centric politics is what the Japanese truly want, a better approach would likely have been to adopt a national closed party list PR system for the entire House of Representatives. A national legal threshold (minimum vote requirement) could be used to prevent excessive party fragmentation. In this way, the power of personalities and parochialism could be most effectively minimized, party cohesion maximized and electoral fairness better ensured.

---

***Thomas Lundberg*** received an MA in political science at George Washington University in 1995.

Copyright (c) 2000 The Center for Voting and Democracy, 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 901, Takoma Park, MD 20912.  
Used with permission.

## 1994 ELECTIONS IN ITALY

By Richard S. Katz

Few countries have undergone such dramatic changes in their political systems in recent years as Italy. With the collapse of the Christian Democratic Party, which had been a part of every governing coalition since World War II, and with the replacement of an extreme version of proportional representation by a system with 75% of seats elected by plurality in single-member districts, Italy's 1994 parliamentary elections provide a remarkable opportunity to study the impact of voting system change.

Many Italians voted for a more majoritarian electoral system in the historic 1993 referendum out of a desire to create a two-party system with regular rotations of power. But the 1994 elections demonstrated that creating such a system requires more than changes in the electoral law. With geographically-polarized results and the continued representation of numerous political parties, the new parliament is arguably less stable than the notoriously complicated coalitions of the pre-reform era.

Beyond the unprecedented victory of the coalitions formed by Silvio Berlusconi just months before the elections and the collapse of the parties of the old ruling coalition, the most striking feature about the outcome of the 1994 parliamentary election is the difficulty one has in saying with any precise detail what the outcome was.

The difficulty stems in part from the facts that there were three separate ballots (Senate, Chamber of Deputies *collegio* and Chamber of Deputies *circoscrizione* list), that the voters were not constrained to cast their votes in a consistent manner and that choices presented to the voters generally differed among those ballots.

The difficulty also stems from variability across the country in the identity even of the major contestants. Most notably, in the north Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* was allied with the *Lega* (Northern League) in the *Polo della Libertà*, which was opposed by the *Alleanza Nazionale*, but in the south and center, the Berlusconi coalition was the *Polo del Buon Governo* formed in alliance with the *Alleanza Nazionale*. A final difficulty was the failure of significant numbers of Senators and Deputies to join the parliamentary groups corresponding to the parties or lists on which they were elected.

These difficulties are reflected in Table 1, which shows the coalition of the right (*the Poli*) to have won a strong absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies, but to have fallen just short of a majority in the Senate. In fact, the *Poli* were a bit farther short of a majority in the Senate than the table shows, because in addition to the 315 elected senators, the Senate includes 11 life senators, none of whom adhered to the parliamentary groups of the *Poli*.

Table 1 also shows the overall distribution of members among the parliamentary groups. Not directly reflected in the table is the fact that 24 deputies and one senator elected as members of the *Progressisti*, *Patto per l'Italia*, or *Poli* chose to join the *Gruppo Misto* in parliament, rather than one of the groups corresponding to their electoral alliance. Principal among these were 5 of the 18 deputies of *Alleanza Democratica* and all 13 of the deputies of the *Patto Segni*.

Also not directly reflected in the table is the movement of 9 deputies who identified themselves in their biographies as candidates of *Forza Italia* into other groups of the right

coalition, and the movement of 15 deputies who identified themselves as candidates of other right-coalition parties into the *Forza Italia* parliamentary group.

Examination of Table 1 shows a significant difference between the blocks in the importance and operation of the proportional seats. While these clearly were intended to assure the continued representation — and existence — of the smaller parties whose votes had been required to pass the reform legislation, it was only in the block of the *Patto per l'Italia* that the PR seats played a major direct role in securing representation for smaller parties.

Table 1. Results

Political Party	CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES			SENATE			Total Seats
	Proportional Seats	District Seats	Total Seats	Proportional Seats	District Seats	Life Senators	
Progressisti	37	131	168	14	60		74
Rifondazione Comunista	12	25	37	4	14		18
PSI				1	8	1	10
Verdi				4	9		13
Rete Socialista							
Democratica				3	5	1	9
<b>Total Progressisti</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>124</b>
Patto per l'Italia	28	4	32	28	3	3	34
Forza Italia	25	88	113	8	27		35
Alleanza Nazionale	22	86	108	13	35		48
Lega Nord	10	106	116	5	55		60
CCD	6	21	27	2	10		12
<b>Total Poli</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>127</b>		<b>15</b>
Mistro	15	14	29	1	6	6	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>326</b>

Table 2. Seats Won and Margin of First-Past-the-Post Victory by Block and Region

		NORTH		CENTER		SOUTH	
		Chamber	Senate	Chamber	Senate	Chamber	Senate
<i>Left</i>	PR seats	19	11	8	0	22	14
	SMP seats	14	10	77	39	73	48
	Mean margin of victory	9.1	7.9	24.1	25.7	8.0	7.1
<i>Center</i>	PR seats	15	10	5	6	23	12
	SMP seats					4	3
	Mean margin of victory					5.8	5.5
<i>Right</i>	PR Seats	27	7	12	9	24	12
	SMP Seats	162	73	3	1	137	54
	Mean margin of victory	24.9	16.3	5.5	8.5	11.3	7.9

Ironically, the principal beneficiary of the PR seats was the *PPI* itself, which as the successor of the DC was assumed in August of 1993 to be one of the major parties. The *PPI* won 18.7 and 32.5 percent of all the PR seats in the Chamber and Senate, respectively, amounting to 87.9% and 90% of its total representation in the two chambers.

On the other hand, with the exception of a few seats in the Senate, the smaller parties appear to have won representation in spite of the PR seats, rather than because of them. This is especially true for the Chamber of Deputies, where the four percent threshold shut out parties that among them won roughly 15% of the vote.

The impact of the threshold fell particularly hard on the left, which won more than half of the “wasted” list votes, and which might have expected to win 10 more seats had, for example, the threshold been one percent instead of four. (At the same time, the *Poli* would have won a decisive majority in the Chamber anyway.)

## REGIONAL POLARIZATION AND EASY VICTORIES

Breaking down the result of the 1994 election by region shows that even with regard to the Senate, for which the aggregate results were extremely close, the reforms have not given Italy a competitive bi-polar system. Rather, the projections from 1993 of “three Italys” have largely been realized, albeit in a form somewhat different from that originally expected.

Using the single-member district seats as an indicator, as Table 2 shows, the north is a solid bastion for the right, which won roughly 90% of the *collegi* for the Chamber, and nearly as large a percentage (88%) for the Senate. Moreover, these contests were not close — the average winning Senate candidate of the *Poli* in the north led his/her closest competitor by over 16% of the vote, while the average margin for his/her lower house counterpart was nearly 25%.

This pattern is repeated, but in mirror image, in the center, which was a solid enclave for the left. The left won over 95% of the single member seats for each chamber in the center, with average margins of victory nearly 25%. Only in the south was there significant competition, both in the sense that both left and right won appreciable numbers of *collegi*, and in the sense that the average margins of victory on both sides were small enough to suggest significant numbers of seats could change hands in either direction.

There were significant regional variations in patterns of competition, with regional differences not only with respect to which general groupings won seats, but also with regard to their patterns of competition. The most significant difference was within the right, where not only did the ally of *Forza Italia* differ across regions, but indeed the *Lega* (Northern League) had no candidates in the center or south and the *Alleanza Nazionale* ran against the *Polo della Libertà* in the north and north-center (Emilia Romagna and Toscana).

A second difference was that *Rifondazione* did not have its own PR list for the Chamber in either of the Sicily *circoscrizioni*. Finally, assuming that the “real” competition in a first-past-the-post election is between the candidates in first and second place, the most common pattern was competition between left and right, with the center finishing at least third. Among those *collegi* in which a candidate of the center did manage to break into the top two positions, the pattern of right-against-center occurred most commonly in the north, while the pattern of left-against-center was overwhelmingly found in the south.

## LESS VOTER CHANGE THAN MEETS THE EYE

The index of voter volatility is difficult to compute for the 1994 election because of the difficulty of identifying successor/predecessor parties. A reasonable approximation, however, is that the index stands at roughly 37.1, equivalent to saying that more than one voter in every three switched parties between 1992 and 1994.

If, however, one looks only at what Bartolini and Mair have called block volatility, thus ignoring shifts among parties within the left or within the right and center, and thus also minimizing the consequences for the index of having *Forza Italia* rise and the DC collapse, but both within the non-socialist block, the index is only 5.5, high but no longer of earthquake proportions. Separating out the MSI-*Alleanza Nazionale* as a third block, increases the index to 8.1. In contrast, total volatility between 1987 and 1992 was only 15.5, while block volatility based on the two block model was 5.3, rising to 5.8 under the three block model.

## INFUSION OF NEW LEGISLATORS

Accompanying this high level of volatility was a radical renewal of parliamentary personnel. More than one third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1992 had then served three or more terms in the Parliament and the overall rate turnover was about 44%; the corresponding figures for the Parliament elected in 1994 were 12% with three or more previous terms and over 71% having no parliamentary experience.

Indeed, upwards of one third of the members of the new parliament report themselves to have had no previous experience in party or electoral politics at all. Naturally, the proportion of members lacking in parliamentary experience is highest for those parties that made great gains (the *Lega*, 69.5% new members; *Alleanza Nazionale*, 77.5% new members; and especially *Forza Italia*, 90.4% with no previous parliamentary experience), but even for the PDS, the PPI, and *Rifondazione Comunista*, over half the deputies elected in 1994 are new. Somewhat fewer senators (about 60%) are without previous experience in Parliament, with the partisan distribution of the inexperienced roughly the same as it is for the Chamber.

Previous service in Parliament is not, of course, the only kind of political experience a member might have. Generally under one third of the members of each of the major groups report themselves to be political neophytes, a position which is least common among members of *Alleanza Nazionale* (under 20%). On the other hand, over 80% of deputies and senators of *Forza Italia* report, with some apparent pride, that they had never been involved in party or electoral politics before entering the lists in 1994.

## REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN

The percentage of women representatives increased only in the Chamber of Deputies, although the decrease in the proportion of women in the Senate is trivial, and the increase in the Chamber of Deputies still leaves the representation of women in the Italian parliament well below that of most European countries. The increase in the Chamber of Deputies comes primarily from the PR seats, over one third of which were won by women (compared to women winning 9% of district seats), but this is still significantly below the 50% that one might naively have expected from the requirement of alternation of the genders on PR lists.

The expectation that the increase in women's representation would come primarily in those parties that made the most significant gains finds only weak support. While it is true

---

that 55% of the increase in the number of women deputies came in the three big parties of the right block, which collectively went from 80 seats in the old Chamber to 337 in the new, the remnants of the DC (PPI plus CCD) had two more women in the new Chamber even though they had lost nearly three-fourths of their seats, while women's representation on the left increased from 27 to 47 Deputies on a loss of roughly 20% of their seats.

Even as the left was losing seats and the right gaining, the *increase* in women's representation as a proportion of the total number of seats won was greater for the left than for the right. While turnover clearly created opportunities for women to win election, the decisions of party elites to nominate women in winnable *collegi* and the required alternation of genders on the PR lists were more important.

Representation of women clearly decreases as one moves from left to right along the political spectrum - a notable change from the Eleventh Chamber of Deputies, and one potentially attributable to the demise of the *voto di preferenza*, which makes election now more dependent on the party's decision to place a candidate in a constituency where the party/alliance is strong, rather than on the strength of the candidate's personal appeal vis-a-vis other candidates of the same party.

---

***Richard S. Katz is professor of political science at State University of New York-Buffalo.***

Copyright (c) 2000 The Center for Voting and Democracy, 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 901, Takoma Park, MD 20912.  
Used with permission.

---

# NEW ZEALAND'S METHOD FOR REPRESENTING MINORITIES

*By Jack Nagel*

Observers have devoted considerable attention to New Zealand's 1993 decision to switch its parliamentary elections from the Anglo-American method of plurality voting in single-member districts to a German-style, mixed-member proportional system.

However, many have neglected a subsidiary but strikingly original aspect of the New Zealand reform — the provisions it includes to promote fair and effective representation for the country's indigenous Maori minority. This plan, which synthesizes mixed-member proportional with New Zealand's 128-year-old tradition of separate Maori electorates, can be abbreviated MMP-DC, for "mixed-member proportional with dual constituencies."

## DISADVANTAGES OF CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS

Before explaining the MMP-DC system and its attractions, it will be helpful to sketch the problems of minority representation in conventional electoral systems. Most national legislatures are elected either from single-member districts (using plurality or majority rule) or from multi-member districts (using a proportional or semi-proportional decision rule).

In single-member district (SMD) systems, if group identity affects voting patterns, then the ability of a minority to elect legislators depends on its geographical distribution in relation to constituency boundaries. This creates the potential for the following disadvantages:

- underrepresentation of geographically dispersed minorities;
- overrepresentation of groups (minorities or majorities) that are distributed geographically in an optimally concentrated pattern;
- increased salience of geographically-linked cleavages, which are often especially dangerous, because they are conducive to secession and civil war;
- development by groups of a political stake in territorial segregation;
- a strong group interest in the mapping of constituencies, which can lead to gerrymandering and other distortions.

In the United States, court battles over constitutionality of odd-shaped "majority-minority" districts (devised to elect more nearly proportionate numbers of blacks and Hispanics) dramatize the conflict between conventional single-member districts and equitable representation of minority groups.

Because of these problems with SMD systems, it has become the conventional wisdom in comparative politics to recommend proportional representation (PR) as the best system for plural societies. Because PR and related "semi-proportional" systems use multi-member districts, parties — acting from statesmanship or to gain votes — can offer lists or slates that include candidates from various groups.

If a group nonetheless considers itself under-represented, its members can organize their own party and win a share of seats proportional to the vote they attract, once they

surpass the threshold of representation. Despite this compelling logic, conventional PR systems have four potential drawbacks as devices for representing minority groups:

- If groups are represented primarily by their own parties, then the process of political mobilization at the mass level will perpetuate and perhaps aggravate group differences. Unless such divisions are countered by accommodative norms and successful coalition-building at the elite level, the unity of the polity may be endangered.
- A group that organizes its own party in order to achieve fair representation risks ineffectual or even dangerous political isolation, because other parties may give up hope of competing for its members' votes.
- PR in itself offers no constitutional guarantee of representation to any minority; each group must take its chances in a political process that may be dominated by an indifferent or hostile majority.
- Although it is usually deemed an advantage that PR offers hope of fair representation within a legal framework that treats all individuals equally, without reference to group identities, some groups may strongly desire explicit constitutional recognition of their distinctive status.

## HOW MMP-DC WILL WORK

MMP-DC has three crucial elements:

- As in other mixed-member systems, each voter will cast two ballots — one for a constituency representative elected by plurality from a single-member electorate and one for a national party list. Following the German compensatory principle, seats that parties win in electorates will be subtracted from their list allocations, so each party's overall representation in Parliament will be proportional to the vote for its list. Adaptations of the New Zealand system might help solve the problems of other democracies, established or emerging, that face the problem of how to combine two or more different peoples into a unified polity on a basis of fairness and consent.
- The single-member electorates will consist of two types of constituencies — General and Maori. This dual-constituency (DC) feature can be visualized as a map with two overlays — one dividing New Zealand into numerous General electorates, the other apportioning the same territory into a smaller number of geographically larger Maori electorates. Mps elected from both types of electorates will serve in the same chamber with equal rights and privileges.
- In a process known as “the Maori option,” New Zealanders of Maori descent will periodically choose whether they wish to vote on the General or Maori electoral roll. The number of Maori seats will fluctuate up or down depending on the number of people on the Maori roll, using the same population quota as determines the number of General seats.

## ADVANTAGES OF MMP-DC

Compared with both standard systems of representation, the New Zealand invention of dual constituencies has significant advantages as a device for ensuring minority representation.

1. MMP-DC allows separate representation to a minority that desires it — whether negatively out of insecurity and distrust or positively to maintain a cherished distinctive identity; but it also provides a mechanism to end that separate system if — through intermarriage, assimilation, or personal choice — members of the minority acting as individuals no longer wish to affirm their difference by registering on the minority roll.
2. Although MMP-DC offers members of the minority a distinctive status, it does not confine them to it. The General roll and seats are defined in universalistic rather than exclusive terms, and they are open to all. Thus, the voting system is fully inclusive and the state forces no one to accept an unwanted ethnic identity.
3. MMP-DC offers guaranteed representation to the minority even if it is geographically dispersed.
4. MMP-DC does not require the minority to form a separate political party in order to attain an assured minimum of descriptive representation; however, if enough members of the group believe that a separate party would be advantageous, that alternative is feasible because of the party-list element of the mixed-member system.
5. Because it assigns the minority seats based on enrollment, MMP-DC provides a mechanism to ensure that the group's guaranteed representation is fairly proportional, thus preventing the dangers of tokenistic underrepresentation or privileged overrepresentation.
6. MMP-DC promotes higher levels of voting participation among the minority group in three ways. First, if its members believe that the polity treats them fairly, they will be less alienated from politics. Second, because the number of minority seats depends on how many voters register on the separate roll, MMP-DC rewards efforts to enroll minority voters. Third, as a list-PR system, MMP-DC fosters higher turnout generally, because each party-list vote has a roughly equal chance to influence the allocation of seats and even minor parties have a chance to share legislative power. In contrast, in SMD systems, votes cast in safe districts and votes cast for minor parties have less impact.
7. Finally, in what may be its most important feature, MMP-DC enables the minority to have a guaranteed level of descriptive representation without risking loss of substantive influence. The party list vote determines the overall allocation of seats among parties, and there is no distinction between the party-list votes of electors on the minority and general rolls. Therefore, all parties have an incentive to appeal to the minority for list votes, despite the segregation of their constituency votes. Thus under MMP-DC the minority can have separate representation without becoming politically marginalized. In contrast, in SMD systems, a minority that is concentrated in its own electorates (whether from residential segregation or gerrymandering) loses substantive influence over legislators from the majority group. No matter how compelling they seem, these arguments remain theoretical until MMP-DC is tested in practice. In fact, the system is off to a rocky start, as Maori leaders have charged that the government devoted too little time and money to the first Maori option campaign, which resulted in fewer voters on the Maori roll than they had expected.

Once this dispute is resolved, the development of Maori politics over the next decade will be a question of more than parochial interest. However, even if the new system for

---

Maori representation proves an unqualified success in New Zealand, other plural societies cannot transplant it unless they meet three preconditions.

1. There must be no constitutional barrier to giving some citizens a distinctive status on the basis of group identity.
2. As a form of proportional representation based on party lists, MMP-DC does not apply to small councils, non-partisan elections or single-winner contests. It is most suitable for parliamentary systems with fairly large chambers, in which list votes can be pooled system-wide or in large-magnitude districts.
3. If a polity has more than one significant minority, there must be some generally accepted way to decide who is entitled to separate representation. In New Zealand, that question is readily answered, because Maori are the indigenous people and other minorities are not yet numerous. Where two or more substantial minorities have compelling claims, the concept might be extended to three or more sets of constituencies; but proliferation could not be carried too far without creating unworkable political and administrative complexity.

The first two of these restrictions (and probably the third also) suggest that MMP-DC will not be applicable in the United States, which is perhaps regrettable, given our current dilemma over the gerrymandering of majority-minority Congressional districts. Nevertheless, adaptations of the New Zealand system might help solve the problems of other democracies, established or emerging, that face the problem of how to combine two or more different peoples into a unified polity on a basis of fairness and consent.

---

*Jack Nagel is the Daniel J. Brodsky Term Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania.*

Copyright (c) 2000 The Center for Voting and Democracy, 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 901, Takoma Park, MD 20912.  
Used with permission.

# VOTING IN THE MAJOR DEMOCRACIES

*By the Center for Voting and Democracy*

Lower/Single House Elections in the World's Major, Full-fledged Democracies			
Country	PR	SMD	SMD-PR
Australia	*	SMD (irv)	
Austria	PR		
Belgium	PR		
Benin	PR		
Bolivia	PR (mmpr)		
Canada		SMD	
Costa Rica	PR		
Czech Republic	PR		
Denmark	PR		
Finland	PR		
France	**	SMD (mr)	
Germany	PR (mmpr)		
Greece	PR		
Hungary			MIXED (pr)
Ireland	PR (stv)		
Israel	PR		
Italy			MIXED (smd)
Jamaica		SMD	
Japan			MIXED (smd)
Korea, South			MIXED (smd)
Latvia	PR		
Lithuania			MIXED (equal)
Netherlands	PR		
New Zealand	PR (mmpr)		
Norway	PR		
Poland	PR		
Portugal	PR		
Romania	PR		
Slovakia	PR		
Slovenia	PR		
South Africa	PR		
Spain	PR		
Sweden	PR		
Switzerland	PR		
Taiwan			SNTV (w/PR)
United Kingdom	**	SMD	
United States		SMD	
Uruguay	PR		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>

Data supplied by Professor Mark Jones of Michigan State University.

"Full-fledged" democracy means the country earned a 1998 Freedom House Average Freedom score of 2 or less.

"Major" requires the country to have a population of at least two million.

\* Australia uses PR for Senate elections.

\*\* France and the United Kingdom use PR for European Union elections.

Canada, Jamaica and the United States are the only countries to qualify for the list and not use PR in any national elections.

irv = Instant Runoff Voting which Australians call alternative vote

MIXED = some reps elected by PR and some by SMD

mmpr = Mixed-Member Proportional Representation

PR = Proportional Representation

SMD = Single Member District

stv = Single Transferable Vote

sntv = Single Non-Transferable Vote

For the Mixed Systems, SMD or PR signify that the SMD or PR component is dominant.

Copyright (c) 2000 The Center for Voting and Democracy, 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 901, Takoma Park, MD 20912. Used with permission.

# THE PREFERENCE VOTE AND ELECTION OF WOMEN

*By Wilma Rule and Matthew Shugart*

Women's representation in parliament in long-established democracies in 1995 varied from 2% in Japan's lower house to 41% in Sweden. The United States ranks in the lower middle with 11% in the House of Representatives, just below Ireland.

What accounts for this variation? We believe that a substantial part of it can be explained by the existence of laws that allow voters to choose specific candidates among the several that a party nominates in multi-seat districts.

Voters in thirteen European countries and Japan may choose women and/or men for their preferred representatives among the candidates nominated by their political party in the final and decisive election.

Women would appear to have less opportunity for parliamentary election where voters' choice is limited, where they must choose only a fixed party slate of candidates, and where single member districts are used, as in the United States.

But does increasing voters' options make the difference in women's legislative representation compared to countries which do not have it? Or could the determining factor be the number of representatives in a district (district magnitude), or perhaps the social, economic and political context?

To answer these and other questions the authors conducted a study of 24 nations with and without "preference vote" laws to determine the relationship between the preference vote and women's election to parliament.

Studying women's representation in parliament from 1970-1991, each of the 24 nations' electoral laws was investigated and each country was classified as to whether voters both had the preference vote and generally used it. Because women's use of the preference vote to increase their parliamentary representation is documented only for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Italy, no general classification could be made on women's use.

Countries with a utilized preference vote included Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Countries with a non-utilized preference vote include Austria, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Ten countries without a preference vote in the decisive election are the single member district countries of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States and the fixed/closed list PR countries of Germany, Israel, Spain and Portugal.

Effective district magnitude, a more accurate measure than a country's average seats in electoral districts, was used to test whether a large magnitude and a preference vote made a difference in the proportions of women MPs elected.

Contextual variables included political party proportions in parliament, unemployment, women in the labor force and among college graduates and dominant religion. Previous studies have found all these variables to be secondary in importance to the electoral system for explaining women's greater or lesser representation in parliament.

## THE FINDINGS: ROLE OF THE “PREFERENCE VOTE”

Countries with a preference vote law in the 1970-1991 period averaged 13% women members of parliament, with Japan at the bottom and Finland first with 27%. The ten countries without a preference law averaged only 6%. They ranged from a low of 3% in Australia to a high of 9% in Germany.

However, unless the district magnitude is over five representatives in a district, the preference vote does not make a significant contribution to women’s election to parliament. This is the case for Greece, Ireland, and Japan — each of which has a different electoral system. (Greece has party list PR; Ireland, preference voting, or single transferable vote; and Japan, the single nontransferable vote, a form of limited voting.)

When Greece, Ireland and Japan — which average only four representatives in a district — were eliminated from the multiple regression tests, women’s representation showed significant increases. Magnitudes for the remaining preference vote countries ranged from Norway’s 7 representatives to the Netherlands’ 75. (All were logged, however.)

A preference vote combined with a party-list/PR system and large magnitudes resulted in the greatest proportion of women MPs among 21 countries tested (Greece, Japan and Ireland omitted). In countries with high women’s representation, center and left-wing political parties were second in importance to the preference vote and other electoral

systems features. This includes Norway and Denmark which elected an average of 27% and 23% women MPs, respectively, between 1970-1991.

In Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, which all have party list PR electoral systems and a non-utilized preference vote, women candidates also did very well. One possible explanation is that women preferred working within parties to obtain favorable placement on the lists. Another was that party leaders knew that if women were not well positioned, voters could be rallied to use the preference vote and change the order on the lists.

Closed/fixed list countries with party list/PR and majority/plurality countries have low women’s representation over the twenty years studied. Germany and New Zealand had only about 9% women in parliament from 1970-91. The United States was in the middle with 4% and Australia last with 3%.

The societal factors interact with all countries’ electoral systems in the 24 countries studied. Favorable factors are lack of a dominant religion, large proportions of women in the workforce and among college graduates and full employment. Countries with these characteristics and favorable electoral procedures are high in women’s parliamentary representation; those without have one-third or less women in their national legislatures.

### Women in Legislatures Around the World

Percentage of women in parliament. Countries in bold have winner-take-all systems.

Country	% Women in Parliament	Election Date
Sweden	41%	9/94
Finland	39%	3/91
Norway	36%	9/89
Denmark	33%	12/90
Netherlands	29%	9/89
Germany	26%	10/94
South Africa	25%	4/94
Iceland	24%	4/91
Austria	21%	10/90
Switzerland	18%	10/91
Slovak Republic	18%	12/92
Spain	16%	12/93
Italy	15%	3/94
Latvia	14%	12/93
Bulgaria	13%	10/91
Estonia	13%	9/92
Russia	13%	12/93
Ireland	12%	11/92
<b>United States</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>11/94</b>
Czech Republic	10%	12/92
Poland	10%	10/91
Belgium	9%	11/91
Portugal	9%	10/91
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>4/92</b>
Hungary	7%	4/90
Lithuania	7%	11/92
<b>France</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>3/93</b>
Greece	5%	4/90

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union and The Center for Voting and Democracy

---

## PREFERENCE VOTING A TOOL FOR WOMEN

Japan, Italy and New Zealand changed electoral systems in 1993-1994 — Japan and Italy because their corruption was seen as a consequence of their electoral systems with preference voting, New Zealand because of voters' dissatisfaction with their plurality, single-member district election system.

While blame was placed on the preference vote in Japan and Italy, which subsequently eliminated it, other countries with it have prohibited donors from giving money and gifts to parties, candidates and parliament members and have had little corruption.

New Zealand with 16% women in parliament in 1990 does not fit the generalization that very low proportions of women can generally be expected in plurality or majority electoral systems. Likewise Belgium with a preference vote and the party list/PR system is also an anomaly with only 9% women parliamentarians. These and other exceptions are subjects for further study.

Electoral systems with a preference vote law and high district magnitude generally can help overcome societal hindrances to women's successful recruitment to parliament. However, favorable societal conditions cannot make up for unfavorable electoral arrangements. Finally, it appears that the preference vote has a symbolic democratic value. It is there if voters choose to use it.

---

*Wilma Rule is adjunct professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Reno.*

*Matthew Shugart is associate professor of political science at the University of Calif.-San Diego.*

Copyright (c) 2000 The Center for Voting and Democracy, 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 901, Takoma Park, MD 20912.  
Used with permission.

# THE MINORITY MAJORITY IN 2001

*By Brad Edmondson*

In less than one lifespan, Americans who belong to racial and ethnic minority groups will outnumber non-Hispanic whites. Blacks, Asians, Native Americans, and Hispanics will attain the U.S. majority shortly after the year 2050, according to Census Bureau projections. They are already a majority in New Mexico, Hawaii, and many large cities. These minority strongholds are the vanguard of a demographic shift that will transform politics and business over the next 50 years.

This map (page 36) shows the proportion of non-Hispanic whites for each U.S. county in the first year of the 21st century. The minority majority will exist in 226 U.S. counties in 2001, up from 186 counties in 1990, according to Equifax National Decision Systems in San Diego. California will reach a statewide minority majority in 2000 and Texas will by 2010. The driving force in both states is immigration to urban areas. For example, the population of middle-class (1) Orange County, CA, should increase from 1.9 million in 1980 to 2.8 million in 2001, but the non-Hispanic white population will remain at about 1.4 million. Only 51 percent of residents will be non-Hispanic white in 2001, compared with 72 percent in 1980.

Counties that are approaching a minority majority fall into three types. Some are the most populated places in America, such as central (2) Chicago, IL (Cook County, pop. 5.1 million in 2001, 49 percent non-Hispanic white); (3) Dallas County, TX (2.1 million, 50 percent); and downtown (4) Detroit, MI (Wayne County, 2 million, 52 percent). These urban cores also tend to be racially diverse. In some big cities, such as (5) Queens County, NY (2 million), the population is 38 percent Anglo, with the rest equally divided between African, Hispanic, and Asian Americans.

Some smaller cities in the South and West are also approaching a minority majority, but their population is not as diverse. In (6) Albany, GA (Dougherty County, 2001 pop. 101,000), almost everyone will be black (49 percent) or white (49 percent). In the (7) Corpus Christi, TX metro area (San Patricio County, 70,000), 53 percent will be Hispanic and 45 percent Anglo. And sometimes the minority majority is in rural areas that have held a racial balance for generations. The original European and African settlers of (8) Dillon County, SC (30,500, 50 percent Anglo) arrived about 300 years ago.

Counties that are completely dominated by Anglos tend to be northern and rural. The two whitest places in America are (9) Robertson County, KY (2001 pop. 2,317), with a projected minority population of 4, and (10) McPherson County, NE (558), where demographers estimate that there is 1 lonely minority resident. The hills and hollows of Robertson are the cradle of bluegrass, the true white soul music. The prairies of McPherson were settled 100 years ago by German families that apparently still have the place to themselves.


There will also be 38 counties where fewer than one in five residents is non-Hispanic white. Sixteen are in south Texas, including (11) El Paso County (2001 pop. 776,000, 16 percent white) and the counties that contain Laredo and McAllen-Edinburg-Mission. Twenty are enclaves of rural poverty, and one is (12) Bronx County, NY (1.2 million, 16 percent). The exception is (13) Miami (Dade County, FL, 2.2 million), where demographic change in the 1990s has been like a hurricane. Non-Hispanic whites will decline from 30

---

percent of Miami residents in 1990 to a projected 14.5 percent in 2001. In other words, Miami should see an absolute decline of 268,000 Anglo residents in this decade, while its total population increases by 254,000. “Your mother doesn’t live here anymore,” says Robert Joffe, a Miami-based pollster and political analyst. “The working-class Jewish people who came to Miami decades ago have either died or moved north.” Meanwhile, Anglo baby boomers avoid Miami’s crime and county-wide public-school problems.

But Miami is different. “Lots of people here are Hispanic in name only,” says Joffe. “The younger ones were born here. They don’t even speak Spanish.” It’s the story of America, where every family started out in the minority.

Copyright (c) American Demographics. Used with permission.



# THE DEMISE OF RACIAL DISTRICTING AND THE FUTURE OF BLACK REPRESENTATION

*By Charles S. Bullock, III and Richard E. Dunn*

## INTRODUCTION

Many of the early stalwarts in the civil rights movement, including Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., placed their highest expectations on winning unencumbered access to the ballot box. They expected that once African-Americans became enfranchised, they would be able to use political muscle to bring about changes in other spheres such as employment, public accommodations and education. They realized that a people who cannot vote not only are ignored by public officials but also may become scapegoats whose name is invoked to rally an electorate that opposes their aspirations.<sup>1</sup>

Civil rights acts passed in 1957 and 1960 dealt primarily with discriminatory practices that blocked black voter registration in the South.<sup>2</sup> These statutes, along with the 1964 Civil Rights Act,<sup>3</sup> had some impact, but it remained for the Voting Rights Act of 1965<sup>4</sup> to launch a full-scale federal assault on discriminatory registration practices.<sup>5</sup> Immediately after signing the last of these laws, President Lyndon Johnson dispatched federal registrars to particularly obstinate communities, and they began signing up black voters.<sup>6</sup> Soon thereafter, obstacles disappeared as the literacy tests, good character tests, and understanding tests that had been used to keep African-Americans from the ballot box were rooted out. The demonstration of a federal commitment to enforcement also reduced the incidence of intimidation and contributed to the eradication of discriminatory practices such as registration slow downs.<sup>7</sup> Beginning in the mid-1960s, black registration rates jumped, erasing a considerable amount of the disparity in black and white registration rates.<sup>8</sup>

As barriers to registration fell, the emphasis of voting rights activists changed from expanding the ranks of black registrants to increasing black office holding. The use of the Voting Rights Act to confront minority vote dilution received a major boost in 1969 when the Supreme Court held that changes in the electoral laws that might dilute minority voting strength and efforts to block participation are subject to the Act's pre-clearance provision in section 5.<sup>9</sup> This decision recognized that some southern communities continued to throw roadblocks in the way of full black participation by making the election of black candidates difficult. Techniques used to this end included changing elective offices to appointive ones and, in some instances, replacing local offices elected from single-member districts with at-large formats.<sup>10</sup>

By the early 1990s, it had become an article of faith with the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and many civil rights advocates that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the creation of majority-minority electoral units whenever feasible. The DOJ's goal of maximizing the number of majority-black legislative districts received a boost in 1989 from an Arkansas district court. In *Jeffers v. Clinton*,<sup>11</sup> a federal judge threw out state legislative districts in southern and eastern Arkansas when plaintiffs showed that a different configuration would produce additional majority-black districts. The decision hinged not on evidence that Arkansas officials, including Governor Bill Clinton, had acted to limit the number of black districts, but rather simply a showing that an option more favorable to African-American political ambitions existed.<sup>12</sup>

Although not binding on the rest of the nation, the Jeffers decision guided DOJ reviews of jurisdictions subject to pre-clearance. It also affected the redistricting decisions of other jurisdictions that did not have to secure pre-clearance of districting plans from DOJ but wanted to avoid private lawsuits challenging the fairness of their districting schemes.<sup>13</sup> The consequences of interpreting section 2 as placing an affirmative duty on jurisdictions to create majority-minority districts when possible fell heavily on the South, although it also impacted Illinois and New York. As a result of the mandate to draw more majority-black districts, African-Americans won additional seats on governmental bodies in the early 1990s. Most visible was the increase in the number of black members of Congress from the South, which went from five to seventeen.<sup>14</sup> Other increases came in state legislatures, county commissions, school boards and city councils.

Beginning in 1993, the Supreme Court raised questions about the appropriateness of the steps taken to create some of these heavily minority districts. In *Shaw v. Reno*,<sup>15</sup> the Court held that challenges to heavily minority districts were justiciable, and because citizens had been classified by race in drawing these districts, courts should apply strict scrutiny.<sup>16</sup> This meant that in order to justify heavy reliance upon race in drawing districts, a jurisdiction had to show that the remedy it provided was narrowly tailored and designed to achieve a compelling state interest.<sup>17</sup>

Two years later, in *Miller v. Johnson*,<sup>18</sup> the high court struck down Georgia's 11th Congressional District because it had been drawn predominantly on the basis of race.<sup>19</sup> Subsequent court orders invalidated majority-minority congressional districts in Louisiana,<sup>20</sup> Texas,<sup>21</sup> Florida,<sup>22</sup> Virginia<sup>23</sup> and New York<sup>24</sup> on the same grounds. At the time of the 1996 congressional elections, redistricting had been carried out in all or portions of Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas with black majorities eliminated in at least one district in each of these states. Furthermore, some state legislative districts in Florida and Georgia were redrawn in time for the 1996 elections, and North Carolina and Virginia had new congressional districts in place for the 1998 elections.

Many voting rights advocates warned that these developments would result in "the ultimate bleaching of the U.S. Congress" and other collegial bodies.<sup>25</sup> Despite the dire predictions, all but one incumbent successfully sought re-election in the reconfigured congressional districts.<sup>26</sup> Sheila Jackson-Lee (TX-18) and Corrine Brown (FL-3), in fact, rolled up larger margins than they had enjoyed previously.<sup>27</sup> Though the successful black candidates may have been aided by being incumbents and having a successful Democratic presidential candidate on the top of the ballot, some see these results as evidence that majority black districts are not necessary for the election of African-Americans.<sup>28</sup>

This article offers a preliminary assessment of the consequences of eliminating black majorities from legislative districts. Though it is too early to evaluate the full ramifications of the *Shaw*/*Miller* line of cases on descriptive black representation, we can begin to test propositions offered by the proponents and opponents of majority-minority districts. The next two Parts review the creation of majority-minority districts in the 1990s redistricting cycle, the assumptions behind them, the creative cartography used to draw district lines, and the charges of plaintiffs who challenged the districts.<sup>29</sup> In Parts III-V, we employ statistical techniques to estimate racial support for the successful black candidates, focusing primarily upon three candidates in Florida and Georgia but also looking at the performances of other candidates in new majority-black districts.<sup>30</sup> In general, we find that these incumbents attract about one-third of the white general election vote, a result that is in

line with levels of white support for white Democratic candidates for other federal offices in the South.<sup>31</sup> Finally, in Parts VI and VII, we complete the analysis by examining 1998 returns from three southern states and by considering additional evidence from state legislative races.<sup>32</sup> These results continue to show black Democrats running almost as well among white voters as white Democrats.

## I. BASES FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GERRYMANDERING

The notion that jurisdictions had to create majority-minority districts when possible was relatively new in 1990. The basis for this expectation came from the amendment of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982,<sup>33</sup> a provision that removed any obligation on the part of plaintiffs to demonstrate intent in order to prove a violation of voting rights. Although a caveat sponsored by Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) had stipulated that the failure of minorities to be proportionally represented was not sufficient evidence of a discriminatory effect,<sup>34</sup> proportionality often became the benchmark in assessing the equity of a districting scheme.<sup>35</sup> Among the criteria to be considered in judging the fairness of a districting plan were the frequency with which minorities had been elected and the existence of racial voting patterns.

Some states, such as Georgia, probably received the 1990 Census data fully expecting to create an additional majority-black district. Having accepted that more majority-minority districts would have to be created, the degree of concentration of minorities necessary to ensure an equal opportunity to elect minority-preferred candidates became an issue. From the past came the “sixty-five percent rule,” which set sixty-five percent black as the level of concentration necessary to give African-Americans an equal chance at election.<sup>36</sup> Although by 1990 the DOJ had recanted its commitment to this standard,<sup>37</sup> it continued to hold sway with some players, and the sixty-five percent threshold was approximated in Georgia’s 11th, Virginia’s 3rd, and South Carolina’s 6th Districts.<sup>38</sup> At a minimum, the DOJ required that a majority of a district’s population be minority for it to be considered a minority district, even if African-Americans constituted only a plurality of the voting age population<sup>39</sup> as, for example, in Texas’s 18th and 30th Districts and Florida’s 23rd District.<sup>40</sup>

The belief that super-majorities were needed if districts were to elect African-Americans rested on three premises: blacks register at lower rates than whites; among registrants, blacks are less likely to turn out and vote than are whites; and white voters are less likely to vote for a black candidate than black voters are to cast ballots for a white candidate.<sup>41</sup> Along with these assumptions came the understandable desire among prospective candidates in these majority-minority districts to stack the odds in their favor. If the minority population were sufficiently large, then the choice of a candidate would be confined to the Democratic party, thereby avoiding a serious general election campaign.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the black vote constitutes a greater share of the vote in a Democratic primary than in a general election, so prospects for electing African-Americans rise when the determination is made in the primary.

The expectations of lower levels of black than white participation had been prevalent for years. In *United Jewish Organization of Williamsburgh v. Carey*,<sup>43</sup> the Supreme Court adopted sixty-five percent as the level of concentration needed to give minorities a fair opportunity to elect their candidate of choice.<sup>44</sup> It has been widely rumored that sixty-five percent was arrived at when a DOJ official began at fifty percent and then added five point increments to reflect black under representation in the voting age population, registrants

and turnout.<sup>45</sup> These five-point increments were not empirically derived and would have been nothing more than averages, as the rates of black and white participation vary substantially across time and jurisdictions. For example, in Georgia, the disparity between black and white registration was 1.1 points in 1990, but in 1994 the Census Bureau found blacks slightly more likely than whites to report being registered.<sup>46</sup> In Louisiana, from 1990 to 1996, 165,000 more whites and 147,200 more blacks were added to the registration rolls, which narrowed disparities between the races.<sup>47</sup>

Assumptions about relative levels of black and white voter cohesion may also have become outdated by the early 1990s. It had been assumed, based on earlier elections, that blacks were more likely to cross over and vote for whites than vice-versa.<sup>48</sup> Data presented later in this Article will shed light on current levels of racial crossover voting in southern congressional elections.<sup>49</sup>

Creating districts in which nearly sixty-five percent of the population was African-American necessitated violating traditional precepts of districting, such as compactness and adherence to existing political boundaries of cities and counties.<sup>50</sup> The constraint of equal populations among a state's congressional districts established by *Wesberry v. Sanders*,<sup>51</sup> combined with an absence of concentrations of blacks sufficient to constitute a majority of the population, meant that county boundaries and even precinct lines would be ignored far more often than ever before.<sup>52</sup>

The twelve majority-black districts newly created in the South in the 1990s had to be crafted carefully to capture pockets of black citizens while avoiding concentrations of whites. As a consequence, new extremes in cartographic creativity were achieved. In North Carolina, Interstate Highway 85 became the connective ribbon that tied together the black urban concentrations between Charlotte and Durham that became the 12th District. In places, the district was no wider than the two lanes going in one direction, and at some points, the district was held together by a touch point (a single geographic point such as the Four Corners area at which four western states come together) where the district switched from the northern to the southern lanes or vice-versa.<sup>53</sup> Georgia and Virginia utilized riverbeds to skirt white populations as they reached out for African-American concentrations.<sup>54</sup> Georgia's 2nd District had a ragged eastern boundary as the mapmakers went block by block putting majority black blocks into the district while avoiding majority white ones.<sup>55</sup> Florida's 23rd District had a tail that ran along the Florida East Coast Railroad to pick up black concentrations in Fort Lauderdale and North Miami.<sup>56</sup>

Black neighborhoods and white neighborhoods had to be disentangled with surgical precision lest the population maximum be reached before a black majority could be secured. Except in Texas, creating new majority-black districts necessitated tying together disparate minority concentrations. For example, Louisiana's majority-black 4th District included portions of Lafayette, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, and Monroe.<sup>57</sup> The far-flung district included portions of 28 of the state's 64 parishes, and all but four of the parishes were divided with an adjoining district.<sup>58</sup> In the remainder of the state, only four parishes were split between districts other than the new majority-black district.<sup>59</sup> Each of the two new majority-black districts in Georgia linked African-Americans in three different metropolitan areas; the 2nd District divided 12 counties, and eight counties fashioned the 11th District.<sup>60</sup> Boundaries of districts not shared with Districts 2 and 11 resulted in only six splits among the remaining 102 counties.<sup>61</sup> South Carolina's majority-black 6th District included six split counties in its total of sixteen, while in the rest of the state only two of thirty counties had

been split.<sup>62</sup> Florida’s “bug-splat” 3rd District had a black majority, but none of fourteen counties was entirely in the district.<sup>63</sup> The 23rd District in south Florida involved portions of seven counties.<sup>64</sup> Where districts did not share boundaries with Districts 3 and 23, only eight of forty-six counties were split.<sup>65</sup> In much the same fashion, all ten counties in North Carolina’s I-85 district were split, as were nineteen of twenty-eight counties in the majority-black 1st District.<sup>66</sup> Elsewhere in the state, fifteen of sixty-two counties were split.<sup>67</sup> As Table 1 shows, in six of seven states in which affirmative action gerrymandering was impossible in a single urban area, the number of counties split in order to fashion majority-black districts exceeds the number of split counties in the remainder of the state. The exception is in Virginia 3rd District, where the majority-black district divides eleven counties and independent cities, the same number divided for non-racial reasons in the rest of the state. In areas where separating black and white citizens was not a priority, whole counties continued to be the building blocks for districts even as states narrowed the tolerances around the equal population standard.

**Table 1. Counties Split for New Majority-Black Congressional Districts and Elsewhere in Southern Districts**

	District No.	Splits in Black District(s)	Splits in Districts*	1980 Splits
Alabama	7	5/14**	2/53***	2/67
Florida	3	14/14	8/46	15/67
	17	1/1		
	23	7/7		
Georgia	2	12/35	6/102	3/159
	11	8/22		
Louisiana	4	24/28	4/36	7/64
North Carolina	1	19/28	15/62	4/100
	12	10/10		
South Carolina	6	11/16	2/30	1/46
Virginia****	3	11/18	11/123	6/141

*Source:* Calculated by authors from information available in Barone & Ujifusa, supra note 14, and in Philip D. Duncan and Christine C. Lawrence, *Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America 1996* (1995).

\* Counties split because they are shared with a majority black district and a predominately white district are not included in this column.

\*\* Number of counties split/total number of counties in district.

\*\*\* Number of counties split/total number of counties in state not included in majority-black districts.

\*\*\*\* Includes independent cities and counties.

The final column in Table 1 reports the number of counties split in the 1980s, when there was no pressure to maximize the number of majority-black districts. The figures in that column provide a baseline indicating the rate of county splitting needed to achieve equal populations among districts. Thus, while some county boundaries would have to be sundered to meet one-person, one-vote standards, the obligation to create new majority-black districts substantially increased the extent to which the traditional building blocks of districts were ignored. For example, Georgia, which divided 20 counties in order to create the two new majority-black districts, divided only three counties in 1982. Louisiana divided seven parishes in its 1980s plan, North Carolina split four counties, and South Carolina split only Berkeley County in the 1980s. The only divided counties in Alabama in the 1980s were two in the Birmingham area. In each of these states, except Alabama, county lines were far more likely to be ignored in the 1990s than in the preceding decade. Only in Florida, which had more districts and a greater number of large urban areas than the other states in Table 1, was county splitting not a rarity in the 1980s.

Only when substantial black concentrations existed, as in Atlanta, Memphis, Houston and Dallas, could a majority-black district be carved out of a single urban area. The pre-existing Houston district and the newly-designed one in Dallas were challenged in the early 1990s on the grounds that they violated notions of compactness and sorted voters into districts on the basis of race.<sup>68</sup> In Houston, the legislature sought to create both a Hispanic and a black district, and because the two minority groups often lived in close proximity, the objective could be attained only through the extraordinary efforts of segregating Hispanics

from blacks and Anglos from blacks and Hispanics. In one extreme case, a single precinct was pulled in three directions as the black population went into District 18, the Hispanic population went into District 29, and the Anglo population was assigned to District 25. In Dallas, a more compact black district could have been drawn but, at the behest of Rep. Martin Frost (D), black populations were shared with Frost's district and that of another Democrat, an allocation that necessitated creative cartography in order to locate enough African-Americans for a majority-black district.<sup>69</sup>

As evidence that equal population districts could be achieved while respecting existing political boundaries in the 1990s, consider the redrawing of Georgia following *Miller v. Johnson*.<sup>70</sup> After the Supreme Court struck down Georgia's 1992 plan,<sup>71</sup> a three-judge district court prepared new maps that achieved a maximum population variation among districts of 2,047 (0.35% deviation) and required splitting only six of 159 counties.<sup>72</sup> All six split counties are in the Atlanta metropolitan area and one, Fulton, was split because its population exceeds the maximum for a district.<sup>73</sup>

## II. OVER-REACHING

Coincident with the election of the new African-American representatives came indications that those who drew the exotic districts from which these individuals were elected went too far. After an initial lawsuit in North Carolina, challenges came in Georgia, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Virginia, and South Carolina.<sup>74</sup> Plaintiffs in these cases emphasized the degree to which traditional districting principles were ignored. The Supreme Court in *Shaw v. Reno*<sup>75</sup> held that subordinating traditional districting principles to consideration of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.<sup>76</sup> Under the strict scrutiny standard of review employed by the Court, reliance on race to classify citizens will be tolerated only if the remedy is narrowly tailored and in pursuit of an acceptable governmental objective.<sup>77</sup> Thus far, the Supreme Court has not found the use of race to have been sufficiently narrowly tailored in drawing the districts that have been challenged.<sup>78</sup> In North Carolina, the high court rejected the trial court's finding of narrow tailoring and struck down the I-85 district<sup>79</sup> — a district approved by a two to one vote by the trial court.<sup>80</sup>

Challenges to the new majority-black districts have included assertions that the districts were made more heavily black than necessary to avoid minority vote dilution.<sup>81</sup> Occasionally, as in Florida, analyses performed before the districts were drawn estimated the degree of minority concentration necessary for likely minority group success. Lisa Handley, a political scientist testifying on behalf of the Florida House of Representatives at the hearing before the special master (a retired federal judge) that produced the state's congressional plan, concluded that under some conditions, districts with a bare black majority in their voting age population would be safe for a black candidate.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, she found that in districts in which the black voting age population hovered just below 45 percent, and in which black registration was at 40 percent, African-Americans would have a fair shot at being elected.<sup>83</sup>

In the course of challenging affirmative action districts, experts have testified that a district would have been likely to elect a minority candidate even if the minority concentration was lowered.<sup>84</sup> The issue of the degree to which minority concentrations would be necessary to give a minority candidate an equal chance of being elected frequently constitutes a major part of the factual debate in the course of a trial. Plaintiffs focus on the

successes minority candidates have enjoyed in the area contained within the congressional district, while defense experts typically emphasize the degree to which white and black voters prefer the same candidates. Experts for opposing sides talk past one another, because minority candidates have often won despite not receiving the bulk of the white vote. Courts have resolved this situation, which is captured by Bob Dylan's "you are right from your side and I am right from mine,"<sup>85</sup> by turning to *Thornburg v Gingles*<sup>86</sup> to define substantively significant racial polarization in the electorate as occurring only when the white bloc vote usually defeats the candidate preferred by a cohesive minority community.<sup>87</sup> In the challenges to the majority-minority districts, plaintiffs have had the advantage of election outcomes in the subject jurisdiction, and have pointed to the impressive margins by which minority-preferred candidates have usually won as evidence that the minority population has been packed into districts in excessive numbers.<sup>88</sup> Plaintiffs' experts claim that, with smaller concentrations of black voters, the minority-preferred candidate still would have won, and had the remaining minority population been placed in neighboring districts, it might have contributed to the election of other minority-supported candidates who would be expected to be responsive to African-American political concerns.

In contrast, experts defending the drawing of these districts have emphasized that the candidates preferred by the bulk of the black and white voters in the areas have tended to differ, with black voters usually preferring African-American candidates while white voters have lined up behind white candidates.<sup>89</sup> Defense experts have contended that the presence of racially polarized voting necessitates the drawing of majority-black districts if African-Americans are to win office<sup>90</sup> Some have urged that districts concentrate minorities to the extent that legislators will not have to build biracial coalitions and, therefore, can respond exclusively to concerns of minorities rather than having to balance minority demands with those of whites<sup>91</sup>

Empirical research done using the set of congressional districts in place for the 103rd Congress estimates that in the South, once the black voting age population reaches forty-one percent, there is a better than even chance that a black can win<sup>92</sup> An analysis of elections to the South Carolina Senate between 1988 and 1994 concluded that the point at which black candidates have a fifty percent chance of success came at 46.64% black voting age population.<sup>93</sup>

Challenges to the proposition that African-Americans are more likely than not to be elected in some districts in which their race constitutes less than half the voting age population note the infrequency with which minorities have historically won these kinds of districts. David Lublin reports that between 1972 and 1994, blacks won 72 of 5079 elections held in majority-white districts, while they won all but 19 elections held during this same period in majority-black districts.<sup>94</sup> In recent years, districts in which the black voting age population is between the equal opportunity point and fifty percent have been rare, so that an adequate test of the alternative perspectives has not been conducted. We turn now to results of black-white congressional elections.

*Portions of this article have been omitted.*

---

## CONCLUSION

Mark Twain's observation that "the report of my death was an exaggeration"<sup>159</sup> might also be applied to the gloomy warnings of defenders of racial gerrymandering. None of the black members of Congress or of the Georgia General Assembly who ran for re-election in newly-designed districts with higher percent white populations lost in 1996 or 1998. The historic disparity in black and white registration and turnout used to justify the elevation of race above traditional districting concerns, such as compactness and respect for political boundaries, has waned. Black registration rates are approaching those of whites, and in the former majority-black districts, may even exceed white registration rates. Black turnout, on the other hand, still generally lags behind white voting rates. By 1998, in districts featuring a black candidate, the disparity had generally narrowed to about five percentage points and never reached ten points. Even the estimates for the black challenger in Georgia's 10th District show white turnout exceeding black turnout by six to nine points. White advantages in participation rates are offset by the greater willingness of whites to vote for black candidates than of black voters to cross over to white candidates.

The sixty-five percent rule that once guided districting efforts sets too high a standard today for congressional districts. As long as white crossover rates outpace black crossovers, and black and white registration rates are roughly equal, African-Americans will not need majority-black districts to win. With black Democratic candidates able to muster almost universal support from the African-American electorate, the crossover advantage will not likely be imperiled even as more southern whites shift support to the GOP. Currently, black Democrats, although not performing as well with the white electorate as do white Democrats, attract about a third of the white vote. Support at this level, often coupled with near universal black support, should enable blacks to win in congressional districts in which African-Americans are numerous but less than a majority.<sup>160</sup>

This article is a follow-up to Charles S. Bullock, III, "Winners and Losers in the Latest Round of Redistricting," 44 *Emory Law Journal* 943 (1995), which was presented at the 1995 Randolph W. Throver Symposium, Emory University School of Law.

---

*Charles S. Bullock, III, is Richard B. Russell Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. Richard E. Dunn is a Visiting Instructor of Political Science at Dickinson University.*

## FOOTNOTES:

1. See Earl Black, *Southern Governors and Civil Rights* (1976).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C and 42 U.S.C.).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 257 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

5. See David J. Garrow, *Protest in Selma 6-30* (1978); Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., & Charles S. Bullock, III, *Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences* 24-28 (1972).
6. Rodgers & Bullock, *supra* note 5, at 30.
7. “Slow downs” were dilatory tactics created by registration officials to complicate the registration process. Examples of slow downs include extending breaks when no registration applications were accepted, having irregular office hours, and refusing to allow more than one applicant at a time to apply.
8. See James E. Alt, *The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration in the South*, in *Quiet Revolution in the South: 1965-1990*, at 351, 366 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Groffman eds., 1994).
9. See *Allen v. State Board of Education*, 393 U.S. 544, 569-70 (1969) (citing Voting Rights Act of 1965 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1994))).
10. See Washington Research Project, *The Shameful Blight: The Survival of Racial Discrimination in Voting in the South: A Report* 9-10, 109-26 (1972).
11. 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
12. *Id.* at 214-15.
13. One example is Illinois’ 4th Congressional district, the “ear-muffs” shaped district drawn such that Hispanic-Americans constitute a majority. See *Congressional Quarterly’s Politics in America 2000*, at 434 (Philip D. Duncan & Brian Nutting eds., 1999).
14. See Michael Barone & Grant Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics 1994* (1995).
15. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
16. *Id.* at 642-44.
17. *Id.* at 655.
18. 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995).
19. *Id.* at 910.
20. See *Hays v. Louisiana*, 936 F. Supp. 360, 371 (W.D. La. 1996).
21. See *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952, 985-86 (1996).
22. See *Johnson v. Mortham*, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1551 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
23. See *Moon v. Meadows*, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1997).
24. See *Diaz v. Silver*, 978 F. Supp. 96, 117, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
25. Ronald Smothers, *G.O.P. Anxiously Awaits Redistricting*, N.Y. Times, Jun. 20, 1995, at A13; see also Holly Idelson and Juliana Gruenwald, *Court Considers Question of Minority Districts*, 53 Cong. Q. 1133 (1995); Dan Sadowsky, *New South, Creative Loafing*, Feb. 24, 1996, at 1, 25.
26. Louisiana’s 4th District was redrawn but its incumbent, Cleo Fields, did not seek re-election. See Michael Barone & Grant Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics 1998*, at 624 (1997).
27. Brown’s 1996 performance remains her strongest, as her percentage slipped from sixty-one to fifty-six in 1998. See *Politics in America 2000*, *supra* note 13, at 293. Jackson-Lee avoided GOP opposition in 1998 and took 90 percent of the vote against minor-party opposition. *Id.* at 1333.

28. Ron Dellums (CA-9), William Clay (MO-1), and J.C. Watts (OK-4) were other African-American members of Congress elected from districts without black majorities.
29. See *infra* notes 33-94 and accompanying text.
30. See *infra* notes 95-139 and accompanying text.
31. See *infra* notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
32. See *infra* notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
33. Voting Rights Act of 1982 2, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1994)).
34. *Id.* 2(b).
35. See, *e.g.*, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
36. See Kimball Brace et al., The 65 Percent Rule in Legislative Districting for Racial Minorities: The Mathematics of Minority Voting Equality (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1985 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
37. See *id.* at 2.
38. Georgia's 11th District as drawn for the 1992 election was sixty-four percent black, South Carolina's 6th District was sixty-two percent black and Virginia's 3rd District was sixty-four percent black. See Barone & Ujifusa, *supra* note 14, at 357, 1161, 1314.
39. Voting age population is the population of adults over age 18.
40. The 18th District in Texas was fifty-one percent black, the 30th District was fifty percent black and Florida's 23d District was fifty-two percent black in total population; none of these had black majorities in their voting age population. Barone & Ujifusa, *supra* note 14, at 323, 1251, 1278.
41. See *infra* notes 43-47 and accompanying text. A fourth potential factor is the difference in voting age population between African-Americans and whites.
42. Exit polls over the last thirty years have repeatedly confirmed that blacks have been among the most faithful supporters of the Democratic party. As an example, the data presented in Table 3 *infra* shows that in the 1996 contest for Georgia's 4th District, while blacks made up only 40.3% of the registered voters, they cast between 58% and 64.1% of the ballots in the Democratic primary.
43. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
44. *Id.* at 164.
45. See Brace, *supra* note 36.
46. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 453, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1990*, at 35 (1991); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1994*, at 24 (1995).
47. See Louisiana Comm'n of Elections, *Quarterly Reports of Registered Voters* (1980-1996).
48. See, *e.g.*, Hearing on the Extension of the Voting Rights Act, Part 1, before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 262 (1982) (statement of James W. Loewen).
49. See *infra* Table 4.
50. See *infra* Tables 2, 4, & 7.
51. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
52. See *infra* Table 1.

53. William Rasberry, *Superdistricts in North Carolina*, Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1998, at A23.
54. See *Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America 1994*, at 387, 421, 1566, 1580 (Phil Duncan ed., 1993).
55. Interview with Tracy Atcheson, former staff member of the Georgia Legislative Reapportionment Office (March 26, 1992).
56. Warren Richey, *A Test of Race-Based Voter Districts: A Florida Case Will Be the Next Barometer of How Far States Can Go*, Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 9, 1999, at 1.
57. See *Politics in America 1994*, supra note 54, at 651.
58. See *id.* at 633.
59. See *id.*
60. See *id.* at 387, 397, 421.
61. See *id.*
62. See *id.* at 1364, 1388.
63. See *id.* at 318, 333.
64. See *id.* at 385.
65. See *id.* at 318.
66. See *id.* at 1112, 1121, 1155.
67. See *id.* at 1112.
68. See *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
69. See Donald W. Beachler, *Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering: Three States in the 1990s*, 19 Am. Rev. Pol. 1, 9 (1998).
70. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
71. See *id.*
72. This plan was upheld in *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74 (1997), even though it had only one majority-black district.
73. See *Johnson v. Miller*, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1572-86 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
74. See, e.g., *Moon v. Meadows*, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997); *Smith v. Beasley*, 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996); *Johnson v. Mortham*, 915 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Fla. 1995); *Johnson v. Miller*, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994); *Vera v. Richards*, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994); *Shaw v. Hunt*, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994); *Hays v. Louisiana*, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993). Hispanic districts in Illinois and New York have been the subjects of similar lawsuits and the latter district has been redrawn. See *King v. State Board of Elections*, 979 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1997); *Diaz v. Silver*, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
75. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
76. *Id.*
77. *Id.* at 653-55.
78. *Id.*; see also *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
79. *Shaw*, 517 U.S. at 903.
80. Challenges to legislative districts brought under the Voting Rights Act are heard by three judge panels usually made up of one Court of Appeals judge and two District Court judges; appeals are directly to the Supreme Court. See 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1996).

81. See Final Report of Ronald E. Weber on Liability Issues for Hearing, *Moon v. Meadows*, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1996) (No. 3:95CV942); Preliminary Report of Ronald E. Weber, *Vera v. Richards*, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (No. H-94-0277).
82. See Record, *DeGrandy v. Barr*, TCA 92-40015-WS (N.D. Fla. May 7, 1992) (testimony of Lisa Handley).
83. *Id.*
84. See Record, *Johnson v. Miller*, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (No. 194-008) (testimony of Ronald E. Weber); Exhibit 4, *Hays v. Louisiana*, 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996) (Nos. 92-1522, 95-1241).
85. Bob Dylan, *One Too Many Mornings*, on *The Times They Are A-Changin'* (Columbia 1964).
86. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
87. *Id.* at 49.
88. See Declaration of Ronald E. Weber, *Cromartie v. Hunt* (E.D.N.C. Sept. 10, 1999) (No. 01-CV-104-H2); Final Report of Ronald E. Weber on Liability Issues for Hearing, *Moon v. Meadows*, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 3:95CV942); Preliminary Report of Ronald E. Weber, *Vera v. Richards*, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (No. H-94-0277).
89. See Record, *Moon v. Meadows*, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 3:95CV942) (testimony of Lisa Handley); Record, *Johnson v. Miller*, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (No. 194-008) (testimony of Allan Lichtman).
90. See *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); *McDaniels v. Mehfoud*, 702 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Va. 1988); *City of Petersburg v. United States*, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972); Frank R. Parker, *Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi After 1965*, at 159 (1990).
91. See Deposition of Richard L. Engstrom, *Collins v. City of Norfolk*, 605 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Va. 1984) (No. 83-526-N).
92. See Charles Cameron et al., *Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?*, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 794, 804 (1996).
93. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, *A Social Science Approach to Race, Redistricting and Representation*, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 187, 189 (1999).
94. David Lublin, *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress* 41 (1997).
159. Note to London correspondent of the *New York Journal*, June 1, 1897, as printed in John Bartlett, *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations* 528 (16th ed 1992).
160. Available evidence suggests that somewhat higher concentrations of blacks may be necessary for African-Americans to win state legislative seats. See Charles S. Bullock, III, *Racial Composition of District Population and the Election of African-American Legislators*, 24 S.E. Pol. Rev. 611 (1996); see also Epstein & O'Halloran, *supra* note 93.

---

# THE STATE OF ILLINOIS THEN, NOW, AND TOMORROW

---

## VOTING FOR THE ILLINOIS HOUSE: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FROM THE ILLINOIS LABORATORY

*By James H. Kuklinski, James D. Nowlan, and Philip D. Habel*

This paper analyzes the consequences of cumulative voting (CV) and, more recently, single-member-district plurality voting (SMDV) in the election of members to the Illinois House of Representatives. We are especially interested in the effects of the change from the one system to the other that began with the 1982 House elections.

We find, among other observations, that CV provided greater diversity of membership and more representation for partisan (but not racial and ethnic) minorities than does SMDV. On the other hand, SMDV has provided clearer partisan majorities, greater party unity, and more capacity to act decisively than did CV. There has been less competition for seats under SMDV than under CV, and during the period from 1972-80, when the Illinois Constitution of 1970 required each party to certify at least two nominations, voters had some choice in nearly all general elections. That is far from the case today.

### HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Voting procedures have consequences. In 1867, U. S. Senator Charles Buckalew of Illinois argued that one of the main contributing factors to the Civil War was the winner-take-all election system that polarized North and South. The system, Buckalew declared, allowed extremists on both sides to be represented and failed “to secure to the friends of peace and union a just measure of political power.” (Amy)

Buckalew proposed instead that the U. S. House of Representatives be elected by cumulative voting. In such a system, more than one member would be elected from each district; voters would be allowed to cast one vote for each member to be elected, and they could cumulate their votes for a single candidate. This would increase the opportunity for a minority party or interest to elect one of their own candidates.

The national legislature rejected the idea, but three years later Buckalew was successful in helping persuade Illinois to adopt cumulative voting for its state House of Representatives. At the Constitutional Convention of 1870, Delegate Joseph Medill argued that cumulative voting would dampen polarization between the north and south of Illinois. At the time, Republicans dominated in the north (including Chicago) and Democrats in the south of the state.

Medill, who was also editor-owner of the Chicago Tribune, held that cumulative voting would abate partisan animosity, lessen the power of party caucuses and leaders, and replace the “feudal theory of exclusive majority representation with the true ideas of representative government.” (Rishel; Illinois Issues 1982)

Under cumulative voting, any number of legislators can be elected from a district. Medill proposed three members per district, saying that two-member districts could

provide too much minority representation, and that more than three members might lead to the representation of more than two political parties.

The system worked as intended. The second party in each section of the state was represented in greater numbers than before. The system also made it difficult for third parties to take root in the legislature. In 1906, for example, the Prohibition, Socialist, and Labor parties received 15 percent of votes cast for state representatives, yet elected only three members (2 percent).

Between 1870 and the Constitutional Convention of 1920, opposition to cumulative voting developed in some quarters because the majority party generally nominated two candidates and the minority party one, denying voters any choice in the three-member districts. Between 1916 and 1934, 55 percent of the 510 House contests offered no competition for voters. (Illinois Issues 1982)

The final report of the Convention of 1920 eliminated cumulative voting. The proposed new charter was rejected soundly, however, for a number of reasons that were more prominent than the CV issue.

In 1927, the Illinois Supreme Court added a new wrinkle to cumulative voting. The court overrode the Illinois General Assembly's wishes and ruled that three-vote cumulative voting had to be applied in the state's new primary elections, even if a party made only two nominations. This could not have been contemplated in 1870, of course, when representation of minority parties was the sole concern, and party caucuses rather than primaries were the accepted manner for making nominations.

There has been little analysis of the consequences of cumulative voting in primary elections, but anecdotally the device seemingly encouraged candidates who felt they could gain an advantage if their supporters cumulated their votes. For example, in 1956 in his first race for the Illinois House, from a South-Side-of-Chicago district, Abner Mikva was able to defeat the Democratic Organization in the primary and then two strong Republican candidates, largely through the use of "bullet voting," i.e., cumulated votes. The results are displayed below:

**1956 Democratic Primary Election**

Mikva	20,374 1/2
Kinnally	17,742 1/2
Bank	11,588
Garrity	2,623

**1956 General Election**

Mikva (D)	60,064 1/2
Kinnally (D)	52,216
Lee (R)	48,880
Samuels (R)	46,978 1/2

As can be seen, if Mikva voters had split their votes (for two candidates in the primary and two or three in the general election), Mikva might well have failed to win his seat.

For a Downstate example, one of the authors of this discussion (Nowlan) states he would not have become a candidate for the House absent cumulative voting. Nowlan came from a tiny rural county (Stark) and calculated that if "his voters" cumulated their votes for

him only, while voters in larger counties elsewhere in the district divided their votes among better-known candidates, then Nowlan could gain the second nomination. In 1966, Nowlan came within 1,800 votes of the second nomination (50,000 votes were cast for six candidates). In 1968 he won the second nomination of his party, and was unopposed in the three-nominee general election.

The illustrations are offered to make the point that a voting system can affect behavior and outcomes in ways not intended by its framers.

## 1970 CON-CON DIVIDED OVER CUMULATIVE VOTING

During the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention an unlikely coalition of Chicago Democrats and independents favored retaining cumulative voting in the proposed new charter. Republicans opposed them, and argued that cumulative voting was confusing to voters and permitted inter-party collusion and intra-party conflict. Behind their position was the belief that single member districts would allow more Republicans to be elected to the House, as had been the case in the state Senate. (Illinois Issues 1982)

Proponents of retaining cumulative voting argued that single-member districts would polarize parties between Chicago on the one side and its suburbs and downstate on the other. (Rishel)

After much wrangling, the Convention voted to present the question of cumulative voting vs. single-member districts to the voters as a separate issue outside the proposed new constitution. Cumulative voting was retained, with 56 percent of those voting on the issue supporting it. Chicago support was especially heavy

The Convention also made two significant changes to the Legislative Article of the new Constitution, which the voters also adopted. First, political parties were prohibited from limiting nominations for House seats to fewer than two for each district, to assure competition in the general election. As a result, from 1972 until cumulative voting was abolished a decade later, only 4 percent of House districts were formally uncontested in the general election. It must be added, however, that the minority party and minority legislator would sometimes arrange for only token effort by the second nominee. For example, one of the authors heard a House member tell several colleagues that he had his nephew nominated to the required second spot on the ballot, and then sent him to Florida for the duration of the campaign.

Second, amendments to the Legislative Article, and that article only, could be proposed directly to the voters by initiative petition. In presenting the majority report of the Legislative Committee to the full convention, Delegate Louis Perona stated: "We feel that it's unlikely that the legislature would propose an amendment reducing the number of legislators or in changing from cumulative voting as we have today to single-member districts." Perona was prescient.

## THE CUTBACK AMENDMENT

Just three years later, in 1973-74, attorney Robert Bergstrom led an unsuccessful petition drive to seek voter elimination of cumulative voting. There appeared to be little public interest in the issue. In 1978, however, following a terribly bungled legislative pay raise fiasco that infuriated citizens from the local coffeehouse to the White House, a new petition drive was initiated. In the closing days of the 1977-78 biennial legislative session,


lawmakers adopted pay raises for a wide array of state officials, including a 40 percent increase for themselves (from \$20,000 to \$28,000). A salary study commission had held hearings to discuss the problems of inadequate compensation for state agency directors and other officials. Governor Thompson first favored the panel’s recommended increases, but late in the November campaign for re-election, Thompson flew around the state to declare his opposition to pay increases of the size ultimately adopted. Thus the legislative pay raise action at the end of November 1978 appeared to come in the dark of night, and although this term lacks academic precision, it is fair to say the voters “went ballistic.” Thirty-two thousand tea bags as well as corn labeled for the “hogs in Springfield” hit the governor’s desk. Alfred Kahn, chairman of President Carter’s Council on Wage and Price Stability, called for an official probe of the pay raises, which violated his 7 percent wage guidelines. An endless torrent of angry letters filled the state’s newspapers.

With this as the lightning rod, Bergstrom immediately initiated another drive to end the cumulative voting drive. More important, indefatigable populist Patrick Quinn and his Coalition for Political Honesty became the lead force in a drive that culminated in putting the issue of both reducing the size of the House of Representatives and elimination of cumulative voting onto the ballot in 1980. Opponents to the Quinn-led drive included former governors Richard Ogilvie and Sam Shapiro, major interest groups, and of course many legislators. (See page 53 for a list of the arguments made during the campaign for and against cumulative voting and for and against reduction in the size of the legislature.)

Efforts to thwart the drive included a change in state law that appeared to invalidate many petition signatures collected before the change in law and reject the petition effort by the state Board of Elections. In September of 1980, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled the elections unit and ordered the issue onto the November ballot.

The issue became known popularly as the “Cutback Amendment,” which suggests that reduction in the size of the House was a more compelling and easier issue for the public to grasp than cumulative voting. For all the intensity of the forces favoring and opposing the issue, the election campaign on the issue was a modest affair. The Coalition for Political

Figure 1. Percent of Illinois House Districts That Were Uncontested in the General Elections, 1952 to 2000.



## ARGUMENTS FOR THE CUTBACK AMENDMENT (AND AGAINST CUMULATIVE VOTING)

From the Voter Guide mailed to citizens by the Illinois Secretary of State (arguments prepared by representatives of proponent organizations):

Single-member districts will:

- Save taxpayers an estimated \$7 million a year in reduced legislative expenses.
- Streamline the legislative process by making it a more efficient and productive body.
- Enhance legislative accountability on issues by forcing political incumbents to run in one-on-one contests.
- Increase electoral competition by returning Illinois to the traditional American system of electing representatives: each person will have one vote to cast for one candidate.
- Bring government closer to the people by cutting the size of House districts in half.
- Bring Illinois in line with other major industrial states that have smaller and more effective houses of representatives.
- Give taxpayers a responsible way to demand better performance from State representatives who gave themselves a 40 percent pay raise after the last election and are now the highest paid in the nation.

Additional arguments found by authors:

- Will be easier to understand than cumulative voting.
- Will force parties to become competitive.
- Will reduce if not eliminate party collusion in choosing candidates for elections.
- Will restore the one man-one vote voting system.
- Will produce clear one party majorities and reduce deadlock.

## ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CUTBACK AMENDMENT (AND FOR CUMULATIVE VOTING)

From the Voter Guide mailed to citizens by the Illinois Secretary of State (arguments prepared by representatives of opponent organizations):

Single-member districts will:

- Deny representation to independents, to Democrats in Republican areas, and to Republicans in Democratic areas.
- Allow one political party to dominate the legislature.
- Fail to reduce costs.
- Promote regional rivalries, particularly between rural and urban areas.
- Discourage electoral competition.
- Increase the influence of special interests, power brokers, and party bosses.
- Decrease legislative accountability to the people.
- Reduce independent and issue-oriented deliberation in the legislature.
- Create dangerous legislative deadlocks.

Additional arguments found by authors:

- Enhances regional understanding by bringing representatives from all regions of state into each party caucus.
- Avoids wasted votes; that is, all votes can be cast for the preferred candidate.
- Cushions the House against electoral landslide swings in representation.
- Is not confusing. A survey reported by Douglas Amy (not from Illinois) found that 95 percent of voters knew how to cast votes in CV system.

Honesty spent \$25,000 on radio ads. The opposition had an active speakers' bureau and flew in lawmakers from Massachusetts to argue before newspaper editorial boards that the cutback in that state had been a failure. But there were no huge expenditures like those often made in initiative efforts in California.

Only 44 percent of those going to the polls in 1980 voted on the "Cutback Amendment," but 69 percent of that number approved the amendment, which went into effect with the 1982 election cycle.


## VOTER CHOICE IS DECLINING

Lack of voter choice was one of the most compelling flaws in CV throughout most of the state's century-long experiment with the system. As noted above, half or more of the districts under CV in a typical general election offered only three candidates for three seats. Some observers countered that there was significant choice offered instead at the primary elections, which were party elections, of course, open to the voters of only one party. This was certainly true, as is illustrated here.

Figure 1 shows the percent of House districts that lacked choice in the general elections from 1952-2000. Indeed, about half of the districts were uncontested from 1952-70. The two elections of 1966 and 1968 are anomalies in that they followed, in the first case, the at-large "bedsheet" ballot election of House members in 1964 and, in the other, the subsequent redistricting in 1966. Figure 2 shows, however, that if one includes the primary elections from 1952-70, the number of districts lacking any competition falls dramatically, to around 20 percent on average

Following the adoption of the Constitution of 1970, which mandated at least two nominations for the House by each political party, there was choice (with at least four candidates seeking three seats in the general election) in nearly all House districts from 1972-78 and for all but 8 percent in 1980. This change in the CV system appears to have achieved its objective of increasing voter choice, if not actual competition.

Figure 2. Percent of Illinois House Districts That Were Uncontested in the General and Primary Elections, 1952 to 2000.



During the past two decades of experience with SMDV, voter choice has declined from that under CV. On average, over the 1982-1998 period, 30 percent of the districts lacked any choice in both primary and general elections. Even more disturbing is the trend line, with competition declining sharply throughout the 1980s and 1990s, to the point that about 50 percent of all 2000 House elections had either no or only token competition. In other words, in about one-half of the districts voters had no choice in either the primary or general election.

However, the decline in voter choice cannot necessarily be attributed to the change from CV to SMDV. Figure 3 displays the percent of Illinois Senate districts that lacked voter choice in both primary and general elections in the 1952-2000 period. The comparison with Senate districts is revealing, for they have always been SMDV. Until 1974, most Senate districts provided at least some choice of candidates. Since then, however, choice has declined to levels similar to those for House districts. During the time period of 1974-present, the Illinois legislature was becoming a career-oriented, often full-time body, and re-election campaigns were becoming ever more expensive. Possibly as a result, in the redistricting processes of 1981 and 1991, incumbent lawmakers may have induced creation of an unusually high number of “safe districts” for incumbents of both parties, where challenges would have been seen as futile. Of course, it is likely that the creation of House SMDV provided an opportunity for the creation of safe districts that CV might have precluded, or at least restrained.

Competitiveness in House races under SMDV appears to decline significantly in the wake of the first election after redistricting. Figure 4 indicates this for the period 1982-1990. In 1982, the first election after redistricting, fifteen percent (18 of the 118 House districts) had highly competitive elections, that is, no candidate received more than 55 percent of the vote. By the end of the decade, only six percent (7 of the districts) had races that were that close. In the same period, the number of House districts with basically no competition at all increased from 27 percent (32 districts) in 1982 to 44 percent (52 districts) in 1990.

Figure 3. Percent of Illinois Senate Districts That Were Uncontested in the General and Primary Elections, 1952 to 2000.



Figure 4. Percent of Highly Competitive and Non-Competitive Illinois House Districts, 1982 - 1990




Figure 5. Average Turnout for Illinois House Elections, 1982-2000, by Level of District Competition




Figure 6. Average Drop-Off from Presidential Vote to Vote for Illinois House Elections, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996



This suggests that once an incumbent establishes him- or herself, and utilizes the resources of the office as well as personal skill in developing positive name recognition, interest and effectiveness in challenging an incumbent diminishes.

One of the best ways to put the preceding figures into perspective is to compare them with equivalent figures for other states (see Table 1). What we find is that, in recent years, Illinois' state legislative elections have been discernibly less competitive than legislative elections in many other states. In fact, when Illinois' 2000 totals are put into the table (1998 and 2000 totals for other states were not available), the lack of competition is particularly worrisome.

### VOTER TURNOUT DECREASES WITHOUT CHOICE

Figure 5 shows that from 1982-2000, voting for candidates to the Illinois House is associated with the competitiveness of the district races. For example, in races where one candidate dominated and received between 76 and 90 percent of the vote, 27,229 persons, on average, cast votes. However, in districts with close races (one candidate received 55 percent or less of the vote), 36,456 voters cast ballots. Because districts have nearly equal populations (and, we found, quite similar numbers of registered voters as well), this comparison is valid. What the figures cannot show is the possibly reinforcing effect: Lack of competition reduces voting in House elections, which in turn reduces competition further, which in turn reduces voting further, etc.

Closely related, as the competitiveness of the House races increases, there is less voter "drop-off"

from the top of the ticket to the House races. Figure 6 shows that in races where one candidate received from 76-90 percent of the vote, 2,663 fewer district voters, on average, cast votes for the House race than for the top of the ticket contest. In contrast, drop-off was just 1,534 votes in the most competitive races (no candidate received more than 55 percent of the vote).

These figures underline what is common-sensical, yet had not been analyzed earlier: real competition engages voter interest.

### PARTISAN MINORITIES BETTER REPRESENTED UNDER CV THAN SMDV

The objective of CV was to provide representation of the minority party in areas where it would not receive seats under SMDV. Political scientists often analyze representation of party in terms of the “seats-to-votes ratio.” This is based on the premise that the percent of legislative seats a party receives should be proportional to the percent of votes it garners. That is, if a party receives 42 percent of all the votes cast, it should receive 42 percent of the seats. A ratio of 1.0 signifies that a party received seats perfectly proportional to the percentage of the votes it received. The further the ratio is from one, the more one party is advantaged and the other disadvantaged.

Statewide, the ratio has generally been close to one most of the time. This masks substantial regional biases, however. Table 2 looks at the seats-to-votes ratios for the Republican Party in Illinois House and Senate districts for the period 1952-2000. Figures greater than 1.0 indicate that Republicans are advantaged, less than 1.0 that they are disadvantaged. Statewide, the SV ratios are generally close to 1.0 throughout, for both the House and Senate. If the reader focuses on the Cook County and “collar counties” regions, however, he or she will see that substantial changes in the ratios for House elections have occurred. Under CV (1952-1980), Republicans in Cook County as well as in the collar counties received seats fairly proportionate to the votes the electorate cast for them. This is not true in the 1982-2000 period, when Democrats have been advantaged in Cook County and the Republicans in the collar counties. Another way to interpret these findings is that Republican votes are wasted in Cook County while Democratic votes are wasted in the surrounding areas. The Senate ratios must be read with great caution, since they often are based on only a few races (only one-third of the Senate is elected in an election year). Nonetheless, the figures show that Republicans were significantly under represented in Cook County and over represented in the collar counties throughout the whole period.

Table 1. Uncontested Legislative<sup>1</sup> Elections by State, 1996<sup>2</sup>

State	Percent Uncontested
Michigan	0
Minnesota	6
California	7
Ohio	10
Maine	10
North Dakota	12
South Dakota	16
Washington	16
Nevada	17
Alaska	20
Oregon	20
Iowa	21
New York	22
Hawaii	25
Vermont	25
Connecticut	25
Oklahoma	26
Wisconsin	29
Pennsylvania	29
Colorado	30
New Hampshire	30
Kansas	31
Indiana	31
West Virginia	32
Montana	33
<b>Illinois (1996)</b>	<b>34</b>
North Carolina	34
Missouri	34
Idaho	37
Delaware	39
Kentucky	40
New Mexico	41
Utah	42
Arizona	48
Tennessee	48
Wyoming	48
Rhode Island	49
<b>Illinois (2000)</b>	<b>50</b>
Florida	51
<b>Illinois (1998)</b>	<b>51</b>
South Carolina	55
Georgia	56
Texas	60
Arkansas	68
Massachusetts	69
Alabama	*
Louisiana	*
Maryland	*
Mississippi	*
Nebraska	*
New Jersey	*
Virginia	*

1. Percents include combined data for elections of both upper and lower chambers in each state.

2. Illinois data for 1998 and 2000 elections are included where indicated.

\* No legislative elections were held in 1996.

Sources: Illinois percentages computed by Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, from data in *State of Illinois Official Vote*, Illinois State Board of Elections, reports for 1996, 1998, and 2000. Percentages for all other states from The Center for Voting and Democracy, “Contested Legislative Seats: State Ranking: 1996 Elections, State Legislatures,” *Electing the People’s House*, August 1998.

Table 2. Seat-Votes Ratio\*, Illinois Legislature, 1952-2000

<i>Illinois House</i>				
	Statewide SV Ratio	Cook County Districts SV Ratio	Collar County Districts SV Ratio	Other Districts SV Ratio
1952	1.037	0.862	0.987	1.141
1954	1.039	0.906	0.982	1.094
1956	0.983	0.902	1.003	1.077
1958	1.076	0.939	1.071	1.097
1960	1.042	1.009	1.108	1.233
1962	1.009	0.975	1.078	1.034
1966	1.061	1.004	1.026	1.146
1968	1.044	1.057	1.006	1.055
1970	1.094	1.106	1.103	1.095
1972	1.000	0.918	1.110	1.090
1974	1.073	1.127	1.151	0.900
1976	1.000	1.000	1.120	0.990
1978	1.042	1.020	1.080	1.090
1980	1.020	1.020	1.040	1.100
<b>AVG</b>	<b>1.037</b>	<b>0.989</b>	<b>1.062</b>	<b>1.082</b>
1982	0.953	0.740	1.300	0.870
1984	0.878	0.630	1.060	0.990
1986	0.896	0.680	1.090	0.910
1988	0.915	0.700	1.180	0.950
1990	0.830	0.650	1.170	0.760
1992	0.977	0.800	1.340	0.820
1994	1.038	0.930	1.150	1.090
1996	1.021	0.780	1.260	1.070
1998	1.021	0.840	1.070	1.120
2000	0.992	0.876	1.130	1.029
<b>AVG</b>	<b>0.952</b>	<b>0.763</b>	<b>1.175</b>	<b>0.953</b>

<i>Illinois Senate</i>				
	Statewide SV Ratio	Cook County Districts SV Ratio	Collar County Districts SV Ratio	Other Districts SV Ratio
1952	1.573	0.687	1.509	1.668
1954	0.811	0.394	1.484	1.401
1956	1.422	1.235	1.515	1.510
1958	0.815	0.333	1.666	1.188
1960	1.402	1.094	1.700	1.475
1962	1.100	0.704	1.558	1.614
1966	1.214	0.996	1.448	1.400
1970	1.054	0.738	1.687	1.177
1972	1.020	0.804	1.556	1.050
1974	0.933	0.735	1.039	1.030
1976	0.955	0.760	1.390	1.180
1978	0.958	0.860	1.570	1.020
1980	0.942	0.760	1.240	1.240
1982	1.048	0.880	1.250	1.050
1984	1.000	1.000	0.940	1.050
1986	0.979	0.580	1.010	1.010
1988	0.940	0.880	1.000	0.940
1990	0.922	0.510	1.090	1.210
1992	1.227	1.040	1.370	1.290
1994	1.077	0.650	1.220	1.060
1996	1.178	1.160	1.200	1.180
1998	1.000	1.020	0.950	1.200
2000	1.073	1.279	1.180	0.862
<b>AVG</b>	<b>1.071</b>	<b>0.830</b>	<b>1.329</b>	<b>1.209</b>

1968 has been eliminated because there were only two Senate elections in 1968.

\*Ratio greater than 1.0 indicates a Republican advantage. Ratio less than 1.0 indicates a Democratic advantage. For the purpose of this analysis, districts were classified on the basis of where the majority of the district is located. For example, a district where the majority of the population is in one of the collar counties, but part of the district is in one of the collar counties, was classified as a Cook County district.

Practical politicians would probably credit some of the above to the leaders who drew the redistricting maps and their tactics of packing and diluting for maximum advantage. Nevertheless, it appears that it was more difficult under CV than under SMDV to achieve partisan advantage in terms of the seats-to-votes ratio. Put another way, fewer votes were wasted under CV.

## RACIAL, ETHNIC, AND GENDER REPRESENTATION

During the debate surrounding the change from cumulative to plurality voting, proponents of the latter argued that it would increase racial, gender, and ethnic representation. This is a rather peculiar argument, since cumulative voting and proportional representation systems are generally viewed as being more favorable toward the representation of minority groups. In reality, neither cumulative nor plurality voting has produced Illinois state legislatures that mirror the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of the population.

The key question is whether racial, ethnic, and gender representation would be greater in the Illinois House today if cumulative voting were still in effect. Although it is difficult to answer this counterfactual satisfactorily, there is reason to think it would.

By all accounts, group identity and consciousness have grown during the last two decades. Women, more than ever before, identify with women's issues, blacks and other ethnic groups with minority issues. This implies that bloc voting might be more prevalent than it was in earlier years if members of the various groups felt they could rally successfully around a candidate. Such a feeling of efficacy is far more likely under cumulative than plurality voting.

## PARTY UNITY, DECISIVENESS GREATER IN ILLINOIS HOUSE WITH SMDV

Some observers think that a good seats-to-votes ratio in a state that is balanced politically tends to create the problem of razor-thin, unstable majorities. Further, diversity of representation within a party caucus (Chicagoans in the Republican caucus and suburbanites in Democratic Party confabs) tends to reduce party unity, or discipline, which some political scientists have long considered a virtue for policymaking.

The switch to SMDV in the House—and the gerrymandering it fostered—has created larger party majorities and greater party unity. With respect to party majorities, Figure 7 shows that they were relatively small between 1952-1980, became much larger from 1980 until about 1994, and since then have once again shrunk in size. Moreover, Figure 8, which is based on interest group ratings, shows that House members varied significantly more in roll-call votes within their respective parties than did their Senate colleagues during the decade prior to the shift to SMDV. After the change to SMDV in the House, the within-party cohesion looks very similar across chambers. In short, there was much greater philosophical diversity of membership in the CV period than under SMDV.

Figure 7. Percent of Illinois House Seats Held by Democrats, 1952-2000.





Figure 8. Difference in Illinois House and Senate Intra-Party Cohesion, 1973-1994.



These two trends—larger party majorities (until very recently) and greater party cohesion—have had an effect on state legislative policymaking. Under SMDV, House Speaker Michael Madigan (D-Chicago) was able in 1989 to introduce and pass an income tax proposal out of the House in one day! In 1995, Speaker Lee Daniels (R-DuPage County) pushed through the House a series of dramatic tort liability changes, reform of the Chicago school system, reorganization of the system of higher education, major changes in the Cook County property tax assessment system and other controversial legislation. These kinds of actions, certainly the swiftness of the actions, would have been highly unlikely under CV.

## UNITY OR DIVERSITY? SOME ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE

At the time of the 1980 Cutback Amendment vote, Robert Schaller analyzed the interest group ratings of pre-Cutback Amendment lawmakers. (Illinois Issues, Nov. 1980) He found that the minority representative was less likely to vote along party lines than the majority representatives were, and that suburban Democrats tended to be more liberal than their party as a whole. “The inescapable conclusion is,” he declared, “that cumulative voting tends to encourage diversity in both parties.”

Schaller observed that, “without minority party members, partisan polarization would be intensified, which, it could be said, might encourage the clarification of controversial issues. The question for voters is whether the presence of moderates and independents in both parties improves or diminishes the effectiveness of the House.”

In 1986, David Fremon interviewed House members as well as many who had been eliminated by the change to SMDV. (Illinois Issues, December 1986) Rep. John O’Connell (D-Western Springs), who was still serving at the time, said SMDV, “made legislators more accountable to their districts. Some legislators were way of out synch with their districts. Now most are truly representative of their districts.”

“It has brought much more stability to the legislative process,” said former Rep. Pete Peters (R-Chicago), adding that order is not necessarily an improvement. “The old process was chaotic, but in a creative sense.”

“The representatives now tend to swing from the political center,” noted Rep. Peg Breslin (D-Ottawa). “Fewer and fewer controversial bills come to the floor, or even in committee. There is no gay rights bill this year, or any legislation pertaining to AIDS. When you had minority legislators, they could afford to move further to the left or right.”

Or, as Rep. Alan Greiman (D-Chicago) put it in a 1983 interview: “We used to have honest-to-god crazy right wingers and progressive progressives who could say what they thought.” (Illinois Issues, June 1983)

And when Republicans were elected from Democratic strongholds and vice versa, there was a mixing of views, observed former Rep. Bernard Epton (D-Chicago). “I could talk to a Republican from southern Illinois and tell him about the problems with city schools. There were people in both parties to speak on behalf of the cities. But now, what stake does the GOP have in mass transportation issues?”

Several of those interviewed by Fremon found the SMDV system more partisan and the leaders stronger. “The speaker has more influence and power,” said former Rep. Glenn Schneider (D-Naperville). “The new system took the lobbying groups away from the individual representatives and sent them to the leadership.”

Table 3. Sizes of State Legislative Bodies and State Legislative Districts

	Size of Lower Chamber		Size of Upper Chamber		Population of Lower Chamber Districts		Population of Upper Chamber Districts
New Hampshire	400	Minnesota	67	California	372,325	California	744,650
Pennsylvania	203	New York	61	New York	119,940	Texas	547,935
Georgia	180	<b>Illinois</b>	<b>59</b>	Texas	113,240	Florida	323,450
Missouri	163	Georgia	56	Florida	107,817	Ohio	317,788
Massachusetts	160	Oklahoma	54	Ohio	104,870	New York	294,934
Connecticut	151	Mississippi	52	<b>Illinois</b>	<b>96,873</b>	Michigan	244,605
Maine	151	Indiana	50	New Jersey	96,850	Pennsylvania	236,660
New York	150	Iowa	50	Michigan	84,500	<b>Illinois</b>	<b>193,746</b>
Texas	150	Montana	50	North Carolina	67,673	New Jersey	193,700
Vermont	150	Pennsylvania	50	Virginia	61,890	North Carolina	157,905
Maryland	141	Rhode Island	50	Arizona	61,083	Virginia	154,725
Minnesota	134	North Dakota	49	Pennsylvania	58,291	Missouri	150,500
Kansas	125	Washington	49	Indiana	55,440	Massachusetts	150,400
South Carolina	124	Maryland	47	Colorado	50,677	Wisconsin	148,242
Mississippi	122	South Carolina	46	Washington	49,663	Tennessee	147,788
Florida	120	New Mexico	42	Wisconsin	49,414	Arizona	122,167
<b>Illinois</b>	<b>118</b>	North Carolina	42	Tennessee	49,263	Georgia	115,679
Michigan	110	California	40	Oregon	47,367	Alabama	115,429
Alabama	105	Florida	40	Louisiana	40,210	Indiana	110,880
Louisiana	105	Kansas	40	Alabama	38,476	Louisiana	108,256
Oklahoma	101	Massachusetts	40	Massachusetts	37,600	Maryland	101,723
Arkansas	100	New Jersey	40	Kentucky	36,870	Washington	99,327
Indiana	100	Virginia	40	Georgia	35,989	Kentucky	97,026
Iowa	100	Louisiana	39	Maryland	33,908	Oregon	94,733
Kentucky	100	Kentucky	38	Minnesota	32,657	Colorado	94,114
Montana	100	Michigan	38	Missouri	31,393	South Carolina	75,783
Ohio	100	Connecticut	36	Oklahoma	31,149	Arkansas	67,171
Rhode Island	100	Alabama	35	Nevada	28,619	Minnesota	65,313
Virginia	100	Arkansas	35	South Carolina	28,113	Kansas	61,950
West Virginia	100	Colorado	35	Iowa	27,770	Utah	59,414
Tennessee	99	Idaho	35	Arkansas	23,510	Oklahoma	58,259
Wisconsin	99	Maine	35	Utah	22,973	Nevada	57,238
North Carolina	98	South Dakota	35	Hawaii	21,725	Iowa	55,540
North Dakota	98	Missouri	34	New Mexico	21,643	West Virginia	52,735
Washington	98	West Virginia	34	Mississippi	21,107	Mississippi	49,519
California	80	Ohio	33	Kansas	19,824	New Hampshire	46,208
New Jersey	80	Tennessee	33	West Virginia	17,930	Hawaii	44,320
Utah	75	Wisconsin	33	Delaware	14,805	New Mexico	36,071
Idaho	70	Texas	31	Idaho	14,386	Maine	35,086
New Mexico	70	Arizona	30	Alaska	12,222	Delaware	28,905
South Dakota	70	Oregon	30	Rhode Island	10,030	Idaho	28,771
Colorado	65	Vermont	30	South Dakota	9,943	Alaska	23,913
Arizona	60	Wyoming	30	Maine	8,132	Rhode Island	20,060
Oregon	60	Utah	29	Montana	7,990	South Dakota	19,886
Wyoming	60	Hawaii	25	Wyoming	7,567	Vermont	18,767
Hawaii	51	New Hampshire	24	North Dakota	6,520	Connecticut	18,500
Alaska	45	Alaska	23	Connecticut	4,411	Montana	15,980
Nevada	42	Delaware	21	Vermont	3,753	Wyoming	15,133
Delaware	41	Nevada	21	New Hampshire	2,773	North Dakota	13,041
<b>Median</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>32,657</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>94,114</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>46,963</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>123,141</b>
				<b>Mean</b>	<b>40,980</b>	<b>Mean w/o CA</b>	<b>110,193</b>
				<b>w/o CA &amp; NH</b>			

Nebraska is not included because it has a unicameral legislature.

In 1991, a decade after passage of the Cutback Amendment, political scientist David Everson found that, as predicted, SMDV created more homogeneous partisans, with fewer having the desire or need to buck leadership because of regional and philosophical differences with their party.

## SIZE AND COST OF THE ILLINOIS HOUSE BOTH CUT BY CUTBACK AMENDMENT

Before closing this paper, we touch on the issues of cost and size of the Illinois House, which were central to the debate over the successful Cutback Amendment yet bear little on the CV-SMDV debate. On the measure of House spending as a percent of total state spending, the cost of the Illinois House has declined modestly. For the fiscal years 1972-81, costs of operating the House, including salaries, averaged 0.08 percent (eight hundredths of one percent), whereas for the SMDV period—from fiscal years 1982-2000—the average has been 0.07 percent. For fiscal year 2000, the cost was 0.06 percent. During the same period, the average cost of operating the Senate increased from 0.04 to 0.05 percent.

On a different measure, that of cost per member of the legislative body, the Illinois House costs increased in nominal terms from \$62,500 per 177 members in 1981 to \$193,000 per 118 members (\$23 million) for the year 2000, about a three-fold increase on a smaller membership base. For the same years, state Senate costs increased from \$100,100 to \$314,000 per 59 members, a similar three-fold increase, but on the same member base. During that period, the consumer price index doubled, so expenditures have been increasing faster than the rate of inflation for the Senate, but only at the rate of inflation for the House.

It is fascinating to observe, to the extent that cutting the cost of operating the legislature was a big issue to voters at the time of the Cutback Amendment, that the slice of the budget under consideration was so tiny. Of course, the symbolism of the voters having an opportunity to exact retribution on the legislature, by cutting their numbers and expenditures, probably loomed larger than the actual dollars involved.

In terms of the size of legislature, the Illinois House of 118 is just above the mean and median for the 50 states, yet the population per district of about 100,000 is three times the median of 33,000 per elected House member and about twice the mean. If Illinois had retained the 177-member House, Illinois would now have the fourth largest house, yet its population per seat of about 67,000 would still be significantly above the mean and median for the states. See Table 3.

## FINAL OBSERVATIONS

Both CV and SMDV have their virtues and defects. The proper question is not that of which is better than the other, but rather which system would serve better overall to meet the needs and values of a political system during a particular era. That is why the framers of the Constitution of 1970 were sage in their requirement that the state charter be reviewed every twenty years to determine if the provisos and systems in force still meet the needs and values of a changing society.

---

**James H. Kuklinski** is a professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

**James D. Nowlan** is a Senior Fellow with the University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs and an adjunct professor of public policy at Knox College.

**Philip D. Habel** is a graduate student in political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

## PRINCIPAL SOURCES

Douglas Amy. "Behind the Ballot Box: A Citizen's Guide to Voting Systems."  
Manuscript, 2000.

George S. Blair. *Cumulative Voting, An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics*. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1960.

David H. Everson and Joan A. Parker. "Legislative Elections: Reviving an Old Partnership."  
*Illinois Issues*, March 1983.

David H. Everson. "The Cutback at 10: Illinois House without Cumulative Voting and 59 Members." *Illinois Issues*, July 1991.

David H. Fremon. "Where Are They Now?" *Illinois Issues*, Dec. 1986.

Barbara Hipsman and Bob Springer. "First Fruits of Cutback: Homogenization." *Illinois Issues*, June 1983.

"Special Report: The Cutback Amendment." *Illinois Issues*, 1982.

George Fox Rishel. "Illinois' Experience with Cumulative Voting." *Journal of Election Administration*, Volume 18, 1997.

Robert B. Schaller. "The 'Cutback Amendment' and Diversity in the House." *Illinois Issues*, Nov. 1980.

Charles N. Wheeler. "Two Myths Bite the Dust." *Illinois Issues*, May 1984.

---

# THE CASE FOR CUMULATIVE VOTING

*By Judge Abner J. Mikva*

**F**or more than a century, Illinois thought political pluralism was a good idea. It expressed its commitment to such pluralism by electing the House of Representatives through cumulative voting. The 177 members of the House were elected from 59 larger districts, each having 3 representatives. This ensured that the political minority in each district could win a seat in the House if they could earn the votes of about one third of the district.

Some of the brightest and most independent members of the House came from the “minority” seat in their district: Jeanne Hurley Simon, Al Hachmeister, Anthony Scariano and William Redmond were top-notch legislators who represented the partisan minority in their district. In the rock-ribbed Republican suburbs, there was always a Democrat like Bill Redmond to represent the Democratic voters. And in the solid Democratic city districts, the Republican voters in the minority always had a voice through people like Art Telscher and Elroy Sandquist.

Frequently, these state representatives were the only elected officials of their party in the entire region. This gave voice to the political minority, not only in Springfield, but in other political battles as well. The state representatives worked on other campaigns and gave their party a chance to build an organization. Some of the political changes that took place within such districts in Illinois during that period were the direct result of cumulative voting. When I ran for Congress in the suburbs of Chicago, in a district that had not elected a Democratic congressman in 80 years, I built on the base that elected Democratic state representatives had created in previous elections. When Richard Ogilvie was elected sheriff of Cook County, (imagine a Republican getting elected to anything in Cook County today) he built on the Republican presence in the city of Chicago that came from the elected Republican state representatives.

Since cumulative voting was used in the primary elections as well as the general elections, there was even pluralism within the political parties. This gave an opportunity for independents—those not part of the party patronage machines—a chance to compete for election. Paul Simon won his seat in the legislature by running in the Democratic primary against the party choices. That’s how I won my first election in 1956. I received a little more than 40% of the primary vote, while the two organization candidates split 60% between them. Without cumulative voting, it is very hard for maverick voices in either party to get elected to the House and it becomes much easier for the party leadership to dominate the nomination, the election, and the performance of the Members.

The original purpose of three-member districts was to make the two party system work better. And it succeeded. Cumulative voting ensured that the minority party had at least one elected representative in each region. The monolithic nature of the Democratic political structure in Chicago and the Republican political structure in DuPage County makes any political competition between the parties virtually impossible. Cumulative voting promoted at least a minimum diversity.

This strengthening of the two-party system with three member districts is often confused with the multi-party systems that the more extreme forms of proportional representation create. In some of those extreme versions, such as Israel, small minorities of

voters can hold the balance of power. This frequently promotes political instability, and forces public policy decisions into abnormal directions. Although third parties occasionally did win state representative contests (Clarence Darrow was elected as a member of the Single Tax Party in the early part of the century), cumulative voting did not increase the instability of the system. The result of three- member districts in Illinois was a stronger two-party system, and not an unstable multi-party system.

What was the downside of this unique political institution of cumulative voting in Illinois? The biggest downside, and the main reason that it was repealed in a constitutional referendum was the confusion that the system engendered. Many people never quite understood how their votes could be divided.

Another argument that was successfully exploited against cumulative voting was that it led to a larger number of House members, and that eliminating cumulative voting would allow for a reduction of the number of legislators, with a resultant saving to the taxpayers. Of course, the House could be of any size with or without cumulative voting. If there were any value to reducing the size of the House, it could have been done without switching to single-member districts. If the voters wanted a smaller House, we could have created 39 districts with 3 members in each—elected by cumulative voting.

More fundamentally, the arguments for reduced size are somewhat specious. The minor savings in salaries and expenses for the legislators is more than offset by the reduction in democratic values. The smaller the House, the less voice each constituent has, and the more voice that each Member has. The extreme of the argument for smaller size would be to have a House of one Member. Some critics of the present system, after cumulative voting was eliminated, argue that is the system that exists, since the House really is too strongly dominated by the Speaker. Pluralism implies a large number of legislators.

The real reason why the people backed the Cutback Amendment which abolished cumulative voting had little to do with cumulative voting itself. As in the case of most substantial changes in the political system, the people were responding to a great deal of unhappiness with the legislature as it had been performing. The legislature had voted itself a pay raise in the period immediately after the 1978 election. Pay raises are always unpopular, and when they are enacted by a “lame duck” legislative body, they are perceived to be sneaky. It was easy to capitalize on that unhappiness and to blame cumulative voting. Incidentally, the largest percentage of turnover in the United States Congress occurred after a similar “midnight” pay increase in the 19th century.

A lot of the voting public are unhappy with the way the present legislature is performing. While the issue is not midnight pay raises, it is a sense that the real issues that concern the people are not being addressed.

Special interests are perceived to have too much influence in the way things happen. The “Four Tops” (as the legislative party leaders are known) are seen as having too much power. Perhaps this is an appropriate time to ask the people to reconsider their repeal of cumulative voting. At a time when pluralism is again considered to be a positive value, maybe we can go back to a system that worked very well in our diverse state.

A call for a return to cumulative voting will be difficult. It is not likely that such a proposal would be initiated in the legislature. While some of the leadership has expressed interest in reviving cumulative voting, the chances of the Speaker giving up much of the

---

power that he now wields are small. But a drive to put the proposition on the ballot via initiative would have a chance of success. Some of the trade unions and business groups have already expressed support or interest. So have some of the state's leading newspapers. Even the League of Women Voters, one of the principal backers of the repeal of cumulative voting in the first place, has decided to study the issue again. A drive to revive cumulative voting would not be easy, but it would be worth the effort to give Illinois an enhanced political pluralism.

---

***Judge Abner J. Mikva** is a visiting professor of law at the University of Chicago. He served as judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from 1979-1994, and as chief judge from January, 1991 to September 1994. He was a representative in the Illinois General Assembly from 1957-1967 and served ten terms as a representative in the U.S. Congress, from 1968-1978.*

# THE CUTBACK AMENDMENT AND FUTURE REFORMS

*By Patrick Quinn*

The Cutback Amendment in 1980 marked the first and only time in Illinois' 182 years of statehood that voters enacted a constitutional amendment by citizen initiative and referendum. The Cutback Amendment reduced the size of the Illinois House from 177 to 118 members and abolished cumulative voting by requiring House candidates to run in 118 single-member districts.

Prior to the Cutback Amendment, three representatives were elected from fifty-nine districts which had about 200,000 persons each. After the Cutback reform, districts became much smaller in geographical size, especially in Downstate areas. There were 118 districts which each had about 100,000 persons, half the previous number of constituents to serve.

The Cutback Amendment was directly enacted by Illinois voters by an overwhelming sixty-nine percent margin after a robust two-year statewide debate. The Associated Press voted the citizen movement that gathered initiative petition signatures and won the referendum for the Cutback Amendment as the top Illinois story of 1980.

The Cutback Amendment reached the referendum ballot after a sixteen-month petition drive which gathered 477,175 signatures collected by more than 10,000 volunteer Illinois petition passers. During the middle of the Cutback petition drive, the Illinois General Assembly attempted to derail the citizen petition effort by enacting the most severe legal restrictions on initiative-petition assign in the country. House members elected under the cumulative voting system voted overwhelmingly in favor of this anti-petition law which violated the fundamental petition rights of millions of Illinois voters.

The Illinois Supreme Court and federal courts struck down these anti-petition restrictions as blatantly unconstitutional and ordered that the Cutback Amendment be placed on the statewide ballot for the voters to decide in November, 1980. The slogan of Cutback supporters during the referendum campaign was "the Illinois House belongs to you, not the politicians" and Illinois voters agreed at the ballot box.

Since the Cutback Amendment was implemented in 1982, Illinois taxpayers have saved more than \$125 million because there are fifty-nine fewer legislative salaries, benefits, and expenses to pay for in every session. Contrary to erroneous predictions of Cutback opponents, the Illinois House is much more diverse and representative of Illinois' population under the Cutback Amendment system than under its predecessor. The Illinois House in the past 18 years has had more women, African Americans, and Hispanics elected than before 1982. In addition, women, African-Americans, and Hispanics comprise a far higher percentage of the Illinois House with 118 single-member districts than under cumulative voting with 177 seats.

In its one-hundred-year history, the cumulative voting system with its large population districts and multi-member districts systematically diluted the voting strength of racial minorities. In the history of cumulative voting, not one Hispanic representative was ever elected to the Illinois House, despite significant concentrations of Hispanic voters. Under the Cutback system today, there are 4 Hispanic legislators elected from smaller single-member districts without cumulative voting. Similarly, there are more African-Americans legislators today with single member districts. The cumulative voting system before the

---

Cutback Amendment permitted many white Republican legislators to win a House seat with less than ten percent of the vote in districts that were predominantly African-American.

In the eighteen years of elections under the Cutback system, voters have defied the conventional wisdom by electing good candidates single-member districts which have historically been dominated by one party. Republican representatives have been elected in Chicago, and Democratic representatives have been elected in Cook County suburbs, Lake County, Will County, and McHenry County.

The single member districts of the Cutback Amendment have ended the collusion which was the hallmark of the cumulative voting system in Chicago, the suburbs, and Downstate. Incumbent representatives under cumulative voting would regularly recruit straw candidates who would deliberately fail to run an active general election campaign and thus allow their “running mate” to win re-election with ease. In other cases, running mates of the same party would sabotage each other in the general election by urging their supporters to “bullet” (cast all three votes for one candidate) and deny their “running mate” any votes at all.

The collusive nature of the cumulative voting system was best illustrated by the regular refusal of both major political parties to nominate three candidates for the three available seats in a House district. Instead of maximizing competition by having six candidates competing for three seats with cumulative voting in a district, the two political parties colluded with each other to restrain full competition by voluntarily nominating only two candidates for the three representative openings in a district.

In 1980, the voters resoundingly rejected this wasteful, confusing, collusive, unaccountable, and discriminatory system, despite heavy spending by incumbent legislators and lobby groups to preserve the status quo. In the past twenty years, the people of Illinois have shown no interest in signing initiative petitions (eight percent of the previous gubernatorial vote) to qualify a referendum seeking to revive the cumulative voting system.

If the Task Force on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems wishes to undertake an objective and comprehensive evaluation of Illinois’ electoral system, it ought to examine other issues with far more public support and interest than a drive to revive the cumulative voting system. Any of the following eight proposed electoral reforms would create a more effective electoral democracy in Illinois and foster better public policy:

Constitutional Reform #1 (“The Lincoln Amendment”) Give Illinois voters the same petition power which has been part of the Massachusetts Constitution since 1918 — the right to get a recorded roll call vote by both legislative houses on any proposed bill that has secured the petition signatures of at least four percent of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election.

Constitutional Reform #2 (“The Open Primary Amendment”) Elect General Assembly members in nomination and general elections on a nonpartisan basis where voters and candidates would not be required to publicly declare their party affiliation. The top two vote-getters in the nomination election would run against each other in the general election, thus insuring maximum competition. This electoral system works successfully in Illinois municipal elections and was used successfully to elect Constitutional Convention delegates

in 1969. Two con-con delegates were elected from each of Illinois' fifty-eight senate districts on a nonpartisan basis with no party declaration requirement. The top four vote-getters in the nomination election ran in the general election.

**Constitutional Reform #3 ("Term Limit Amendment")** In 1994, nearly a half million Illinois voters signed initiative petitions calling for a referendum to establish eight-year term limits for Illinois legislators. In a controversial 4-3 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that term limits could only be proposed to the voters by resolution of the General Assembly, not by direct citizen initiative. The Illinois General Assembly whose four top leaders have been in office for 34, 28, 28, and 26 years respectively has refused to consider term limits in any way. In other states where voters enacted term limits by referendum in the 1990s, term limits have opened the door to fresh air in representative government by maximizing electoral competition, allowing new people to run for office, reforming campaign finance practices, and eliminating the concentrated power of long-time incumbents.

**Constitutional Reform #4 ("Annual Referendum on Whether the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate should be retained in office")** Currently Illinois judges are periodically required to run in a retention election to allow voters to decide whether a judge should remain in office. The same principle can be applied to the two top legislative leaders of the General Assembly. In a referendum to be held before April 15 of every year, Illinois voters would be asked whether the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate should be retained in their leadership position or removed. If a majority of the electorate voted in favor of removal, the members of the appropriate legislative house would be required to elect a new leader.

**Constitutional Reform #5 ("Recall")** Since the turn of the Twentieth century, voters in Wisconsin and many other states have had the power to recall unaccountable legislators from office before their terms expire. The recall power has been used prudently by Wisconsin voters and voters in other states. In the Twenty-first century, Illinois voters ought to be given the power to recall legislators who have lost the public's confidence before their terms are up.

**Constitutional Reform #6 ("Reapportionment Reform")** In the past thirty years, the legislative redistricting process has been an excessively political process which has reduced electoral competition, protected incumbent officeholders, and divided local communities in bizarre ways. Rather than rely on legislators (who have a self-interest in avoiding robust electoral competition) to draw legislative maps every decade, Illinois should adopt a reform where the state Supreme Court would nominate one hundred persons, no more than fifty from the same political party, and then twelve redistricting commission members would be chosen by lot just by jury. The redistricting commission by a two-thirds vote would be required to draw legislative boundaries which are compact, contiguous, equal in population, and competitive.

**Constitutional Reform #7 (Revision Commission")** Several states have adopted an innovative constitutional provision called a "revision commission" to break legislative gridlock on important issues and give the public another vehicle to be heard. The revision commission is constituted once a decade or once every twenty years. In Florida in 1998, a revision commission consisting of about twenty appointees conducted public hearings on issues for an entire year and then proposed a number of far reaching reforms to the voters

---

for their consideration in referendum. The reforms — which had been consistently ignored by the incumbents of the Florida legislature — were overwhelmingly approved by Florida voters in a referendum. In Illinois, a revision commission could be part of the “redistricting commission” mentioned in constitutional reform #6. Such a commission would meet once every decade in the year after the census with the power to draw legislative districts and the power to propose legislative changes directly to the voters for their referendum consideration. Illinois could have a twelve-member “revision commission” where the state Supreme Court would nominate one hundred persons — no more than fifty from the same political party — and the twelve commission members would be selected by lot just like a jury to break legislative grid lock.

Constitutional Reform #8 (“At-Large Legislators”) One way to help break legislative gridlock and give the public a greater voice in the legislative process would be to elect a handful of legislators in both houses on a statewide basis in at-large elections. In 1964, a number of worthy Illinois legislators were elected on this basis. For example, if the Illinois Senate had sixty members, fifty-seven could be elected from districts and three could be elected by the voters of the entire state in an at-large election. Under this scenario, the Illinois House would have 117 members with 114 elected from 114 districts and three elected by the voters of the entire state. A number of Illinois municipalities have city councils which have some members elected by districts and some members elected at large, and this reform is worth considering in Illinois in order to break concentrated legislative power and advance the public interest.

---

*Patrick Quinn is an attorney in Chicago, Illinois. He was treasurer of the state of Illinois from 1991-1995. In 1979 he organized the Coalition for Political Honesty and led the drive for the Illinois Cutback Amendment in 1980.*

# A COMPARISON OF SELECTED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

*By James H. Kuklinski*

The principal purpose of this section is to propose and evaluate four electoral systems, including the current plurality system, that conceivably could be used to elect members to the Illinois House of Representatives.

The discussion is divided into three parts:

- (1) an enumeration of nine criteria to evaluate electoral systems;
- (2) a summary of the four electoral systems; and
- (3) an evaluation of the systems using the nine criteria.

## PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR JUDGING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

We all have an idea or two about what makes for a good electoral system. A Republican might prefer majority voting, for example, because he or she knows that most people in the state are Republicans. Or independents might favor proportional representation because it helps minor parties win legislative seats. A truly systematic evaluation, however, requires an explicit, inclusive, and exhaustive list of general criteria that can be applied to any electoral system of interest.

Scholars and practitioners have spent considerable time setting forth such criteria. Building on past efforts, the Task Force concluded that the following nine criteria should be used to evaluate an electoral system:

1. Does it encourage citizen participation in the electoral process?
2. Does it encourage competition and offer citizens a real choice in the selection of legislative representatives?
3. Does it simplify the voting task and enhance voter understanding of that task?
4. Does it ensure that the partisan division of elected legislators closely resembles the overall pattern of partisan votes in the electorate?
5. Does it provide fair regional representation in the legislature?
6. Does it provide significant racial, ethnic, and gender representation in the legislature?
7. Does it enhance the accountability of legislators to their constituents?
8. Does it foster decisiveness in the legislative process?
9. Does it encourage cooperation and the effective participation of all legislators?

We take the first three criteria—encourages citizen participation, offers citizens a real choice, and simplifies the voting task—to be uncontestable. Any electoral system that fails to meet these three criteria does not serve its citizens well. Debate is more likely to center on the remaining criteria. This is not because any particular criterion is undesirable—most students of electoral systems endorse them all—but because meeting one criterion often conflicts with meeting another. For example, ensuring that the partisan division of elected legislators closely resembles the partisan vote (criterion 4) is not likely to be compatible with ensuring significant racial, ethnic, and gender representation in the legislature (criterion 6). An electoral system designed to maximize the representation of women, Hispanics, and African-Americans almost never will produce a legislature that accurately

represents the partisan split in the vote. Similarly, encouraging decisiveness in the legislative process (criterion 8) likely will conflict with encouraging the effective participation of all legislators (criterion 9).

Most political disagreements about the choice of electoral systems are over one or both of two issues. We just discussed the first: which of the conflicting criteria are more important. The second—how well a particular system meets the criteria—will become evident when we try to apply the nine criteria to several systems. We will do that shortly. First, however, we need to identify the systems and then briefly discuss them.

## FOUR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

### *Single-Member District Plurality Voting*

Single-member district plurality voting (SMD) is the system most commonly used for legislative elections in the United States. Also known as “first-past-the-post,” SMD is the system currently used to elect state legislators to the Illinois House and Senate. All of the candidates appear on the ballot—the list typically is winnowed to two, one from each of the two dominant parties, via primary elections—and each voter votes for one of them. The winner is the candidate with the most votes, whether or not that candidate’s votes are a majority of the total.

Two of the most often cited advantages of this system are its simplicity and its low administrative costs. It is also seen as a system that promotes close ties between legislator and constituency, in that the districts are relatively small and constituents know whom to contact in time of need. It promotes a two-party system because third-party candidates rarely win. Critics are quick to note that SMD wastes all the votes cast for the losing candidate(s) and denies representation to third parties. It also encourages gerrymandering, which in turn leads to a decline in competitive districts, often to the extent that there is only a single candidate from which to choose.

### *Instant Run-Off Voting*

A variation of plurality voting is instant run-off voting (IRV). Just as in plurality voting, all candidates are listed on the ballot. But instead of voting for only one candidate, voters rank the candidates in order of their preference (“1” for first choice, “2” for second, etc.). The counting is also different from plurality voting. A computer scans and tabulates the ballots. First, all the number one preferences of the voters are counted. If a candidate receives over 50 percent of the first choice votes, he or she is declared elected. If no candidate receives a majority of the first-place votes, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated. The ballots of supporters of this candidate are then transferred to whichever of the remaining candidates was marked as the number-two choice. The vote is then recounted to see if any one candidate now receives a majority. This process continues until one candidate receives a majority of the vote, which consists of his or her first-place votes plus the needed number of continuing votes.

Advocates of IRV believe that it has two notable advantages over first-past-the-post voting. First, the winning candidate will have the meaningful support of a majority of the voters, which increases his or her legitimacy. Second, IRV ensures that an independent or a third-party candidate will not play spoiler and throw the election to the one of the two major-party candidates who in fact was not the electorate’s overall first choice. On the other

hand, IRV is more administratively complex. Closely related, summing the continuing votes to identify a winning candidate can lead to perverse outcomes when many voters do not identify second and third choices.

## *Cumulative Voting*

Cumulative voting (CV) was used to elect members to the Illinois House until 1982. In the United States, CV is the most talked about form of semi-proportional representation. It currently is not used in any country outside the United States; and within the United States, it is used at the local level.

The cumulative voting system retains the plurality, first-past-the-post part of SMD. Candidates run in multi-member districts. Voters have as many votes as there are seats. Voters cast their votes for individual candidates and the winners are the ones with the most votes. The major difference from SMD systems is that voters can “cumulate” or combine their votes, instead of just having to cast one vote for one candidate. In other words, voters can distribute their votes among candidates in any way they prefer.

Proponents of CV see it as an especially effective way to ensure minority party representation. Many also believe that it can increase the chances for racial and ethnic minorities to win representation and thus see it as the best alternative to race- and ethnic-conscious districting. Cumulative voting also discourages gerrymandering, or at least makes it more difficult. On the other hand, a large number of candidates, especially in the primary election, can overwhelm citizens’ ability to make rational choices. Critics of cumulative voting as it existed in Illinois argue that party control over candidate selection was much greater than met the eye. They also contend that the actual act of voting was too complicated for many voters.

## *Party-List Voting*

Party-list Voting (PLV) is a form of proportional voting, which is the main rival to plurality-majority voting. Among advanced Western democracies, proportional representation (PR) has become the predominant system. In Western Europe, for example, 21 of the 28 countries use PR. These include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. PR operates on a simple principle: the number of seats a political party or group wins should be in proportion to the legislature support it garnered among voters. So, if a political party (or group) wins 30 percent of the vote, it should receive 30 percent of the seats.

Under PLV systems, legislators are elected in large, multi-member districts. Each party puts up a list or slate of candidates equal to the number of seats in the district. Independent candidates can also run, and they are listed separately on the ballot as if they were their own party. On the ballot, voters indicate their preference for a particular party and the parties then receive seats in proportion to their share of the vote. So, in a five-member district, if the Democrats win 40 percent of the vote, they would win two of five seats. The two winning Democratic candidates would be chosen according to their position on the list. There are two broad types of list systems: closed list and open list. In a closed list system, the party fixes the order in which candidates are listed and elected, and the voter simply casts a vote for the party as a whole. That is, winning candidates are selected in the exact

---

order that the parties put them on the list. Most European democracies now use the open list form of party voting. This approach allows voters to express a preference for particular candidates, not just parties. It is designed to give voters some say over the order of the list and thus which candidates get elected. Voters are presented with unordered or random lists of candidates chosen in party primaries. Voters cannot vote for a party directly, but must cast a vote for an individual candidate. This vote counts for the specific candidate as well as for the party. So the order of the final list used to choose legislators completely depends on the number of votes won by each candidate on the list. For example, if the Democrats win two of five seats, and Joe and Mary receive the most Democratic votes, Joe and Mary are elected.

PLV and proportional representation (PR) systems more generally tend to be friendlier than other systems to minority parties. They also waste fewer votes and afford better representation of racial, ethnic, and gender minorities. The districts tend to be more competitive, and representation of diverse interests in the legislature is relatively good. PR systems also reduce gerrymandering and encourage greater discussion of issues in campaigns. On the other hand, PR systems can foster unstable legislative coalitions and legislative gridlock. Some critics feel that, in a multi-party system (which PR encourages), small parties have too much power and get too many concessions. If the multi-member districts become too large, it weakens constituency-legislator relationships. Closed lists encourage parties to select diverse candidates, while open lists give more power to voters. Open lists also can become highly complicated and can intensify intra-party rivalries, since candidates often end up campaigning against other candidates of the same party.

#### *A Hypothetical Example*

To see how different electoral systems can lead to different outcomes, consider two types of district. In the first, the district is split 70-30 between X and Y, where X and Y can stand for Democrat and Republican, white and non-white, men and women, etc. Under both plurality and instant run-off voting, the X candidate wins. Under cumulative and party list voting, there will be more winning X than winning Y candidates, but both types will be elected to the legislature. The difference in the cumulative and party listing voting outcomes will depend on the extent to which the candidates included in the party list differ from those who would run on their own.

Next consider a very different district: one that is split 34, 33, and 33 percent among three interests. Designate these interests, respectively, as X, Y, and Z. Under plurality voting, the X candidate wins. Under instant run-off, in contrast, any of the three candidates can win, depending on how voters' second preferences are configured across the three candidates. Whereas the plurality and instant run-off voting systems led to similar outcomes in the first example, they do not here. Under cumulative and party list voting, at least one candidate X will be elected to office. How the other two seats will be allocated (assuming there are three in total) under cumulative voting is not clear. Under party list voting, it is almost certain that one X, one Y, and one Z candidate will be elected to office.

Not everyone will agree on the most desirable system. No one can deny, however, that the choice of an electoral system has considerable consequences for the way that citizens' votes are translated into legislative seats.

## AN EVALUATION OF THE FOUR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

We have delineated nine criteria and briefly summarized four electoral systems. How, then, do the four systems stand up vis-à-vis the criteria? To answer this question, we have done the following. For each criterion, we have placed the four systems along a 10-point scale, ranging from very poor to very good. Thus, on any given criterion, one can quickly compare the performance of the four systems.

Two notes of caution are in order. First, not everyone will agree with our conclusions. Indeed, our principal purpose is to encourage discussion of the systems vis-a-vis the criteria, not to impose our own conclusions. Second, any evaluation requires simplifying what is in reality a very complex political phenomenon. The consequences of different electoral systems depend on a host of factors: how the population is distributed, who controls the financing of campaigns (which itself can depend on the type of electoral system that is being used), and what factors citizens consider most important (party versus racial and ethnic identification, for example).

With these caveats duly noted, our evaluations appear in the box on the next page. Following is a brief discussion of our rationale for the alignment of systems on each of the nine criteria.

### *Criteria 1 and 2: Encourages Citizen Participation and Offers Citizens a Real Choice*

Plurality and instant-run-off voting fare poorly on these two criteria because both systems encourage gerrymandering, which in turn reduces competition and thus voting turnout. In contrast, cumulative and party-list-voting systems typically afford citizens meaningful choices and thus do better at encouraging citizens to vote.

### *Criterion 3: Simplifies the Voting Task*

Plurality voting systems excel in meeting this criterion. Typically, at least in general elections, voters are asked to choose between two candidates who run on the two major-party labels. All three of the other systems, in contrast, require the voter to make more complicated choices. Sometimes the task before the voter can be formidable and lead to confusion.

### *Criterion 4: Ensures Accurate Translation of Partisan Votes into Legislative Seats*

Plurality voting does relatively poorly on this criterion because all of the votes in a district that go to other than the winning candidate are wasted. Instant run-off voting performs better because voters' second and third preferences are taken into account if no candidate receives a majority of the votes on the first ballot. Cumulative and party list voting are designed to provide a fairly accurate translation of the partisan vote shares into shares of the legislative seats.

---

### *Criterion 5: Provides Fair Regional Representation in the Legislature*

Illinois historically has divided into three political regions: Cook County, the surrounding collar counties, and downstate. None of the systems would be extremely poor at representing all three regions. However, cumulative and party-list voting do better at ensuring that all regions receive majority and minority party representation in the legislature. Both also do better at ensuring the representation of various groups across all three regions.

### *Criterion 6: Provides Significant Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Representation.*

Any form of proportional or semi-proportional representation (party-list and cumulative voting, respectively) potentially will achieve this goal more fully than plurality and majority systems will. Indeed, the goal of group representation is usually the rallying cry for implementation of the former systems.

### *Criterion 7: Enhances Accountability of Legislators to Constituents*

Plurality voting fares poorly on this criterion because it affords parties the opportunity to carve out legislative districts in a way that reduces if not eliminates competition. Cumulative and party-list voting strengthen the accountability of representatives to certain parts of the constituency.

### *Criterion 8: Fosters Decisiveness in the Legislative Process*

Relative to plurality voting, cumulative and party-list voting weaken decisive legislative decision-making. Under the most extreme of circumstances, when party list voting leads to a fragmented party system, minor party legislators can stall and sometimes stop legislative policymaking.

### *Criterion 9: Encourages Effective Participation of All Legislators*

Cumulative voting is an especially effective vehicle by which to ensure that all legislators effectively participate in the policy process. At the other extreme, plurality voting and single-member districts increase the opportunities for leaders to gain power over the rank-and-file.

---

*James H. Kuklinski is a professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.*

## Evaluation of Four Electoral Systems

**SMD**, Single-Member District Plurality Voting  
**CV**, Cumulative Voting

**IRV**, Instant Run-Off Voting  
**PLV**, Party-List Voting

CRITERION	VERY POOR										VERY GOOD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Encourages Citizen Participation		SMD		IRV				CV	PLV		
Offers Citizens a Real Choice		SMD		IRV					CV	PLV	
Simplifies the Voting Task		CV	PLV	IRV							SMD
Ensures Accurate Translation of Partisan Votes into Legislative Seats		SMD			IRV				CV	PLV	
Provides Fair Regional Representation in Legislature					SMD	IRV			CV	PLV	
Provides Significant Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Representation		SMD	IRV						CV	PLV	
Enhances Accountability of Legislators to Constituents		SMD			IRV			CV	PLV		
Fosters Decisiveness in Legislative Process			PLV	CV				IRV		SMD	
Encourages Effective Participation of All Legislators		SMD		IRV		PLV			CV		



# PARTICIPANTS, ILLINOIS ASSEMBLY ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION & ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

**Mary-Lou Aagaard**

Election Laws Specialist,  
Co-Chair, League of Women Voters, Illinois  
Alternative Elections Study  
League of Women Voters of Illinois  
Glenview, Illinois

**Tobias G. Barry\***

Consultant, Aplington Kaufman McClintock  
Steele & Barry  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1961-1974  
Justice, Illinois Third District Appellate  
Court, 1974-1994  
La Salle, Illinois

**Suzanne Bassi**

Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1999-2001  
Palatine, Illinois

**David Bennett**

Executive Director  
Illinois Press Association  
Springfield, Illinois

**Woods Bowman**

Professor, DePaul University  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1977-1991  
Chicago, Illinois

**Cindi Canary\***

Project Director  
Illinois Campaign for Political Reform  
Chicago, Illinois

**Bruce Clark\***

County Clerk  
Kankakee County  
Kankakee, Illinois

**Rich Clemmons**

Government Affairs Director  
Illinois Farm Bureau  
Bloomington, Illinois  
**Alice Cottingham**  
Executive Director  
Fund for Immigrants and Refugees  
Chicago, Illinois

**Daphne Duame**

Vice President, League of Women Voters,  
Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

**Jim Edgar, Task Force Co-chair\***

Distinguished Fellow  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1977-1981  
Secretary of State, State of Illinois, 1981-1991  
Governor, State of Illinois, 1991-1999  
Urbana, Illinois

**Judy Erwin\***

Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1991-2001  
Chicago, Illinois

**Jan Flapan\***

President  
League of Women Voters of Illinois  
Chicago, Illinois

**Barbara Flynn Currie**

Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1979-2001  
Chicago, Illinois

**John Foreman\***

Editor and General Manager  
The News-Gazette  
Champaign, Illinois

\* Member of the Illinois Task Force on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems. Task Force members Jacky Grimshaw, John Jackson, Patricia Lindner, and Maria Valdez were unable to attend the Assembly.

\*\* Academic Advisory Committee and Support Staff

**Roberta Friedman**

Co-Chair of League of Women Voters,  
Illinois Alternative Elections Study,  
Former Member League of Women Voters,  
Illinois Board of Directors  
Wilmette, Illinois

**Randy Fritz**

President, Citizens' Utility Board of Illinois  
Williamsfield, Illinois

**Samuel K. Gove,\*\***

Director Emeritus, Institute of Government  
and Public Affairs  
Urbana, Illinois

**Larry Hansen\*\***

Vice President, Joyce Foundation  
Chicago, Illinois

**Ross Harano**

Chairman, Asian-Pacific American  
Democratic Council of Illinois  
Chicago, Illinois

**Linda Harlan**

Program Director, Chicago Foundation for  
Women  
Chicago, Illinois

**William C. Harris**

Commissioner of Banks and Trust  
Companies, State of Illinois, 1977-1990  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1955-1961  
Senator, Illinois General Assembly, 1961-  
1977  
Pontiac, Illinois

**Susan R. Hartter\*\***

Assistant Director  
Institute of Government and Public Affairs  
Champaign, Illinois

**John S. Jackson\***

Chancellor, Southern Illinois University  
Carbondale, Illinois

**Dan Johnson-Weinberger**

Executive Director, Midwest Democracy  
Center  
Chicago, Illinois

**Nancy Kaszak**

Executive Director, Corlands  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1993-1997  
Chicago, Illinois

**Harold Katz**

Managing Partner, Katz Friedman Eagle  
Eisenstein & Johnson  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1965-1983  
Chicago, Illinois

**Norton Kay**

Public Affairs Consultant, The Haymarket  
Group  
Chicago, Illinois

**James F. Keane**

Consultant, Keane & Associates  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1979-1993  
Chicago, Illinois

**Priscilla Kersten**

President, League of Women Voters of  
Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

**Jack H. Knott\*\***

Director, Institute of Government and Public  
Affairs  
Chicago, Illinois

**Scott Koeneman\*\***

Communications Manager  
Institute of Government and Public Affairs  
Urbana, Illinois

**James H. Kuklinski\*\***

Professor, Political Science and Institute of  
Government and Public Affairs  
Urbana, Illinois

**Jeff Ladd**

Senior Partner, Bell Boyd & Lloyd  
Chicago, Illinois

**John J. Lanigan**

John J. Lanigan & Associates  
Senator, Illinois General Assembly,  
1965-1971  
Hometown, Illinois

**Tuyet Le**

Director, Asian American Institute  
Chicago, Illinois

**Sharon Legenza**

Staff Attorney, Fair Housing Project  
Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil  
Rights Under Law  
Chicago, Illinois

**Patricia Lindner\***

Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1993-2001  
Sugar Grove, Illinois

**Richard Lockhart**

President, Social Engineering Associates  
Chicago, Illinois

**Ann Lousin**

Professor, John Marshall Law School  
Chicago, Illinois

**Sheila Luecht**

Director of Communications, AAUW-Illinois  
Crystal Lake, Illinois

**John W. Maitland**

Senator, Illinois General Assembly, 1979-  
2001  
Bloomington, Illinois

**Vasyl Markus**

Vice President of Public Impact, Planned  
Parenthood  
Chicago, Illinois

**Robert Marx**

Rabbi, Congregation Hakafa  
Glencoe, Illinois

**Michael McCormick\*\***

Special Assistant, Institute of Government  
and Public Affairs  
Urbana, Illinois

**Kenneth McMillan**

Assistant Professor of Political Economy and  
Commerce, Monmouth College  
Senator, Illinois General Assembly, 1977-  
1983  
Monmouth, Illinois

**Ronanld Michaelson\***

Executive Director, Illinois State Board of  
Elections  
Springfield, Illinois

**Abner Mikva, Task Force Co-chair\***

Visiting Professor, University of Chicago  
Law School  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1957-1967  
Representative, U.S. Congress, 1967-1978  
Judge, District of Columbia Circuit, U.S.  
Court of Appeals, 1979-1990  
Chief Judge, District of Columbia Circuit,  
U.S. Court of Appeals, 1979-1990  
Chicago, Illinois

**Calvin Morris**

Executive Director, Community Renewal  
Society  
Chicago, Illinois

**Dawn Clark Netsch\***

Professor of Law Emerita  
Northwestern University School of Law  
Senator, Illinois General Assembly, 1973-  
1991  
Comptroller, State of Illinois, 1991-1995  
Chicago, Illinois

**Diana Nelson\***

Director of Public Affairs  
Union League Club of Chicago  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1981-1985  
Chicago, Illinois

**James D. Nowlan\*\***

Senior Fellow, Institute of Government and  
Public Affairs  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1969-1973  
Toulon, Illinois

---

\* Member of the Illinois Task Force on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems. Task Force members Jacky Grimshaw, John Jackson, Patricia Lindner, and Maria Valdez were unable to attend the Assembly.

\*\* Academic Advisory Committee and Support Staff

---

**David Orr**  
County Clerk, Cook County  
Chicago, Illinois

**Alice Palmer**  
Research Associate Professor, Urban  
Planning & Public Affairs  
University of Illinois at Chicago  
Senator, Illinois General Assembly,  
1991-1997  
Chicago, Illinois

**Joan Parker**  
Manager, KPMG  
Chicago, Illinois

**Diane Pinderhughes**  
Professor, Political Science  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  
Urbana, Illinois

**Geoff Poor**  
Citizen  
Champaign, Illinois

**Ann Poor**  
Citizen  
Champaign, Illinois

**Patrick Quinn**  
Attorney, Law Offices of Patrick Quinn  
Treasurer, State of Illinois, 1991-1995  
Chicago, Illinois

**David Ransburg\***  
Chairman and CEO, L. R. Nelson  
Corporation  
Peoria, Illinois

**Dennis A. Rendleman**  
General Counsel, Illinois State Bar  
Association  
Springfield, Illinois

**Deborah Rugg**  
Citizen  
Urbana, Illinois

**Len Small**  
President, Small Newspapers  
Kankakee, Illinois

**Earl Struck\***  
President/CEO, Association of Illinois  
Electric Cooperatives  
Springfield, Illinois

**Joe Tecson**  
Partner, Chuhak and Tecson  
Riverside, Illinois

**Art Turner**  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1981-2001  
Chicago, Illinois

**David Vaught**  
Financial Advisor, Mitchell, Vaught &  
Walker Inc.  
Naperville, Illinois

**Joseph Vosicky Jr.\***  
Partner, Law Offices of Joseph F. Vosicky Jr.  
Wheaton, Illinois

**Richard A. Walsh**  
River Forest Republican Committeeman  
Representative, Illinois General Assembly,  
1963-1975  
Senator, Illinois General Assembly,  
1977-1983  
River Forest, Illinois

**Cynthia Wilson**  
IGPA Fellow  
Univeristy of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  
Urbana, Illinois

**Randall Witter**  
President, Cook-Witter Inc.  
Springfield, Illinois

**Paula Wolff\***  
Senior Executive, Chicago Metropolis 2020  
Chicago, Illinois



