Azerbaijani domestic politics are characterized by increasingly limited pluralism, as President Heidar Aliyev’s administration exerts a dominating influence over both mass media and grassroots activity. In addition, opposition parties are hampered by their own limitations.

The referendum of August 24, 2002 – labeled by opposition partisans and international observers alike as flawed – has served to curtail the ability of Aliyev’s domestic critics to participate in politics. It has altered the system for parliamentary elections from one of partial proportional representation (which gives some voice to the typically smaller opposition parties) to an exclusively majoritarian (“first past the post”) system. This new structure provides an additional advantage to the well-financed and larger pro-government parties.

The referendum has also made it possible for the elderly Aliyev to appoint a temporary successor should he be unable to continue fulfilling his duties as president. This chosen substitute would be well positioned to win an election for the vacated post. Political analysts say this may offer Aliyev an opportunity to engineer his own political succession, installing his son, Ilham, as president after he leaves the political stage.

Ultimately, the new system may end up encouraging a greater level of protest outside the extant political framework. Some political observers believe 2003 could be a turbulent year for Azerbaijan, with presidential elections scheduled for October and social unrest on the rise.

Although a host of opposition parties are allowed to operate in Azerbaijan, few of them have any influence over policy-making. Many political observers say that opposition parties have yet to formulate a message that can attract the support of a substantial portion of the general population. Indeed, opposition parties have had problems differentiating their policy stances on many issues from those held by the Aliyev administration. On those issues where substantial differences exist, the opposition response to government policy has tended to be to organize protest actions, rather than attempting to offer proactive alternatives. In addition, opposition parties have often become entangled in intra-mural squabbles and rivalries.

Due to the government’s attempts to stifle institutional opposition and the opposition’s own failure to unite and strike a chord with the Azerbaijani populace, the number of spontaneous protests is likely to grow in the coming months and years. The diversion of anti-government sentiment into non-official forms of protest can already be seen in such events as the violent clashes in the village of Nardaran in June 2002 (and continuing unrest in the area), the protests of cadets at Azerbaijan’s main military academy in September, and other public demonstrations. Fundamental Islamist sentiment, which offers an outlet for dissent outside of official structures, may likewise be on the rise.

Background

Azerbaijan’s political development since its independence in 1991 is inextricably linked to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The status of this Armenian-inhabited enclave inside Azerbaijani territory has long been a source of discord and tension in the region, and the violence that flared up during the late Soviet era quickly turned into full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenians were victorious, and now control an estimated 15 to 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s Soviet-era territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict further created an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan (with many Azerbaijanis claiming the figure to be as high as one million). No peace deal has been concluded since the 1994 cease-fire, and the short-term prospects for one seem dim.

In addition to its massive social and economic effect, the war had a major impact on Azerbaijani internal politics. Popular discontent over the handling of the conflict by the government of former Communist Ayaz Mutalibov led to his ousting in the spring of 1992, when the main opposition movement, the Popular Front, took over. Further losses in the war, however, as well as serious internal problems, led to the subsequent dismissal of the Popular Front government. This paved the way for the return of Aliyev, the veteran Communist Party leader of Azerbaijan.

Aliyev succeeded in stabilizing the country, negotiating a truce in the war, and securing Azerbaijan’s status as an independent state. Internally, he consolidated his hold over the country in a series of disputed elections, and his New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) now enjoys a comfortable majority in parliament.

The Azerbaijani President was not always in such a dominant position. The Popular Front, which can be regarded as the ancestor of many of today’s opposition parties, played an important role in the early years of independence. It was formed in 1989 to promote perestroika in Azerbaijan, but soon became an umbrella group for a broad spectrum of groups opposed to the Communist regime. In early 1992, it led the protests against Mutalibov that forced his resignation. The movement’s chairman, Abulfaz Elchibey, captured the presidency in June of that year with 60 percent of the vote. However, a series of battlefield setbacks, beginning with the controversial killing of hundreds of Azerbaijani soldiers and civilians at Khojaly in February 1992 continued to erode public confidence in Elchibey’s leadership. One year after taking power, in June 1993, Elchibey was forced to step down following a military uprising and nationwide antigovernment protests. As speaker of parliament, Aliyev became acting president. Elections later that year made that status permanent, despite the widespread reporting of irregularities.

The Opposition

Major Parties

Azerbaijani political parties, according to the more critical observers, are not necessarily representative of an association of individuals who share common political values and objectives. Instead, there is a tendency for them to be patronage structures centered on powerful, charismatic politicians. In this respect, opposition parties in Azerbaijan do not differ from the ruling party. The personality- rather than platform-based style of politics means that many of those in the opposition have extremely limited organizational depth and a very narrow support base. Although approximately 40 parties exist in all, only three of the opposition groups have local branches throughout the country and a constituency numerous enough to have any influence. All three owe their existence largely to the disintegration of the Popular Front.

Popular Front: This movement, which began to take shape prior to the Soviet collapse, evolved into a large and loosely organized protest group for any organization opposed to the Communists. It was the leading political force in the period just before and after independence, but the forced resignation and internal exile of Elchibey shattered this dominance in 1993. Afterwards, the Popular Front lost many leading figures to other parties.

Elchibey’s return from banishment in his home province, the exclave of Nakhichivan, in October 1997 led to a split in the Popular Front. A younger group supporting liberal ideas, led by Ali Kerimli, came to dominate, while a smaller, more traditional group of nationalists remained clustered around Elchibey. (Upon Elchibey’s death in August 2000, Mirmahmud Miralioglu took over the leadership of the nationalist wing.) Attempts to reunite the party have failed; in fact, in 2002 a second split appeared when a group led by Gudrat Hasanguliyev left Kerimli’s wing. As its three branches and history of infighting attest, the Popular Front remains an extremely loose organization. It finds most of its support in Baku and the isolated Nakhichivan region, and presently controls six seats of a total 125 in parliament.

New Equality Party (Musavat): Musavat is the self-proclaimed successor to the pro-Turkish party of the same name that figured prominently in the first independent Azerbaijani republic (1918-1920). In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, many of the present Musavat leaders were members of the Popular Front. They split with the Popular Front in 1992, originally distinguishing themselves with an ideological mixture of nationalism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, but later becoming increasingly moderate and secular in orientation. Recently Musavat, often described as the party of Azerbaijan’s intelligentsia, has taken over the Popular Front's role as the most prominent opposition party. Similar to the Popular Front, there exist within the party disagreements over whether to emphasize nationalism or a more Western, liberal stance, but in this case a split has been avoided. Isa Gambar currently heads Musavat, which enjoys support in Baku and the country’s central regions and currently holds two seats in parliament.

Azerbaijan National Independence Party (ANIP): The ANIP's core constituency is made up of Azerbaijanis who used to live in Armenia. Its leader, Etibar Mamedov, like Musavat’s Gambar, is a former Popular Front member. Founded in September 1992 on a platform of liberal market reforms, the party blames Aliyev for the country’s widespread poverty. Mamedov, who has at times cooperated with Aliyev’s regime in return for influence, was nevertheless its strongest opponent in the 1998 presidential elections. The ANIP has two deputies in parliament.

Democratic Party of Azerbaijan: Exiled former Chairman of Parliament Rasul Guliyev leads the Democratic Party. An ally of Aliyev's in the mid-1990's, the two later fell out and Guliyev joined the opposition. By the late 1990's his party had attracted a large enough following to be considered one of the key opposition groupings, although its level of exposure and regional representation were not on par with the three described above. In 1998, Guliyev was charged with embezzlement and similar crimes and fled abroad. The party's electoral influence has declined since his departure, although it is still quite active on the opposition scene.

Cooperation and Disagreement

All of the above-mentioned party leaders at one time or another were members of the Popular Front and share many of the same political beliefs. Their greatest disagreement is over which of them is the best-equipped to lead a united opposition. At times all three parties and other like-minded factions have proven their ability to work together – as a rule just before elections – but normally such cooperation fades as soon as the event that brought them together has passed. This lack of coordination has undoubtedly hurt their electoral chances. More importantly, perhaps, the infighting has allowed Aliyev to isolate each party politically and maintain his dominance through a “divide and conquer” approach.

An organization called the Democratic Congress (DC) represents the most durable form of opposition alliance. Established in 1994, it unites a fluctuating number of parties – usually around 10 – of which the most influential are the Popular Front and Musavat. Even given such a longstanding multiparty organization, though, until recently true cooperation remained elusive. The DC does not present a united party list during elections, and its small Baku office seems devoted primarily to exchanging ideas and maintaining informal ties.

However, recent joint statements and rallies by key parties in response to the August referendum have some observers predicting that opposition cooperation will continue to rise in the face of increasing pressure from Aliyev’s administration. The informal coalition set up to contest the referendum, which is both broader and looser than the DC, remains intact, issuing a statement on October 9 calling for the removal of Aliyev from power. Four opposition rallies followed over the course of October, with high attendance. The core group opposing the referendum, which has created an Opposition Coordinating Center, is active on other issues as well, such as the drafting of the new electoral code.

Alone or in cooperation, funding is a perennial problem for opposition parties. The NAP, as the party of power, controls a much larger war chest than these groups. There are four main sources from which the opposition attracts financial support, explained Leila Yunus of the Azerbaijani NGO Institute of Peace and Democracy: membership dues, contributions of Azerbaijani businessmen inside the country, donations from businessmen that reside abroad and the finances of party leaders themselves. Of all these sources, Azerbaijani businessmen living abroad are the most significant contributors. These businessmen often feel excluded from opportunities in many lucrative domestic sectors, which tend to be controlled by Aliyev’s relatives and political allies. These businessmen hope that a change in leadership could provide them with new commercial openings.

Relations with Government

Despite such tension, the main opposition parties agree with the current government in a number of areas. They all promote a pro-Western course and champion the extraction of Azerbaijan’s natural resources as a means of developing the country as a whole. Even here, however, the DC “worries about the large compromises that the government made to foreign [oil] companies.” The DC shares the government’s wariness of Iran, however. Both fear that Iran might try to foment an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in the country; Azerbaijan is, after all, one of the few other Islamic countries in the world with a Shia majority. Instead of defining themselves as such, however, both opposition and government see secular Turkey and the United States as the country’s most important strategic allies.

Similarities aside, opposition parties tend to be considerably more nationalistic than the government, most notably on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. The DC claims that “the humiliating ‘peace’ proposals of the international missions” to solve the problem are “an unsuccessful result” of the administration’s policies. Taking a more hard-line stance than the government, the DC proposes offering the region autonomy “according to European standards,” a concept that it has yet to define further.

Considering the paramount importance of the Karabakh issue in Azerbaijani politics, existing policy differences make dialogue between the two sides unlikely, despite their similarities in other areas. The apparent ballot manipulation during successive elections by Aliyev’s administration is another major irritant in opposition-government relations. For example, Human Rights Watch [for additional information see the EurasiaNet archives], observing the 2000 parliamentary elections, reported that local government authorities were engaged in “widespread and systematic interference in electoral procedures, principally by blocking access to the ballot for opposition and independent candidates in the country’s . . . single-mandate constituencies.” Furthermore, “candidates, their campaign personnel, and those voters who gave signatures in support of their candidacies all faced harassment from local government authorities.” Amnesty International, meanwhile, noted a “completely flawed counting process.”

In addition, some observers say law enforcement and other government agencies have been utilized by the administration to intimidate opposition parties. For example, on October 2, 2002, police stormed the headquarters of the Democratic Party, reportedly smashing furniture and discarding documents. Only a day earlier, six Musavat party members had been rounded up for arrest on unclear charges.

The media also comes under significant government pressure. While there is officially freedom of the press in Azerbaijan, in practice the government indirectly controls much of what is broadcast and written in the country, political experts say. As the National Democratic Institute writes, “despite the formal abolition of censorship in 1998, reporters and the print media continue to come under pressure. Journalists have been subject to violence in recent years, and actions by government officials . . . have fostered an atmosphere of self-censorship.” This was particularly true in late 2002 and early 2003, as court action against independent print media increased and broadcast media faced the prospect of continued state oversight, despite a Council of Europe-sponsored initiative to encourage less government control.

The government further hinders the opposition by attempting to attract independent parties or individuals into its camp through offers of power-sharing or economic incentives. As a local political analyst explains, the ANIP acted in accordance with the government for a long period of the 1990’s, and was for a time better funded than the rest of the cash-strapped opposition. The uneasy alliance ended during the presidential elections of 1998, as Mamedov, suspecting that Ilham Aliyev was being groomed to succeed his father and therefore doubting his own chances, parted ways with the ruling party and began to campaign in earnest.

Future Prospects

An Underrepresented Populace

The opposition currently has little to no impact on Azerbaijan's mainstream politics. Like the government they oppose, opposition politicians understand the problems of society, such as a lack of employment and uneven development, but do no better than the government at proposing constructive means to combat them. Instead, many opposition leaders give the appearance of pursuing individual agendas. This struggle leaves a majority of the population politically alienated, a situation which engenders great apathy, “and also a vacuum, which is very dangerous,” as put by Andreas Gross, one of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s (PACE) rapporteurs for the country.

This apathy could lead to a situation in which dissatisfied citizens, alienated from both government and opposition, decide to circumvent the political process and take to the street. The riots in the village of Nardaran beginning in June 2002, prompted by appalling living conditions, might foreshadow such a development. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. While some argue that Nardaran is a case apart, as the village is very close-knit, whose residents have a reputation for being devoutly Islamic – giving the government an opportunity to blame the unrest on Iranian influence – the fact remains that the village is the site of ongoing protests that have occurred separate from the political framework. Another, less explosive demonstration occurred on October 2, as members of the Union of Baku and Baku Villages picketed the Interior Ministry and prosecutor's office, demanding the release of their imprisoned leader. For its part, both opposition and government failed to anticipate or even adequately react to these events.

External Factors

Meanwhile, the United States seems more concerned with maintaining Azerbaijani stability than promoting democratic processes. As the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline begins to take form and oil flows at an ever-increasing rate, Azerbaijan's strategic importance will similarly increase. Some political analysts believe that, as in many of the countries of Central Asia, Azerbaijan will become a state in which the commitment of the United States and other major powers to human and civil rights becomes secondary to perceived economic and security interests.

Russia and Iran are two other countries that can possibly have considerable influence over domestic developments. Relations between Baku and Moscow have improved over the past year, [for additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives], although areas of tension remain, including the illegal migration of Azeris to Russia in search of work. Balancing the often-different strategic and economic objectives of Russia and the United States in the Caucasus will remain an ongoing challenge for Azerbaijani leaders. Forging better ties with Iran is also an important task, not only in the religious sphere, but also in the economic realm. Baku and Tehran continue to struggle to find a mutually acceptable formula for the division of the Caspian Sea [for background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. A Caspian pact is seen as a key to ensuring the stable development of regional energy resources. However, given their strategic interests and history of relations with the region, both Russia and Iran cannot be expected to push for significant democratic reform.

In contrast, the country’s accession – together with Armenia – to the Council of Europe in early 2001 could potentially lead to some encouraging developments. While Azerbaijan has a long way to go to reach European standards in the areas of human rights, civil liberties and press freedom, to name a few, some observers express hope that constructive engagement by European structures will push Azerbaijan along the road to a truly representative democracy. So far, however, the Council of Europe's involvement has been limited to a few key issues, such as advocating the release of Azerbaijan's political prisoners.

Opposition Chances

Given the triple hindrance of administrative obstruction, low popular support, and a lack of international interest, the chances for the opposition in future elections seem bleak. This is true even without considering the constitutional amendments adopted in the August 2002 referendum.

Aliyev has announced that he will run for the presidency again in 2003, and there is little doubt that he will win. Once the elderly president has secured another term, the recently approved amendments to the Constitution allow him to virtually appoint his successor. The changes stipulate that the prime minister will take over from the head of state in the case of the latter’s incapacity or death – rather than the parliamentary speaker, as in the past.

Most opposition leaders believe Aliyev will appoint his son Ilham as prime minister. In the event of Aliyev’s retirement or death, his son would then have a much smoother road to the presidency if, as acting president, he had continued control of the governmental bureaucracy, budget and media outlets. While the opposition may have once hoped to take advantage of the window of opportunity if Aliyev were to die or become incapacitated, the August referendum appears to have considerably limited the chances of ending the family’s dominance over Azerbaijani politics.

With Aliyev making every effort to assure his continued control of the political playing field, it seems unlikely that the opposition will be willing to compromise with the government. Rather, the already significant mistrust between these groups and the administration will stiffen, as shown by both the recent crackdowns by the authorities as well as the increased coordination displayed by the opposition.

The ongoing clashes over a draft elections code underline both these points. The Opposition Coordinating Center has united in an effort to boycott discussions of the draft code, on the grounds that the government will not allow opposition parties to participate on an equal footing. The parties claim that the proposed law does nothing to address Azerbaijan's continual problems with electoral corruption and vote-rigging. PACE has expressed its own concern over the draft code, with rapporteur Guillermo Martinez Casan stating that if the elections of October 2003 are held under such provisions, the Council of Europe will not recognize the results.

Alternative Protest

Alternative forms of protest and expression are likely to gain ground as more citizens reject all groups in the traditional political arena, whether pro-government or opposition. Islam is one such outlet. The Azerbaijan Islamic Party, which advocated the country's development through Islamic laws and principles, was banned in 1996. Its leaders were arrested and accused of espionage for Iran. Despite rumors that the Iranians helped to fund the organization, it seems likely that the government was less afraid of Iranian intrigue than of the appeal of alternative political views to an increasing restive populace. While according to a 1997 survey only up to 6 percent of Azerbaijanis consider themselves devout, Islam’s popularity seems to be rising. During a demonstration in Baku in early 2002, shouts of “Allahu Akbar” were heard for the first time since 1989.

It is possible, therefore, that Islamist ideology may become a rallying point for impoverished Azerbaijanis. However, regardless of the form political protest takes, the ailing but still powerful Aliyev holds the key to the riddle of Azerbaijani politics. His abrupt departure from the scene could potentially lead to widespread destabilization or the continuation of rule by his son. Indeed, even in the way he exits from political life, Aliyev seems set to retain the controlling influence over Azerbaijan’s domestic political life.

Azerbaijani domestic politics are characterized by increasingly limited pluralism, as President Heidar Aliyev’s administration exerts a dominating influence over both mass media and grassroots activity. In addition, opposition parties are hampered by their own limitations.

The referendum of August 24, 2002 – labeled by opposition partisans and international observers alike as flawed – has served to curtail the ability of Aliyev’s domestic critics to participate in politics. It has altered the system for parliamentary elections from one of partial proportional representation (which gives some voice to the typically smaller opposition parties) to an exclusively majoritarian (“first past the post”) system. This new structure provides an additional advantage to the well-financed and larger pro-government parties.

The referendum has also made it possible for the elderly Aliyev to appoint a temporary successor should he be unable to continue fulfilling his duties as president. This chosen substitute would be well positioned to win an election for the vacated post. Political analysts say this may offer Aliyev an opportunity to engineer his own political succession, installing his son, Ilham, as president after he leaves the political stage.

Ultimately, the new system may end up encouraging a greater level of protest outside the extant political framework. Some political observers believe 2003 could be a turbulent year for Azerbaijan, with presidential elections scheduled for October and social unrest on the rise.

Although a host of opposition parties are allowed to operate in Azerbaijan, few of them have any influence over policy-making. Many political observers say that opposition parties have yet to formulate a message that can attract the support of a substantial portion of the general population. Indeed, opposition parties have had problems differentiating their policy stances on many issues from those held by the Aliyev administration. On those issues where substantial differences exist, the opposition response to government policy has tended to be to organize protest actions, rather than attempting to offer proactive alternatives. In addition, opposition parties have often become entangled in intra-mural squabbles and rivalries.

Due to the government’s attempts to stifle institutional opposition and the opposition’s own failure to unite and strike a chord with the Azerbaijani populace, the number of spontaneous protests is likely to grow in the coming months and years. The diversion of anti-government sentiment into non-official forms of protest can already be seen in such events as the violent clashes in the village of Nardaran in June 2002 (and continuing unrest in the area), the protests of cadets at Azerbaijan’s main military academy in September, and other public demonstrations. Fundamental Islamist sentiment, which offers an outlet for dissent outside of official structures, may likewise be on the rise.

Background

Azerbaijan’s political development since its independence in 1991 is inextricably linked to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The status of this Armenian-inhabited enclave inside Azerbaijani territory has long been a source of discord and tension in the region, and the violence that flared up during the late Soviet era quickly turned into full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenians were victorious, and now control an estimated 15 to 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s Soviet-era territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict further created an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan (with many Azerbaijanis claiming the figure to be as high as one million). No peace deal has been concluded since the 1994 cease-fire, and the short-term prospects for one seem dim.

In addition to its massive social and economic effect, the war had a major impact on Azerbaijani internal politics. Popular discontent over the handling of the conflict by the government of former Communist Ayaz Mutalibov led to his ousting in the spring of 1992, when the main opposition movement, the Popular Front, took over. Further losses in the war, however, as well as serious internal problems, led to the subsequent dismissal of the Popular Front government. This paved the way for the return of Aliyev, the veteran Communist Party leader of Azerbaijan.

Aliyev succeeded in stabilizing the country, negotiating a truce in the war, and securing Azerbaijan’s status as an independent state. Internally, he consolidated his hold over the country in a series of disputed elections, and his New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) now enjoys a comfortable majority in parliament.

The Azerbaijani President was not always in such a dominant position. The Popular Front, which can be regarded as the ancestor of many of today’s opposition parties, played an important role in the early years of independence. It was formed in 1989 to promote perestroika in Azerbaijan, but soon became an umbrella group for a broad spectrum of groups opposed to the Communist regime. In early 1992, it led the protests against Mutalibov that forced his resignation. The movement’s chairman, Abulfaz Elchibey, captured the presidency in June of that year with 60 percent of the vote. However, a series of battlefield setbacks, beginning with the controversial killing of hundreds of Azerbaijani soldiers and civilians at Khojaly in February 1992 continued to erode public confidence in Elchibey’s leadership. One year after taking power, in June 1993, Elchibey was forced to step down following a military uprising and nationwide antigovernment protests. As speaker of parliament, Aliyev became acting president. Elections later that year made that status permanent, despite the widespread reporting of irregularities.

The Opposition

Major Parties

Azerbaijani political parties, according to the more critical observers, are not necessarily representative of an association of individuals who share common political values and objectives. Instead, there is a tendency for them to be patronage structures centered on powerful, charismatic politicians. In this respect, opposition parties in Azerbaijan do not differ from the ruling party. The personality- rather than platform-based style of politics means that many of those in the opposition have extremely limited organizational depth and a very narrow support base. Although approximately 40 parties exist in all, only three of the opposition groups have local branches throughout the country and a constituency numerous enough to have any influence. All three owe their existence largely to the disintegration of the Popular Front.

Popular Front: This movement, which began to take shape prior to the Soviet collapse, evolved into a large and loosely organized protest group for any organization opposed to the Communists. It was the leading political force in the period just before and after independence, but the forced resignation and internal exile of Elchibey shattered this dominance in 1993. Afterwards, the Popular Front lost many leading figures to other parties.

Elchibey’s return from banishment in his home province, the exclave of Nakhichivan, in October 1997 led to a split in the Popular Front. A younger group supporting liberal ideas, led by Ali Kerimli, came to dominate, while a smaller, more traditional group of nationalists remained clustered around Elchibey. (Upon Elchibey’s death in August 2000, Mirmahmud Miralioglu took over the leadership of the nationalist wing.) Attempts to reunite the party have failed; in fact, in 2002 a second split appeared when a group led by Gudrat Hasanguliyev left Kerimli’s wing. As its three branches and history of infighting attest, the Popular Front remains an extremely loose organization. It finds most of its support in Baku and the isolated Nakhichivan region, and presently controls six seats of a total 125 in parliament.

New Equality Party (Musavat): Musavat is the self-proclaimed successor to the pro-Turkish party of the same name that figured prominently in the first independent Azerbaijani republic (1918-1920). In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, many of the present Musavat leaders were members of the Popular Front. They split with the Popular Front in 1992, originally distinguishing themselves with an ideological mixture of nationalism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, but later becoming increasingly moderate and secular in orientation. Recently Musavat, often described as the party of Azerbaijan’s intelligentsia, has taken over the Popular Front's role as the most prominent opposition party. Similar to the Popular Front, there exist within the party disagreements over whether to emphasize nationalism or a more Western, liberal stance, but in this case a split has been avoided. Isa Gambar currently heads Musavat, which enjoys support in Baku and the country’s central regions and currently holds two seats in parliament.

Azerbaijan National Independence Party (ANIP): The ANIP's core constituency is made up of Azerbaijanis who used to live in Armenia. Its leader, Etibar Mamedov, like Musavat’s Gambar, is a former Popular Front member. Founded in September 1992 on a platform of liberal market reforms, the party blames Aliyev for the country’s widespread poverty. Mamedov, who has at times cooperated with Aliyev’s regime in return for influence, was nevertheless its strongest opponent in the 1998 presidential elections. The ANIP has two deputies in parliament.

Democratic Party of Azerbaijan: Exiled former Chairman of Parliament Rasul Guliyev leads the Democratic Party. An ally of Aliyev's in the mid-1990's, the two later fell out and Guliyev joined the opposition. By the late 1990's his party had attracted a large enough following to be considered one of the key opposition groupings, although its level of exposure and regional representation were not on par with the three described above. In 1998, Guliyev was charged with embezzlement and similar crimes and fled abroad. The party's electoral influence has declined since his departure, although it is still quite active on the opposition scene.

Cooperation and Disagreement

All of the above-mentioned party leaders at one time or another were members of the Popular Front and share many of the same political beliefs. Their greatest disagreement is over which of them is the best-equipped to lead a united opposition. At times all three parties and other like-minded factions have proven their ability to work together – as a rule just before elections – but normally such cooperation fades as soon as the event that brought them together has passed. This lack of coordination has undoubtedly hurt their electoral chances. More importantly, perhaps, the infighting has allowed Aliyev to isolate each party politically and maintain his dominance through a “divide and conquer” approach.

An organization called the Democratic Congress (DC) represents the most durable form of opposition alliance. Established in 1994, it unites a fluctuating number of parties – usually around 10 – of which the most influential are the Popular Front and Musavat. Even given such a longstanding multiparty organization, though, until recently true cooperation remained elusive. The DC does not present a united party list during elections, and its small Baku office seems devoted primarily to exchanging ideas and maintaining informal ties.

However, recent joint statements and rallies by key parties in response to the August referendum have some observers predicting that opposition cooperation will continue to rise in the face of increasing pressure from Aliyev’s administration. The informal coalition set up to contest the referendum, which is both broader and looser than the DC, remains intact, issuing a statement on October 9 calling for the removal of Aliyev from power. Four opposition rallies followed over the course of October, with high attendance. The core group opposing the referendum, which has created an Opposition Coordinating Center, is active on other issues as well, such as the drafting of the new electoral code.

Alone or in cooperation, funding is a perennial problem for opposition parties. The NAP, as the party of power, controls a much larger war chest than these groups. There are four main sources from which the opposition attracts financial support, explained Leila Yunus of the Azerbaijani NGO Institute of Peace and Democracy: membership dues, contributions of Azerbaijani businessmen inside the country, donations from businessmen that reside abroad and the finances of party leaders themselves. Of all these sources, Azerbaijani businessmen living abroad are the most significant contributors. These businessmen often feel excluded from opportunities in many lucrative domestic sectors, which tend to be controlled by Aliyev’s relatives and political allies. These businessmen hope that a change in leadership could provide them with new commercial openings.

Relations with Government

Despite such tension, the main opposition parties agree with the current government in a number of areas. They all promote a pro-Western course and champion the extraction of Azerbaijan’s natural resources as a means of developing the country as a whole. Even here, however, the DC “worries about the large compromises that the government made to foreign [oil] companies.” The DC shares the government’s wariness of Iran, however. Both fear that Iran might try to foment an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in the country; Azerbaijan is, after all, one of the few other Islamic countries in the world with a Shia majority. Instead of defining themselves as such, however, both opposition and government see secular Turkey and the United States as the country’s most important strategic allies.

Similarities aside, opposition parties tend to be considerably more nationalistic than the government, most notably on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. The DC claims that “the humiliating ‘peace’ proposals of the international missions” to solve the problem are “an unsuccessful result” of the administration’s policies. Taking a more hard-line stance than the government, the DC proposes offering the region autonomy “according to European standards,” a concept that it has yet to define further.

Considering the paramount importance of the Karabakh issue in Azerbaijani politics, existing policy differences make dialogue between the two sides unlikely, despite their similarities in other areas. The apparent ballot manipulation during successive elections by Aliyev’s administration is another major irritant in opposition-government relations. For example, Human Rights Watch [for additional information see the EurasiaNet archives], observing the 2000 parliamentary elections, reported that local government authorities were engaged in “widespread and systematic interference in electoral procedures, principally by blocking access to the ballot for opposition and independent candidates in the country’s . . . single-mandate constituencies.” Furthermore, “candidates, their campaign personnel, and those voters who gave signatures in support of their candidacies all faced harassment from local government authorities.” Amnesty International, meanwhile, noted a “completely flawed counting process.”

In addition, some observers say law enforcement and other government agencies have been utilized by the administration to intimidate opposition parties. For example, on October 2, 2002, police stormed the headquarters of the Democratic Party, reportedly smashing furniture and discarding documents. Only a day earlier, six Musavat party members had been rounded up for arrest on unclear charges.

The media also comes under significant government pressure. While there is officially freedom of the press in Azerbaijan, in practice the government indirectly controls much of what is broadcast and written in the country, political experts say. As the National Democratic Institute writes, “despite the formal abolition of censorship in 1998, reporters and the print media continue to come under pressure. Journalists have been subject to violence in recent years, and actions by government officials . . . have fostered an atmosphere of self-censorship.” This was particularly true in late 2002 and early 2003, as court action against independent print media increased and broadcast media faced the prospect of continued state oversight, despite a Council of Europe-sponsored initiative to encourage less government control.

The government further hinders the opposition by attempting to attract independent parties or individuals into its camp through offers of power-sharing or economic incentives. As a local political analyst explains, the ANIP acted in accordance with the government for a long period of the 1990’s, and was for a time better funded than the rest of the cash-strapped opposition. The uneasy alliance ended during the presidential elections of 1998, as Mamedov, suspecting that Ilham Aliyev was being groomed to succeed his father and therefore doubting his own chances, parted ways with the ruling party and began to campaign in earnest.

Future Prospects

An Underrepresented Populace

The opposition currently has little to no impact on Azerbaijan's mainstream politics. Like the government they oppose, opposition politicians understand the problems of society, such as a lack of employment and uneven development, but do no better than the government at proposing constructive means to combat them. Instead, many opposition leaders give the appearance of pursuing individual agendas. This struggle leaves a majority of the population politically alienated, a situation which engenders great apathy, “and also a vacuum, which is very dangerous,” as put by Andreas Gross, one of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s (PACE) rapporteurs for the country.

This apathy could lead to a situation in which dissatisfied citizens, alienated from both government and opposition, decide to circumvent the political process and take to the street. The riots in the village of Nardaran beginning in June 2002, prompted by appalling living conditions, might foreshadow such a development. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. While some argue that Nardaran is a case apart, as the village is very close-knit, whose residents have a reputation for being devoutly Islamic – giving the government an opportunity to blame the unrest on Iranian influence – the fact remains that the village is the site of ongoing protests that have occurred separate from the political framework. Another, less explosive demonstration occurred on October 2, as members of the Union of Baku and Baku Villages picketed the Interior Ministry and prosecutor's office, demanding the release of their imprisoned leader. For its part, both opposition and government failed to anticipate or even adequately react to these events.

External Factors

Meanwhile, the United States seems more concerned with maintaining Azerbaijani stability than promoting democratic processes. As the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline begins to take form and oil flows at an ever-increasing rate, Azerbaijan's strategic importance will similarly increase. Some political analysts believe that, as in many of the countries of Central Asia, Azerbaijan will become a state in which the commitment of the United States and other major powers to human and civil rights becomes secondary to perceived economic and security interests.

Russia and Iran are two other countries that can possibly have considerable influence over domestic developments. Relations between Baku and Moscow have improved over the past year, [for additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives], although areas of tension remain, including the illegal migration of Azeris to Russia in search of work. Balancing the often-different strategic and economic objectives of Russia and the United States in the Caucasus will remain an ongoing challenge for Azerbaijani leaders. Forging better ties with Iran is also an important task, not only in the religious sphere, but also in the economic realm. Baku and Tehran continue to struggle to find a mutually acceptable formula for the division of the Caspian Sea [for background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. A Caspian pact is seen as a key to ensuring the stable development of regional energy resources. However, given their strategic interests and history of relations with the region, both Russia and Iran cannot be expected to push for significant democratic reform.

In contrast, the country’s accession – together with Armenia – to the Council of Europe in early 2001 could potentially lead to some encouraging developments. While Azerbaijan has a long way to go to reach European standards in the areas of human rights, civil liberties and press freedom, to name a few, some observers express hope that constructive engagement by European structures will push Azerbaijan along the road to a truly representative democracy. So far, however, the Council of Europe's involvement has been limited to a few key issues, such as advocating the release of Azerbaijan's political prisoners.

Opposition Chances

Given the triple hindrance of administrative obstruction, low popular support, and a lack of international interest, the chances for the opposition in future elections seem bleak. This is true even without considering the constitutional amendments adopted in the August 2002 referendum.

Aliyev has announced that he will run for the presidency again in 2003, and there is little doubt that he will win. Once the elderly president has secured another term, the recently approved amendments to the Constitution allow him to virtually appoint his successor. The changes stipulate that the prime minister will take over from the head of state in the case of the latter’s incapacity or death – rather than the parliamentary speaker, as in the past.

Most opposition leaders believe Aliyev will appoint his son Ilham as prime minister. In the event of Aliyev’s retirement or death, his son would then have a much smoother road to the presidency if, as acting president, he had continued control of the governmental bureaucracy, budget and media outlets. While the opposition may have once hoped to take advantage of the window of opportunity if Aliyev were to die or become incapacitated, the August referendum appears to have considerably limited the chances of ending the family’s dominance over Azerbaijani politics.

With Aliyev making every effort to assure his continued control of the political playing field, it seems unlikely that the opposition will be willing to compromise with the government. Rather, the already significant mistrust between these groups and the administration will stiffen, as shown by both the recent crackdowns by the authorities as well as the increased coordination displayed by the opposition.

The ongoing clashes over a draft elections code underline both these points. The Opposition Coordinating Center has united in an effort to boycott discussions of the draft code, on the grounds that the government will not allow opposition parties to participate on an equal footing. The parties claim that the proposed law does nothing to address Azerbaijan's continual problems with electoral corruption and vote-rigging. PACE has expressed its own concern over the draft code, with rapporteur Guillermo Martinez Casan stating that if the elections of October 2003 are held under such provisions, the Council of Europe will not recognize the results.

Alternative Protest

Alternative forms of protest and expression are likely to gain ground as more citizens reject all groups in the traditional political arena, whether pro-government or opposition. Islam is one such outlet. The Azerbaijan Islamic Party, which advocated the country's development through Islamic laws and principles, was banned in 1996. Its leaders were arrested and accused of espionage for Iran. Despite rumors that the Iranians helped to fund the organization, it seems likely that the government was less afraid of Iranian intrigue than of the appeal of alternative political views to an increasing restive populace. While according to a 1997 survey only up to 6 percent of Azerbaijanis consider themselves devout, Islam’s popularity seems to be rising. During a demonstration in Baku in early 2002, shouts of “Allahu Akbar” were heard for the first time since 1989.

It is possible, therefore, that Islamist ideology may become a rallying point for impoverished Azerbaijanis. However, regardless of the form political protest takes, the ailing but still powerful Aliyev holds the key to the riddle of Azerbaijani politics. His abrupt departure from the scene could potentially lead to widespread destabilization or the continuation of rule by his son. Indeed, even in the way he exits from political life, Aliyev seems set to retain the controlling influence over Azerbaijan’s domestic political life.