Improving New York City's
Community School Board Elections

Testimony to the Citywide Community School Board Elections Committee on December 2, 1997
By Robert Richie, Executive Director, The Center for Voting and Democracy



(The New York City Community School Boards have been elected by the choice voting method of proportional representation since 1970. The elections have been controversial. Rob Richie of the Center for Voting and Democracy recently testified before a task force charged with making recommendations about changes in the elections, including a possible elimination of the choice voting method. Note: the Center does not take a position on the school boards. Rather, we seek to make it clear that problems that exist with these elections have nothing to do with the method of election --a method which in fact produces more diverse representation than likely could be achieved by any other election method.)

        Good evening. My name is Rob Richie. I am executive director of The Center for Voting and Democracy. Based in Washington, D.C., the Center is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that researches and disseminates information on electoral systems that promote voter participation and fair representation. I have both a professional and personal interest in your city's Community School Board elections.
        On the personal side, my great uncle was George Hallett, who worked at the Citizens Union for many decades. George played a leading role in the adoption of proportional representation for city council elections in New York City in 1936 and a leading role in several successful defenses of that system before its 1947 repeal. He also was the primary architect of the proportional representation election law for the Community School Boards.
        On the professional side, the Center is the nation's leading national resource on proportional representation systems. In my capacity as executive director since its founding in 1992, I have:

  • worked with the staff of Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney in developing the Voters' Choice Act (HR 3068), a bill to allow states to use proportional systems;
  • addressed the Voting Section of the U. S. Department of Justice, Texas Commission on Judicial Efficiency, the annual meetings of the National Association of Counties and the National Conference of State Legislatures and many foreign visitors through the United States Information Agency;
  •  testified in special sessions before charter commissions in Nassau County (NY), Miami Beach (FL), Cincinnati (OH) and Detroit (MI) and advised charter commissions and elected officials in several other cities;
  •  published commentary in the New York Times, Washington Post, Roll Call, Nation, Social Policy, Christian Science Monitor and many other publications and been a guest on numerous radio and television programs, including C-SPAN and MSNBC. In the appendix is an article I co-authored for the most recent Federal Elections Commission Journal on "Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies."


        The Center takes a special interest in the school board elections. Although most mature democracies use proportional systems, relatively few localities and states have experience with them in the United States. New York City is one of only two cities to use the choice voting system -- one that we have begun to call choice voting. This fall I met with your task force's director Alan Gartner and helped link the task force with scholars who will help study results from the 1996 school board elections.
        Going into those 1996 elections, the Center received grants totaling $30,000 from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, National Non-Partisan Voter Registration Campaign and Fund for the City of New York to promote increased understanding of choice voting and informed participation in the school board elections. We produced: a 15-minute video that aired numerous times on New York cable stations; a public service announcement that aired on commercial television stations; a series of radio public service announcements in English, Spanish, Cantonese (Chinese), Creole, Korean and Russian; information for our web page http://www.igc.org/cvd/ (see appendix); and materials designed to assist journalists in providing improved media coverage of choice voting.
        Although disappointed in the record-low turnout in 1996, I believe the most important reasons for this low turnout had nothing to do with the method of election. At the same time, the record-high representation of racial and ethnic minorities had everything to do with the choice voting system. I am sure you will hear a great deal about both of these issues. What I would like to focus on tonight is:
        1) how representative of racial and ethnic diversity the school boards generally are, when measured by the only standard that should be used for measuring representativeness in elections -- voting-age population;
        2) issues to consider when exploring alternative systems, with a special emphasis on limited voting and cumulative voting;
        3) my recommendations for changes.

Background on Choice Voting
        As you know, the school boards are elected by voters in their school district every three years. Candidates run at-large for nine seats, and voters rank candidates they like in order of choice on paper ballots. Choice voting is used in a variety of elections around the world. Among them: city council and school board elections in Cambridge, Mass.; parliamentary elections in the Republic of Ireland; local elections in northern Ireland; senate elections in Australia; nearly all student council elections in British universities; and, yes, nominations for the Academy awards. Other systems of proportional representation are used in most mature democracies; every nation in Europe now uses proportional representation for at least one of its national elections.
        Choice voting receives a great deal of criticism in New York City, sparking frequent calls for its elimination by many reform organizations and journalists. I believe that most of this criticism is misdirected. The following points should be made about choice voting.

         Choice voting is a simple voting process despite negative publicity to the contrary. As one slogan goes, it is as easy as 1, 2, 3. Voters rank the candidates they like in order of choice -- in New York City on paper ballots, marking a "1" by their first choice candidate, a "2" by their second choice and so on. That is all there is to it for voters, and easy enough that 98% of voters in the 1993 elections cast valid ballots.
        The vote-counting process is more complicated -- in part due to its newness, as baseball or football is complicated to newcomers -- but the principle is simple: a voter's ballot is counted toward the voter's highest-ranked candidate who can win with that vote. Most voters help elect their first choice -- meaning that their other choices don't factor into the results -- but many voters' top-choice candidate is either too unpopular to win or popular enough to win without their support. These voters' ballots are counted toward their next-choice candidate. Given that a voter's lower choice can never cause a higher choice to lose, voters are free to rank as many candidates as they want, and sometimes a fifth, sixth or lower choice actually is the first candidate a voter can help elect.
         Choice voting guarantees that nearly all voters (close to 90%) will help elect a candidate -- usually one's first choice in a large field. No other voting system used in the United States comes close to this guarantee. Nine of ten voters will officially help elect someone; most of them and most of the remaining 10% also will rank winning candidates on their list who did not need their vote to win. Over 70% of voters regularly elect their first choice in the elections, quite high given voters' wide range of choices.
        If voters know the candidates and vote according to their preferences, they will win fair representation within a 10% margin of error, no matter their ideology, race, ethnicity or gender. It is no accident that the school boards have more women (51%) and fairer racial and ethnic representation than any of New York City's other elected offices -- a fairness obscured by some observers who contrast board composition with student population rather than voting-age population.
        This very fairness, however, can mean that a majority of voters cannot necessarily oust a board member these voters find offensive or ineffective as long as this board member has significant core support. However, a majority can prevent such a board member from being part of the governing majority. The principle of choice voting is that the majority will earn the right of decision at the same time that substantial minorities earn their right to representation.
         Fair results in choice voting are entirely tied to voter participation and voter education, which is thus the source of its potential empowerment and potential problems. If a group of voters making up 10% of the overall electorate vote for a certain candidate or candidate slate, these voters will elect one of nine seats. If a group of voters making up 51% of the electorate votes for a certain candidate slate, these voters will elect five seats. Every new voter could lead to more seats to be won, which provides a great incentive for higher voter turnout.
        Conversely, low voter turnout among a certain group of potential voters will mean that particular group will not elect the candidates it potentially could elect. In addition, lack of information about candidates will prevent voters from voting effectively. Many current problems with boards are tied in part to low voter participation and to lack of information about candidates.

Choice Voting in New York
        One might fairly ask if choice voting is such a good system, why so few participants in the Community School Board elections seem to like it.
        * Ignorance of candidates and function of boards: One problem is that many voters and potential voters do not know the candidates in the Community School Board elections, which keeps them away from the polls or keeps them from voting with much coherence. Many also do not know the function of school boards.
        * Election administration problems: Candidates and those most involved in the school boards often have to put much energy into their campaigns and election day efforts. They then generally have to go through weeks of work after the elections in order to observe the ballot-count. As will be discussed below, this long ballot-count is unnecessary -- but understandably a sore point with many candidates and parents.
        * "Urban myths" about choice voting: A third problem is due to the many mythologies about the voting process -- that the system is impossibly complicated, that ranking more candidates often keeps voters' first choice from winning, that small groups of voters can manipulate their ballots to win far more seats than they deserve and so on. These myths -- all of the above are inaccurate -- scare some voters away from the polls and confuse many of those who do vote. Low voter turnout and confusion at the polls is a problem because if voters do not participate or vote effectively, they will not win their fair share of seats.
        Choice voting in fact has a built-in incentive to promote higher voter turnout than "winner-take-all" systems used in most elections in the United States: as explained above, results are tied to turnout, which encourages voters to participate and candidates to mobilize voters. In Cambridge (MA), voter turnout in local elections with choice voting is higher than turnout in similar communities using winner-take-all elections. Cincinnati had voter turnout of over 70% in its last choice voting election for city council in 1955 (when an African-American gained the highest number of first choice votes and nearly became mayor, which was the major reason the city's Republican machine was able to organize a successful repeal in 1957 after three decades of successful elections). On a national level, political scientists have found that proportional representation systems likely increase voter to participation by 10% to 15%.
        Once voters understand the power choice voting gives them to elect their favorite candidates, they have every incentive to vote and get the representation and policies they seek. In fact, despite New York's problems with it, voter turnout in the 1993 school board elections -- probably in part as a result of the Rainbow curriculum -- was the highest it had been since 1970 and higher than winner-take-all elections for the Los Angeles school board. Washington, D.C. today is holding a special citywide election for one of our 13 city council seats; turnout may drop below the 5% turnout registered for a citywide election earlier this year.

The Voting Rights Act and Fair Representation
        Some proposals for changing the school board elections have been made that I frankly consider irresponsible. A bill was debated seriously in the New York legislature a couple years ago that called for going to traditional at-large elections, in which voters would cast equally weighted votes for up to nine candidates. Such a system would never pass muster with the Department of Justice, which must pre-clear election law changes in three of the city's five boroughs because of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (the other two boroughs -- as with the entire country -- is covered by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, meaning lawsuits could be filed against unfair systems by a protected minority).
        Given frequent complaints that the school boards are unrepresentative, some listeners might be surprised that the Department of Justice would not leap to support any change away from choice voting. But the blunt truth is that it is very unlikely that any other election system could have provided the kind of diverse representation of voters provided by choice voting in elections since it was instituted in 1970.
        Enclosed in the appendix is revealing information from a 1973 memo distributed by Irving Anker, then-Chancellor of the Board of Education. The memo was prepared by Frederick Shaw, head of the Bureau of Educational Program Research and Statistics. It contrasts the racial and ethnic breakdown of the school boards elected in 1973 with the racial and ethnic breakdown of the general population, voting-age population, electorate and student population. The elected school board members actually over-represented black and Latino candidates compared to voting-age population. Blacks and Latinos won 38% of school board seats, in contrast to being 29% of the voting-age population -- and in contrast to blacks and Latinos making up only 5% of the city council and 15% of the state legislative seats from New York. Yet even then the school system had a majority of blacks and Latinos, and as a result, many school reformers mistakenly believed the results were not representative.
        The pattern has continued election after election. Representation of blacks, Latinos and eventually Asian Americans has generally grown steadily, closely matching and often surpassing voting-age population for those groups. Non-white candidates won 57% of seats in 1996, while non-white voting age population is approximately 50%. Women candidates from the beginning also have done very well, usually winning at least 40% of seats and winning over 50% in 1989, 1993 and 1996.
        The Center did an analysis of the 1993 and 1996 elections, district-by-district, which is in the appendix. It demonstrates that not only have the districts been representative of racial and ethnic minorities citywide, but also within most districts. Please see the summary charts in the appendix, but note the following findings:
         Blacks: In 1996, black candidates were elected in 26 districts and were elected in proportion to black voting age population in 26 of 32 districts. Citywide, blacks are represented far above their share of the voting-age population and far above their share of the electorate in other elections. Note that blacks were 21% of New York City electorate in the November 1997 mayor's race, according to a New York Times exit poll, but won 32% of school boards seats in May 1996.
         Asians: Asians in 1996 were elected in proportion to their voting age population in 30 of 32 districts, as was true in 1993. Asian voters do not make up 20% of voting age population in any school district in the city, yet Asians have at least one seat in 7 districts, and 11 of 15 Asian candidates won.
         Latinos: In 1996 Latino candidates were elected in proportion to their voting-age population in 18 of 32 districts, up from 13 of 32 districts in 1993. Latinos are under-represented by only one seat on 12 of the 14 school boards where they do not have proportionate representation. Overall, Latinos won 21.5% of school board seats in 1996, up from 17% in 1993 -- mirroring the rise in the Latino share of the New York City electorate from 13% in the 1993 mayor's race to 20% in the 1997 race.
        But all these numbers don't necessarily convince parents that the boards are producing representative results. And indeed the student population of the city's school continues to differ significantly from the voting population, with far more students of color than white students. This discrepancy helps explain the fact that minorities are actually over-represented on the school boards, as parents are somewhat more likely to participate than non-parents. But non-parent voters have every right to participate in elections, and they must be counted.
        Thus, in 1994 Asian Americans made up 33% of the student population in District 2, but won only one of nine seats in both 1993 and 1996. Why? Asians that year were only 10.6% of the voting-age population in District 2, and almost certainly below 10% of registered voters. Queens is another good example for Asian Americans -- and one underlining how well the choice voting system is representing minorities. Asians in 1994 made up 33% of students in districts 25 and 26. Yet that year they were only 19% of the voting-age population (VAP) in district 25 and 11% of VAP in district 26 -- and less than 10% of registered voters. Still, Asian candidates won three of nine seats in both districts in 1996 -- reflecting in part the fact that over half of parent registered voters were Asian in these districts, and Asian voters probably turned out in disproportionately high numbers.
        As a final point about voting rights, let me point out that the boards reflect a very complex diversity. Eleven of 32 district boards have representatives from at least three of the city's four major racial and ethnic groupings -- whites, blacks, Latinos and Asian Americans. Such diversity would be very hard to replicate with even gerrymandered single-member district plans in these districts.

Other Proportional / Semi-Proportional Systems
        I understand that the task force is looking at other proportional and semi-proportional systems. The two other major such systems that can be used in non-partisan elections are limited voting and cumulative voting. Both are currently in use in a number of jurisdictions around the country. Please see my article from the Federal Elections Commission Journal on "Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies" in the appendix for more information on these systems, including full descriptions of how they work. Additional information in the appendix about these systems includes: a chart on cumulative voting and racial representation in localities around the country; a piece contrasting different systems; a question/answer piece that I wrote for the Southern Regional Council's Voting Rights Review in 1995; and a chart on "thresholds of representation" using different systems.
        As an overall comparison, choice voting has a surface complexity, but an underlying simplicity that improves chances for accurate representation and reduces demands for complex voting strategies. Limited voting and cumulative voting are far more transparent in how they work, but have more complex strategic consequences for both individual voters and for parties (or slates).
        The "thresholds of representation" chart shows that cumulative voting and choice voting have the same threshold of representation for winning one seat (as does limited voting when candidates have only one vote). But because of the mechanism of the "single transferable vote", choice voting is likely to represent well every increment of voters -- meaning a group of voters making up 40% of the electorate is likely to win 40% of seats. Cumulative voting and limited voting are "all-or-nothing" systems, and thus far more votes can be wasted. With cumulative voting, a group of voters making up 40% of the electorate might win 20% of seats or might win 70% of seats depending on how the votes were spread among the candidates.
        I understand that the task force may take a particularly close look at limited voting. The threshold of representation for limited voting is determined by the formula:
        Limited Voting Threshold (to win one seat)

           Votes        x 100%
    Votes + Seats

Note that this threshold rises with the number of votes a voter has. In a nine-seat school district in which voters had five votes, the threshold would be 5/14, or 36% -- high enough that the Department of Justice would be unlikely to pre-clear this change in any of the seven school board districts where Asian-American voters are now electing candidates of choice and in the many districts where black or Latino voting-age population is below 30%.

Recommended Reforms
        Without touching on the full range of possible reforms of the election process, I would like to propose consideration of several possible reforms, some of which go particularly well together.
1. Sub-districts, with a proportional system: One possible reform is creating smaller constituencies within school districts. Districts could have three, three-seat districts, for example. Unlike the Marchi commission proposal, however -- a proposal that almost certainly would not have been pre-cleared by the Department of Justice -- I would suggest that a proportional system be maintained in such districts. Choice voting could be maintained as one option, or limited voting (with one vote) and cumulative voting could be considered -- they are easier to operate in constituencies with fewer seats. Regardless, the threshold of representation would rise to 25% with a three-seat district, but minority voters still might have a fair chance to elect candidates -- most school districts probably have relative concentrations of different groups of minority voters in different parts of the school district.
        Candidates could campaign in a smaller area, and voters would have fewer candidates to consider. On the other hand, drawing sub-districts would be expensive and an administrative headache, and arguments can be made that such a change might lower voter turnout. If sub-districts were used, my one strong suggestion is that a proportional system be maintained.
2. Ballot information: The school board elections are non-partisan. Without the guide of party labels, voters have to work hard to know something about candidates -- which can be particularly difficult given the low degree of media coverage of the elections.
        In 1974, in his testimony on "Use of Proportional Representation for Community School Board Elections" to the New York State Charter Commission for New York City (see appendix for full testimony), George Hallett of the Citizens Union suggested that candidates be allowed to have a designation on the ballot identifying a slate or an organization -- not political party. Such information would make it easier for voters to identify allies and harder for candidates to run "stealth" campaigns.
3. Media education: The Center for Voting and Democracy's project for the 1996 elections could be greatly expanded upon with staff members of the Board of Education and outside consultants. Much more work could be done in particular with journalists, who often explain the system poorly or inaccurately. New York has a wide array of media outlets, with several daily newspapers, many borough and neighborhood papers and numerous radio, cable and television news programs. Journalists have a great capacity to reach potential voters, but unfortunately as far the school boards, this potential has been largely unrealized.
        Many journalists actually contribute to the climate of defeatism surrounding the school board elections by exaggerating choice voting's complexity. A quick survey of print coverage in 1993 revealed that the Daily News called the system "incomprehensible," the Post called it "complicated," the New York Times ran a front page story calling it "complicated" in a headline and Newsday called it "outdated." The Village Voice made a special effort to spur people to the polls, but inaccurately described how to vote. The Times ran a editorial on the day of the election -- a day when many readers were making a final decision about whether to participate -- that was headlined "School Board Sham," included an inaccurate description of how the system works and concluded the system was "complex and confusing."
        Even when reporters correctly describe how to vote, they do not explain how it provides important opportunities for voters to win fair representation -- thus doing little to inspire voter turnout. Aggressive outreach to journalists, from education reporters to editorial boards, should lead to much improved coverage. Better media coverage would reach a broad range of New Yorkers who are involved in the school board elections and are in a position to the improve the climate of the elections, from currently misinformed community leaders to potential voters. One of the most important audiences would be election officers, who are now not required to attend training sessions on choice voting and far too often misinform voters right at the polls. News stories reported on such incorrect instructions, as does Edward Stancik in his critical report on the 1993 school board elections.
4. Community education: Going hand-in-hand with a media education campaign could be a campaign to get information to community organizations already involved with the school board elections. A range of non-partisan educational materials -- print, video, short pamphlets, posters and the like, with some material geared for English-speakers and some geared to immigrants speaking other languages -- could be created for community organizations to use, adapt and distribute as they see fit. These organizations could be asked to help the project improve the material and to find opportunities to put the information into the broader context of the significance of the boards; potential voters must not only understand the power of their vote, but the power and potential power of the boards that will be elected.
        Many parents and potential voters are much more likely to respond to information from community organizations than citywide media. Today, as Donald Murphy of People About Changing Education told the Daily News in 1993 "people are so cynical and filled with feelings of hopelessness in places like District 12." As the Daily News editorialized after the 1993 elections, "the system is a turn-off to parental involvement." If parent organizations working directly in these demoralized districts had more and better material on choice voting, they would have a better opportunity to inspire their supporters to find hope in the election process.
5. Ballot-counting modifications: Current ballot-counting rules for choice voting are based on the count being carried out by hand. Now that the city has licensed a computer program to do the ballot-count -- once information from ballots is entered into the computer -- there is no reason to continue the exact method now used. Without going into great detail, let me say that I recommend that the method of allocating surplus votes from a winning candidate be changed to "the mathematical model."
        In the current law, some ballots are transferred at full value to next choices on these ballots. In the mathematical model all ballots from the winner are transferred to next choices at an equally reduced value. This change makes the count precise, meaning that the results will be exactly the same no matter in what order ballots are counted.
        The law also could be modified to allow voters to cast "tie" votes. The Center has no official position on this potential change, but I would be happy to answer questions about it. Tie votes would virtually eliminate invalid ballots -- which were 2.5% in 1993 -- but make the ballot-count more complicated to explain.
6. Election Administration / Vote-By-Mail / Voter Guides: Election administration of choice voting has not been a success. The City of Cambridge in November 1997 finished its choice voting election ballot-counts for city council and school board elections in one day, using scannable ballots and a computer program. For its choice voting elections for its national parliament, Ireland usually finishes its count by hand in one or two days. New York City, however, generally has taken several weeks to complete ballot-counting in all school districts. I am pleased to see that the Board of Elections has taken important steps to improving its administration of the elections, but hope it continues.
        The Center for Voting and Democracy has done some limited research into vote-by-mail elections -- e.g., elections in which polling places are not open, but voters have a certain number of weeks to mail or drop off a ballot that has been mailed to them. More and more cities and states are using vote-by-mail elections, and New York City's Voter Assistance Commission gave the idea a favorable recommendation in 1994 testimony to the New York Task Force on Voter Registration. Steps would need to be taken to ensure ballot security and prevent corruption, but such steps already must be taken with absentee voters. Other jurisdictions using vote-by-mail have also developed techniques for dealing with these concerns.
        One of the clearest findings of vote-by-mail elections is that they boost turnout for exactly the kind of election we are discussing -- local elections held when not much else is on the ballot. Studies of vote-by-mail election in Oregon show turnout for such local elections sometimes triples. It is easier for voters to cast ballots, and easier for the media and civic organizations to encourage higher participation because voters have two-to-three weeks to cast ballots.
        Vote-by-mail also would allow the Board of Elections to use "marksense" ballots -- as now used in choice voting elections in Cambridge (MA) -- which then could be used in conjunction with ballot-scanning machines to record choice voting ballots accurately and quickly. This would be a great relief to candidates and their supporters who no longer would have to spend weeks monitoring a ballot count.
        Vote-by-mail elections are also significantly cheaper than polling place elections -- a 1994 U.S. General Accounting Office study found that the cost per ballot in vote-by-mail elections had been about one-third cheaper than the cost of conventional elections. Some of the savings perhaps could go to taxpayers, but it also could go to voter guides to be sent out with ballots. These voter guides could have information about the choice voting system -- or other system, if a change is made -- and about the candidates. Better informed people are more likely to vote -- and more likely to feel good about their participation.

        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

CHOICE VOTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION
New York City Community School Boards

Percentage of Seats Won
Group (1975)* 1975 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1993 1996 (1993)**
Women - 42 39 41 48 49 54 54.5 50.7 --
Blacks 21 20 24 25 28 26 30 32.2 31.9 27.3
Latinos 15 14 12 20 17 17 16 17.3 21.5 16.4
Asians 0.3 1 0.7 - - 0.7 1.4 2.4 3.8 2.3
Minorities 37 35 37 45 45 44 47 51.9 57.2 46.0
Whites 63 65 63 55 55 56 53 48.1 42.8 54.0

 

* U.S. Census
* New York Voter Assistance Commission

        Summary of Racial/Ethnic Representation, 1993 and 1996 Elections

        New York City has 32 Community School Boards. Each board has nine seats, and elections take place every three years, using choice voting.
        The threshold of representation for one seat is 10%, and every 10% jump in a voting group's share of the electorate means the opportunity to win another seat. Thus, in the following analysis, a racial/ethnic group having 25% will gain proportionate representation by electing at least two candidates of choice, one that is 31% will gain proportionate representation by electing three.
        The following analysis reflects an assumption that candidates of different races and ethnicities will prefer candidates of their race/ethnicity -- which in reality may be less true in these elections than some others, as the ideological dynamics of "slate voting" are quite important (in which voters may rank candidates more on their association than their race/ethnicity). Nonetheless, voting by race/ethnicity is a helpful measure.


Blacks: In 1996, black candidates were elected in proportion to black voting age population in 26 of 32 districts, down from 28 of 32 districts in 1994. Black candidates also won in 26 districts. Three school boards are one black representative short of proportionate representation; two boards are two representatives short. Citywide, blacks are represented far above their share of the voting-age population.

Asians: Asians in 1996 were elected in proportion to their voting age population in 30 of 32 districts, as was true in 1993. Asian voters do not make up 20% of voting age population in any school district in the city, yet Asians have at least one seat in 7 districts and 11 of 15 Asian candidates won.

Latinos: In 1996 Latino candidates were elected in proportion to their voting-age population in 18 of 32 districts, up from 13 of 32 districts in 1993. Latinos are under-represented by only one seat on 12 of the 14 school boards where they do not have proportio-nate representation. They are two representatives short in the other two districts. Latinos have at least one seat in 16 districts, more than one seat in 12 districts and have at least one seat in districts that are at least 16% Latino in every district except District 24.


1996 New York Community School Board Elections and Racial and Ethnic Minorities:
Seats Won Vs. Voting Age Population
The first number in bold reflects seats won. The second number is the group's district percentage of the voting age population (VAP).

District Blacks Latinos Asians Whites
1 0 : 09.56 4 : 34.76 0 : 12.51 5 : 42.67
2 1 : 04.56 0 : 08.65 1 : 10.60 7 : 75.98
3 1 : 17.08 1 : 15.48 0 : 04.33 7 : 62.74
4 3 : 34.64 5 : 57.80 1 : 01.48 0 : 05.58
5 9 : 78.92 0 : 15.44 0 : 00.94 0 : 07.16
6 2 : 18.20 6 : 60.99 0 : 02.14 1 : 18.18
7 2 : 34.79 7 : 61.44 0 : 00.58 0 : 02.74
8 1 : 21.98 3 : 41.55 0 : 01.49 5 : 34.58
9 4 : 45.10 5 : 50.23 0 : 01.57 0 : 02.31
10 1 : 18.09 3 : 39.79 0 : 04.77 5 : 35.44
11 3 : 36.29 1 : 20.04 0 : 02.61 5 : 40.56
12 2 : 32.23 7 : 60.84 0 : 01.51 0 : 04.78
13 9 : 59.21 0 : 13.75 0 : 02.18 0 : 24.38
14 0 : 12.96 3 : 41.61 0 : 02.59 6 : 42.78
15 0 : 09.51 2 : 30.95 0 : 06.35 7 : 52.73
16 9 : 87.65 0 : 10.57 0 : 00.55 0 : 00.76
17 9 : 82.31 0 : 10.24 0 : 01.63 0 : 05.38
18 3 : 54.06 0 : 06.88 0 : 02.87 6 : 35.88
19 5 : 47.94 4 : 36.51 0 : 03.35 0 : 11.26
20 0 : 01.61 0 : 10.86 0 : 09.11 9 : 78.16
21 1 : 08.14 0 : 08.58 0 : 06.61 8 : 72.51
22 0 : 25.59 0 : 07.79 0 : 05.04 9 : 61.27
23 8 : 80.70 1 : 16.53 0 : 00.49 0 : 01.77
24 1 : 05.70 0 : 28.92 1 : 15.53 7 : 49.46
25 1 : 04.97 0 : 13.57 3 : 18.87 5 : 62.31
26 0 : 02.79 0 : 06.01 3 : 10.65 6 : 80.37
27 2 : 24.33 0 : 15.22 0 : 04.57 7 : 55.24
28 3 : 27.01 0 : 15.38 0 : 09.49 6 : 49.55
29 7 : 62.33 1 : 11.73 1 : 06.08 0 : 19.18
30 2 : 08.30 0 : 26.43 0 : 11.96 7 : 52.65
31 2 : 06.41 0 : 07.12 1 : 04.08 6 : 82.18
32 1 : 25.10 8 : 62.94 0 : 04.20 0 : 06.89



1993 New York Community School Board Elections and Racial and Ethnic Minorities:
Seats Won Vs. Voting Age Population

The first number in bold reflects seats won. The second number is the group's district percentage of the voting age population (VAP).

District Blacks Latinos Asians Whites
1 0 : 09.56 4 : 34.76 0 : 12.51 5 : 42.67
2 0 : 04.56 0 : 08.65 1 : 10.60 8 : 75.98
3 2 : 17.08 1 : 15.48 0 : 04.33 6 : 62.74
4 3 : 34.64 5 : 57.80 1 : 01.48 0 : 05.58
5 9 : 78.92 0 : 15.44 0 : 00.94 0 : 07.16
6 3 : 18.20 3 : 60.99 0 : 02.14 3 : 18.18
7 3 : 34.79 6 : 61.44 0 : 00.58 0 : 02.74
8 2 : 21.98 1 : 41.55 0 : 01.49 6 : 34.58
9 5 : 45.10 4 : 50.23 0 : 01.57 0 : 02.31
10 1 : 18.09 2 : 39.79 0 : 04.77 6 : 35.44
11 3 : 36.29 1 : 20.04 0 : 02.61 5 : 40.56
12 3 : 32.23 6 : 60.84 0 : 01.51 0 : 04.78
13 9 : 59.21 0 : 13.75 0 : 02.18 0 : 24.38
14 0 : 12.96 3 : 41.61 0 : 02.59 6 : 42.78
15 0 : 09.51 2 : 30.95 0 : 06.35 7 : 52.73
16 9 : 87.65 0 : 10.57 0 : 00.55 0 : 00.76
17 7 : 82.31 0 : 10.24 0 : 01.63 2 : 05.38
18 2 : 54.06 0 : 06.88 0 : 02.87 7 : 35.88
19 7 : 47.94 2 : 36.51 0 : 03.35 0 : 11.26
20 0 : 01.61 0 : 10.86 0 : 09.11 9 : 78.16
21 0 : 08.14 0 : 08.58 0 : 06.61 9 : 72.51
22 0 : 25.59 0 : 07.79 0 : 05.04 9 : 61.27
23 8 : 80.70 1 : 16.53 0 : 00.49 0 : 01.77
24 0 : 05.70 0 : 28.92 1 : 15.53 8 : 49.46
25 0 : 04.97 0 : 13.57 1 : 18.87 8 : 62.31
26 0 : 02.79 0 : 06.01 1 : 10.65 8 : 80.37
27 2 : 24.33 0 : 15.22 0 : 04.57 7 : 55.24
28 4 : 27.01 0 : 15.38 1 : 09.49 4 : 49.55
29 6 : 62.33 0 : 11.73 0 : 06.08 3 : 19.18
30 2 : 08.30 1 : 26.43 0 : 11.96 6 : 52.65
31 1 : 06.41 0 : 07.12 1 : 04.08 7 : 82.18
32 2 : 25.10 7 : 62.94 0 : 04.20 0 : 06.89